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Fully compliant? A study of data protection policy in UK public 
ortianisations 
Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate and analyse the extent to which public 
organisations have achieved compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998. 
In order to achieve this aim, two hypotheses were tested. The primary hypothesis 
assessed whether the DPA 1998 represented a positive measure for ensuring 
compliance and good practice in public organisations. The secondary hypothesis 
considered the extent to which the DPA 1998 strengthened individual 
informational privacy, setting the Act in context with previous data protection 
legislation - in the UK and abroad. Moreover, the provisions of the DPA 1998 
were critically compared with other key UK statutes, including the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 
The two hypotheses were tested through triangulation of research. Desk research 
analysed literature in this field and the legal origins of the DPA 1998. Key issues 
impacting on data protection were identified and the challenges of recent UK 
legislation outlined. Consideration was given to challenges posed to organisations 
when handling data belonging to their employees. The findings were supported by 
fieldwork interviews with experts in policy-making, law and campaigning. A 
questionnaire survey was distributed to nearly 400 organisations in order to gain 
indicative data regarding compliance. This provided a gateway for case study 
interviews with Data Protection Officers (DPOs) from 18 public organisations. 
The thesis concluded that the majority of participants had implemented 
considerable changes in corporate practices in response to the provisions of the 
DPA 1998. Important measures included: increased status and influence of the 
DPO; development of detailed staff training plans; implementation of procedures 
facilitating the efficient handling of data subject access requests; and approval of 
detailed data protection policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance 
permeated the organisation. Finally, recommendations have been made for 
improved best practice, including the creation of an integrated records 
management post, and enhanced information security. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The concepts of data protection and individual privacy are fraught with 
difficulties, raising questions from the outset. Firstly, what constitutes data 
protection? Is it a human right founded on the desire to preserve personal privacy, 
or merely a set of strict legal conditions relating to the quality and nature of data? 
In this thesis, the term 'data protection' (also known as 'information privacy') is 
used to describe the individual's control over the circulation of their personal 
informationi. 
Secondly, how do data protection considerations fit into organisational processes 
for information handling? This is a vast and complex area, with organisations - 
and their needs for personal data - taking many forms. Out of necessity, this study 
had to draw boundaries, and the scope of the thesis is limited to researching the 
information handling processes of public organisations. Whilst acknowledging 
that boundaries between public and private sectors are becoming increasingly 
blurred, significant recent legislation has been enacted in the UK applying 
specifically to the public arena. In particular, public authorities will by 2005 have 
to comply with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000. 
The relationship between FOIA 2000 and the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, 
especially amendments the former makes to the latter, will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 (section 5.4). In addition, since October 2000, public authorities have 
been directly affected by the Human Rights Act (HRA) 2000, incorporating the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law. Again, this is 
discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.3), with particular reference to the ECHR Article 
8- right to a private life. Appreciation of the relationship between the DPA 1998 
and the above (and other) related statutes, is important in assessing the extent to 
which public organisations can achieve data protection compliance. 
Furthermore, at a micro-level, it is difficult to consider how organisations handle 
personal data without investigating the protection of data belonging to their 
I 
employees, as well as data collected from the general public (or 'clients') during 
the performance of their corporate duties. Examples of data from both categories 
are given below: 
Personal data acquired about 
employees. 
Personal data acquired during 
performance ofcorporate duties. 
Include: references received, sickness Dependent on the nature of public 
records, next of kin details, annual authority, examples include: council 
appraisals, accident/injury at work and tax details, medical records, criminal 
pension contributions. Much of the convictions, data captured by Closed 
above data are collected due to Circuit Television (CCTV) and 
statutory obligations. education records. 
Table 1: Examples of employee and client personal data 
Whilst in theory all personal data has to be processed in line with the eight 
2 
principles outlined in DPA 1998 , the handling of data belonging to employees 
poses particular challenges. For example, the issue of employee 'consent' for the 
processing of sensitive data, and how this can be freely given in what is generally 
considered to be an unequal relationship. Moreover, access to and processing of 
medical data can require particular attention in the employment context - with 
some employers needing to check whether an employee may be exposed to a 
health risk at work. In such circumstances, the information should be kept to a 
minimum required for an employer to meet his obligations, and access restricted to 
the occupational health physician. Such issues have led to the drafting of an 
Employment Practices Code ofPractice 3 by the UK national supervisory authority 
- the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) - and to the European 
Commission proposing further legislation in this fieW. Therefore, whilst the 
overarching aim of this thesis considered organisational compliance with the DPA 
1998 in general, this study would have been deficient if regulatory activity in the 
field of employee personal data, and the responses of public authorities, had been 
ignored. 
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Consequently, the processing of employee personal data featured prominently in 
various stages of research. Most notably, a questionnaire survey (refer to 
Appendix D) probed organisational handling of employee records, in addition to 
measuring general levels of awareness and informed opinion concerning data 
protection and related legislation. Additionally, employee data formed the focus 
of certain expert interviews with trade unionists and employers' organisations, 5. 
Finally, this issue was raised in general discussion with case study interviewees, 
chiefly in relation to handling of subject access requests (SARs)6. 
An example of the overlap between organisational and employee concerns was the 
case of the health authority, discussed in Chapter 7. In this organisation, two types 
of personal patient data were being held: data belonging to patients generally, and 
data belonging to patients who were also employees. Reconciling the privacy of 
the latter records with the legitimate needs of employees to access patient data 
proved problematic, and abuses of the system had occurred. Such dilemmas were 
present in all organisations handling personal information, although the nature of 
the personal data stored by health and police authorities in particular made these 
concerns more pressing. Yet, the questionnaire survey demonstrated that far fewer 
bodies had defined subject access procedures for employees per se than for 
tackling requests from the general publiC7. These findings were supported to a 
degree during interviews with case study organisations8. On the whole, 
organisations preferred to allow employees access to their personnel records on an 
informal basis, rather than through the submission of a formal SAR. Indeed, such 
an eventuality was considered to represent a "failure" in organisational procedures, 
and thus to be avoided9. 
Finally, the level of importance afforded to data protection issues by public 
organisations has been considered in this thesis. How much of a priority is data 
protection compliance when the rhetoric from central government encourages 
data-matching, 'joined-up government' and commercial access to public sector 
information - initiatives that potentially impact on information privacy? 
3 
It is the above, intertwined strands that will be investigated in this project, wi 
case studies in particular highlighting the challenges public organisations, and in 
particular nominated individuals within those organisations, face in achieving data 
protection compliance in relation to both client and employee records. 
1.2 Aim 
The overall aim of the thesis is: 
To investigate and analyse the extent to which public organisations 
have achieved compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
1998. 
1.3 Hypotheses and key obiectives 
In order to achieve this aim, two hypotheses were tested. Hypotheses were chosen 
as they represent a preconception of what might true, against which various tests 
can be applied. They constituted a guide - continually referred to by the author 
during the progression of the research project. Moreover, the hypotheses served as 
statements about the relationships between variables (for example: the impact of 
various legal texts; the conduct of the supervisory authority in enforcing the DPA 
1998; and the information hanhng practices of different organisations). Key 
objectives set out how each hypothesis was to be investigated. 
4 
Hypothesis 1: At an organisational level, the DPA 1998 represents a positive 
measure for ensuring compliance and good practice. 
Key Objectives 
To survey attitudes of organisations towards the workability the DPA 1998 
and other relevant legislation; 
To identify the actual processes involved in achieving compliance with the 
DPA 1998; 
To devise recommendations for best practice concerning data processing in 
organisations. 
This primary hypothesis directly addressed the aim of the thesis, and was tested 
principally through a questionnaire survey and case study interviews with data 
protection practitionerslo. Questionnaires were posted to a sample of public 
organisations to assess the impact of recent data protection and related legislation 
- such as the Human Rights Act 1998 - on individual informational privacy. 
Moreover, the survey charted the measures organisations, have taken in order to 
ensure compliance. Finally, for the reasons outlined in section 1.1, the 
questionnaire focused on the processing of employee personal data. This 
investigation was followed up by in-depth, case study interviews with data 
protection officers from 18 of those organisations. The case studies aimed to: 
gauge reactions to the DPA 1998; assess the Act's workability; highlight any 
difficulties encountered; and define major changes to organisational practice 
brought about by the Act's implementation. The vast majority of interviewees 
were open, courteous, and generous with their time. Many had gathered 
documents of interest in advance, and others invited guests to the interview. Due 
to promised confidentiality, case study respondents have not been named in this 
thesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: The DPA 1998 has built on previous legislation in the UK, and 
abroad, in order to strengthen the individual right to informational privacy. 
Within the UK, a regulatory framework has been established, enabling this 
right to be exercised effectively. 
- The DPA 1998 works effectively with other legislation impacting on data 
protection. Overlap is minimal and meaning is clear. 
Key Objectives 
To set the DPA 1998 in context with previous data protection legislation - 
both in the UK and abroad; 
To critically compare and review academic studies on the effectiveness of 
data protection legislation, giving particular attention to policy 
recommendations; 
To identify the main provisions of the DPA 1998 concerning individual 
informational privacy; 
To identify measures taken UK supervisory authority, the OIC, to encourage 
data protection compliance; 
To critically compare provisions of the DPA 1998 and other key UK 
legislation, drawing out any ambiguities and potential for confusion. 
This second hypothesis was deliberately wide-ranging. It sought to define the 
context to, and the recent development of, UK data protection law. Knowledge of 
legal and policy context was vital in order to draw conclusions about 
organisational compliance with the DPA 1998. Additionally, it was crucial to gain 
an understanding of the regulatory framework, in particular the extent to which it 
enabled compliance with the DPA 1998. lberefore, consideration has been given 
to the role of the OIC, particularly in promoting codes of practice, and to 
practitioner views on compliance advice received from the supervisory authority. 
This hypothesis was divided into two parts. The overarching intention was to test 
how effectively the DPA 1998 strengthened the individual right to informational 
privacy. However, an important test of the privacy implications of the DPA 1998 
6 
lay in assessing how effectively the Act worked with other legislation impacting 
on privacy of personal information. The key legislation referred to in the 
subsidiary hypothesis, besides the DPA 1998, were: 
HRA 1998 - incorporating a European Convention on Human Rights into UK 
law; 
FOIA 2000 - providing a right of access to information held by public 
organisations. The Scottish Parliament passed a separate FOIA" in April 
2002. This distinct legislation will apply to public authorities within the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament (for example, Scottish educational 
establishments and Scottish National Health Service trusts 12); 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 - in part permitting the 
interception of electronic communications such as email. 
In addition, consideration has been given to the implications of recent anti- 
terrorism legislation in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on I Ith 
September 2001 13 
. 
Testing this hypothesis required considerable desk research. The literature in this 
field is extensive, including monographs and academic articles, standard legal 
texts aimed at lawyers, newsletters, newspaper articles and consumer surveys. 
The academic debate has been shaped by such monographs such as Westin's 
Privacy and fteedom 14 and Rule's Private lives and public surveillance", and 
subsequently developed through the work of scholars such as Flaherty, Bennett 
and Raab 16 . At a practitioner level, newsletters and discussion lists have kept data 
protection officers in organisations informed of new developments in this evolving 
discipline. 
The desk research was correlated by semi-structured expert interviews with 
individuals active in policy-making, law or campaigning. Examples of those 
interviewed include: government (such as the Lord Chancellor's Department and 
the Office of the e-Envoy); non-governmental organisations (such as JUSTICE 
and Consumers International); business interests; trade unions; the supervisory 
authority for data protection in the UK (the OIC); the European Commission in 
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Brussels; and various lawyers and legal advisors to government committees 
working in this field 17 . These interviews gave an insight into the diverse views on 
this topic, most notably concerning implementation and enforcement of the DPA 
1998, and interaction with other key legislation such as the HRA 1998, RIPA 2000 
and FOIA 2000. 
1.4 Outcomes 
The conclusions to this study draw together the main themes that emerged from 
the desk research and fieldwork. The goal has been to provide a critique of data 
protection compliance in public organisations. Recommendations have been 
produced, comprising: 
An evaluation of what has been researched in the case studies; 
Guidance as to how policy can further be developed. 
The recommendations have been referred back to interested case study 
interviewees for comment, and the final version adjusted in light of their views. 
The intention throughout is to provide constructive criticism and to assess 
whether, over the 35 years following the publication of Westin's study, individuals 
are now in a position to 'determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others' 18 . 
References and Notes 
' The meaning of the terms 'privacy' and 'data protection' have been keenly contested by lawyers 
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known as 'data protection', that is investigated in this thesis. This debate is discussed in further 
detail in Chapters 3 (Literature Review) and 4 (Data Protection and the Law). 
8 
2 Naturally, exemptions from certain provisions of the DPA 1998 exist for various purposes. They 
include national security, crime and taxation, health, education and social work. The main 
exemptions appear in Part IV of the Act. 
3 Refer to discussion in Chapter 4 (section 4.6). 
4 Refer to discussion in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.3). 
5 Refer to discussions in Chapter 6 (section 6.2). 
6 Refer to Chapter 7 (section 7.5). 
7 Over half the respondents (63,58.9%) had devised policies for handling subject access requests, 
yet only 32 respondents (29.9%) had specific policies in place regarding employee access to their 
personal data. The methodology and findings from the questionnaire survey are discussed in 
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2. Methodoloay 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Research methodology texts 
Various texts were consulted concerning general research techniques. Usually the 
texts were located from the author's reading, although some were the result of 
personal recommendation of academics at Loughborough University's Department 
of Information Science. For a general overview of academic research 
methodologies, Bell' proved a helpful reference companion. Aimed at students, 
Doing your research project assumed no prior knowledge of research 
methodology, and provided a step-by-step guide through the research process from 
choosing a topic, to collecting and interpreting data, to writing a final report. 
Other useful guides included Denscombe 2- focusing on small-scale research 
projects - and Moore 
3- aimed not just at academic researchers, but also those 
working in government and industry. 
Gorman and Clayton4 assessed qualitative research - the approach largely used in 
this thesis. The authors identified its key features and considered the advantages 
of triangulating this method with other research approaches. The process of 
triangulation, defined by the authors as the use of 'multiple methodologies", is 
analysed in sub-section 2.1.3 of this Chapter. Additionally, Gorman and Clayton 
considered the mechanics of using case studies, described as 'the application of 
6 specific qualitative research methods in a specific setting' . Interview case studies 
-a key part of the research methodology employed in this thesis - were seen as 
particularly pertinent, with the authors emphasising that interviewee responses 
should be allowed to drive the interview process forward. Further analysis of case 
study methodology has been produced by Yin 7. The author considered the theory, 
design and evaluation of case studies, giving various examples that ranged from 
education to computer software development. 
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Other academic texts considered specific elements of the research process. HaA8 
provided an excellent detailed analysis of the literature review, defining its role in 
research broadly: 
'To demonstrate skills in library searching; to show command of the 
subject area and understanding of the problem; to justify the research 
topic, design and methodology. ' 9 
Hart considered the analytical pattern of the literature review, the importance of 
the researcher choosing an appropriate structure for their argument, and the 
practical benefits of the review in progressively narrowing down a topic. Finklo, 
additionally, provided a guide to actually conducting the literature review - 
demonstrating how to identify, interpret and analyse published and unpublished 
research. 
Numerous texts existed concerning the conduct of questionnaire surveys and 
interviews. For the former, practical guides by Fink" and Youngman 12 - whose 
definition of question type is considered in section 2.3.1 - were consulted, in 
addition to relevant chapters in Bell 13 and Denscombe 14 . Concerning the interview 
process, Bell" and Gorman and Clayton 16 proved helpful, not only outlining the 
structure and purpose of interviewing, but also emphasising the need for honesty 
and integrity - in particular respecting requests for anonymity and not taking 
advantage of any indiscretions on the part of the respondent. 
The texts referred to in this section gave ideas about building a general 
methodology, which could be applied to the specific research topic of this thesis. 
The research process as a whole was outlined, and particular methods highlighted. 
However, in order to construct a methodology for assessing data protection, it was 
important to consider detailed research projects that have already been conducted 
in this field. 
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2.1.2 Developing a methodology 
Assessing the effectiveness of legislation and policy was not an easy task - relying 
more on qualitative than quantitative analysis. To some extent, the authors of 
some of the most significant studies in this field have relied on a mix of qualitative 
techniques. Examples include: documentary analysis - in particular business and 
government reports, plus material from privacy advocacy groups (Cate 17); 
comparative analysis of the data protection statutes (Nugter'8); expert interviews 
with civil servants, lawyers and civil libertarians (Flaherty'9); and case studies 
concerning public and private bureaucracies' processing of personal data (Rule 2). 
Most scholarly research has combined some of the above techniques, with authors 
employing a difference in emphasis. Other equally fundamental texts are 
discussed in the literature review that is Chapter 3. 
A methodology for conducting an evaluation of data protection legislation was 
developed by Raab and Bennett during the mid-1990's 21 . The authors decided on 
key criteria that could be used objectively to facilitate an evaluation of the data 
protection system as a whole: 
The law itself; 
The performance of the supervisory authority, for example, dealing 
with complaints, prosecutions, production of information booklets; 
(iii) The performance of the data controllers in adopting best practice; 
(iv) The performance of the data subjects in taking steps to protect their 
personal data - for example, by removing their names from mailing 
lists or requesting access to their own data. 
This PhD study had to set boundaries - lacking the time and resources to research 
into such detail. Nevertheless, desk research and fieldwork touched on three of the 
above criteria to some degree. Legal clarity and policy are analysed in Chapters 4 
and 5. The performance of data controllers, in this case public authorities, in 
adopting best practice is considered in the case studies. However, awareness and 
performance of data subjects - certainly an interesting and important subject area 
- has not been considered due to the aforementioned constraints. 
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Raab and Bennett drew the following conclusions regarding a sound data 
protection methodology: 
Criteria for assessing performance were difficult - one needed to focus 
primarily on the activities of the data protection agency and the 
political processes that drive it; 
The only reliable criteria were procedural - rules, codes, sanctions and 
decisions. Evaluate on the basis of whether the system adequately puts 
in place procedures for data subjects to exercise their own privacy 
rights (for example, to enable subject access requests); 
Data protection agencies needed to define their own system of 
performance measures and regularly test them; 
(iv) Policy implementation within organisations required a 'bottom up' 
perspective. Procedures achieved at ground level through negotiating, 
bargaining and influence should be observed, rather than relying solely 
on quantitative goals imposed by senior management. 
Raab and Bennett emphasised qualitative measures in the evaluation of data 
protection policies. This allowed for some promising avenues of research, 
particularly in the field of comparative policy analysis. The ultimate outcome of a 
successful data protection policy would be, to quote a UK data protection official: 
'that we should work ourselves out of business if all data users were doing 
everything absolutely properly and complying with the data protection 
principles. 22 
At the same time, the European Commission was developing a methodology to 
measure 'adequacy' of protection governing personal data transferred to 'third 
countries', that is, countries outside of the scope of the EU Data Protection 
Directive 23 
. The Commission's early findings were published in a 1997 working 
paper 24 . Although the context to this methodology is different, the content is 
relevant to the criteria for compliance outlined in Chapter 7 (section 7.1.2) of this 
thesis. In particular, the working paper stated: 
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('... any meaningful analysis of adequate protection must comprise ... two 
basic elements: the content of the rules applicable, and the means for 
ensuring their effective application. 25 
The 'content' element of the methodology comprised six core principles, a 
shorthand version of the eight data protection principles that appear in the UK 
DPA 1998. The second half the statement refers to the procedural and 
enforcement mechanisms available in the third country. They need not be 
embodied in national laws, as in EU member states, but must: ensure a good level 
of compliance; support and help individual data subjects; and provide appropriate 
redress. This could be achieved through codes and sanctions, verified by auditors 
or independent data protection officials. Compensation could be paid through a 
system of independent arbitration. 
This methodology was applied by Raab et al, in an EU-commissioned study 
assessing adequacy of the level of protection of individuals regarding the 
processing of personal data in six non-EU countries 26 . Five categories of 
data 
transfer were analysed: sub-contracted data processing; human resources data; 
medical data; electronic commerce data; and sensitive data in airline reservations. 
Reporting in 1998, the authors argued for 'a more empirical analysis of policies 
and practices, as well as rules', in order to assess implementation of principles 
outlined in the Directive by data controllers 27 . This could be facilitated by the use 
of certifiable privacy standards, a process that would involve 'proper self- 
regulation and regular compliance auditing'. The Canadian scheme, mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.7.2) of this thesis, was given as an example 28 . 
Thus it was 
important to consider both the policies and practices of specific organisations, in 
addition to 'the broader regulatory environment'. Raab et al's study concluded 
with an inventory of research questions - used as a guide for data collection, and 
29 useful for anyone researching data protection compliance 
The above recommendations concerning policy implementation within specific 
organisations have been taken seriously in this thesis. As a result, this study chose 
case studies, focusing on public authorities and paying particular attention to 
policy in practice. In certain respects, this case study methodology owed a little to 
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Rule's approach in his classic work Private lives andpublic surveillance3o. Rule's 
study - discussed in Chapter 3- relied mainly on semi-structured interviews and 
direct observation to investigate the collection and use of personal information in 
organisations such as the UK Driver Licencing System and the US Consumer 
Credit Reporting System. Rule's case studies were organised using the following 
strategy'l: 
(i) Structure of organisation: 
Account of the human organisation of the bureaucracy; 
Discussion of the structure of the information kept on the system's 
files, with regard to both form and content. 
Movement of information and decision-making - the processes 
involved- 
- Movement of data into files kept by the system; 
- Movement of data within and without the system, and how this 
bears on decisions made for administrative efficiency; 
- Relationships between management and staff; 
- Question of employee privacy versus administrative efficiency. 
Patterns of change (in the case of this study orchestrated by the DPA 
1998): 
Guidance from the top - for example, government and the OIC; 
Internal guidelines - are there any improvements/recommendations 
in store for the immediate, foreseeable future? 
Although Rule's methodology was aimed at analysing the collection and use of 
personal data by large organisations as a means of centralised surveillance on 
broad sectors of the population during the early 1970's, it provided a useful 
template for this study concerning the procedures used by public authorities to 
safeguard personal data of employees and the general public. 
16 
2.1.3 TrianRulation of research 
The thesis achieved its aims, outlined in Chapter 1, through triangulation of 
research. Lines of enquiry opened up through desk research have been backed up 
by fieldwork, resulting in the structure in Figure I overleaf. 
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Introduction 
Aim and Objectives 
Methodology 
1. Desk Research 
" Documentary 
Analysis 
" Literature Review 
" Legal Situation 
Correlations 
Conclusions 
Recommendations 
Figure 1: Triangulation of research 
11. Fieldwork 
* Expert Interviews 
* Questionnaire 
Survey 
* 18 Case Studies 
This multi-method approach involved cross-checking, or corroborating, the existence 
of certain trends and the reliability of individual accounts by gathering data from a 
number of informants and a number of sources. The above diagram displays the ge- 
neric approach taken. At ground level, each method was as far as practicable com- 
pared and contrasted with two other inputs of evidence to produce as full and bal- 
anced a study as possible. For example, the findings generated by the documentary 
analysis and literature review were cross-validated by expert interviews. Evidence 
from questionnaires and research into legal context were compared to the accounts 
given during in-depth case study interviews. Ultimately, the viewing of accounts 
from different perspectives - together with the opportunity to corroborate findings - 
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enhanced the validity of the data. 
Such an approach, however, had to be weighed against time constraints. 
Moreover, the findings have been affected by the willingness of people to be 
interviewed, to complete questionnaires and, in case study scenarios, to be 
interviewed in finther depth. The findings are discussed and disseminated in detail 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The data collection procedures were assessed for their reliability and validity. 
Reliability referred to the extent to which the methods produced similar results 
under constant conditions, on all occasions. This was particularly important for 
questionnaires, where checks for reliability came at stage of question wording and 
piloting of questionnaire survey with sympathetic and expert parties recommended 
by staff in the Department. Validity in the context of this project referred to the 
soundness of the methods employed - do the methods measure or describe what is 
supposed to be measured or described? Are the correct methods being used? At 
the piloting stage, the validity of the questionnaires was tested, ensuring the 
questions were clear and unambiguous and that the survey was indeed measuring 
what it was intended to measure. Further discussion of the piloting process can be 
found later in this Chapter, and in Chapter 6. The findings for a sample of the 
questionnaires were probed deeper during the in-depth follow-up interviews, 
analysed in Chapter 7. 
Reliability and validity were also factors during the interviews - particularly in 
relation to questions of historical and legal nature. Following transcription of 
interviews, documentary evidence such as government policy papers, Committee 
reports and case-law reports - often dating back thirty years - were revisited to 
follow up points made by the interviewee and verify information imparted. 
Frequently, this resulted in additional insight gained from the interviewee. The 
approach throughout was empirical and functional - seeking to understand the 
practicalities facing organisations. Priority has been given to understanding the 
reality as opposed to the language of the relevant statutes. Interviews continually 
opened up new insights - and documentary evidence - from which further 
information was gleaned. 
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2.2 Desk research 
The desk research took two forms - documentary analysis and a literature review. 
This research helped define what was important, controversial and unique about 
the topic. It enabled statements to be made that could be tested during the 
fieldwork stage. Moreover, it demonstrated how questions raised had been 
addressed in the past, and indicated what may be missing, and consequently, 
where any scope for original research may lie. The outcomes of the desk research 
are found in: Chapter 3- the detailed literature review; Chapter 4- investigating 
the legal context to the DPA 1998; and Chapter 5- assessing the wider legal 
context. 
2.2.1 DocumentM analy Lis 
Documentary analysis involved studying various legislation, policy papers and 
discussion documents from the UK and abroad. They covered a time span of 
thirty years from the early 1970's to the present day. This approach provided a 
solid foundation for the fieldwork questionnaires and interviews, aiding in the 
formulation of key research questions. A document search was undertaken to 
ascertain the existence of different sources of information. This was conducted 
using a variety of methods. The first mention of a document was often in the notes 
and references to various academic articles and books studied for the literature 
review referred to in Chapter 3. Electronic databases proved invaluable research 
tools, enabling the rapid retrieval of a particular document. Among the most used 
databases were BOPCAS - detailing full bibliographic references to UK official 
publications by The Stationery Office, and the Eurolaw database - giving full text 
access to European Union (EU) Treaties, Directives and Regulations. Hard copy 
insights into UK and EU decision-making processes were provided by Bansard 
and the European Union Encyclopedia and Directory respectively. Where the 
databases failed to locate a specific document, academic librarians at 
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Loughborough University's Pilkington Library in particular proved unfailingly 
helpful. 
Publications from membership organisations such the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), plus various non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as JUSTICE and Consumers 
International, were often available on their Internet websites. Where this was not 
the case, most bodies were able to post out documents on request. 
There were inevitably some frustrations when conducting the document search. 
For example, permission was sought from the Home Office to acquire the original 
papers from the 1976 Data Protection Committee from the chairman, Sir Norman 
Lindop, who was willing to dispose the documents. However, this was denied, on 
advice from the Public Record Office - which stated that it should be the true 
repository of such documents, and re-iterated that some of the papers detailing, for 
example interviews and submissions by the police and secret services, were to 
remain closed for thirty yearS32. Such documents would have proved valuable as 
evidence as to the secretive culture within certain public organisations at a time 
when data protection issues were beginning to raise public conceM33 . However, 
that proved to be only a minor setback. On the whole, government departments, 
Parliamentary Committees and the European Commission were happy to make 
documents available. 
The documents were analysed to determine what was said, who wrote it, and why 
it was written. Additionally, consideration was given to how the source came into 
existence, whether it was typical of its kind, and the audience for which it was 
written. Documents were compared to other sources of information - such as the 
views of interviewees - to verify their accuracy and whether such evidence was 
reliable. In certain sources, bias was an important characteristic. This was often 
the case with documents from NGOs, trade unions and employers' organisations 
such as the CBI. Authors of such documents often had a stake in pursuing a 
particular course of action which affected their views on certain legislation or 
policy. In some cases, the most useful evidence derived from such sources - 
providing valuable insights into the political processes involved in policy-making. 
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Such evidence, although not necessarily an accurate account of a development in 
policy or technology, was a reliable expression of the author's views. Such 
analysis enabled a fuller appreciation of the worth of such documentary evidence. 
2.2.2 Literature review 
A critical survey of the available literature was conducted - from academic 
journals to the quality press, from conference papers to monographs. This survey 
provided ideas about other approaches and methods: aiding analysis and 
interpretation of documentary data, and providing a useful template for the 
formulation of guidelines in the concluding Chapter. Data protection policy is 
fluid, and references soon date. Research tools used to locate the most recent 
publications included: newspaper databases on CD ROM, for example The 
Guardian and The Times; and electronic resources such as ASSIA Plus, CSA and 
Web of Science for academic articles. Those tools yielded a large amount of 
information under basic search terms such as 'data protection', 'privacy' and 
'European Data Protection Directive 1995'. For EU-funded research, the 
CORDIS gateway proved a good starting point with nine databases providing 
access to complete information on the research programmes, in addition to 
summaries of official documents relating to the EU's legislative and decision- 
making processes. For comparative information concerning North America, the 
ABI Research Index was an excellent platform, with an advanced search engine 
enabling detailed searches on North American business periodicals, academic and 
educational journals, in addition to articles from newspapers such as The 
Washington Post. 
2.2.3 Cuffent legal situation 
Chapter 4 analysed the present, conflicting, legal situation in detail. The historical 
context to data protection law in particular was significant to the type of data 
protection regime chosen by the UK. Consequently, the Chapter described the 
context to current information privacy law in some considerable detail, drawing on 
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legislation and policy documents from the last thirty years. References were made 
to other countries to highlight the diversity of international policy is in this field, 
and shed some light on the difficulties in providing data protection in the current 
political and economic climate. 
The inherent problems in legislating for data protection were investigated. In 
particular, the difficulties presented by emerging technologies such as genetic 
testing and sophisticated workplace performance monitoring were considered. 
Additionally, the implications of other UK legislation impacting on data protection 
have been examined. Key legislation included: HRA 98; FOIA 2000; FOI 
(Scotland) Act 2002; and RIPA 2000. The relationship between such diverse laws 
is key in investigating whether a viable data protection regime can exist in the UK. 
2.2.4 Other research in the field 
In addition, contact has been maintained with academics and practitioners working 
in the field. Emails have been exchanged and contributions have been posted to 
the JISCmail data protection discussion IiSt34 . Finally, the author attended the 
following relevant conferences, either as a delegate or speaker: 
Keep IT Legal 4h Annual Conference, Nottingham. May 2001 (delegate); 
10th international BOBCATSSS symposium on library and information 
science, Portoroz, Slovenia. January 2002 (speaker)35; 
NADPO36 Annual Conference, Warwick. November 2002 (invited 
speaker). 
2.3 Fieldwork 
Detailed fieldwork was largely qualitative, consisting of interviews, questionnaires 
and case studies. Quantitative methods in a study concerned with policy and best 
practice were more difficult to justify and consequently have been limited to 
graphical representation of data concerning compliance with, and opinion 
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concerning, the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998. This section outlines the 
advantages of the qualitative measures used. Three techniques were employed. 
Firstly, a questionnaire survey, conducted during autumn 2001, aimed at testing 
practitioner opinion and developing contacts within public organisations. In 
particular, the survey sought to assess the challenges facing organisations 
regarding the handling the employee personal data. Secondly, expert interviews - 
also conducted during autumn 2001 - establishing an overview of opinion on data 
protection and human rights issues. Finally, case study interviews, performed in 
spring 2002 with a sample of the bodies contacted during the questionnaire survey. 
2.3.1 Questionnaire sunLey 
The questionnaire survey was a data collection method that required careful 
consideration in selection of question type, question writing, design, piloting 
distribution and return of the questionnaires. 
Purpose and desian 
Firstly, it had to be decided exactly which data was being sought, and indeed 
whether a questionnaire was the most appropriate method for collecting such 
information. Following some deliberation and consultation with supervisors, the 
author decided a questionnaire could yield some useful indicative data regarding 
the measures public authorities were taking towards complying with the DPA 
1998. Most importantly, the survey could provide an opening for future case 
studies. The survey was not expected to produce statistically significant findings. 
The most significant areas for investigation had been identified by preliminary 
reading and the aim and hypotheses outlined in the introductory Chapter. A 
deliberate focus was placed on the processing of personal data belonging to 
employees, reflecting activities in this field by the UK OIC - most notably its 
publication of a draft code of practice and industry's reaction to it 37 . The 
questionnaire intended to provide a practitioner view of the draft Code, which had 
been absent from the media debate surrounding the issue. 
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Subsequently, a sample was determined for the questionnaire survey. It was 
decided to test the reaction, opinion and measures taken by public authorities to 
comply with the DPA 1998, HRA 1998 and RIPA 2000. From the outset, it was 
accepted that the sample was going to be biased. Loughborough University's 
Library and Information Statistics Unit (LISU) and the JISCmail data protection 
discussion list were both consulted to provide details of organisations with a 
particular interest in this field. The main survey was limited to public authorities, 
as they were unambiguously affected by the provisions of the HRA 1998. 
Organisations approached included public libraries, local authorities, the police, 
universities and the National Health Service (NHS). 
Based on this information, the questions were drawn up into four clear, though 
overlapping, areas concerning: 
A. Compliance with the DPA 1998; 
B. Policies on privacy; 
C. Monitoring of employees; 
D. Awareness of, and opinions concerning, the DPA 1998, HRA 1998 and 
RIPA 2000. 
Fourteen questions were included. The language was checked to achieve the 
degree of precision necessary to ensure the subjects understood exactly what was 
asked. Particular care was taken to avoid leading questions that prompted the 
respondent to answer in one way (for example: 'do you not agree that employees 
have a right to free use of internet in the workplace? ') or double or triple questions 
which expected more than one answer. 
The question type employed was mainly structured - making answering the survey 
and analysing the results easier. Four of the seven types of question listed by 
Youngman 38 were employed in the pilot survey: 
List questions, where a list of items was offered, any of which could be 
selected. For example, concerning the steps an organisation had taken 
to comply with the DPA 1998; 
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Categories, where the response was one only of a given set of 
categories. For example, the frequency with which an organisation 
monitored staff use of the internet; 
Scaling, to measure level of awareness and opinion concerning the 
various legislation. A Likert scale was used, measuring the strength of 
agreement/disagreement with given statement on scale of 1-5. 
Responses could then be presented in tables or bar charts; 
Open questions, where the expected response was a word, phrase or 
extended comment. Responses to verbal questions produced some 
useful information which could be followed up in later case studies. 
Others provide pertinent quotations to illustrate certain points in the 
thesis. In the pilot study, such questions were also important in finding 
out which aspects of the topic were of particular significance to the 
respondents. 
Pilot auestionnaire 
The pilot questionnaire survey was distributed during February 2001. Essentially, 
it was an opportunity to test: data collection techniques; timeframe; data analysis 
methods - removing any items that do not yield useful data; and consider any 
suggestions for improvement made by the respondents. It was trialled on a group 
similar to that which would form the population of the study. Organisations 
sampled included a university, an academic library, an IT company and civil 
liberties bodies. The' university and academic library represented public 
authorities, whereas the IT company was included for variety, and because at that 
early stage of the project the author was still debating whether to include the 
private sector. Four civil liberties bodies were sampled. In part, this was to 
achieve some input from bodies campaigning for data protection and human 
rights; in part, it was to aid preparation for later fieldwork interviews with these 
bodies. I 
As participant feedback was the key objective of the pilot, a form was attached to 
the survey with the following questions 39: 
26 
How long did it take you to complete? 
Were the instructions clear? 
Were any of the questions unclear or ambiguous? If so, will you 
say which and why? 
(iv) Did you object to answering any of the questions? 
(V) In your opinion, has any major topic been omitted? 
(vi) Was the layout of the questionnaire clear/attractive? 
(vii) Any comments? 
The responses enabled revision of the questionnaire in time for the main 
distribution. Out of the II questionnaires issued, seven were returned. 
The time taken to complete the questionnaire ranged from 'a couple of minutes' to 
30 minutes. The majority took between five and 10 minutes. This was deemed 
acceptable - long enough to give considered responses, yet not too intrusive on the 
respondent's work routine. All subjects found the layout and instructions 
regarding the questionnaire to be clear. However, there was some confusion over 
the phrasing of two of the four statements measuring strength of feeling in the 
final section of the questionnaire: 
The Lawful Business Practice Regulations complement the Draft code 
of practice on the use of personal data in emplojerlemployee 
relationships; 
The Human Rights Act will work effectively in tandem with the Data 
Protection Act 1998. Overlap is minimal and meaning is clear. 
The above statements were intended to measure opinion on the diverse official 
guidance, regulation and legislation concerning personal information. However, 
one respondent suggested it was unclear whether two documents can 
'complement' each other. They could fail to complement each other by being 
inconsistent, or by addressing entirely different sets of issues. The second 
statement was deemed unanswerable as it posed three separate questions 
concerning: the relationship between the HRA 1998 and DPA 1998; degree of 
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overlap; and clarity of meaning. Finally, one respondent was unclear as to the 
purpose of the questionnaire - whether it was testing: 
Informed opinion on the effectiveness of the various 
legislation/regulations, or; 
Awareness of the existence and contents of those schemes? 
In fact, the survey was testing both. The cover letter accompanying the main 
questionnaire survey was amended to reflect this, stating: 'this survey will 
measure awareness and informed opinion concerning the above regulations... '. 
The feedback from the pilot survey was certainly worthwhile, helping to determine 
the structure and wording of the full questionnaire. 
Amendments following pilot questionnaire 
Following this feedback, important amendments were made to the questionnaire 
format, as detailed below: 
Part 1: Compliance and staffing - reducing section A of the pilot to just 
two questions; 
Part 2: Employee records - this amended section B of the pilot, sharpening 
the focus on employee personal data. This was deemed necessary as part 
of the process of clarifying the aim of the survey. Questions related to 
records management issues, comprising: purposes forwhich personal data 
was being collected; retention periods of employee records; procedures in 
place to check accuracy of such records; subject access procedures for 
those wishing to view their records; and the security procedures in place 
for safeguarding records; 
Part 3: Monitoring of employees - this remained unchanged from the pilot. 
Respondents appeared to have little difficulty understanding this section; 
Part 4: Legislation and oJfIcial guidance - considered awareness and 
opinion of current legislation. This section had been modified in line with 
the feedback. The first question in this section tested the awareness of 
legislation and guidance with simple 'yes' or 'no' options. The second 
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question had five instead of the previous four statements concerning 
strengthen of feeling about the HRA 1998 and DPA 1998; and official 
guidance. However, each statement was simplified with the final triple 
statement scrapped, and being replaced by two straightforward statements 
concerning official guidance to the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998. 
Finally, a box was added for contact details for those interested in participating in 
follow-up case study interviews later in the academic year. The revisions, 
especially in Part 2, had the effect of increasing the length of the questionnaire 
from four pages of A4 paper to five. This was unfortunate, but justified as an 
attempt to clarify the issues surveyed, yet maintain the logical progression of the 
questions within the questionnaire. This consolidated the main purpose of the 
questionnaire: to provide a solid foundation for detailed follow-up interviews. 
The full questionnaire surve 
The questionnaire survey (refer to Appendix D) was distributed to diverse 
organisations from the public sector - explicitly covered by the provisions of the 
HRA 1998. The organisations included public libraries, local authorities, health 
authorities, universities, police authorities and privatised utilities. Privatised 
utilities were included as they conducted public functions and Avere covered in that 
40 respect by the provisions of the HRA 1998 . It was reasoned that contacting 
organisations known to Loughborough University - via LISU - or those interested 
in data protection - via the JISCmail discussion list - would improve the response 
rates. For the privatised utilities, web trade directories (for example, the 
Electricity Associationý) and websites of watchdogs (for exa. -, nllle, OfWae 2 and 
OfgeM43) were referred to - resulting in a list of 43 organisations covering water, 
electricity, gas and transport. Reference to the above sources of information 
resulted in a list of 382 organisations, broken down into the following categories: 
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Type of organisation Number of questionnaires posted 
Local authorities 258 
Universities 58 
Health authorities 10 
Police authorities 9 
Quangosý' 4 
Privatised untilities 43 
Total 382 
Table 2: Distribution of questionnaires by category. 
It was decided that this total was enough to generate indicative findings and, most 
importantly, permit access for case study interviews. 
Distribution and return ofaziestionnaires 
It was decided at an early stage to distribute questionnaires by post. This was so 
that the respondents would have a tangible copy which to answer or distribute to 
colleagues. The survey was printed on coloured paper in an attempt to make it 
stand out on respondent's desks from other documents. A stamped addressed 
envelope was included. Two months prior to distribution, the organisations 
selected were contacted by email in order to give advance notice of the intention to 
post a questionnaire. Details were given as to the intentions of the survey and the 
overall context of this thesis, together with a link to the author's research website45 
and personal contact details. Developing a relationship with the respondent was 
seen as key to improving the response rate and, more importantly, willingness to 
participate in follow-up case studies. Moreover, advance notice allowed 
organisations to opt-out of the study - saving time and resources at a later stage. 0 
However, the number of early refusals was outweighed by the nine public 
authorities that indicated their readiness to fully participate in the study, and the 
interviews before even receiving the questionnaires. At such an early stage, that 
was an encouraging response. 
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The questionnaires were posted out with an accompanying letter. This letter stated 
the purpose of the survey and how any information provided would be processed. 
Confidentiality was promised. Nevertheless, each survey was given a general 
identification (ID) number to track response rates. This was felt necessary to 
avoid duplication and irritation when the time came to pursue nen-respondents. 
However, this ID number was meaningless unless one had access to the coded list 
of the organisations contacted. In fact, confidentiality did not appear to bc an 
issue with respondents, and many questionnaires were returned with business 
cards or compliments slips attached. Nevertheless, the names of the respondents 
have not been included in the thesis. 
The survey was sent out during the first full week of September 2001. A return 
date of five weeks following distribution of all the surveys Was given. This Was 
deemed reasonable - as less than a month might have appeared pressurised, and 
any longer might have tempted respondents to put the questionnaire to one side, 
decreasing the chances of getting as response. The precise day and date of return 
were stated in the cover letter, and prominently displayed on the questionnaire. 
The ID number helped track the response rate, discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Following the passing of the deadline, it was decided after some debate between 
the author and supervisors to pursue non-respondents. A number of options were 
considered, then discounted. Posting out follow-up questionnaires to all the 
organisations that had not replied would have proved prohibitively expensive. It 
would also likely have proved futile, as a subject who has already declined one 
postal questionnaire is unlikely to complete a second such survey. E-Mailing non- 
respondents was considered too much of a scattergun approach. Besides, email 
addresses were not available for a considerable number of the original sample. 
It was finally decided to telephone the organisations involved. This had the 
advantage of communicating directly to the subject and finding reasons for non- 
response. Additionally, it allowed follow-up surveys to be targeted at those who 
needed them, thus saving resources and improving the response rate. 
Approximately 250 organisations were contacted by telephone. Although 
systematic, the procedure proved protracted as, in the period of three months, a 
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number of respondents had changed jobs. In other cases, telephone numbers had 
changed. It proved particularly difficult to locate the relevant person within local 
authorities - each having its unique corporate structure - and it was not 
uncommon to be channelled through three different departments before speaking 
to the named respondent. Nevertheless, the process was instructive, yielding 
useful anecdotal evidence of the reasons for non-response. Some of the reasons 
are given below: 
The questionnaire was found by some to be too complex. taking up too 
much time; 
Pressure of other work - particularly in libraries where the appearance 
of the survey coincided with the book-ordering season; 
Staff shortages; 
'Survey overload', with some organisations receiving 4-5 surveys a 
week; 
The questionnaire, particularly in local authorities. having circulated 
various department - IT, legal, and human resources were most 
frequently mentioned - before inevitably being mislaid; 
The organisation having a specific policy of not responding to student 
surveys; 
The respondent had not received the survey; 
The contact had left the organisation, and no-one els-. had responded to 
the survey. 
The uncertain location of the data protection function within organisations 
compounded the issue - with departments as diverse as corporate services, IT, 
legal, administration and finance all claiming some responsibility. Often, the 
designated individual had duties other than data protection. This exacerbated the 
difficulties in targeting the questionnaire in the first instance, and hindered the 
pursuit of non-respondents. 
However, the contacting of non-respondents by telephone did have a positive 
effect. As a consequence of the calls, 60 further questionnaires Nvere posted - end 
eight emailed. Of those, nearly 50 were completed and returned. 
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2.3.2 Expert interviews 
The value of interviews with experts in the field and those from particular interest 
groups was recognised at an early stage. A serni-structured format was chosen. 
Its key advantages were perceived as: 
Enabling subjects to talk at length, eliciting detailed information; 
Shedding light on a sensitive topic in a way a written response may 
conceal; 
Allowing questions to be asked that cannot be answered elsewhere; 
Triangulating desk research by following up specific lines of enquiry. 
Initially, a list of questions was devised around a loose structure to ensure all the 
topics were covered. Some of the questions were generic - based on issues raised 
during desk research, and the pilot questionnaire. Common questions concerned: 
Interviewee's role in that particular organisation; 
Aims of the organisation; 
When and how that organisation developed an interest in data 
protection and/or human rights; 
Other bodies consulted/extent of peer group cooperation within this 
field; 
Official and personal opinion on current legislation. 
One of the key aims of the interviews - other than establishing opinion - was to 
understand the processes and relationships that existed in the field of data 
protection and human rights between government, NGOs, business, trade unions, 
supervisory authorities and Parliament. Further questions were tailored 
specifically to the organisation or individual concerned - usually concerning a 
particular piece of research conducted by that body. Where possible, the 
interviewee was emailed the questions in advance, in order to prepare for the 
interview, and if necessary come back with any queries - although that did not 
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happen. Within this framework, the respondent was allowed a considerable degree 
of latitude. Certain questions were asked, but the subject had the freedom to talk 
about the topic and give their own views in their own time. This approach was 
largely successful, with the interviewee usually moving from topic to topic with 
little prompting. With such a flexible format, the length of time for the interviews 
varied considerably - ranging from 20 minutes to two hours. Generally, the 
average time taken was 50 minutes. 
The respondents were selected on the basis that they would have something 
significant to contribute to the field. They were considered experts with 
experience in policy making, law or campaigning. Interviewees were identified in 
a number of ways: during the piloting of the questionnaires; from published 
research; conference speeches; and, in one case, on the recommendation of one of 
the author's supervisors. Initially, the proposed interviewees were approached by 
letter or email during July and August 2001. As with the communications prior to 
the questionnaire survey, details of the research and the desired outcomes of an 
interview were outlined. Additionally, a link to the author's website and contact 
details for any queries were provided. Finally, the use to which the information 
would be put was summarised - allowing the interviewee the opportunity to 
remain anonymous if preferred. 
Of the 30 people and institutions approached, 15 agreed to be interviewed. Only 
four failed to reply at all. The reasons given by those who declined to be 
interviewed were: 
Time constraints; 
Not having conducted any relevant research into the field; 
Having a policy of not participating in student research. 
Sample interview transcripts can be found at the end of this report. The people 
approached included civil servants, lawyers, trade unionists, business, regulatory 
bodies and NGOs. 
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Good time management was essential when planning for the interviews. Account 
was taken of time required for planning and conducting the interviews, for coping 
with delays and, particularly in large organisations, being shuttled from one 
contact to another. In all cases, permission was requested to tape-record the 
interviews. This was considered most appropriate for the semi-structured format, 
where responses could not always be easily analysed. Of the 15 interviews 
conducted, 10 were tape-recorded. One respondent was unable to be interviewed 
due to illness, but completed an email questionnaire at a later date. A second 
respondent also completed such a questionnaire - due to time and resource 
difficulties in arranging an interview overseas. Of the three face-to-face 
discussions not tape-recorded, only one individual specifically refused permission. 
In the other two instances, office conditions meant that tape-recording was not 
feasible. In those cases, notes were taken and written up as soon as possible after 
the interview ended. 
Tape recordings proved useful for checking the wording of any statement prior to 
quotation, and invaluable for content analysis. Where possible, interview 
transcripts, particularly statements to be used as direct quotations in the report, 
were verified with the respondent. Permission to publish the transcript was 
sometimes asked at the interview stage, or failing that, by letter following 
transcription. Only one of the 10 tape-recorded interviewees refused permission 
for the transcript to appear in the thesis. 
Analysis of the results and quotations from the interviews are included in Chapter 
6. 
2.3.3 Case studies 
The most fundamental part of this project, the case studies had the clear advantage 
of allowing a number of public organisations to be studied in depth. Following the 
questionnaire survey, 19 public authorities stated their intention to be studied in 
depth, with 18 actually participating in the interview process. They comprised: 12 
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public authorities; three universities; one health authority; one police authority; 
and one 'other' -a central govenunent educational organisation. 
Again, the interviews were semi-structured, and lasted anything from 40 minutes 
to two hours. A common approach was taken to all organisations involved. The 
substantive background to the case studies analysed the nature of the 
organisations, their corporate structure, and the number of people they serve. The 
interviews explored questions raised by those affected by the legislation on a daily 
basis. The emphasis was placed on detail, with hard examples given of any 
particular measures enacted to safeguard data protection. The key aim of the case 
studies was to test hypothesis 1. Particular emphasis was given to the workability 
of the DPA 1998 - as a measure for ensuring compliance and good practice, and 
that it worked in tandem with the other aforementioned legislation impacting on 
data protection. Based on earlier research, the author devised the following 
criteria for compliance: 
Status of the data protection function in the organisation: are the 
DPOs being listened to? 
Public awareness: informing those outside the organisation of their 
rights under the DPA 1998 at point of collection; 
(iii) Staff awareness and training: if employees handling personal data 
are not trained, organisations cannot conduct their obligations under 
the DPA 1998; 
(iv) Handling subject access requestq (SARs): a key aspect of the DPA 
1998 in allowing individuals to exercise their rights - verifying 
what is recorded about them and the basis of decisions taken. How 
do organisations handle requests from staff and the public for 
personal information? 
(v) Data protection policy: do organisations have an overarching 
policy? How effective is it? What guidance underpins the policy? 
How is policy evaluated? 
The case study interviews were conducted from February to May 2002, and the 
data is analysed in Chapter 7. The focus has been on the extent to which the above 
36 
issues had been given previous thought and how far data protection is built into 
organisation's policy processes. Finally, Chapter 8 considers the extent to which 
the aim of the thesis has been achieved. Recommendations - presented to a 
number of case study organisations - are proposed for good practice. 
2.4 Limitations of this studv 
Although this thesis has followed a rigorous methodology based upon 
triangulation of research, it has faced limitations. The most obvious restrictions 
have been time and resources. The need to complete this study within three years, 
and the paucity of funding available, has limited the number of organisations that 
could be visited. It has also impacted on the depth of research that could be 
conducted at these organisations. Additionally, the number and location of the 
experts visited was similarly restricted. However, the author believes a sufficient 
cross-section of individuals from different sectors - trade unions, business, 
consumer groups, government and so on - have been interviewed, resulting in an 
indicative insight into the diverse views concerning data protection. 
Moreover, the sheer scope of the DPA 1998, and its related legislation, resulted in 
limitations being placed on what could be investigated. The organisations 
interviewed performed a wide range of functions on which data protection 
impinged. They included: health data and Caldicott; police intelligence; education 
and the role of schools as data controller; exam results in schools, further and 
higher education; the pastoral role of university tutors; contracts with overseas 
offices; and the role of local authority councillors wishing to use personal data for 
political purposes. This list is not exhaustive, and any one of those functions 
could have justified a significant research project in its own right. Consequently, 
the decision had to be made to gain an overview of data protection compliance 
procedures in various public organisations to prevent this research project from 
becoming too bogged down in detail. By the same token, it was vital that this 
study was not superficial. Hence, the importance of triangulation of research, and 
receiving feedback from the participating organisations. The latter was achieved 
46 through a conference paper presented to NADPO in November 2002 . 
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A further limitation was the author's reliance on the information given by the 
DPOs. Although there was no reason at all to doubt the honesty and integrity of 
all those interviewed (indeed, the candour of some interviewees was quite 
surprising and refreshing), there was generally no method of verifying that the 
changes they claimed to implementing were indeed being carried out, and had 
been successful. Nevertheless, the author was usually given copies of policies and 
procedures, and on occasions permitted to speak to other employees in the 
organisation. The DPOs were busy people, and the fact that they were prepared to 
give up an hour or two of their time was appreciated. However, if this project had 
more time, return visits would have been organised and interviews conducted with 
other employees at differing levels in the organisations. This would have 
established the full extent to which data handling procedures were in action, and 
being adhered to. 
Subsidiary to the latter point is the necessary caveat that, in general, only those 
organisations that were well-advanced in terms of data protection compliance were 
likely to invite the author to interview. Although this can be perceived as a flaw in 
the methodology, the fact that the author was able to assess almost full data 
protection compliance (no organisation claimed to be completely compliant) was 
beneficial to the research conducted, enabling recommendations to be drafted that 
could be pitched at all levels. The recommendations are outlined in Chapter 8. 
Moreover, there were certainly two case study organisations - the health authority 
and a county council - where data protection issues were only beginning to be 
addressed. The honesty, and perhaps courage, of these organisations in 
volunteering for interview was greatly appreciated. Thus although it is 
acknowledged that the sample of case study organisations may be skewed towards 
those 'doing well' in terms of data protection compliance, this was not exclusively 
the case. 
Additionally, the topicality of subject presented some difficulties. Most obviously, 
the events of II September 2001 caused major changes in the drafting of the legal 
Chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) and impacted on the nature of the discussions with 
experts during that autumn. Additionally, the Employment Practices Data 
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Protection Code has been under consultation and review for almost the entire 
length of this project - with the first draft being released in October 2000, and at 
the time of writing (January 2003) there are still two parts that have yet to be 
finalised. This has contributed to uncertainty among organisations regarding best 
practice when monitoring employee communications. 
Finally, fresh newspaper reports, emerging academic research and almost frenzied 
government activity in this field has resulted in the need for the literature review 
and legal chapters to be constantly reviewed and updated. Of course, this is 
reassuring -a measure of the relevance of data protection as an issue of public 
policy and a tribute to the vibrancy of academic research into this expanding field. 
However, the sheer quantity of output on data protection has resulted in necessary 
omissions of potentially significant issues - for example, the impact of the DPA 
1998 on the private sector - being forced on the author. Discussion of other 
important activities, for example data sharing between government departments, 
has had to be minimised. A number of these issues have been flagged in Chapter 8 
as topics for ftirther academic research. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The methodology used in this study had its roots in other work - particularly Rule, 
Raab et al, and Raab and Bennett, all cited above. Those works emphasised the 
need to understand the organisations studied - particularly their structure and the 
processes involved in information handling and decision-making. It is only by 
appreciating the movement of data within the system, and the relationships within 
that structure - between departments, between staff and management - that a 
thorough critical analysis of the DPA 1998 in action can be achieved. 
This study intended to - and hopefully succeeded in - developing some of the 
issues identified by the above researchers, as well by other academics in this field. 
Desk research and expert interviews allowed a wide appreciation of the key data 
protection issues facing organisations. They presented an overview - 
encompassing the opinions of civil servants, lawyers, business leaders, trade union 
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representatives and civil libertarians. The questionnaire survey provided a 
gateway for the case studies - permitting an insight into the data protection 
issues 
facing organisations on a daily basis. Finally, the case studies expanded the 
survey's findings, focusing on the detailed policy and political processes affecting 
the protection of personal data. In this Chapter, a framework for evaluation has 
been established - assessing the strengths and weaknesses of internal 
data 
protection policies in order to assist public organisations in their policy-making 
and implementation. 
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3. Literature Review 
I Following the 1995 European Union (EU) directive relating to data protection 
and the subsequent introduction into the UK of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
19982, together with the incorporation of the European Convention of Human 
RightS3 (ECHR) into UK law as the Human Rights Act (HRA) 19984, a range of 
research concerning data protection, privacy and human rights has been published. 
This research has built upon a generation of previous work that commenced in the 
late 1960's and early 1970's. Recently, studies have been pitched at varying 
levels, examining - for example - international concerns, European issues and 
experience within specific sectors of industry. 
In this Chapter, the current state of knowledge and research concerning data 
protection, human rights and the right to privacy within organisations are analysed 
and discussed. All have some bearing on this project, and in determining whether 
the new raft of legislation heralds a new privacy culture in the UK; whether the 
new laws are adequate or, to quote Miller when referring to the US experience 
0 thirty years ago, 'a thing of threads and patches . Whilst focusing on legislation 
in the United Kingdom, this Chapter draws necessary reference to a number of 
high quality studies conducted around the world. The literature in this field is 
vast, and only a limited number can be incorporated into this Chapter. However, it 
is believed enough have been included to give an overview of the scope of 
literature and opinion available concerning privacy legislation. 
The Chapter has been divided into three discrete sections. In the first, the research 
sources available for data protection issues are considered. This section identifies 
a number of landmark studies that have helped define information privacy in the 
UK and elsewhere. Additionally, sources of information regarding legal text, 
current awareness and so-called 'grey literature' are discussed and analysed. 
Finally, reference has been drawn to research and methodologies that have 
recently or are currently being used to measure and report reaction to, and 
experience of, the new law. 
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In the second section, research issues regarding the HRA 1998 are discussed. In 
comparison to data protection, this topic has not been the focus of significant 
investigation. However, as discussed and analysed in this section, there has been a 
growing corpus of academic and legal work, providing a platform for further 
research in this field. 
The final section considers privacy issues within organisations. In particular, there 
has been considerable uncertainty with the enactment of various 'information 
society' legislation relating to organisational handling of personal data. This 
section also outlines various academic and legal studies in this complex area. 
Finally, conclusions are offered - summarising the key findings from this 
literature review. 
3.1 Data Protection 
3.1.1 Landmark studies: the 'privacy' debate 
Academic studies concerning privacy and human rights have increased 
significantly over the last four decades. It was during the late 1960's and early 
1970's that the concept of information privacy (or data protection), as distinct 
from other aspects of privacy concerning physical intrusion and surveillance, was 
developed. Two US publications in particular helped define the issue - Privacy 
and Freedom by Westin (1967)6 and Miller's The Assault on Privacy (197 1)7 . For 
Westin, information privacy meant the claim of individuals 'to determine for 
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
,8 communicated to others . Miller's definition was more succinct: 'the individual's 
ability to control the circulation of information relating to him'9. Another 
publication, Rule's Private Lives and Public Surveillance (1973)10 contained an 
in-depth examination of the collection and use of personal data as a means of 
social control. Detailed case studies of organisations such as the UK Driver 
Licensing system and the US Consumer Credit Reporting system examined what 
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information the systems collected, through what means, who had access to it, how 
it was used and how such use impinged on the person it related to. In many 
respects, they were the first detailed case studies of their kind. 
From the academic debates of this period, privacy of personal data emerged as a 
value that could not be taken or misused by government without due process of 
law. This idea was later developed into a set of best practice principles - both in 
the US and Europe - ensuring fair processing, minimal intrusion and limited 
purposes for the use of personal data. It was this informational aspect of privacy 
that was most profoundly affected by the rapid developments in information 
technology during the 1960's. Concerns about the increased use of the computer 
and the setting up of national databanks were growing. In these circumstances, the 
choice of the individual was seen as central to the concept of data protection - both 
in allowing physical intrusion and the sharing of personal information. Westin, 
Miller and Rule were among the first commentators to articulate and promote such 
individual choice. 
3.1.2 Comparative research 
As western countries began to enact data protection legislation during the 1970's 
and 1980's, comparative studies of national laws emerged. The work of Burkert, 
Nugter, Flaherty, and Bennett were particularly significant in comparing the 
development of data protection laws during the 1980's, and early 1990's. Burkert 
and Nugter both provided overviews of data protection legislation within the 
European Community (EC)". Burkert probed the 'functions' of such laws - that 
is, the services data protection laws provided for society and the means by which 
this was achieved 12 . Reconciling basic values - such as access and security - with 
technological change, and educating all participants in the legislative system, were 
viewed by the author as particularly significant functions of data protection 
legislation' 3- Given that such laws were part of a new type of regulations caused 
by technological changes, Burkert perceived the need for a regulatory mechanism 
to keep a proper balance between two key objectives: 
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Society must adapt to technology to take advantage of the merits of 
technological change; 
Technology must be adapted to the basic values of society to ensure 
social coherence in a changing environment. 
Burkert highlighted the need to address the all-important role of data protection 
authorities as new, more specialised public agency and their relationship with 
more traditional institutions of political power 14 . Although Burkert perceived the 
data protection authorities 'seem to perform reasonably well', the author 
optimistically envisioned a time when they could become obsolete, following 
increased awareness of the value problems of Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICT), greater openness from data users or controllers, and increased 
15 confidence in and access to ICT by individuals 
Nearly a decade later, Nugter 16 analysed data protection laws in four EC states as 
part of a doctoral thesis into the transborder flow of personal data within the 
private sector. The author concluded that the disparate laws were unable to 
guarantee sufficient data protection for the data subject where such transborder 
flows of personal data were involved. As the divergences revealed were obstacles 
to free trade, Nugter argued that the harmonisation of data protection statutes was 
obligatory under Community law. The author weighed the options for 
harmonisation, proposing an EC directive aimed at the highest possible level of 
protection 17 . It was an 
indication of the timeliness of this thesis that the year 
Nugter submitted her work (1990), the EC published its first draft of what became 
18 the 1995 Data Protection Directive . The development of a harmonising 
Directive, with its provisions for judging the 'adequacy' of third country 
legislation, demonstrated the need for detailed comparative studies, complete with 
recommendations. 
On a wider scale, Flaherty and Bennett published comparative studies of privacy 
and data protection legislation concerning countries in both Europe and North 
America. During the 1980s, Flaherty studied the effectiveness of national data 
protection laws in controlling surveillance, particularly in the public sector'9. A 
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hugely significant work, Protecting privacy in surveillance societies was one of 
the first detailed investigations into the work of national data protection 
agencies 20 . Flaherty articulated their role as bodies that should solely concentrate 
on data protection. Rather than attempt- to develop other aspects of information 
policy - as happened in France - the agencies should look to strengthen the 
existing legislation and limit government surveillance 21 . 
Bennett in Regulating Privacy (1992)22 , examined political responses to the data 
protection issue in four Western democracies, comparing legislation in the US, 
Germany, the UK and Sweden. This research built on earlier papers 23 where he 
had contended that, with the definition of privacy being so ambiguous, legislation 
is most effective if tailored to suit the political and legal cultures of the countries 
concerned. The author found that five different models existed for the 
implementation of fair information principles 24 . The law could be implemented 
through a licencing approach, as in Sweden or France. It could be via a system of 
registration as in the UK and the Netherlands. Thirdly, it may be administered by 
voluntary control through self-regulation. Alternatively, the onus could be on the 
citizenry to enforce their rights in the courts - the 'self-help' solution in the US 
under the Privacy Act 1974. Finally, the law may be overseen by a Data 
Protection Commissioner as in Canada and Germany. However, during the 1990's 
these boundaries, particularly in the EU, became increasingly blurred. 
3.1.3 Recent academic research 1995-2003 
Following the finalisation of the Data Protection Directive by the EU in 1995, a 
number of general analyses were published - outlining the provisions of the EU 
Data Protection Directive 25 . Whilst, of course, literature concerning EU data 
protection initiatives was published prior to 1995, this subsection considers just 
some of the research conducted since that period. . Opinion on its effectiveness, 
however, has been divided. Pearce and Platten highlighted the significance of the 
Data Protection Directive at a European level, as being the first Directive to 
specifically address human rights issueS26. In this respect, the Directive 
represented a landmark piece of legislation for the EU, although the authors 
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acknowledged that variations in national responses provide major obstacles to 
achieving to achieving data protection equivalence. 
Bainbridge and Pearce argued that in the UK, the DPA 1998 - implementing the 
27 Directive into national law - compromised the spirit of the Directive . Whilst the 
Directive aimed to protect privacy, the word 'privacy' was not mentioned in the 
DPA 1998. Moreover, in order to benefit from the new data subject rights, 
individuals had to be pro-active and knowledgeable - directly approaching 
organisations to object, for example, to direct marketing, and making a complaint 
to the supervisory authority - now called the Office of the Information 
Commissioner (OIC) - in case of a breach. The authors were also critical of the 
enforcement procedures with the absence of custodial sentences for offences, the 
paltry fines issued by the courtS2& and the small number of prosecutions each year 
'[doing] little to encourage full compliance with data protection law 29 . Finally, 
the issue of consent was brought up, with the authors stating that although various 
forms of processing are subject to the data subject's consent, it is generally only 
one of a number of alternative conditionS30. Thus, 'the data subject's right to 
prevent processing by withholding his consent is, in the vast majority of cases, 
merely illusory. 31 
However, Bainbridge and Pearce believed that the implementation of the HRA 
1998 would have a significant impact on data protection law. Article 8 of the 
ECHR - the right to a private life - was specifically mentioned in Recital 10 of the 
Directive as underpinning the level of protection for individuals outlined in the 
Directive 32 . The authors concluded by arguing for increased self-regulation in the 
form of organisational Data Protection SupervisorS33' combined with the provision 
of more information to the data subjects concerning the processing of their 
personal data. Crucial to the success of these recommendations was education, in 
particular, raising awareness among data subjects of their rights under the DPA 
1998. 
In other EU member states, industry specific codes of practice have attracted 
increased attention. The growth of the internet, and increased dissemination of 
personal data, point up to the increasing difficultY of regulating the flow of 
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personal data through 'one size fits all' national and transnational legislation. In 
the Netherlands, van de Donk and van Duivenboden 34 outlined the role of such 
codes in the national data protection system, where codes had been drawn up in 
consultation with the Dutch data protection authority. This form of 'controlled 
self-regulation' eased some of the pressure of enforcement from the national 
regulators, whilst allowing sectors of industry a degree of (officially approved) 
independence from the state - providing compliance was achieved with the codes. 
In the UK, codes of practice have been developed for the use of closed circuit 
television (CCTV)35 and more controversially concerning employment practiceS36. 
The case for codes of practice has been strengthened by Article 25 (2) of the Data 
Protection Directive, allowing them to be taken into consideration when assessing 
the 'adequacy' of data protection in third countries. The academic lawyer, 
Shaffer37 argued that the Directive has changed the way all US institutions 
addressed data protection issues. Since the enactment of the Directive, US 
businesses have been prodded to change their behaviour in order to avoid 
confrontations with EU regulators; US regulators have pressed US businesses to 
enhance their internal standards to avoid a regulatory conflict; and US privacy 
advocates have been presented with a functioning alternative to US law which 
they can promote. This analysis implied that the personal data of EU member 
states should be secure when transferred to the US in accordance with the 'Safe 
Harbor' agreement reached in July 200038 . Long and Quek39 concurred, assessing 
the 'Safe Harbor' agreement in the context of the debate over the impact of 
globalisation on state sovereignty. Writing in 2001 (published 2002) the authors 
argued that the actions of the US illustrated the degree to which even a powerful 
state has had to make substantial changes in its policies and, to a lesser extent, its 
institutions due to the external forces of globalisation. 
Raab, one of the most prominent researchers in data protection over the last 
decade, has published detailed articles focusing on the relationships within the 
various national data protection models - involving people, roles and institutions. 
In 1997, he argued that, if privacy was to be safeguarded, it would become 
increasingly important to comprehend - even shape - the connections among the 
various mechanisms or strategies, and among those who deploy thern4o. Raab 
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advocated a position in which the various market, civil society and state forces 
involved in 'co-producing' effective data protection were mutually dependent. 
However, this approach required ftirther detailed empirical and comparative 
investigation across systems in order for privacy and data protection to emerge as 
a coherent field of public policy. 
Bennett and Grant considered four possible futures for data protection in the 
excellent Visions ofPrl=3ý1 -a collection of essays by prominent academics and 
campaigners in the field. The first was the surveillance society, in which the 
individual would have little or no control over the collection and circulation of 
personal information. The second scenario comprised an incoherent and 
fragmented patchwork of data protection, where the pressures for surveillance 
would continue, but would be punctured by periodic and unpredictable victories 
for the privacy value. A third vision, perhaps the one currently in existence, was 
of privacy haves and have-nots. Some societies would apply instruments for data 
protection comprehensively and vigorously. Others, like the US, would react to 
privacy issues as they emerged in particular sectors. Finally, an optimistic vision 
was put forward of global privacy standards, with instruments of privacy 
protection spreading as a process of 'ratcheting up' to the standard of the EU Data 
Protection Directive. The authors correctly concluded that any of the above 
futures was possible, and could result from an explicit policy choice - by 
organisations applying data protection principles and building privacy into their 
practices, and by individuals protesting surveillance out. 
3.1.4 Sources of infonnation on data protection 
Standard legal texts 
Several standard books - aimed at practitioners - explain the content of the DPA 
1998. For detailed line-by-line analysis of the Act, together with a copy of the 
statute, Carey's Data protection in the UK proved a very useful reference source". 
It is a comprehensive guide - assuming no prior knowledge of data protection 
legislation. The book is structured logically, with chapters on the rights of 
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individuals, the data protection principles, exemptions and enforcement. In 
addition, specific chapters are dedicated to the internet, telecommunications and 
the obligations of employers. 
43 A more critical text is Jay and Hamilton Data Protection: law and practice 
Comprehensive like Carey, Jay and Hamilton, however, attempt greater historical 
detail: making greater reference to case law and to a series of hypothetical cases. 
The authors highlighted the limitations placed on the DPA 1998 - particularly its 
failure to address privacy, in spite of the clear provisions in the overarching EU 
Data Protection Directive relating to private life. This, argued the authors, could 
lead to problems in UK courts with lawyers arguing that the Directive has not been 
fully transposed into UK law". On the HRA 1998, the authors made the 
important point that the manner in which the Convention has been inserted into 
UK law did not endow individuals with a direct right to take action in courts for 
breach of their privacy. The right must be respected by the state, but if an 
individual's privacy is breached by a private party, the litigant has no basis on 
which to take action in breach of that right alone 45 . However, not all 
commentators agree with this interpretation. The views of Singh, a human rights 
barrister, will be considered in section 3.2 of this literature review. Nevertheless, 
Jay and Hamilton helped highlight such procedural complexities. In addition, they 
clarified what was missing from the DPA 1998, what needed to be developed 
through case law (for example the nature of the right to private life), and included 
a detailed case study on the definition of 'relevant filing system'. A privacy 
culture based on both the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998 may be possible, but it 
will take many years as it will need to be established via the UK courts. 
Academic-iournals 
The enactment of the Data Protection Directive in 1995 dramatically increased 
privacy research across many disciplines - including law, social sciences and 
politics. As a forurn for detailed analysis of such research, the academic journals 
proved most enlightening. For instant analysis, electronic journals have been 
particularly useful - combining academic articles with more descriptive 
commentaries. Publications include The Journal of Law, Information and 
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)46 Technology (JILT based at Warwick Law School, Warwick University and the 
Web Journal of Current Legal IssueS47 published bi-monthly at Newcastle 
University. The former has been especially prolific, with a dedicated data 
protection issue in January 1996 48 featuring articles outlining the European 
Directive - from the introduction by Lloyd 49 to features on its impact in various 
European countries such as Denmark, UK, Ireland and the Netherlands. Recent 
issues have considered technologies for privacy protection 50 . 
The Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (IVJCLI) is less orientated towards the 
information sector, but has featured some comment on data protection. Kosten 
and Pounder provide a detailed Article-by-Article analysis of the Data Protection 
Directive, drawing attention to some of the difficulties that may occur during the 
implementation of the Directive into UK law5l. Difficulties included exemptions 
'in the public interest' 52 - exemptions balancing right to privacy with 'rules 
governing freedom of expression'53 which could be problematic, possibly 
conflicting with Article 10 of the ECHR. Further detail can be found with 
Widdison's article which tabulated the key changes between the 1984 and 1998 
Data Protection ACtS54. More recent editions of WJCLI have featured freedom of 
information considerations" and the privacy implications of recent legislation 
permitting greater inception of communications by public organisations and 
business 56 
. 
In terms of ongoing research, the hard copy journals proved an excellent source of 
information, for example: International Review of Administrative Sciences; 
Cambridge Law Journal; Journal of Common Market Studies; The Information 
Society; Information, C6mmunication and Society; European Human Rights Law 
Review; Science, Technology and Human Values. Finally, the International 
Review of Law, Computers and Technology dedicated issues one and two to data 
protection in 1997, whilst in 1999 Revue Franqais dAdministration Publique 
featured a special issue (number 89) concerning the transposition of the EU Data 
Protection Directive into several counties. The above journals are generally more 
geared towards refereed articles than commentaries, often showcasing research 
conducted over a number of years. This included studies into the effectiveness of 
the DPA 1998, development of a methodology for assessing the workability of 
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data protection legislation, comparison of data protection law cross-nationally, and 
questions concerning the causes and effects of surveillance. Naturally, the 
journals in this subsection represent a sample of the publications in existence. In 
particular, there are many other relevant lawjoumals, especially in the US. 
Newsletters 
Business newsletters are essential for providing expert opinion on new 
developments within organisations - often prior to the publication of academic 
research in the area concerned. Privacy Laws and Business are a consultancy firm, 
producing international and UK newsletters concerning the impact of data 
protection law on the public and private sectors. A recent issue of the international 
newsletter featured activities of the European Commission during autumn 2002 57 . 
Particular attention was given to possible amendments to the Data Protection 
Directive, and to consultation concerning a proposed directive on workers' 
personal data. The UK edition has highlighted strategies employed by various 
organisations to achieve compliance with the DPA 1998 including retailers5s, 
banks 59 , and health6o. 
The style and structure of the newsletters varies considerably. Privacy and Data 
Protection, edited by Carey, was established in 2000 and dedicated largely to UK 
data protection issues, such as the debate over the use of the electoral roll for 
marketing purposes 61 and how employers cope with subject access requests from 
employeeS62. It has featured perspectives from overseas - with regular views from 
the US in particular. Finally, the journal provides an information service for 
subscribers - allowing receipt of documents free of charge. 
In the US, the monthly Privacy Journal tackles 'privacy in the computer age'. At 
approximately eight pages in length, it is lighter than the newsletters mentioned 
above. Additionally, it does not feature contributions from external commentators 
- being more of a news digest of privacy issues in the US. The only outside 
contributions - sometimes from privacy experts - come in the letters page. As a 
result, the journal, although a useful source of information, has a narrower 
perspective compared with some newsletters. 
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There is also a body of electronic newsletters. They tend to be less substantial in 
content, usually structured as news digests. Act Now details data protection issues 
in the UK public sector. In addition to news stories, it lists details of relevant 
conferences and other resources such as guides to the DPA 1998 by government 
departments, and training seminars on the Act. In the US, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC), a civil liberties group and research centre, publishes 
the bi-weekly EPIC Aler t63. This is a well ordered subscription newsletter, with a 
table of contents outlining the articles featured, a bookstore cataloguing other 
publications, and a list of conferences. Additionally, the 'EPIC Bill-Track' feature 
charts the progress of privacy-related legislation through Congress. Altogether, 
this newsletter provides a clear, informative picture of current US privacy policy 
and debate. Another prominent electronic newsletter, and forum for discussion of 
the effect of technology on privacy, is the Computer Privacy Digest64. 
Other newsletters include: in the UK, Data Protection and Privacy Practice; in the 
US, Privacy Times and Privacy andAmerican Business; in Canada, Privacy Files; 
and in Australia, Privacy Law and Policy Reporter. Finally, solicitors such as 
MasonS65 and Bird and Bird66 produce their own newsletters detailing recent legal 
developments in privacy law. 
3.1.5 The wider debate 
Government 
The official source for information concerning data protection policy and 
67 implementation in the UK is the OIC. In her Annual Report for 2002 , the 
Commissioner looked forward to the challenges faced by the government's 
response to terrorism and to freedom of information. Other pressing issues 
included public registers, particularly the use of the electoral roll, and reviewing 
the OIC's current enforcement powers. The Commissioner's Annual Reports are 
thus key documents outlining what the supervisory authority view as significant 
issues, and priorities for the subsequent 12 months. Finally, appendices to the 
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2002 Annual Report detail various statistics and performance indicators regarding 
notifications processed, complaints investigated, customer and level of public 
awareness. 
Within the European Union, data protection largely falls under the remit of the 
Data Protection Unit at the Internal Market Directorate. This Directorate's 
website has access to a variety of resources 68 . They 
include news, working papers, 
and studies into data protection, in addition to other international instruments on 
69 the topic, for example Convention 108 . Convention 108 had been drafted 
by the 
Council of Europe 70 , and opened up for signature in 1981 as world's first 
legally 
binding international data protection measure, setting a precedent for the 1995 EU 
Data Protection Directive 71 . 
Non Government Omanisations CNGOs) 
Civil liberties groups have become increasingly influential in lobbying 
government for changes to the law, often commissioning their own studies into 
key aspects of privacy. Considerable information is included on their websites: 
Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (ýttp: //www. cyber-riphts. org) containing 
detailed information on RIPA; the Foundation for Information Policy Research 
(bttp: //www. fipr. or , also heavily involved in the RIPA issue; Campaign for 
Freedom of Information (CFOI) (http: //www. cfoi. org. uk lobbying the 
government for changes to the freedom of information legislation; and Liberty 
(ýttl2: //www. liberty-human-rijzhts. oriz. Uki which has reported across a range of 
issues concerning human rights. The above sources have been complemented by 
the websites of pressure groups such as Statewatch (http: //www. statewatch-o-r-0, 
monitoring state and civil liberties in the EU, and the aforementioned civil liberties 
organisation EPIC (httD: //www. epic. or . 
The identification and availability of reports by such interest groups can be 
difficult. A key source for such documents has been expert privacy websites such 
as Privacy Exchange, (http: //www. privacyexchangg. org), and Privacy 
International, ttp: //www. privacy. org/DiD. The former website has an 
informative section listing reports in the field including those by governments and 
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civil liberties organisations. In 2002, separate reports were published by the US 
goverment and EPIC concerning privacy and consumer issues 72 . 
Finally, a key report was commissioned by Privacy International and the US-based 
civil liberties group, EPIC. Privacy and Human Rights 2002, reviewed the state of 
privacy in over fifty countries 73. It examined the impact of government anti- 
terrorism measures following the attacks of II September 2001. Trends identified 
included increased communications surveillance, and further profiling and 
identification of individuals. Conversely, the report discovered that laws to protect 
privacy in the workplace are gathering more support, and efforts to enact new data 
protection laws continue in Eastern Europe, Asia and South America. Thus, there 
is an active campaigning community regarding privacy interests. 
Expert forums 
Expert discussion forums play an important role in shaping the debate on data 
protection and privacy. The Data Protection Forum is a discussion group bringing 
together companies, public sector and consumers to discuss personal data in 
seminars. Presentations have been by organisations as diverse as the National 
Consumer Council and Deloitte, Touche. During 2002, seminars have been held 
on subject access requests, data protection in the workplace and international data 
sharing. Many of the presentations are available to members at: 
http: //www. dpforum. org. uk/previous. shtml. 
The JISCmail-hosted Data Protection Discussion Group 74 helps to promote the 
discussion of data protection among UK lawyers, academics and data protection 
officers. Online discussions include how the Act will work with regard to 
workplace surveillance, sensitive data - such as student names held by universities 
- and genetic data. The relevance of the discussions, and the standard of the 
inputs, is inevitably varied. Yet, it generally represents a worthwhile contribution 
to the debate on data protection. 
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Consumer opinion 
Important raw data can be gathered from surveys. This subsection details a 
sample from the US and Europe. Privacy Exchange has a detailed list of privacy 
surveys dating from 197975. Among the most prominent is the long series of 
surveys Equifax/Harris have undertaken since 1979 - under the direction of Alan 
Westin and heavily funded by industry, in particular the Equifax credit rating 
service. One of the most recent in the series followed the terrorist attacks in New 
York on II September 200 176 . This survey 
found customers demanding that 
companies increase measures to protect handling of their personal data, with 84% 
of respondents believing that company privacy policies should be independently 
verified. Key concerns regarding handling of personal information included: 
providing information to third parties without permission (75%) and lack of 
security (70%). Another US survey is by the Pew Internet and American Life 
Project who have published reports on various topics, for example: September II 
and the internet - one year on (2002); e-government (2002); and fear of online 
crime (200 1)77. 
Another valuable website for such information is http: //www. nua. ie/survgys - an 
online information database - containing statistics on all aspects of the internet, 
including privacy. Usefully, the information is provided in order of date, complete 
with links. Examples include an October 2002 survey stating that the percentage 
of Americans using the internet more frequently was still increasing, although the 
level of trust had fallen, with only 21% of internet users believing that making 
purchases online was secure 78 . 
In the UK, annual surveys are conducted by the regulatory authority, the OIC, for 
fifteen years the Office of the Data Protection Registrar (ODPR). This 
information can be found on the OIC website 
http: //www. datal)rotection. gov. uk/dpr/dpdoc. nsf 79. Commencing in 1987, public 
attitudes towards the use of personal data were tracked. Questions concerned 
attitudes towards personal privacy and the DPA - including awareness of the Act 
among data subjects. This had increased from 34% in 1987 to 71% in the 2001 
survey, the most recent research available. Other UK surveys include Perri 6's 
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study The future of privaqy8o for the think-tank DEMOS. Among the findings 
were that few people saw any loss of privacy as inevitable, and that very few were 
willing to trust any organisation - with supermarkets found to be the least trusted, 
few people being convinced that their loyalty cards are treated with enough 
confidentiality. 
Finally, Consumers International published Privacy@ne, 81 an international 
comparative study into consumer privacy on the internet in 2001. The research 
was conducted by an international project team, with participants from 14 
consumer organisations around the world assessing the approach of 751 internet 
sites to data protection. Among the findings were that just over two thirds of sites 
collected some sort of personal information, and that the vast majority of websites 
gave users no choice about being on the site's mailing list or having their name 
passed onto affiliates or third parties. Perhaps one of the more surprising findings 
was that the most popular US sites were more likely than the EU ones to give 
users a choice about being on the company's mailing list or having their name 
passed on, despite the Data Protection Directive obliging EU member states to 
provide users with a choice 82 . The report concluded with a series of 
recommendations including the need for greater consumer control over collection, 
use and disclosure of their personal data and the establishment of an independent 
oversight body to ensure compliance. This important report received considerable 
publicity at the time of publication, plus invitations from legislators to discuss the 
findings. When asked in September 2001 whether they would be conducting any 
further investigations into data privacy, Consumers International answered: "Yes, 
,, 83 we hope to but it depends on funding and won't be for 2-3 years. 
Media debate 
One of the paramount ways of keeping up to date has been via the quality press. 
The Guardian in particular has produced regular and well-informed pages on 
information issues, as well as launching its own campaign for greater openness in 
government in the wake of the proposed freedom of information legislation". 
Additional relevant articles have been found via newspaper databases such as 
British Newspaper Index and European Intelligence Wire". Those references 
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have yielded commentary on the RIPA, as well as a variety of consumer issues 
such as online purchasing, CCTV and workplace surveillance. 
The Guardian has recently featured stories concerning the UK governments' 
attempts to facilitate electronic government (or 'e-government) 86 . 
The expenditure 
of El billion to date has raised questions about its potential benefits. The online 
media is now an important source - allowing quick and easy access to breaking 
news. TT com - the online arm of the Financial Times - was one of the many 
sites that broadcast the UK government's retreat during summer 2002 over the 
expansion of RIPA 200087. Other stories featured recent EU legislation 
concerning junk emails, or spam 88 , and the online Independent 
has discussed the 
rise of CCTV89. 
Further coverage of the debate on privacy is located on online business news 
services such as Silicon. com and CNET Networks. The latter mentioned attempts 
of pressure groups in the US to force the online retailer, Amazon, to tighten up its 
privacy policies9o. Silicon, meanwhile, broke a story in May 2002 concerning the 
new Electronic Communications Directive 91 , and attempts by some EU member 
states to allow retention of telecommunications traffic data for not just national 
security, but also for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offenceS92 . This has been strongly opposed by civil liberties groups as an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy. 
For further international legal perspectives, the EU-based QuickLinks provides 
links to news items about the legal and regulatory aspects of the internet and the 
information society. The website http: //www. glinks. net contains frequent updates, 
an events page and news items organised by category (for example, 'Data 
Protection') as well as chronologically by issue and full text search. This source 
has proved to be the first point of reference for breaking news, providing citations 
that can be followed elsewhere. 
61 
3.2 Human Rights 
The significance of the HRA 1998 was stressed in the quality press. On the day it 
came into force -2 October 2000 -a front page caption on The Guardian read 
'UK law sees the biggest change in more than 300 years'93 . BBC Online ran a 
special feature during the first week of the Act, analysing its effect on the police, 
health, councils and workplace among other institutions? 4. Additionally, the Act 
has been warmly welcomed by the OIC, believing it will strengthen the application 
of the DPA 1998, as well as reinforcing the case for privacy and data protection 
more widely. An alternative journalistic view of the HRA 1998 came from 
Davies, who saw lawyers as the main beneficiaries from the spate of litigation that 
will stem from the Ac? 5. 
3.2.1 Incorporation of European Convention of Human Rights 
As the UK DPA 1998 is ultimately derived from the ECHR96 , especially Article 8, 
an initial understanding of human rights legislation is fundamental. Wadham and 
Mountfield's Blackstone's guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 provided an 
excellent introduction to the HRA 1998 97 . The authors began by pointing out that 
the HRA 1998 only incorporated part of the ECHR. It did not incorporate any of 
the procedural rights of the Convention, nor the right to an effective remedy 
(Article 13), although regard will be made to case law developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. Wadham and Mountfield proceeded to list 
the limitations of the Act, including issues such as the rule of law and whether any 
state interference was necessary in a democratic society or proportionate to the 
ends achieved, for example, the protection of privacy from excessive media 
interference. Usefully, the authors examined each Convention right, and issues 
that could be raised in UK courts. For Article 8, important issues existed 
regarding police listening devices, CCTV and employee privacy. The book also 
has a valuable table of cases referred to in the text, and appendices concerning 
background policy papers, parliamentary debates, rules of procedure for the 
European Court of Human Rights and the text of the ECHR. Altogether, this is a 
fundamental reference source. 
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3.2.2 Privacy and human rights context 
Specific academic research concerning privacy and human rights has been more 
difficult to locate. The information aspect of the right to privacy - data protection 
- has been analysed in detail in section 3. L Research into the cultural context of 
privacy as a human right has been limited. In 1994, a wide-ranging study into the 
issues surrounding privacy and human rights in the international context was 
published by Michael as Privacy and Human Rights". The author examined the 
social, political and cultural context to global privacy and data protection laws, 
highlighting the difficulties that the term 'privacy' may present to different 
societies and the diverse legal approaches taken to its protection. 
The legal approaches were categorised under three headings: Nordic, civil and 
common. Nordic was defined as a combination of legal remedy available to the 
individual through rights of access and the administrative regulation of 
computerised records. In many ways, this form of remedy pioneered information 
legislation. Certainly, rights of access were well entrenched, with Sweden having 
a Freedom of the Press Act in 1776, the oldest such law in the world. Sweden also 
led the way in regulation of computerised records, with the world's first national 
data protection law in 197399. 
The civil law approach differed in that it relied on statements of general principle. 
Its clear influence has been seen through the ECHR, a codification of international 
human rights law. Common law - the third approach identified by Michael - 
applied the principles through individual cases. In the UK, for example, the 
emphasis had been on particular legal remedies against particular infringements. 
Such rights were often developed by judges without reference to Parliament. An 
example would be the essentials of the English law of confidence. However, 
following the implementation of the first Data Protection Act in 1984, this trend 
had been somewhat eclipsed, with the UK establishing a supervisory body to 
police the legislation. Nevertheless, the enactment of the HRA 1998 has led to 
speculation that privacy common law may be developed. This issue will be 
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expounded later in Chapter 4. Michael concluded optimistically, stating that since 
the early 1970's the spread of automated information handling has almost been 
matched by the spread of legislation to protect individual privacyloo. 
3.2.3 HRA 1998: recent research 
Since the enactment of the HRA 1998 in October 2000, and the subsequent 
development of case law in this field, analysis in academic and legal journals has 
been increasing. This subsection comprises the writings of academics and 
practising lawyers concerning the possible development of a UK common law of 
privacy, based on the provisions of the HRA 1998. 
One of the earlier analyses of the possibilities of the new legislation was by Singh. 
Writing shortly after the HRA had completed its passage through Parliament in 
101 autumn 1998, Singh presented a detailed interpretation of the right to privacy . 
Although considering the interface between privacy and freedom of expression, 
his critique raised some interesting points in relation to privacy law. Firstly, 
Article 8 imposed an obligation to 'respect' privacy - not just - prohibit 
interferences to privacy by the State. This distinction, Singh argued, is crucial as 
Strasbourg has stated the positive obligation will extend to requiring action to 
protect an individual from the acts of other private parties 102 . This could set a 
precedent, for example making employers accountable to the HRA 1998 in the 
private, as well as public, sector 103 . 
Secondly, Singh argued that a provision in the HRA 1998 - Section 6 (6) - 
preventing the possibility of a complaint being made that Parliament failed to 
legislate against a particular right, could lead judges to develop their own common 
law - extending far beyond the current breach of confidence case law. To 
summarise Singh's findings: 
The HRA 1998 may be indirectly applicable against private 
individuals and companies; 
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(ii) The HRA 1998 provided a springboard for developing existing 
causes of action, thus filling gaps in the patchy privacy -protection 
provided in English law. 
Analysis ofcase law 2000-2003 
Academic and legal journals have analysed the privacy case law deriving from the 
HRA 1998 as and when judgements have been made. In this respect, the legal 
journals have been most prolific. Useful publications not previously mentioned in 
section 3.1.4 of this Chapter include: New Law Journal; The Law Quarterly 
Review; European Law Review; Industrial Law Journal; and European Law 
Journal. The standard of analysis varies from brief descriptions of a single case 
and its implications, to deeper analyses of the context to a number of judgements 
under the HRA 1998. 
Elliot (2001)104 was an example of the former -a brief report that analysed the 
Douglas case involving the celebrity wedding photographs'05. Reviewing the 
summaries of the three judges, Elliot concluded that the judgement pointed to two 
important developments. Firstly, it corrected the long-standing failure of English 
law to embrace the right to privacy as a legal right capable of existing 
independently from that of the law of confidential information. Secondly, the 
ruling disclosed judicial unwillingness to isolate the development of English 
common law from the influence of Convention rights. Therefore, it conferred 
upon them a degree of 'horizontal effect' - that is, the rights applied to some 
extent to private individuals as well as public bodies. However, at the time of 
writing (January 2003) the case is still ongoing 106 . 
Singh and Strachan (2002)107 took a longer view, placing the emerging law of 
privacy in historical context and considering how the English courts may secure 
privacy rights. The most recent cases reviewed were those involving supermodel 
Naomi Campbell's claim against the Daily Mirror for breach of privacy after 
being photographed leaving Narcotics Anonymous'08, and the footballer Gary 
Flitcroft's attempts to keep his extra-marital affairs out of the public domain'09. In 
both cases, the judgements were reached in March 2002, although the Campbell 
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case is ongoing"O. The authors argued that the HRA 1998 had become a catalyst 
for the development of the common law of breach of confidence. However, the 
courts although beginning to recognise the existence of a separate right to privacy, 
had yet to express that right in a clear and explicit way. 
3.3 Individual Privacy protection: the organisational dimension 
3.3.1 New legislative framework: potential for conflict? 
In the new legislative environment, perhaps the area where the impact of the new 
regulations is most uncertain is within organisations. In addition to the DPA 1998 
and HRA 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI's) Lawful Business 
Practice Regulations"' and the OIC's Draft Code ofPractice: the use ofpersonal 
data in employerlemployee relationships 112 have, or will have, a substantial 
bearing on workplace privacy. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
(ATCSA) 2001 113 is also relevant. The above, and other legislation from 1988 
onwards can be referred to via the HMSO website: 
http: //www. hmso. p, ov. uk/acts. htm. Finally, official documents detailing reactions 
to government proposals are helpful, for example, in the case of the Lawful 
Business Practice Regulations 114 . 
In April 2002, the UK government addressed some of these concerns with the 
publication of its report Privacy and data-sharing: the way forward for public 
services"S. A hugely significant document for all public organisations, Privacy 
and data-sharing sought to chart a course between achieving greater electronic 
provision of public services and the evolving legal framework concerning human 
rights issues and privacy. In order to achieve this, the public needed to trust the 
government with its personal data. To this end, 25 recommendations are made for 
public organisations, including: development of data standards to improve 
accuracy of personal data; adoption of the BS 7799 standard promoting 
information security; and the appointment of board level Chief Knowledge 
Officers to integrate issues such as data protection, human rights, freedom of 
information and records management. All public sector organisations are expected 
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to embody their service-level privacy agreements in a 'Public Service Trust 
Charter'. The 'Charter' is currently in the second round of consultation, with a 
view to being finalised by spring 20031 16 . 
Significant EU grey literature included the COM series of documents. These 
documents include proposals for legislation, annual reports, and policy statements. 
They can be traced via the excellent Eurolaw service at http: //www. ili. co. uk. This 
site also includes Court case decisions and parliamentary questions. Finally, in 
order to focus on a particular piece of legislation for example, the Data Protection 
Directive, the European Parliament website <http: //www. europarl. eu. int> has a 
helpful legal observatory with details on documents produced, the agents involved 
and providing commentary - mainly in French - on the various stages leading to 
the final text. This is an excellent facility and the first point of reference for any 
document search regarding EU legislation. 
3.3.2 Academic and legal research 
Extensive research into the practice of surveillance has been conducted over a 
number of years. In 1988 Clarke 117 used the term 'dataveillance' in a paper to 
describe the systematic monitoring of people's actions or communications through 
the application of information technology. The effects of this monitoring by 
public organisations, and attempts to limit it, have been studied by authors such as 
Westin, Miller, Rule and Flaherty - all mentioned in section 3.1. Important 
research in private sector activity in this field has been conducted by Cate 118 - 
advocating minimal legal and government intervention in the data handling 
practices of private organisations - and Reidenberg 119 - arguing for globalised 
standards for fair information practice, 'co-regulating' the divergent data 
protection practices of the EU and the US. 
Surveillance within organisations has been discussed at length by Mohammed in a 
JILT article in 1999120. In a 1999 conference paper, Davies provided a detailed 
overview of the new technologies coming to the fore 121 _ extending to every 
aspect of a worker's life. Miniature cameras monitor behaviour. 'Smart' 
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identification badges - popular with IT companies such as Olivetti Research in 
Cambridge - track an employee's movement around a building. Telephone 
Management Systems analyse the pattern of telephone use and the destination of 
calls. Computer-based monitoring systems record statistics about the employee 
assigned to a particular terminal, including the number of keystrokes per minute 
and the amount of time spent on the computer. Software such as Baltimore's 
MAILsweeper and WEBsweeper can monitor employee email and web use - 
blocking access to 'backdoor' email accounts such as Hotmail 122 . Finally, 
psychological tests, aptitude tests, performance tests, and personality tests - many 
of which are electronically assessed - raise a great many issues of privacy, control 
and fairness. For many employees, surveillance and monitoring have become part 
of the modem work environment. 
Since the terrorist attacks of II September 2001, the privacy implications of anti- 
terrorism measures enacted by most Western governments have come under 
scrutiny. Malcolm and Barker (2002) 123 assessed the problems faced by 
communications providers - for example, telephone companies and internet 
service providers - in complying with the provisions of the UKs ATCSA 2001. 
Under the provisions of this Act, traffic data must be retained by organisations. 
Initially, this will be on a voluntary, self-regulating basis 124 . However, the 
possibility has been left open for compliance through statutory instrument 125 . The 
authors highlighted concerns about the compatibility of this provision with 
Principle Five of the DPA 1998 which stated that data must not be held any longer 
than necessary 126 . Moreover, the costs of compliance incurred by communications 
providers are likely to be significant 127 . New systems will have to be put in place 
to cope with increased demand for retention and access - by national security and 
law enforcement agencies, and by data subjects themselves - under the DPA 1998. 
As the EU was approving a new Directive in this field 128 , the authors expected the 
UK government to enact the statutory option, compelling communications 
provides to retain such traffic data. 
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3.3.3 Regulating employee personal data 
From the literature reviewed in this section, there is a requirement for 
organisations to devise clear policies concerning data collection, use and retention. 
Research into such policies forms a significant part of the case study fieldwork, 
the findings of which are discussed in Chapter 7. In particular, the way 
organisations process data belonging to their employees has been viewed by some 
regulators and academics as requiring ftirther clarification. Given that data 
protection legislation generally governs the processing of all personal data - 
belonging to both clients and employees - held by organisations, the case for 
further legislation is contentious. Nevertheless, the European Commission has 
recently expressed its intention to legislate to safeguard workers' personal data, 
citing globalisation, technological advance and 'post II September insecurity' as 
the main drivers129. This proposal, and the response of employers in particular, is 
discussed in ftirther detail in Chapter 6. 
A detailed policy statement on the regulation on protection of employees' personal 
data was drawn up by academic, lawyer and former data protection regulator, 
Simitis in 1999130. The author believed that employees needed to be empowered 
to protect their own privacy. This is the reverse of current situation where the 
onus appears to be on employees, and the community at large, to show that 
surveillance is not necessary. Simitis defined eight areas - closely linked to the 
DPA 1998's eight data protection principles - as being crucial to the regulation of 
employee data. Chief among these, were the method of data collection, with 
informed consent of the employee being crucial, and the collective rights of the 
employees. 
In many ways, the last factor summarised Simitis' point: that employees, 
collectively through representatives, should at least be informed and consulted 
prior to the introduction or modification of automated data processing systems; 
before direct and indirect electronic monitoring; and as to the purpose, content and 
prospective uses of any questionnaires or tests. However, it is highly unlikely that 
organisations, particularly in the UK, would accept such an increase in regulations. 
The course that the UK government has chosen to regulate employees privacy is 
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altogether more moderate, as demonstrated by the Lawful Business Practice 
Regulations 2000. This measure actually legally permits employers to read staff 
emails and monitor websites visited by staff - if they think an employee is 
131 committing a crime or doing something 'unauthorised' 
At the same time, the OIC's recent draft Code of Practice in this area is almost 
certainly relevant to monitoring of personal electronic communications such as 
email. According to the draft Code, employers have to ensure that monitoring is 
in such a way that it does not intrude unnecessarily, otherwise employers who 
acquire information under the Lawful Business Practice Regulations could still be 
prosecuted by the OIC. The employer clearly needs a system that complies with 
three Acts - the DPA 1998, HRA 1998 and RIPA 2000 - so the one most 
favourable to employees will determine how much employers can intercept. 
Currently, the DPA's Draft Code of Practice offers most protection. However, 
according to the OIC, this Code is now not due to be finalised until "Easter 
132 2003" 
3.4 Conclusions 
From this literature review, three strands of the debate can be identified that are of 
particular interest to this study: 
The increasing difficulty of regulating the flow of personal infonnation 
through the 'one size fits all' national and transnational legislation that has 
been favoured by European nations for three decades. 
The difficulty of defining information privacy ensured that safeguarding individual 
rights in this field has been a formidable task from the outset. With the increased 
dissemination of personal data via stand-alone computers rather than centralised 
government databanks, data protection law needs to evolve. Sector-specific codes 
of practice and model agreements (such as 'Safe Harbor') between organisations 
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trading in different countries have become increasingly prevalent, with privacy 
being viewed as a quality standard to be 'built-in' to good business practice. 
The possible development - in the absence of privacy legislation - of 
privacy common law by the UK courts. 
The method of incorporating the ECHR into UK law devised by the government 
has ensured that the HRA guarantees the right to privacy. However, an individual 
cannot take action in breach of that right alone. The rulings in the Douglas and 
Campbell suggested that, although the HRA 1998 is still in its infancy and both 
cases are still in progress, a separate privacy common law remains a distinct 
possibility. 
(iii) The regulatory morass regarding privacy in organisations. 
In particular, the relationship between the Lawful Business Practice Regulations 
and the Draft Code of Practice: The use ofpersonal data in employerlemployee 
relationships has caused confusion. The OIC believe that the two can work in 
133 tandem, but trade unions and employers' organisations remain to be convinced . 
The ATCSA 2001 has added to the uncertainty, particularly for communications 
providers. The government report Privacy and data-sharing outlined important 
recommendations that will have a significant impact on the handling of personal 
data in the public sector, aiming to streamline procedures and build trust between 
individuals and the state. Finally, organisations, have been increasingly devising 
their own privacy standards - based on official guidance, but shaped around their 
particular corporate needs. Organisational privacy policies have been studied as 
part of the case study fieldwork, discussed in Chapter 7. 
There is certainly a flourishing and vibrant debate in this field - with contributions 
from civil liberties organisations, the quality press, academics and discussion 
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groups. Various fora for exchanging ideas exist - provi ing important stimuli 
for 
the future development of data protection policy research. 
Comparative studies have increased the knowledge of experience overseas. 
Indeed, the EU Data Protection Directive can be viewed as a testament to 
incorporation of some of the diverse legislative strands identified by Bennett - 
particularly the ombudsman approach from Germany, and the promotion of sector 
specific codes of practice prominent in the Netherlands. There is considerable 
uncertainty as to whether recent UK legislation offers adequate protection for 
individual's personal data. Both the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998 are relatively 
recent Acts of Parliament, with little case law to date. Consequently, the bulk of 
the literature concerning the legislations' impact on organisations has been 
necessarily speculative. Thus, there is a need for a detailed critical study of this 
nature into the effect of the DPA 1998 on the data handling processes of public 
organisations. Such research will be required to develop the findings of the 
academics and lawyers referred to in this literature review. 
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4. Data Protection and the Law 
4.1 Tntroduction 
The development of data protection law within the UK, the EU and globally has 
been complex and varied. This Chapter focuses on the context and concepts of 
data protection legislation - in particular the processes leading up to the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998. It commences by defining the concept of data protection as a 
value distinct from the wider field of privacy. Section 4.2 charts the early 
development of data protection law internationally. This section commences with 
public concerns at the growth of large computer data banks with a capacity to store 
vast amounts of information concerning individuals, and concludes with nascent 
attempts to regulate this by large intergovernmental organisations such as the 
Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). These measures represented early attempts at international 
policy 'convergence', a theme first developed in Bennett's book Regulating 
Privacyl. 
International development of data protection law was strengthened from the early 
1990's with the added input of the then European Economic Community (EEC). 
With divergent national approaches to data protection legislation threatening to 
distort the single market, and with increased data-sharing among member states 
following the Schengen Agreement, the EEC perceived a growing need to 
harmonise the disparate data protection legislation. Section 4.3 assesses the case 
for a general Directive and the structural reforms undertaken by the system of 
European governance at the time - transforming the EEC into the European Union 
(EU). This section concludes by outlining the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC, the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 97/66/EC, 
and the latter's replacement - the Electronic Communications Directive 
2002/58/EC, enacted in July 2002. 
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The remainder of this Chapter analyses various national attempts to legislate for 
information privacy. Section 4.4 assesses the early attempts made in Europe by 
the German Land (state) of Hesse (1970) and Sweden (1973) to legislate for 
information privacy. Additionally, German attempts to legislate at a Federal level, 
and the Netherlands' pioneering use of sectoraI2 codes of practice are considered. 
In all cases, analysis is comprehensive - charting a chronological course from the 
motivations to drafting the earliest laws to the need to update and reassess 
legislation in reaction to both national and international developments. 
Section 4.5 assesses the UK experience in detail. Analysis commences with the 
first private members' bills on privacy drafted in the early 1960's, through detailed 
government papers and reports produced in the 1970's, concluding with the UK's 
first Data Protection Act, passed in 1984. Section 4.6 brings the UK experience up 
to date, charting attempts to implement an infrastructure for successful data 
protection, and gauging the privacy implications of the DPA 1998 - enacted to 
implement Directive 95/46/EC. Finally, organisational considerations are 
considered, with particular reference to the Employment Practices Code of 
Practice, currently being published in various sections by the OIC. 
Section 4.7 considers the experience in North America. This is of vital importance 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, trading concerns, with the US being the UK's 
and EU's largest trading partner. Secondly, related to trade, employment 
considerations with a sizeable number of North American companies having 
subsidiaries based in the EU. Finally, in order for protection of personal 
information to be successful in the current globalised political and economic 
climate, the world's largest economy needs to be accommodated. The domestic 
experience of the US is considered, from judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution to the Privacy Act 1974 - drafted in response to domestic political 
scandal. Additionally, attempts to accommodate Directive 95/46/EU through a 
'Safe Harbor' agreement - opposed by the current US administration - are 
analysed. The experience of Canada in this field serves as a contrast. Over a 
period of twenty years, Canada has steadily consolidated its data protection 
legislation, from patchwork state protection to a federalised structure under the 
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Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2001 that has met 
with approval from the EU3. 
Finally, conclusions are offered - summarising the key findings from this Chapter. 
4.1.1 Method 
Desk research accounted for the bulk of the methodology in this chapter. 
Documents were analysed from organisations as diverse as the European Union 
(formerly Community), the UK government, the non-specialist press, consumer 
groups, and civil liberties organisations. However, use has been made of expert 
interviews - in particular those conducted with officials from the European and the 
UK government. The conclusions drawn will be tested during the fieldwork stage. 
Most of the evidence analysed in this chapter was documentary - legislation, court 
cases, codes of practice, government consultation documents and European Union 
(EU) working papers. 
4.1.2 Obiectives 
The objectives of this chapter are to: 
Set the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 in context with previous data 
protection and privacy legislation, both in the UK and abroad; 
Identify the main provisions of the DPA 1998 affecting individual data 
privacy, assessing whether the UK really does provide best practice in this 
area; 
Investigate the success of EU harmonisation, establishing whether (and 
how) the UK differs from other member states regarding data protection 
legislation; 
Analyse the relationship between the EU and the US, assessing the impact 
of the 'Safe Harbor' on the international transfer of personal data. 
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4.1.3 Definitions: 'privacy' and 'data protection' 
The starting point for the debate about privacy and computers, when it commenced 
in the US and Europe in the 1960's, was the concept of 'privacy'. 'Privacy' has 
proved difficult to define, being more of a broad social value than a specific policy 
area, with different people having diverse notions of 'privacy'. However, many 
attempts have been made, from Judge Cooley's very wide 'right to be let alone' in 
1888 4, to the International Commission of Jurists' Nordic Conference's catalogue 
of ten items in 19675. In the UK, a concise working definition was posited by the 
Calcutt Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) 6: 
'the right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his 
personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or 
by publication of information. ' 
This is close to the formulation in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR)7 , and extended beyond the protection of personal information. 
The definition of 'data protection', however, is more precise. According to Jay, it 
outlined: 
'(a) the standards to be applied when handling information about people, 
and; 
(b) the practices to be followed to achieve and maintain those standards. ' 8 
This is the interpretation frequently encountered in organisational circles. It 
relates to the good practice policies of organisations in which protection is 
afforded through the prevention of hacking, unauthorised access, corruption of 
data, or other damage. 'Data protection' has been construed as data security and 
national data protection laws have frequently been merely a means of facilitating 
the use of personal data rather than protecting privacy. However, security is only 
one principle of 'data protection', and actually has less to do with the privacy 
interests of those whose data are held, and more with the organisation's functional 
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need to maintain confidentiality of information they hold against the risks of leaks 
or destruction9. 'Data protection' represents a reconciliation of values, especially 
between the claims of personal 'privacy' and the unimpeded flow of information 
between organisations within or between countries. Indeed, Raablo argued that 
'data protection' can contribute to the achievement of non-privacy values such as 
public confidence in the police or other public organisations. 
The overlap between the fields of 'privacy' and 'data protection' was identified by 
the Lindop Committee on Data Protection (1978) as 'data privacy' - 'the 
individual's claim to control the circulation of data about himself". This 
definition acknowledged the pioneering work of Westin and Miller, discussed in 
Chapter 3. It lends clarity to the concept, referred to in this thesis simply as 'data 
protection' in order to avoid any confusion. 
4.2 The international scene: from guidance to lezal enforcement 1967-1981 
Much of present day interest in data protection stemmed from the growth of 
information technology and widespread concern over the potential for computers 
to intrude into the lives of individuals. During the 1960's and 1970's, a number of 
countries initiated studies on both personal data and individual privacy. 
4.2.1 The Nordic Conference 
In 1967, the Swedish section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
hosted a conference on the issue in Stockholm 12 . An independent body of judges 
and lawyers 13 , the ICJ lobbies for the promotion of human rights through research 
and by influencing policy-makers, particularly in intergovernmental organisations 
such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Their declaration 
concerning the meaning of the right to privacy listed ten specific rights. Some of 
the rights applied to data protection more closely than others. The last three rights 
referred to the need for the individual to be protected against: 
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Interference with his correspondence; 
Misuse of his private communications, written or oral; 
(iii) Disclosure of information given or received by him in circumstances of 
professional confidence. 
Although having no legal force, they were highly persuasive, being an important 
reference point in the national debates about the meaning of privacy and data 
protection that continued throughout the 1970's. In the UK, the rights were 
14 heavily drawn on in Brian Walden's Right to Privacy Bill 1969 , the debate of 
which moved the government into commissioning the Younger Committee on 
Privacy in 1970. 
Following on from the Nordic Conference 1967, there was a lot of activity in the 
international field concerning data protection. Discussions took place in the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OECD. Some regulation of 
international data traffic was deemed necessary for two reasons: 
(i) 
(ii) 
To avoid data users 15 evading a country's own data protection rules by 
processing abroad personal information about its own citizens; 
To preserve the free flow of information against unilateral protectionist 
measures that may disrupt international trade. 
It is the endeavours of intergovernmental bodies to provide regulation that will be 
analysed in the remainder of this section. During the period 1973-1981 two 
organisations were particularly active: the Council of Europe and the OECD. 
4.2.2 The Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe was formed in 1949 with the aim of bringing political 
cooperation for the advancement and protection of individual rights and freedoms 
throughout Europe. It was a pan European inter-governmental organisation - 
wholly distinct from the EEC, and in 1967 sent observers to the Nordic 
Conference. Its involvement was particularly significant, as the Council's 
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Convention on Human Rights16 had been the one of the first European publications 
to make specific mention of the individual right to privacy. This was further 
developed, with the Council initiating a survey (1968-1970) on the legislation of 
its member states with regard to human rights and modem scientific and 
technological developments. The survey found that the existing law within 
member states did not provide sufficient protection for the citizen against 
intrusions on privacy by technical devices 17 . Legislation at the time touched on 
the protection of privacy from a limited point of view, such as secrecy of 
correspondence or the inviolability of the home. 
Furthermore the Council found that the ramifications of the concept of privacy had 
never been established. It was 'doubtful whether the European Convention on 
Human Rights ... offer[ed] satisfactory safeguards against technological intrusions 
into privacy'18. The survey noted, for example, that the Convention took into 
account only interferences with private life by public authorities, not by private 
parties. A particularly new threat to privacy came from the rapid growth and 
popularisation of computer technology. The ability of the computers to build up 
'data banks'- collections or integrated networks of information capable of 
providing instantly, and over large distances, extensive data on individuals - was a 
major concern. 
EarL Resolutions 
Following the survey, the Council set up a Committee on the Protection of Privacy 
vis-A-vis Electronic Data Banks. The Committee reviewed the situation in various 
member states, paying particular attention to the data protection laws in Hesse and 
Sweden. Following this, the Committee drafted Resolution (73) 22 - elaborating a 
set of principles concerning the protection of the privacy of personal information 
vis-A-vis electronic data banks in the private sector19. 
A year later, the Council of Europe produced Resolution (74) 29 on the protection 
of privacy of individuals vis-A-vis electronic data banks in the public sector 20. 
This set out similar standards for processing in the public sector. Ile key 
difference between the Resolution (74) 29 and Resolution (73) 22 was that whilst 
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the latter did not include internal use of personal data (only the release of 
information to third parties), the public sector resolution found it difficult to 
distinguish between internal and external use. This was on the basis that in many 
member states all the branches of public administration were regarded as forming 
a whole, those different branches could not be considered 'third party' towards 
each other2l. In both cases, the resolutions were drafted as recommendations to 
member states, taking into account both: 'the rapid development of computer 
technology and the urgency for European action before new divergences anse 
between the laws of the member states'22 . It is significant that, at this early stage, 
harmonisation was seen as an issue. Indeed, Resolution (73) 22 mooted the 
possibility of a binding convention as a way of coping with the issue of 
transnational data banks 23 . At this stage, the two Resolutions in their own right 
influenced the drafting of data protection principles in various member countries, 
and resembled those contained in paragraph 34 of the 1975 UK White Paper 
4 Computers and Privaq)ý . 
Convention 108 
In 1976, following on from the Resolutions on Electronic Data Banks, the Council 
of Europe established a Committee of Experts on Data Protection25. This body 
consisted of two experts from each member state, with the UK being represented 
by officials from the Home Office and the Central Computer Agency. Its terms of 
reference were defined in June 1977 and included a provision to: 
4prepare a Convention on the protection of privacy in relation to data 
processing abroad and transfrontier data processing. ' 26 
The work of this Committee was a natural continuation of the work carried out 
earlier by the Committee on the Protection of Privacy vis-a-vis Electronic Data 
Banks in order to both secure international solutions to an international problem, 
and to reinforce national legislation. The Committee of Experts had its first 
meeting in November 1976, with the OECD, EEC, Australia, the US and Canada 
among those enjoying observer status. Close liaison was maintained between the 
OECD both at the secretariat level and at the level of the Council of Europe's 
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Committee of Experts and its OECD counterpart - the Data Bank Panel, succeeded 
in 1978 by an expert group on transborder data barriers. 
From November 1976 to May 1979, the Committee of Experts on Data Protection 
held four meetings, first under French chairmanship, then subsequently under that 
of the UK. The details were worked out by a working party of experts from ten 
member states, including the UK. The text was finalised in April 1980, and 
subsequently adopted by the Council of Europe. The Convention - number 108 - 
opened for signature on 28 January 1981. Since a wide geographical scope was 
considered essential in order for the Convention to be effective, Article 22 of the 
document fixed at five the number of ratifications by member states necessary for 
its entry into force. Therefore, as Table I below shows, the Convention did not 
enter into force until three months after ratification by Germany in June 1985. By 
1990 - when the European Commission first drafted a general data protection 
directive - the number of ratifications had risen to 10. By mid-January 2003, this 
total had nearly trebled to 29. 
States 
Date of 
signature 
Date of 
ratification 
Date of entry into 
force 
Sweden 28/01/81 29/09/82 01/10/85 
France 28/01/81 24/03/83 01/10/85 
Spain 28/01/82 31/01/84 01/10/85 
Norway 13/03/81 20/02/84 01/10/85 
(West) Germany 28/01/81 19/06/85 01/10/85 
United Kingdom 14/05/81 26/08/87 01/12/87 
Luxembourg 28/01/81 10/02/88 01/06/88 
Austria 28/01/81 30/03/88 01/07/88 
Denmark 28/01/81 23/10/89 01/02/90 
Ireland 18/12/86 25/04/90 01/08/90 
Table 3: Early ratification of Convention 108 by Council of Europe member states 1982-1990 
Source: Treaty Office, Council of Europe at hqp: //conventions. coe. int 
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The Convention was significant as it represented the first attempt at European- 
wide data protection legislation. The preamble clearly stated that its aim was to 
reconcile the need for privacy embodied in the ECHR Article 8 with free trade. 
Furthermore, like the ECHR, this measure was binding on contracting states. 
However, unlike the ECHF, Article 23 of Convention 108 was drafted with a view 
to allowing the accession of non-member states to the instrumen t27. Indeed, the 
explanatory report to the Convention stated that in this respect it was not advisable 
to rely solely on the ECHR for data protection, as it is a 'closed instrument' - not 
permitting the participation of non-European and non-member states 28 . 
The Convention had three main purposes: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
To establish minimum standards of data protection which contracting 
states would undertake to enforce internally; 
To define special rules on transborder data flows; 
To facilitate mutual assistance and cooperation between national data 
protection authorities. 
The principles, found in Chapter II of the Convention, owed much to the principles 
laid down in the earlier Council of Europe Resolutions on data banks - (73) 22 and 
(74) 29, and, to legislative developments in member states 29. They were to form 
the common core in the domestic legislation of contracting states, and were as 
follows: 
Fair and lawful obtaining and processing of personal data; 
Storage of data only for specified purposes; 
(iii) Personal data should not be used in ways incompatible with those 
purposes; 
(iv) Personal data should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purposes to which the data are stored; 
(v) Personal data should be accurate and where necessary kept up to date; 
(vi) Personal data should be preserved in identifiable form for no longer 
than is necessary; 
(vii) There should be adequate security for personal data; 
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(viii) Personal data should be available to be accessed by individuals who 
have rights of rectification and erasure. 
Whilst the Convention gave clear and precise instructions as to the purpose to be 
achieved by each principle, the manner of implementation in domestic law was left 
to each member state. Chapter III - concerning transborder data flows - aimed to 
reconcile the simultaneous and often competing requirements of free flow of 
information and data protection. The main rule was that transborder data flows 
between contracting states were not to be the subject of any special controls3o. 
Thus, this avoided the principle of free flow of information being jeopardised by 
any form of protectionism. 
Finally, Chapters IV and V provided the mechanisms for cooperation between 
contracting states. The former concerned individual cases, for example mutual 
cooperation between authorities and assistance to data subjects abroad. Chapter V 
concerned cooperation with regard to the Convention as a whole. A Consultative 
Committee was set up on enactment of the Convention, consisting of two 
representatives from each contracting state. Their role was purely advisory, 
putting forward opinions and proposals concerning the application of - and 
amendments to - the Convention. 
States were not to ratify the instrument until they had national law in place 
guaranteeing compliance with standards set out in the Convention 3 1. In effect, 
until states could give such guarantees, they ran the risk of having trade barriers 
erected against them or alternatively becoming 'data havens' for those wishing to 
avoid the data processing regulations. It was this threat of trade barriers, more 
than any regard for individual privacy, that was to galvanise the UK government 
into action 32 . In 1984, the UK passed the Data Protection Act, finally ratifying the 
Convention in August 1987. 
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4.2.3 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an 
international organisation whose primary aims are to foster economic stability and 
encourage trade. It was initially founded as the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation in 1948 with the aim of coordinating national economic 
policies in post-war Europe. In 1960, as other European institutions took 
responsibility for economic cooperation, it transformed into an international 
trading body with the accession of Canada and the US. In 1964, Japan became a 
member with Australia and New Zealand subsequently gaining membership. 
The OECD imidelines 
Until 1978, OECD work in the field of data protection was conducted by the Data 
Bank Panel, which considered data protection among other issues. However, the 
implications of the proposed Council of Europe Convention forced the OECD to 
reconsider its priorities in this field. During a seminar on Transborder Data Flows 
and the Protection of Privacy in September 1977, the non-European participants 
expressed concern that the Convention would lead to restrictions being placed on 
the export of personal data to non-contracting states 33 . Such discrimination had 
already occurred as a result of national legislation. The Swedish Data Inspection 
Board, for example, had been particularly strict in controlling the export of 
personal data to countries without similar data protection laws. Swedish 
organisations had sometimes been refused permission to export data to processing 
by UK service companieS34 , and in 1995 American Airlines was prevented from 
transferring passenger meal preference data that could reveal religious convictions 
(for example, kosher food) to the US for processing 35 . 
Therefore, to protect the requirements of its wider membership, the OECD 
embarked on a separate drafting exercise of its own. The Data Bank Panel was 
replaced with an Expert Group on Transborder Data Barriers and Privacy 
Protection, which first met in April 1978. Its terms of reference included: 
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'develop guidelines on basic rules governing the transborder flow and the 
protection of personal data and privacy, in order to facilitate the 
harmonisation of national legislation, without this precluding at a later 
date the establishment of an international convention. ' 36 
The latter part of the statement was significant, with the option of a joint 
Convention a further indication of the close cooperation and consultation at an 
international level with the Council of Europe and the EEC. 
In 1980, the OECD adopted recommendations in relation to data protection37 - 
Perhaps the weakest of data protection instruments issued at this time, the OECD 
Guidelines focused on eight general principles, based broadly on those set out by 
the UK Younger Report (refer to section 4.5.1 of this Chapter). The principles 
dealt with matters such as: limiting the amount of information collected; ensuring 
its accuracy and quality; ensuring the restriction of its use to the purpose specified; 
provision of adequate safeguards for the secure storage of personal data; 
permitting individuals to check access to the validity of personal data; and 
requiring the accountability of the operators of data banks for those stores of 
personal information. The preamble emphasised the concern that national moves 
to protect privacy might create unjustified barriers to trade, and recommended that 
member states take account of the guidelines in their domestic legislation in order 
to overcome the possibility of trade barriers. This point is vague in its 
requirements, supporting both legislation and self-regulation. Nevertheless, it 
does require both 'reasonable means for individuals to exercise their rights' and 
'adequate sanctions and remedies in case of failures to comply'38 . 
Applicable to both public and private sectors, the Guidelines recommended that 
transborder data flows should not be restricted to other member states. An annual 
review of national progress was also instrumented. Yet, there was no formal 
process to ratify or adopt the OECD Guidelines. As such the Guidelines had little 
influence within Europe, with EEC states, as shown in Table 2, implementing 
Convention 108. However, the Guidelines have proved popular as a forum for the 
discussion of data protection issues among the wider international community. 
They were accepted immediately by the US and have been widely referred to in 
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Canada as a basis for its self-regulatory instruments, culminating in the Canadian 
Standards Association's 1996 Model Code for the Protection of Personal 
Information". Moreover, they have stood the test of time, and have since been 
under active development by the OECD's Group of Experts on Security and 
Privacy, particularly in relation to international networksýo. 
4.3 'Top down': the role of the European Commission 1985-2003 
4.3.1 Context: The European Economic Communijy (EEC) 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in 1957 - developing out 
of the European Coal and Steel Community which had been founded six years 
earlier. The EEC comprised six founding states - France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On 1 January 1973, the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland acceded, increasing membership to nine. 
Date Country 
25 March 1957 Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
I January 1973 Denmark 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
I January 1981 Greece 
I January 1986 Portugal 
Spain 
I January 1995 Austria 
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Finland 
Sweden 
Table 4: Accession of member states to the European Community 
Source: Weidenfeld, W. and W. Wessels. Europe from A to Z- guide to European integration. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997. 
The debate on data protection in the EEC during the period 1973-1981 turned on 
the relationship between the Commission of the European Communities (hereafter 
the European Commission) - the institution that proposes, and then enforces EEC 
legislation - and the European Parliament, which during this period had a largely 
advisory role 41 . The Commission first expressed an interest in data protection in 
1973, arguing that it would be better to establish common ground rules at an early 
stage than have subsequently to harmonise conflicting national legislatioril 2. In 
1974 it sought the views of the European Parliament on the matter. According to 
Mellors and Pollitt, it was 'the first time that it had asked for guidance from the 
Parliament before drafting a directive 43 . The Parliament responded by passing 
resolutions in 1975 and 1977 calling on the Commission to prepare a directive on 
safeguards for privacy. By 1976, the Commission had set up its own Group of 
Experts on Data Processing and the Protection of Privacy, a body on which the UK 
was represented by Home Office officials. This group commissioned a study into 
transborder data flows, the possible distortion of competition, and data security. 
However, in 1980, the European Commission chose to merely address a 
Recommendation to Member States 44 that they should ratify the Council of 
Europe's Convention 108 before the end of 1982. 
The European Community was thus a latecomer regarding data protection 
measures. In fact, it was factors from outside - particularly trade - that prompted 
the Commission to submit its first proposal for a Directive in 1990. The issues 
surrounding the move towards a Directive will be analysed in this section, along 
with the key provisions of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC45, finalised in 
1995. A sister Directive, concerning data protection in public 
telecommunications46 , was enacted in 1997, and revised in 2002. Both Directives 
had, and still have, wide-ranging implications for the member states. 
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4.3.2 The case for a general Directive 
Different national qMroaches 
The implementation of Convention 108 had been hampered by the lack of 
compulsion. Compliance was very slow with only seven EC countries ratifying 
the instrument up to 199047. Moreover, those that did - by introducing appropriate 
national laws - had such a diversity of approaches that there was a complete lack 
of consistency in the legislative framework within the Community. Differences in 
legislation were manifold: the UK, Irish and Swedish laws did not include manual 
records, whilst those of Germany and France did. Some laws - for example in 
France - prohibited the collection and storing of certain types of sensitive personal 
data, whilst UK law merely permitted additional protection for sensitive data at the 
discretion of the Secretary of State. German law did not recognise sensitive data 
at all. Finally, subject rights varied. All laws required the data user to pass a copy 
of data to a data subject should he request it. However, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and France, for example, required that the data user informed the data subject that 
data about him was being held, whilst no such obligation existed in the UK and 
Ireland. 
Additionally, interesting differences occurred on the question of exemptions from 
the statutes. German law specifically exempted personal data processed for 
journalistic purposes; French law specifically exempted personal data in the public 
domain; whilst most laws exempted data collected for personal or domestic use 
from requirements under their legislation. Bennett (1992) sought to find 
explanations for such policy 'divergence' by analysing domestic characteristics of 
the countries he studied". These explanations were: the repertoire of policy 
instruments within the state; the preferences of dom. inant social groups; the role of 
the political parties in electoral competition; the position and power of 
bureaucracy; and economic constraints. A mixture of these influences can be seen 
in each of the states analysed later in this Chapter. 
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By 1992, all European Community members states bar Italy and Greece had 
enacted data protection legislation. Yet, the significantly different approaches 
taken by these states magnified the need for harmonising legislation from the 'top 
down'. 
The European single market 
Moreover, the situation distorted the Commission's aim of achieving a single 
market. As the 1980's progressed, concerns about free trade increased in 
prominence. The uneven laws created potential obstacles to the free flow of 
information and additional burdens for 'economic operators and citizens 49 . By 
the early 1990's, companies were required to register or be authorised to process 
data by supervisory authorities in several member states, to comply with different 
standards, and were restricted from transferring data to other EU member states. 
The fears of a decade earlier that trade barriers would be erected based on 
differential privacy protection in member states were being realised. 
The concerns of business were crystallised by the Fiat case in 1988, which 
according to Burkert 50 , prompted the European Commission to begin serious work 
on a data protection instrument. The Fiat incident was sparked by the refusal of 
the French Data Inspection Commission to allow the transfer of personal data 
about Fiat managers from their subsidiary in France to the parent company in 
Torino, Italy. France had a data protection law at that time; Italy did not, nor had 
adopted Convention 108. Consequently, the French Commission insisted that Fiat 
Italy made a written representation that the French Data Protection Act and 
Convention 108 governed the data transfer. This case clearly highlighted the 
potential for disruption to the operation of the internal market. 
Additionally, there were increased public concerns at the accumulation of personal 
data beyond national boundaries, with information concerning the citizens of one 
member state increasingly being processed in other member states of the EU. 
Spurred on by the above factors, work on a data protection directive began in 
earnest in 1990 - two years prior to the enactment of the European single market. 
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The aim was to enact legislation that removed obstacles to the free movement of 
personal data whilst still guaranteeing the protection of individual privacy. 
The Schenizen Areement 
A ftirther stimulus towards a general data protection directive was provided by the 
Schengen Agreement, regarding the abolition of internal borders between certain 
European Community member states and cooperation in policing. The orginal 
Agreement was signed between France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands in 1985. Although an instrument outside Community law, it was 
politically associated within the Community, and demanded data protection 
considerations. Raab and Bennett viewed the 1990 Schengen Convention, which 
built on the Agreement, as key in driving overall integration of the European 
Community". This focused on issues of law and order, law enforcement and 
national security including terrorism, drug trafficking, asylum seeking, visas and 
extradition. At the heart of the Schengen mechanism was the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) -a universal computerised investigation and 
information system to aid the fight against cross-border crime. The SIS allowed 
all police stations and consular agents from the Schengen group to access data on 
specific individuals, or vehicles and objects that had been lost or stolen. Although 
not involving all members states of the European Community 52 , 
it nevertheless 
posed acute issues of privacy protection across national borders. Anxiety about 
the exchange of sensitive criminal information meant that each Schengen country 
had to enact legislation at least equal to that level in Convention 108 and the 
53 Council of Europe's 1987 Recommendation on police data 
Yet, there was an absence of a central supervisory authority - leaving important 
controlling, verifying and troubleshooting functions unperformed. In 1991, data 
protection commissioners from eight European Community states 54 declared 
Schengen's provisions 'coherent', but reaffirmed absolute necessity of national 
enforcement arrangements before Schengen entered into force". This added to the 
climate at a time when the European Commission was drafting a directive on data 
protection. 
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From CommunitE to Union: structural reforms 
In 1990, the Commission published its first proposal for a directive 56 , which took 
another five years to be finalised. During that period, the focus shifted from a text 
designed primarily to protect individual rights, whilst preventing barriers to the 
free flow of personal data, to more balanced approach. This move can be seen in 
the change in titles of the proposed Directive. The first draft related to: 
Proposal for a Council directive concerning the protection of individuals 
in relation to the processing of personal data. 
However, following amendments tabled by the European Parliament and 
complaints that the original draft was over-reliant on German data protection 
laW57, a second proposal (which became the actual Directive) was published in 
1992. Its title reflected the move towards a harmonising text: 
Amended proposal for a Council directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on thefiree 
movement ofsuch data". [Author's italics]. 
The debate surrounding the Directive took place during a period of rapid reform 
within the European Community. The European Treaty had been revised at 
Maastricht" in February 1992, and came into force in November 1993. Under this 
treaty, the European Union (EU) was founded as an overarching legal structure - 
comprised of three pillars: the European Communities 60 ; common foreign and 
security policy; and justice and home affairs. Among the amendments, the treaty 
wrote new principles of citizenship and subsidiarity, and established new decision- 
making procedures. Following Maastricht, the European Parliament was able to 
play a more significant role. Parliament obtained the right to approve the 
appointment of each new European Commission, and to become more involved in 
the legislative process due to the introduction of a complex new co-decision 
procedure by Article 189b. Legislation introduced through this procedure needed 
approval of Parliament to be adopted. 
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The process is ongoing. Further amendments were made with the Treaties of 
Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (signed February 200 1)61. Amsterdam was 
significant for several reasons. Firstly, it extended co-decision procedure to all 
areas of decision-making except economic and monetary union 62 - Secondly, a 
new stress on human rights and democracy was encouraged. Thirdly, Amsterdam 
integrated the Schengen Agreement. Moreover, Amsterdam inserted a new Article 
into the original European Community Treaty of 1957, making the rules on 
protection of individuals applicable to the Community institutions themselves 63 . 
The new Article 286 provided that from 1 January 1999, Community acts on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the 
free movement of such data applied to the Community institutions and bodies. 
Additionally, it provided for the establishment of an independent supervisory body 
responsible for monitoring the application of those Conununity acts to Community 
institutions and bodies. Measures harmonising data protection laws had reached 
the heart of the European Community. 
4.3.3 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC: key provisions 
The Directive was finally adopted in October 1995, with member states required to 
implement the measure into their national laws by 24 October 1998. The UK 
complied with its obligations by passing the Data Protection Act 1998, which 
entered into force on I March 2000. The Directive can be seen as a general 
framework legislative provision which has two aims: 
(a) protection of an individual's privacy in relation to the processing of 
personal data; 
(b) harmonisation of data protection laws of the EU member states 64 
Member states could not, therefore, restrict or prohibit free flow of personal data 
to other members states on grounds of unequal protection65- This would avoid a 
repeat of the 1988 Fiat dispute between France and Italy. Some of the 
terminology changed, too, with those processing, holding and using the data - 
known in the UK DPA 1984 as 'data users' - being called 'data controllers'. The 
104 
terms of the Directive were more precise, and applied to both the public and 
private sectors. The legislation introduced features from national data protection 
laws, for example, codes of conduct from the Netherlands and the concept of an 
internal (company) data protection officer from Germany. Jay 66 identified seven 
significant features that separated the Directive from earlier data protection 
instruments: 
(i) It applied to some manual files; 
(ii) It set out requirements for the legitimate processing as threshold 
requirements; 
(iii) It required specific controls for processing of sensitive data; 
(iv) It provided for extensive individual rights, beyond those of access and 
rectification; 
(v) It restricted transborder data flows outside the Community to those 
states without adequate protection; 
(vi) It provided exemptions forjoumalistic, literary and artistic purposes; 
(vii) It significantly strengthened the security requirements for processing. 
One of the main features of Directive 95/46/EC was the extension of data 
protected to cover manual records. The first reference to manual data appears in 
Article 2(b), describing processing of personal data as 'any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means . The use of the word 'any' clearly emphasised every conceivable 
operation on personal data is 'processing' (e. g. from collection, use, and 
disclosure, to storage and destruction). This had wide-ranging implications. 
Article 3 of the Directive restricted the definition of manual processing to data 
intended to be part of a 'filing system' (i. e. organised, or intended to be organised 
in a structured manual file). 
The criterion concerning legitimacy was also a significant addition, recognising 
that every form of processing of personal data is to be regarded as an intrusion 
upon the fundamental freedoms and right to privacy of a person - therefore 
requiring legitimacy. This could come from the unambiguous consent of a data 
subject, from a legal provision, from the necessity of a performance of a contract, 
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or a task in the public interest, or in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subJeCt67 . An example of vital interests would be if the data subject's life was in 
danger, and it was impossible to gain his consent to access his medical records. 
Sensitive personal data about racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, health or sex life were especially 
heavily protected 68 .A key element of protection of personal privacy, under this 
provision such data could now only be processed under specific conditions, 
including with the 'explicit consent' of the data subject. It is not clear where the 
distinction lies between the data subject's 'unambiguous' consent for legitimate 
processing of data (Article 7(a)) and 'explicit' consent for more sensitive material. 
However, sensitive data can be accessed by third parties if required by national 
employment law, or if 'manifestly made public by the data subject 969 . An example 
of the latter would be if a person revealed their political loyalties in a letter to a 
newspaper. 
The data subject had extended rights set out in Articles 10-12, and 14. In addition 
to rights of access and rectification, these included rights: 
To information about the processor, the recipients and purposes of the 
processing operation; 
To have incomplete data erased or blocked; 
To object to data being processed for the purposes of direct marketing; 
Not to be subject to a decision that has legal effects and which is based 
solely on automated processing of data; 
To stop data controllers processing data which would cause distress or 
damage to the data subject; 
To compensation if distress or damage has been caused due to 
contravention of requirements of Directive. 
The Directive also set out the conditions under which personal data may be 
transferred to countries outside the European Union. In general, a transfer may 
only take place if a third country ensured an adequate level of protection for the 
rights and freedoms of the data subjects. The impact of this on global transfer of 
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data are discussed in section 4.7 of this Chapter, with particular reference to the 
'Safe Harbor' principles agreed between the EU and the US. Finally, Article 29 of 
the Directive established a Working Party on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data. This was to give the Commission an 
opinion on the level of protection in third countries and examine any questions 
covering the application of national measures adopted in the Directive in order to 
contribute to the uniform application of such measureS70. Parallel to this, Article 
31 established 'The Committee', comprising representatives of member states. If 
there is a data protection problem, the Commission representative submits draft 
measures to be adopted; the Committee then deliberates and delivers its opinion. 
In this way, initiatives or opinions arising from Working Party concerns can be 
reported to the Commission, considered by the Committee, and adopted if agreed. 
Once adopted, the measures 'shall apply immediately'71 . 
Nevertheless, some transitional exemptions were specified in Articles 32 and 33. 
Following on from the deadline for implementation of 24th October 1998, a delay 
of up to three years was permitted with respect to manual personal data the 
processing of which was 'under way' at that time. Yet, no lag has been permitted 
in regard to processing beginning after that time - even if processed in a manual 
system. Moreover, there was a nine-year delay (until October 2007) to the 
application of three Articles with respect to personal data already held in manual 
filing systems. The Articles in question are: Article 6- the data protection 
principles; Article 7- regarding lawfulness of processing; and Article 8- sensitive 
personal data. Such postponements could, argued Carlin 72 , encourage the creation 
of data havens that the Directive sought to eliminate. If the UK allowed 
exemptions for existing files to run for the full twelve years, some controllers may 
be tempted to centralise their manual files within the UK. However, in creating 
the Data Protection Working Party, Commission sought to minimise the potential 
for such divergences in national legislation. 
Yet, in spite of the more precise regulations, common problems still existed with 
the general Directive. When considering the criteria for legitimising data 
processing (Article 7), it was difficult to identify a general principle behind the 
term 'consent'. As Blume 73 has stated, such a term presupposes that the citizen is 
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both informed and able to freely decide whether he wants to give his consent. If 
not, the notion of consent could be an illusion, making privacy dependent on other 
conditions. Essentially, formal data protection law was not the final word in the 
fight for privacy of personal data, just the starting point. As studies by Rule 74 1) 
Raab and Bennett 75 , and Raab et a 
P6 
, among other academics, have demonstrated 
information privacy can only be guaranteed by implementation of a full data 
protection infrastructure. Opinions differ on the exact criteria required to ensure 
compliance. However, factors may include: a strong proactive supervisory 
authority; an educated and interested citizenry; and detailed rigorous application of 
data protection principles by the organisations that process individuals' personal 
data. It is the final factor that will be assessed in some detailed in the case study 
analysis of this thesis (Chapter 7). 
Finally, concern was expressed at a possible reduction of the level of protection in 
states such as Germany and Sweden. This appeared foreclosed by Recital 10 in 
the Directive: 'the approximation of those [national] laws must not result in any 
lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a 
high level of protection in the Community' 77 . Yet there are still inconsistencies. 
In many states, the press and media exemptions have to be reassessed, with 
Germany, for example, against general privilege for the media. 
The success or otherwise of harmonisation of data protection laws is currently 
being assessed by the European Commission78. The initial implementation of the 
Directive was slow. Of the 15 member states, only Sweden and Greece had data 
protection legislation fully in force by the 24 October 1998 deadline. By January 
2003, over four years after the deadline for implementation, two EU states - 
France and Ireland - had still to put the Directive fully into operation79. 
Nevertheless, with 13 member states having implemented Directive 95/46/EC, it 
appears that in terms of implementing the relevant legislation harmonisation is 
being achieved. Issues surrounding implementation of the Directive's provisions 
at ground level in a sample of member states, including the UK, are considered in 
sections 4.4 and 4.6 of this Chapter. 
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4.3.4 Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 97/66/EC 
The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 97/66/EC was applicable to 
processing of personal data in public telecommunications, in particular, in the 
integrated services digital networks (ISDN) and public digital mobile networks. 
These communication systems facilitated the wide ranging storage of data 
concerning, for example, identity of callers, duration of calls, identification of 
phone numbers, identification of incoming and outgoing calls and the profiling of 
teleshopping details. Under Directive 97/66/EC, data subjects had the right to 
prevent processing of the above data for marketing purposes, but had to accept the 
storage of data for connection and accounting purposes. Finally, the Directive 
prescribed obligations for the member states to take care of liability rules and 
sanctions and extended the protection of data to legal persons (companies). The 
Data Protection Working Party's terms of reference were extended to clarify 
questions arising from the application of Directive 97/66/EC. 
Electronic Communications LE-Communications) Directive 20021581EC 
In July 2002, the European Commission approved a successor E-Communications 
Directivego, replacing Directive 97/66/EC. Member states have until 31" October 
2003 to bring the new Directive into effect. The aim of Directive 2002/58/EC is to 
provide technology neutral legislation in the telecommunications sector. It has 
been drafted so that it is applicable to all types of electronic communications, and 
it includes the following key provisions: 
Unsolicited communications: a harmonised opt-in consent to unsolicited 
commercial email and SMS messages to mobile telephones 81 ; 
Cookies 82 : users should be provided with clear and comprehensive 
information on their purposes and have the right to refuse them; 
Directories: subscribers must be given the choice as to whether their 
details appear in a publicly available printed or electronic directory, plus 
rights to verify, correct or withdraw their data; 
Location data: information concerning the geographical location of a user 
of or subscriber to a mobile telephone must not be processed without the 
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consent of the relevant person. Even where consent has been given, users 
and subscribers must be given the opportunity to both permanently 
withdraw such consent at any time and to temporarily switch off the 
telephone or network! s ability to track the location of the mobile telephone. 
Controversially, member states may legislate for a 'limited period' to restrict the 
scope of protections offered under the Electronic Communications Directive to 
safeguard national or public security, defence, and to prevent, detect and prosecute 
crime when 'necessary, appropriate and proportionate' within a democratic 
society. These measures must be in accordance with the ECHR and the rulings of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, this aspect has proved 
controversial with civil liberties groups as it overturns part of the Directive 
97/66/EC permitting data retention only for business purposes, for example 
billing 83 
. 
Additionally, concerns have been expressed about the extra cost of data 
84 retention for businesses 
Directive 2002/58/EC will provide greater harmonisation within Europe in the 
context of electronic communications. The opt-in provision for email and SMS 
marketing will have a dramatic effect on e-commerce businesses, as these 
organisations will have to alter their websites to take opt-in consent - as opposed 
to the commonly existing opt-out consent - from users. This has been widely 
welcomed by consumer groups, but not by the Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE) which stated that the provision does not 
achieve the goal of curbing spam as 'most sparn originates from outside the EU 
and opt-in thus only puts legitimate European business at a competitive 
disadvantage'85. 
4.4 Europe: divergence to convergence 
During the period 1967 to 1978, there was considerable activity within European 
Community states on the area of data protection. The German Land of Hesse 
initiated the world's first data protection law in 1970. In 1973, Sweden became 
the first country to enact a national data protection law. In the following five 
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years, five more European countries were to follow suit. By 1978, the data 
protection laws of Hesse and Sweden were being amended. However, two 
decades would pass before data protection was harmonised at a European 
Community level. In the interim, a multitude of national data protection laws (see 
Table 3 below) resulted in a diverse regulatory environment within the European 
Community. 
Year of 
enactment 
Country Legislation 
1973 Sweden Personal Data Act 
1977 (West) Germany Federal Data Protection Act 
1978 France Act on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties 
1978 Denmark 
Private Registers Act 
Public Authorities' Registers (Consolidation) Act 
1978 Norway Act relating to Personal Data Registers 
1978 Austria Data Protection Act 
1979 Luxembourg 
Act concerning the Use of Nominal Data in Computer 
Processing 
1984 United Kingdom Data Protection Act 
1988 Ireland Data Protection Act 
1988 Netherlands Data Protection Act 
1992 Belgium Law on Privacy Protection 
Table 5: European national data protection legislation prior to EU Data Protection Directive 1995 
Source: Data Protection, Directorate General Legal Affairs, Council of Europe 96 . 
This section analyses data protection laws of Hesse, Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands. These statutes were selected for a couple of reasons. Firstly, Hesse, 
Sweden and Germany were among the states and countries to draft the first 
generation of data protection statues. They were laws drafted in response to 
various national pressures, largely free from influence by international bodies such 
as the Council of Europe, the OECD and the European Commission. Secondly, 
those laws, together with the Netherlands' Data Protection Act (not passed until 
1988) exemplified different national approaches to the problem of regulating data 
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users. Such disparities resulted in the diverse regulatory environment that was to 
compel the European Community to act to harmonise data protection from the 
beginning of the 1990's. It is useful to gain detailed context to this process. 
However, this discussion has not been limited to four countries. The UK DPA 
1984, an example of a registration approach, is assessed in section 4.5. Finally, 
the North American response to data protection concerns is considered in section 
4.7. 
Bennett argued in 1988 that these differences in national approach stemmed from 
domestic constraints - based on administrative, historical and cultural factors - 
filtering out unacceptable options 87 . This section will study these domestic 
constraints. Three main considerations underlie the analys is of national data 
protection legislation in this section. Firstly, how such diverse approaches to data 
protection legislation emerged from the public concerns about privacy of personal 
information in the 1960's and 1970's. Secondly, the way the laws influenced the 
drafting of Directive 95/46/EC. Thirdly, the process of convergence, as national 
laws were modified, and harmonised, after 1995 to accommodate the provisions of 
the Directive. 
4.4.1 Hesse: the first data protection law 
In Hesse, the Data Protection Act (DPA) served two main interests. Firstly, it 
aimed to prevent the violation of individual privacy arising from the introduction 
of a new public computing systems. Indeed, the DPA had been introduced to 
mitigate the provisions of another Act authorising a state and local data processing 
network88. Effectively, a measure to extend public sector processing had been 
accompanied by a piece of legislation safeguarding privacy. Secondly, the DPA 
1970 addressed the possible shift in the constitutional balance of powers due to the 
'information advantage' enjoyed by the executive over the parliamentary organs. 
Local communities feared what they saw as the inherent centralising power of the 
executive machine would shift their traditional power and influence to the Land". 
This fear was allayed by section 6 of the Act which allowed the Land parliament 
and local representative bodies the right to information that did not contain 
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personal data. For the parliarnent, this was reinforced by the provision in section 5 
(3) stating: 
'As a rule public interest shall not stand in the way of the Land 
parliament's right to information. ' 90 
The original Act was therefore wide in scope - extending beyond personal data to 
combine the function of a data protection law with those of a limited freedom of 
information law. 
The Hesse Data Protection Act 1970 therefore dealt with computerised data held 
by local and public bodies within the Land's jurisdiction. The Act laid down 
penalties for the examination, alteration, extraction and destruction of data by 
unauthorised persons. The data subject had a right of access, a right of correction 
of inaccurate data and the possibility of obtaining an injunction and remedies in 
the case of unlawful processing. Moreover, a Data Protection Commissioner was 
appointed to oversee the handling of information provided by individuals and to 
consider complaints. However, the Commissioner had no decision-making power. 
As the Data Protection Commission regulated the public sector, it was crucial for 
it to be seen to be independent of the government. To this end, the Data Protection 
Acts of Hesse declared its data protection authority not to be subject to direction 
from the Land government in the exercise of its duties. Furthermore, it was 
answerable to the legislature rather than the executive. Thus, the Commissioner 
was appointed by, and reported to, the Hesse parliament and acted at its behest to 
investigate a refusal by the executive to release information. In the successor Act 
of 1978 (section 30), this independence was strengthened further by manning the 
Commissioner's office from the Parliamentary staff rather than, as previously, 
from the Prime Minister's office. However, the absence of a specific registration 
requirement hampered the Commissioner's work to such an extent that this 
requirement too was added to the 1978 Act? '. 
Although the initial 1970 Act was limited in terms of subject rights, it did establish 
some of the basic elements for future legislation. Firstly, it influenced German 
and later European terminology - with its usage of terms such as 'data protection' 
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for the protection of the rights of persons who data was being handled, and the 
term 'commissioner' for the ombudsman who oversaw the application of the law. 
In Simitis, Hesse had a long-standing Commissioner who, during his sixteen years 
in office (1975-199 1), saw his job as being highly political - emphasising the need 
for cooperation with the media, the public and the legislature 92 . Without support 
of these partners, crucial for the policy process, effective data protection would 
become virtually impossible. 
Secondly, the Hesse Act set out some basic themes for the forthcoming legislation 
in Europe. Burkeft93 identified four: 
The negative default rule - that the processing of personal data was 
seen as interference per se that needed legitimisation; 
The rights of the data subject. For the first time, data subjects had a 
right of access to information relating to them without the need to show 
any reason as to why they wanted access; 
The omnibus approach. Although, due to reasons of legislative 
competence, the Hesse Act could not cover the private sector, it set out 
to regulate all of the state public sector (within its jurisdiction); 
(iv) The establishment of a supervisory authority. 
Essentially, the Act expressed what Burkert called the 'regulative philosophy'. 
Regulations established to influence behaviour were backed up by institutions to 
take care of the individual's interests, even if the authority was closely linked to 
the infrastructure of the state that was being supervised94. 
4.4.2 Sweden: the first national data protection law 
In Europe, Sweden pioneered the use of computers in public administration. In 
1963, the Swedish Agency for Administrative Development was charged with 
overall coordination of computer policy. By 1969, plans for a computerised 
Population register were announced amidst significant public unease. The 
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development of the central population register was suspended by parliament in 
April 1972, pending the report of the Royal Committee on Publicity and Secrecy. 
The recommendations of this Committee were incorporated into the 1973 Data 
Act, the first national legislation of its kind. In this Act, privacy protection was 
balanced with the public right to know. Sweden had a long tradition of freedom of 
information extending back to the Freedom of Press Act 1766 95 . The right of the 
individual to have access to government files about himself was reinforced and 
extended to computerised records kept by the private sector. At the same time 
privacy was to be protected by controlling access to such records by third parties. 
As in Hesse, the Swedish statute extended only to automated records. However, 
the Swedish system was regulated by the powerful Data Inspection Board (DIB) - 
which granted extensive licensing powers and was able to draw up detailed rules 
for particular users and classes of user. Sections 5,6, and 10 of the Data AC? 6 set 
out the basic data protection rules (for example, right of legal access by data 
subjects). Yet, most of the rules - what data may be processed, how it may be 
used, to whom it may be disclosed - were determined by the Board, with 
organisations requiring DIB's permission to process personal data. The need for a 
licence also meant that the essential characteristics of record systems were 
rendered transparent, thus enabling oversight of the automatic processing of 
personal data from the earliest collection stages, to its organisational uses and its 
disclosure elsewhere. In this way, the Swedish approach was anticipatory - with 
the legislation based on the assumption that the computer would raise further 
problems requiring additional regulation. A similar system of licensing was later 
established in France with the enactment of its Act on Data Processing, Data Files 
and Individual Liberties (refer to Table 3 on page 99). 
The Swedish Data Act 1973 was unique in making no distinction at all between 
the public and private sectors. The only sector singled out in the statute was the 
class of data bank which had been legally established. Following approval in 1976 
for a computerised central population register, the Swedish parliament in 1977 
introduced a new section to the Data Act limiting the number of privately owned 
population files. Data banks were exempted ftorn the usual requirement to obtain 
authorisation from DIB, although any further legislation resulting in a new 
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databank had to be submitted to DIB for an opinion97. Overall, DIB proved very 
successful at keeping costs down, but its staff doubled in the first five years from 
fifteen to thirty, and the revised Act of 1978 simplified the procedure for licensing 
routine applications. 
The high profile of DIB during the late 1970s and early 1980s was in no small part 
due the role of its flamboyant Director General, Freese. Indeed, Flaherty 
described Freese as 'the most important single influence on the development and 
implementation of data protection'98. That may be an overstatement, given that 
the Swedish Data Acts enabled the Director General to wield a large stick. Yet, 
from his appointment in 1977 to his departure in 1986, there is no doubt that 
Freese proved willing to take a robust public position on matters affecting data 
protection. In particular, he was strongly opposed to record linkages (or data 
matching) involving Sweden's numerous automated public and private sector data 
banks. In this respect, his main concern was with the quality of the data used and, 
importantly, how the citizens were to be informed of their rights. Freese's high 
profile approach on this issue in particular was crucial in attracting public support 
and discouraging certain politicians and bureaucrats from challenging him. 
Moreover, like Simitis, he was something of a political fixer - comfortable 
operating in the corridors of power. In conclusion, Freese demonstrated 'the 
importance of personality and a capacity for public relations in trying to make data 
protection effective'99. 'Mis clearly strengthened the position of DIB and raised 
the profile of data protection in Sweden generally. 
Revision followiniz Directive 951461EC 
In Sweden, the licensing approach had allowed DIB significant powers to stipulate 
specific conditions on collection, storage, manipulation and communication of 
personal data. For this reason, the supervisory agency's attitude towards the 
Directive was one of scepticism'00. Seipel, a Swedish academic, argued in 1996 
that there was: 'concern that the Directive reflect[ed] outdated - possibly even 
muddled - thinking on personal data protection"01, and that it bought together in a 
piecemeal fashion bureaucratic elements from existing data protection laws that 
would prove very difficult to implement in national laws. 
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For Sweden, the Directive heralded a change in approach towards data protection. 
The 1973 Data Act, and its subsequent amendments, was concerned with files. 
This legal thinking dating from the early 1970's had been increasingly difficult to 
apply to the 1990's realities of databases and global data networks. The 
practicality had to be faced of providing a steady stream of information to data 
subjects about who is controlling which personal data. In this respect, a flexible 
attitude towards the Directive was recommended, with the mandate of the 
committee set up in Sweden to revise the 1973 Data Act indicating that it would be 
necessary to look for solutions which reflected national experiences and even rely 
on innovative methods 102 . 
Secondly, the Data Act 1973 did not cover manual processing. Indeed, the Data 
Act has been described as 'a typical computer privacy legislation'103. Thirdly, 
when the Data Protection Directive was first drafted in 1990, there was concern 
about its impact on the principle of free access to public documents guaranteed by 
the Swedish constitution. A number of provisions in the earlier drafts of the 
Directive (1990 and 1992) made it questionable to what extent this freedom of 
information provision could be maintained without conflicting with the principle 
of personal data according to the Directive. However, such a complex 
reconciliation was resolved in the final text following lobbying from the Swedish 
government. A clause - Recital 72 - was inserted into the preamble, augmenting 
the Articles of the Directive: 
'this Directive allows the principle of public access to official documents 
to be taken into account when implementing the principles set out in this 
Directive! 104 
Thus, Recital 72 explicitly allowed for freedom of information within the 
framework of the Directive. This ensured that personal data could be legitimately 
processed, for example when 'necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to 
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which the controller is subject' . 
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106 The Personal Data Act (PDA) 1998 , in which Sweden implemented the 
Directive, came into effect in October 1998. It heralded some important changes 
to the Swedish culture of data protection regulation. Most significantly, the 
system of licensing and issuing permits was abolished. The Directorate-General 
of DIB described the change in his authority's role thus: 
'Whereas fon-nerly DIB was primarily a permits authority, PDA has 
now made it an authority increasingly concerned with supervision, 
counselling and information. ' 107 
All data processing was instead to be notified to the supervisory authority, which 
maintained a record of the notifications. However, organisations were exempt 
from notification if they appointed a data representative and gave notice of this to 
DIB. This process of notification owed a little to the UK tradition of registration 
discussed in section 4.5.4, with the appointment of a data representative indicative 
of the German concept of a company 'privacy' officers. 
Other key features included the extension of the scope of the Act to manual 
records and - four years prior to the Electronic Communications Directive - the 
requirement for controllers to seek the opt-in consent of the data subject prior to 
using personal data for direct marketing' 08 . Finally, it was explicitly stated that the 
provisions of the new Act would not be applied to limit the principle of access to 
official documents. Indeed, provisions concerning freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression in the Freedom of the Press Act and Fundamental Law on 
the Freedom of Expression prevailed over the provisions in the PDA 1998109. 
4.4.3 Germany: federal data protection 
The German data protection law built on those of Hesse (1970) and Rhineland- 
Palatinate (1974). A federal data protection bill was proposed in the mid-1970's 
to accompany another measure - the introduction of a national personal 
identification number to increase data processing efficiency"O. Although, the 
latter provisions were rejected, the Federal Data Protection Act became law in 
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1977. The basic division of jurisdiction between the federal and the state data 
protection statutes was relatively straightforward. The Federal Data Protection 
Act covered data processing of personal information in the private and public 
sectors, but it was largely limited to regulating the public sector at the federal 
level. Land data protection laws primarily regulated the public sector at state 
levels, but there was a tendency towards special measures to regulate particular 
activities in the private sector, such as credit reporting. Private sector users were 
not supervised by the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, whose scope was 
restricted to registered federal users. Instead, they were regulated by various 
authorities (at state level) which had general oversight of private companies, for 
example, the authority which regulated banking had to ensure they complied in 
addition with various data protection rules. There was no general requirement for 
the private sector to register, setting the German data protection system apart from 
those in Sweden and, later, in the UK. 
The Federal Data Protection Act was the first national law in Europe to attempt 
regulation of manual records. However, there were restrictions. For example, the 
information system (manual or automatic) had to demonstrate some of the 
sophisticated characteristics which computers can impart". A further constraint 
was that manual data in the private sector processed for internal use could be 
excluded from all but one of the Act's provisions. 
The statute was regulated in West Germany by the Federal Data Protection 
Commissioner. An intermediary between citizen and record keeper, the 
Commissioner relied on complaints from the citizens to identify trouble spots and 
launch investigations. The most important function of the Commissioner was the 
auditing of data processing. This required expert staff and powers to inspect 
premises, examine records and give advice and recommendations on the secure 
application of new technologies. The key problem was one of employing political 
resources: supportive political opinion; skilled and motivated staff-, leadership; and 
access. Data protection was just one political interest among many, and its status 
as an issue depended on its position in the political agenda and the ability of the 
supervisory authorities to seize on favourable public and legislative opinion. In 
119 
the period up until the Census Decision in 1983 (discussed below), this proved 
particularly difficult. 
As in Hesse, the Commissioner's powers were essentially advisory, although the 
Commissioner could compel government bodies to respond to his or her 
criticisms. Each public authority had to ensure compliance in its own field. 
Ultimately, the statute relied on the government to regulate its own data handling. 
Moreover, the Act had numerous exemptions. Section 13 declared that a federal 
body should not supply the data subject with information from his record where 
(among other circumstances) it would be 'to the disadvantage of the Federal 
Republic or of a Land (State)'; or where the data must be kept secret 'by the 
reason of their nature, in particular by reason of an overriding and justified interest 
of a third person'112. Simitis, the Hessian Data Protection Commissioner of the 
time, said of the German statute in 1977: 'In the history of the Federal Republic of 
Germany there may seldom have been an Act, to put it mildly, which contains so 
many reservations" 13. 
However, it has been pointed out in defence of the Act, that it served as a 
foundation for more specific privacy measures, and that section 3 established a far- 
reaching principle that the processing of personal data is forbidden except where 
authorised by statute or by the consent of the data subject. The enforcement of the 
multi-tiered German data protection legislation was complex, comprising: 
administrative supervision at federal and state level; responsibility of designated 
corporate data protection officers in the private sector; and criminal offences for 
which fines and imprisonment may be imposed. These offences include failure to 
notify data subjects, failure to appoint a corporate data protection officer, and 
failure to give sufficient, correct, and timely information. 
The Census Decision 
A milestone in the German data protection debate was the Census Decision made 
by the Federal Supreme Constitutional Court 19831 14 . The federal government 
had planned a census which was of interest to many subsystems of public 
administration - for example, police, social insurances, resident's register - for 
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updating their records. A large number of questions were to be raised concerning 
living conditions, housing, commuting, family situation, work, leisure time 
behaviour and similar private interests. According to the dedicated Federal 
Census Act, each household was obliged to respond to these questions. However, 
it was not decided in the Act, which subsystem of public administration should get 
access to which data. The data matching potential was therefore considerable, as 
one agency in theory could have gained access to all data. This concern, coupled 
with the failure to prohibit people from officially collecting data in their own 
neighbourhood, resulted in public disputes and demonstrations 115 . 
On 15 December 1983, the Federal Supreme Constitutional Court held that the 
collection and processing of a vast amount of individualised census data was 
unlawful and infringed the Constitution 116 . 
The dignity of man (Article 1 (1) of 
the Constitution) and the right to personal freedom (Article 2 (2)) had been 
breached, if a person did not know who was processing what data on him for what 
purposes. The very general wording of this Decision ensured it extended beyond 
the census to impact on the private sector. Moreover, the Court ruled that, in 
particular, profiling a person was an offence against the Constitution. Following 
that decision, the 'right to informational self-determination' was deemed a part of 
personal liberty and personality. This latter point is significant as it presented a 
modem view on the pervasiveness of information processing and its impact on the 
private, individual sphere. The Court had recognised the informational self, and 
the individual's right to privacy and dignity in his exchanges in an information 
society. The federal data protection law had achieved general acceptance. As a 
result of this decision, millions of printed census questionnaires had to be 
destroyed' 17 
. 
The judgement was followed in Germany by a series of sector specific legislation, 
culminating in a revision of the general data protection law in 1990118. The burden 
of argument shifted to those who sought to limit privacy. Against the background 
of the Constitutional clarification of the right to determine the use of one's 
personal information, the 1990 Act now intended to 'protect the individual against 
his right to privacy being impaired through the handling of his personal data'119. 
For personal data to be handled, the person affected must agree to this, or there 
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must be a statutory arrangement. Moreover, whereas the 1977 Federal Act stated 
that data protection began with the existence of a file, the 1990 Act altered this so 
that data protection began with collection - the deliberate acquisition of personal 
information. In the private sector, however, the threshold at which data protection 
covered information remained that of a file. All details of persons held in other 
ways, for example, lists or books, were not covered by the Act. Finally, the 
existence of data protection agencies as necessary elements of data protection 
regimes was confirmed. This activist view to data protection - commencing with 
the privacy needs of the individual, rather than the processing requirements of data 
controllers - impacted on the Directive, although by 1995 many European 
countries had already established their specific understanding of data protection 120 . 
Revision followiniz Directive 951461EC 
The EU Data Protection Directive owed more to Germany's Federal Data 
Protection Acts (1977 and 1990) than any other national legislation. Like the 
Directive, Germany's federal data protection legislation had been based on the 
assumption that each processing operation on personal data involved an intrusion 
of privacy which demanded legitimation. The legitimation may be obtained by 
express legislation or by the informed consent of the person concerned. Two other 
principles gained fundamental importance: the idea of purpose-orientated data 
processing and the idea of anonymising personal data as far as possible. 
In this context, a German academic, Kilian, stated that the Directive would result 
in a lowering of the German level of data protection 121 . In particular, concern was 
expressed at the permission given by the Directive for free flow of personal data 
between EU member states which have differing levels of protection 122. nis 
called into question which rights would remain for the German citizen in practice. 
The Directive was formally implemented through a series of amendments to the 
1990 Federal Data Protection Act. The amendments entered into force in May 
2001, and are a short-term measure whilst German data protection law undergoes a 
major review. This review is ongoing 123 . 
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4.4.4 The Netherlands: codes of conduct 
The Netherlands was cautious in its national approach towards data protection. 
Although bills had been published since the mid-1970's 124 , the Data Protection 
Act (DPA) was not passed until 1988 - entering fully into force in 1990. The Act 
promoted self-regulation, and provided consumers with certain rights, including 
notice, access to information, disclosure and correction of inaccuracies. Both 
manual and computerised records were covered. The DPA required those in 
control of personal data files to take measures to assure only authorised 
disclosures and ensure informational accuracy. A data subject had to be informed 
of the collection of data within one month in writing. Notice had to contain the 
purpose of the file and the name and address of the file controller. Finally, the 
DPA allowed consumers to seek and obtain compensation for damages. 
The Act created a Chamber of Registration, responsible for monitoring data 
protection development, advising the Dutch cabinet on relevant matters, and 
enforcing the provisions of the Act. Under the DPA, controllers of personal files 
containing data relating to more than one person were obliged to fill out a form (if 
private sector) or make a regulation (public sector), and send it to the Chamber in 
order to register. 
However, the Dutch law has been most notable for introducing codes of conduct in 
their regime - an approach often cited, particularly during the 'Safe Harbor' 
negotiations. In consultation with the Chamber, professional organisations were 
able to adapt certain clauses in the law to their particular sector. By the beginning 
of 1996, approximately ten codes of conduct had been approved by the 
Chamber 125 The law provided for a closely-knit connection between self- 
regulation and state supervision. Part of this model was adopted by the EU, with 
Article 27 of the general Directive incorporating codes of conduct: 
'The member states and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up 
of codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation 
of the national provisions adopted by member states taking account 
of the specific features of the various sectors! 126 
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At the time of adoption of the Directive, the impact of the DPA was under review 
as a matter of routine 127 . The findings of the evaluation, published 
in December 
1995, recommended exploiting the Directive's potential for an optional procedure 
for the approval of codes of conduct 128 . 
The main difference between the Dutch DPA 1988 and the Directive was in scope. 
The latter was a new generation of legislation that replaced the static concept of 
'personal data files' with the more dynamic concept of 'processing personal data'. 
The DPA had only applied in the former situation. As in a number of situations, 
processing of personal data will take place without the creation of a personal data 
file, the scope of the Directive was much wider. 
Another point of interest was the provision in Article 18 (2) offering simplification 
or exemption from notification for controllers that appoint a personal data 
protection official in accordance with the national law. In the Netherlands, with 
the exception of a few municipal privacy committees, privacy officers per 
company were rare 129 . The German method of appointing such officers provided 
that the officer controlled the appliance of the national data protection law within 
the organisation - keeping a register of all the data processing and remaining 
independent as a consequence. Bergfeld argued that a combination of codes of 
conduct and privacy officers per branch or sector might lead to better results in the 
Netherlands than notification 130 . Overall, Bergfeld argued that the final text of the 
Directive was a sound basis for data protection in the Netherlands. 
Personal Data Protection Act 2000 
The Directive was implemented through the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) 
131 2000 , which entered into force in September 2001. At the same time, the 
Chamber of Registration was replaced by the Personal Data Protection 
Commission - marking the change in emphasis from concentrating solely on 
registration to overseeing the whole cycle of data processing. Indeed, the dated 
concept of 'personal data files' was replaced with 'processing of personal data', 
thus extending to the collection and acquisition of personal data. The previous 
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distinction between public and private sector was cancelled, with government 
institutions also having to notify their data processing operations with the new 
Commission. The concept of the organisational data protection official was 
introduced. Finally, codes of conduct remained prominent 132 , with the supervisory 
authority able to declare that such codes properly implement the Act. Such 
declarations are valid for up to five years. 
4.5 Data Protection in the UK: context 
From the 1960's, data protection measures were being discussed in the UK. 
Concerns about new technological developments received increased attention in 
Parliament. A number of private members' Bills, some dealing with limited 
aspects of privacy and others with privacy as a whole, were introduced, although 
none reached the statute book 133 . The earliest privacy Bill was 
introduced in the 
House of Lords in 1961 'to protect a person from any unjustifiable publication 
relating to his private affairs and to give him rights in law in the event of any such 
publication' 134 . Further privacy 
Bills were introduced in the House of Commons 
in 1967 135 and 1969 136 . 
Additionally in 1969, Bills were introduced in both 
137 Houses concerning computerised personal information . Finally, 
in 1972, 
another Bill was introduced to control both computerised and manually processed 
databanks 138. However, it was not until the Data Protection Act 1998 - twenty six 
years later - that manually processed data was to be finally regulated in the UK. 
To some extent, the new public concern was due to developments in information 
technology. Some government computers had been designed to facilitate the 
centralisation of information about people's private affairs and their dissemination 
for purposes other than those specified. Additionally, there had been a spectacular 
growth in the collection and distribution of information as a commercial activity, 
giving rise to anxiety in connection with granting of credit and mail order 
businesses 139 
. 
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4.5.1 Common Law and the Younger Report on Privacy 1972 
The catalyst towards further government enquiry in this area proved to be the 1969 
Right of Privacy Bill introduced by Brian Walden MP, and drafted by JUSTICE140 
- the British section of the International Commission of Jurists. Influenced by the 
conclusions of the Nordic Conference two years earlier, this Bill called for the 
creation of a general right of privacy, with civil remedy provided for certain 
infringements. However, in the course of its second reading debate in the House 
of Commons, the Labour Home Secretary James Callaghan announced that the 
government was to appoint an official Committee on Privacy in May 1970 with 
141 Kenneth Younger MP as chairman . It was given the remit of considering 
whether legislation was needed to 'give further protection to the individual citizen 
and to commercial and industrial interests against intrusion into privacy by private 
persons and organisations' 142 . Thus, it was restricted to considering the private 
sector, plus the BBC and British universities. 
The Committee paid detailed attention to the contemporary legal situation. There 
was no right to privacy as such in the law of England and Wales. Yet some 
aspects of privacy were already covered by existing law designed for other 
purposes - for example, trespass, nuisance, defamation and breach of confidence. 
Of those, the Committee considered the most effective protection to be the remedy 
in breach of confidence. This tort afforded a means of protection for all specific 
and reasonably implied confidences, except where the disclosure of the 
143 information given in confidence is shown to be in the public interest . Indeed, 
the Committee believed the extent of this remedy's potential effectiveness was not 
as widely recognised as it should be. As such it was recommended that the law 
relating to breach of confidence should be referred to the Law Commission 'With a 
view to its clarification and statement in legislative form' 144 . 
In English law, there had -not been a tradition of protecting the rights of citizens. 
Instead, reliance had been more on the principle that what is not prohibited is 
permitted. The main emphasis in civil rights, therefore, had been on keeping 
within acceptable limits, and providing precise definitions of the restrictions 
imposed by civil and criminal law on the individual's freedom of action. This 
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differed from Scotland, where the common law was to a considerable extent 
derived from the civil law, with a tendency to rely on general principles and 
readiness to assert general rights which it was the duty of the courts to uphold, 
exercising a wide interpretative discretion. In this way, Scotland was more in line 
with continental Europe which had general rights embodied in their written 
constitutions. 
On the problem of definition - one of the obstacles to the development of a 
satisfactory law on privacy - the Committee concluded that the right to privacy had 
two main aspects. Firstly, a freedom from intrusion upon oneself, one's home, 
family and relationships. This was effectively the broad social value that privacy 
embodies - one that depended on the outlook of the individual - and it was 
questionable whether this would be suitably regulated on the basis of common 
law, slowly built up and tending to reflect the values of an earlier period rather 
than contemporary society. The second aspect defined by the Committee related 
to privacy of information. This definition essentially tackled data protection - the 
right to determine for oneself how, and to what extent, information about oneself 
should be communicated to others. In conclusion, Younger decided there was no 
need for a general privacy law. Rather, the Committee pointed to the adoption of 
specific proposals in the report, some of which related to the use of computers. On 
balance, it was deemed better to accept the remnant of difficult cases that may 
remain, than to attempt to deal with them all by means of a general privacy 
measure that may have a serious impact on other rights, in particular, freedom of 
communication 145 . 
The use of computing technology was taken seriously by Younger, with an entire 
section of the. Report devoted to the collection and handling of personal 
information and its possible misuse in private sector 146 . The Committee stated that 
most of the problems which concerned them in this area were 'common to all data 
banks whether computerised or not' 147 . Chapter 20 of the Report concerned the 
use of computers for information storage and handling in the private sector. The 
Committee believed there was sufficient potential threat, and public and private 
disquiet, to justify serious attention being given to the establishment of appropriate 
safeguards. To this end, the Committee recommended ten guiding principles for 
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the use of computers that manipulated personal data 148 . Known as the Younger 
Principles, they were an important indication of the data protection principles that 
were to underpin both the 1984 and 1998 Acts: 
(i) The purpose of holding data should be specified; 
(ii) There should only be authorised access to data; 
(iii) There should be minimum holdings of data for specified purposes; 
(iv) Persons in statistical surveys should not be identified; 
(v) Subject access to data should be given; 
(vi) There should be security precautions for data; 
(vii) There should be security procedures for personal data; 
(viii) Data should only be held for limited relevant periods; 
(ix) Data should be accurate and up to date; 
(X) Any value judgements should be coded. 
These principles concentrated mainly on security and access to data rather than 
dissemination of information. Communication between computers, for example in 
the form of data matching or, from the mid-1990's, the internet - had yet to 
become a significant feature of day to day computing. Younger recommended that 
these principles should form the basis of a voluntary code of practice which could 
be adopted by computer users 149 . The Report also proposed the setting up of a 
4standing commission"50 to consider the use of computers and their impact on 
individuals, in both public and private sectors. 
4.5.2 White Paper: Computers and Privacy 1975 
The government responded to the Younger recommendations concerning 
computers in the White Paper Computers and Privacy'51 (1975), in which it 
announced its intention to consider legislation. In parallel with the Younger 
Committee's enquiry into the private sector, the government had reviewed the 
categories of information held in the computer systems of government 
departments and the rules governing its storage and use. The results of that 
review, together with information concerning the rest of the public sector, were 
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also published in 1975 as Computers: Safeguards for Privacy 152 . This report 
found no evidence of improper use of computers in the public sector. 
Nevertheless, the White Paper highlighted the need for regulation, stating that 
'those who use computers to handle personal information ... can no longer remain 
the sole judges of whether. their own systems adequately safeguard personal 
privacy' 153 . The threat to privacy was identified as arising from five particular 
features of computer operations: 
They facilitate the maintenance of extensive record systems and 
retention of data in those systems; 
They can make data easily and quickly accessible from many different 
points; 
They make it possible for data to be transferred easily from one 
information system to another; 
(iv) They make it possible for data to be combined in ways which might not 
otherwise be practicable; 
(v) They store, process and often transmit data in a form which is not 
directly intelligible. 
Importantly, point (iii) made reference to dissemination of information. With 
usage of the Internet almost universal in Western society, this has now become a 
major issue, over 25 years on from the publication of the White Paper. 
The government, in Computers and Privacy, acted on Younger's recommendation 
of setting up a 'standing commission' concerning the processing of personal 
information with computers, by announcing the establishment of a Data Protection 
Committee. It was to seek to secure that all existing and future computer systems 
in which personal information was held - in both public and private sectors - were 
operated with appropriate safeguards for the privacy of the data subject. The 
government viewed the introduction of legislation as involving two key elements: 
(i) The establishment of a set of objectives to set standards governing the 
use of computers that handle personal information; 
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The establishment of a permanent statutory agency to oversee the use 
of computers in both public and private sectors. 
The ten Younger Principles recommended for the private sector were seen as an 
important base for the first element of the proposed legislation: 'the objectives to 
be declared in the statute should, therefore, cover very much the same ground. 1154 
However, the influences behind the establishment of a statutory data protection 
agency were less clear. Nevertheless, the two models proposed - registration and 
licensing, or an ombudsman - suggested the government had at least had reference 
to the experiences of Sweden and Germany respectively, although it was yet to 
155 make up its mind about the best way forward 
4.5.3 The Lindop Report on Data Protection 1978 
The Committee on Data Protection began work in July 1976, chaired by Sir 
156 Norman Lindop . Membership comprised of six specialists 
in areas relevant to 
privacy and information technology, and six so-called "lay people", including the 
chairman himself. When interviewed for this thesis 157 , 
Lindop stated that the two 
key experts were Paul Sieghart and Charles Read. Sieghart was a barrister, a 
human rights advocate and the primary author of the White Paper Computers and 
Privacy. He was involved in bringing together the members of the Committee 
other than the chairman. Read, director of the Inter-Bank Research Organisation, 
fif, 158 was an excellent Committee man" 
In conducting its task, the Lindop Committee undertook several studies. Firstly, 
on the relationship between privacy and data protection, the Committee found that 
the function of data protection law should be different from that of privacy law. 
Rather than establishing rights, it should provide a framework for finding a 
balance between'the interests of the individual, the data user (the processor of 
personal data) and the community at large. 
Secondly, concerning the implications of technological progress, the Committee 
found that the proportion of all information processing activities conducted by 
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automatic means had increased, and would likely increase further'59. Distinctions 
between manual and computerised systems had become increasingly bluffed. As a 
result, the legislation had to be sufficiently flexible to 'enable the rules governing 
the handling of personal data to evolve over time' 160 . Thirdly, the 
Committee 
considered the public and private sector. This was the first large scale independent 
review into the use of personal data by both central and local government and the 
industrial and private sectors. Younger had only been permitted to survey the 
private sector. Yet, some public bodies proved reluctant to participate, with the 
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secret services and the police particularly wary of the work of the Committee . 
As a result, Lindop had to rely on the work of an investigative journalist Stewart 
Tendler regarding the Police National Computer 162 . The outcome from this multi- 
sector review was that data protection legislation needed to be flexible. A single 
set of rules to govern all handling of personal data by computers would not be 
sufficient. The legislation had to strike appropriate balances between all 
legitimate interests. 
Lindop recommended that the scope of the legislation should extend to all 
automatic handling of personal data in the UK by any user, in both public and 
private sectors. The definition of 'automatic' was to be wide-ranging, including 
organisations where any part of the operation was conducted automatically. A set 
of seven statutory principles should be included to reflect the interests of the data 
subjects, users and communities at large. These covered broadly the same area as 
Younger, and in detail were 163 : 
In the interests of data subjects 
(i) Data subjects should know what personal data relating to them are 
handled, why those data are needed, how they will be used, who will 
use them, for what purpose, and for how long; 
(ii) Personal data should be handled only to the extent and for the purposes 
made known when they are obtained, or subsequently authorised; 
(iii) Personal data handled should be accurate and complete, and relevant 
and timely for the purpose for which they are used; 
(iv) No more personal data should be handled than are necessary for the 
purposes made known or authorised; 
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(v) Data subjects should be able to verify compliance with these principles; 
In the interest of users 
(vi) Users should be able to handle personal data in the pursuit of their 
lawful interests or duties to the extent and for the purposes made 
known or authorised, without undue extra cost in money or other 
resources; 
In the interests ofthe community at large 
(vii) The community at large should enjoy any benefits, and be protected 
from any prejudice, which may flow from the handling of personal 
data. 
The principles were not to be directly enforceable, but were to guide the actions of 
the supervisory authority. This body - the Data Protection Authority - was to 
implement the principles, ensuring that personal data was handled with adequate 
safeguards for the interests, in particular the privacy, of the data subjects. 
Lindop recommended mandatory registration for computer users. Additionally, 
the Committee proposed the development and adoption of Codes of Practice to 
ensure compliance with the principles. Such codes would have the force of law, 
and any breach would be a criminal offence. Different codes would be prepared 
for different classes of personal data applications, in the same way codes have 
been drafted and developed for closed circuit television (CCTV) and employment 
data under the 1998 Data Protection Act. However, although this recommendation 
was not adopted in the UK for the DPA 1984, it did form the basis of the law 
passed by the Netherlands in 1988. The fact that there is a provision in the 1998 
Act proved the concept to be an enduring one 164 . 
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4.5.4 The UK Data Protection Act 1984 
Processes 
Following publication of the Lindop Report in October 1978, progress towards 
data protection legislation was slow, with a general election in 1979 compounding 
the delay. The issue lacked a specific catalyst to bring it to the forefront of public 
debate. In the UK there had been no equivalent to the establishment of central 
population registers that had been proposed in many European states. Politically, 
the new Conservative government opposed the Lindop proposals - especially to 
the creation of another quasi-autonomous non-government organisation, or 
quango, in the form of the Data Protection Authority 165 . This perceived extra layer 
of bureaucracy was clearly set against Conservative pledges to yield substantial 
savings through the 'reduction of waste, bureaucracy and over-government' 
outlined in their 1979 general election manifesto 166 . However, the adoption by the 
Council of Europe of Convention 108 and the formulation of the OECD guidelines 
on transborder data flow reinforced concerns of many Conservative MPs that UK 
companies would be at a disadvantage when competing in the international data 
processing market 167 . In March 1981, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, 
announced the government's intention to legislate in order to ratify Convention 
108. The latter treaty was signed by the UK in May 1981 (see Table 1, page 82). 
However, the idea of an independent data protection authority was still 
contentious. Initially, the intention was to allow the Home Office to act as its own 
watchdog over public computers. In September 1981 the Home Office Minister of 
State, Tim Raison, referred to the call for an authority as 'fundamentally 
168 objectionable' . In July 1981 Sir Norman Lindop, frustrated at the lack of 
progress, had reconvened the Data Protection Committee. Two papers were issued 
by the Committee members 169 - The members reiterated the arguments against 
conferring supervisory powers on government, the largest single user of personal 
data. They believed other European countries would doubt the credibility of data 
protection compliance in the UK if it was regulated by the Home Office. Under 
Article 12 of Convention 108, other countries could restrict transborder data traffic 
where the regulations of another country 'do not provide an equivalent protection'. 
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The members did point out that these tasks could be discharged by a single 
Commissioner with an adequate staff rather than the multi-member authority 
originally proposed. 
By January 1982, the government - still adamant there should not be an 
170 independent authority - had moved towards the idea of an independent registrar . 
At a conference in May 1983, Lindop stated that the reasoning for this shift was 
twofold, being: 
"... partly because the medical profession said they would not 
cooperate, but partly also because of the weight of evidence that the 
chief problems do lie in the public sector. "171 
In terms of timescale, the critical statement was made by Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher in a verbal reply during Prime Minister's Question Time, in February 
1982, when the Labour MP Michael Meacher raised a question about the 
publication of his medical records on the front page of a daily newspaper. 
Thatcher commiserated with him, announcing it was the government's intention to 
legislate on data protection in the next Parliamentary session. As Lindop stated a 
year later: 
"I believe this was the first the Home Office knew about it; they were 
put rather smartly on the spot and had to produce a White Paper which 
bore all the signs of being cobbled together in a hurry. "172 
The White Paper, Data Protection: the government's proposals for legislation 173 1 
was published two months later. It fell short of Lindop's recommendations, with 
the government deciding not to adopt legally enforceable codes of practice. Under 
the proposed legislation, the data protection authority would comprise a Registrar 
appointed by the Crown equipped with a staff of about twenty. The Registrar 
would be independent of the government but required to make an annual report to 
Parliament. All users of data systems in the public and private sectors who 
automatically process information relating to identifiable individuals would be 
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required to register. The Registrar would have powers to make inquiries, inspect 
data files, and require modifications to be made to a system or refuse registration. 
Overall, the tone adopted in the paper was one of reluctance on the part of the 
government: 'the public sector costs and manpower will have to be contained 
within existing planned totals even if this means deferring application of 
174 legislation in this area' Clearly, commercial considerations had quickened the 
need for legislation - in particular, the need to ratify Convention 108 and so 
protect Britain's role as a 'crossroads on the international data highway' 175 . As the 
White Paper reflected, 'without legislation firms operating in the United Kingdom 
may be at a disadvantage compared with those based in countries which have data 
protection legislation' 176 . 
The first Data Protection Bill 177 introduced on 22 December 1982 was poorly 
received. Disappointment was expressed by groups as diverse as the British 
Medical Association, the National Computer Users' Forum, the Consumers' 
Association and Society of Conservative Lawyers 178 . Criticism centred on the 
omission of manual files and the sweeping exemptions from registration. 
Computers concerned with national security were fully exempt, whilst those 
concerned with tax, immigration, health, social work and crime detection and 
prevention were all partially exempt. A lead article in The Times captured most 
critics' perception of the Bill: 
'Commerce, not liberty, is the motive power behind the government's 
legislation in the field of data protection. Fear of losing markets, not the 
desire to defend individual privacy against computer-driven intrusions, 
colours, the clauses of the Data Protection Bill. ' 179 
The first Bill fell with the dissolution of Parliament in May 1983, but a revived 
Bill - essentially similar - was introduced in July 1983. Although subject to much 
the same criticism as previously, it received Royal Assent on 12 July 1984 with 
minor amendments relating to compensation for inaccuracy and the exemptions 
from registration. The difficult passage of both Bills underscored the complexities 
inherent in the creation of an entirely new body of law ultimately based - via 
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Convention 108 - on fundamental rights which were recognised but undefined. 
Moreover, this highlighted the problems faced with constant opposition from 
bodies such as the Home Office, which viewed the data protection policy as an 
attack upon the traditional administrative control of personal information 180 . 
Provisions 
The DPA 1984 required users to register automatically processed 'personal data' - 
information which related to a living individual who could be identified from the 
information, including any expression of opinion about the individual. The eight 
data protection principles were taken almost directly from the Council of Europe 
Convention 108. In addition to the establishment Office of the Data Protection 
Registrar (ODPR), a tribunal was created to hear appeals against the Registrar's 
sanctions by aggrieved data users. Although the registration system was borrowed 
from Sweden, it was the UK government - and not the Data Protection Registrar - 
that decided data protection policy as a whole. 
However, the principles only applied to data which was registered. Accordingly, 
this had the effect that users who failed to register could not be required to comply 
with the principles'81. Additionally, the legal provisions were slow to take effect - 
being phased in over a period in excess of three years from enactment of the DPA 
in July 1984. From September 1984, individuals damaged by the loss of data or its 
unauthorised disclosure could claim compensation in the courts. Registration was 
delayed until November 1985, and non-registration was not an offence before May 
1986. Finally, subject access as well as the Registrar's supervisory powers did not 
become available until November 1987. This piecemeal implementation of the 
DPA was of benefit to users for whom data protection was new, but slowed 
application and enforcement of the law. 
Development ofdata protection law 
Although the government could look to laws in other countries when drafting the 
principles of data protection, the task of putting the legislation into practice was 
experimental. The ODPR had to gain the not only compliance, but also 
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understanding of a wide range of data users, many of whom had been hostile to the 
legislation. There were few obvious precedents. RaabI82 argued that 
implementing the DPA 1984 involved challenging powerful public and private 
sector interests dependent on the collection, processing, use and transfer of large 
amounts of personal data with a minimum of interference. The promotion of 
personal claims to privacy was set against the claims of efficient and effective 
public and private administration. 
The fact that the DPA 1984 had been implemented to protect the interests of 
commerce rather than the consumer was in conflict with the approach taken by 
Younger and Lindop during the 1970's. Their reports had been fuelled by 
concerns over the loss of personal privacy in the computer age. internationally, 
Convention 108 had been based on the right to private life in the ECHR. 
However, this point was omitted from the DPA 1984. Disregarding any questions 
of personal privacy, the long title of the 1984 Act was: 
'An Act to regulate the use of automatically processed information 
relating to individuals and the provision of services in respect of such 
information. ' 183 
This appeared to have the effect of removing individual privacy considerations 
from interpretation of the 1984 Act except with reference to Convention 108 - the 
provisions of which the DPA 1984 essentially made law. In the UK, Raab' 84 
argued, the ODPR actually had few allies available for support in enforcing 
individual privacy considerations. There were apparently few votes in data 
protection, public opinion was largely passive, and there were few civil liberties 
groups campaigning in this field. In a 1982 Mori poll, two thirds of those asked 
disagreed with the statement: "I am suspicious about the possible effects of new 
technology" 185 . Further, the choice of Eric Howe, a computer professional, as the 
first data protection Registrar reflected the more pragmatic motivation behind the 
Act and of the people implementing it. 
However, in the early 1990's an important tribunal decision marked a move away 
86 from the purely technical approach to data protection' . It concerned the credit 
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reference industry's use of third party information. This had resulted in people 
being denied credit because of the bad debts of others who happened to live at the 
same address in the past. The Registrar viewed this as unfair processing, a breach 
of the first data protection principle. In 1991, the tribunal agreed with the ODPR, 
stating: 
'It is quite clear ... that the purpose of the Act is to protect the rights of the 
individual about whom data is obtained, stored, processed or supplied, 
rather than those of the data user. ' 187 
Based on the evidence earlier in this subsection, the above statement was 
contentious. In the long title of the DPA 1984, there had been no suggestion that 
any special priority was to be given to the data subject. In its ruling, therefore, it 
could be argued that the tribunal was going beyond the intentions of the original 
UK legislation. However, the decision was more in line with Convention 108 and 
its concern with the protection of individual rights. The pronouncement thus 
represented a significant stage in the development of UK data protection law. It 
was evolving from purely a pragmatic technical statute, towards one recognising 
the privacy rights of individuals. At the same time, it was a signal of the 
increasing influence of the ODPR that, by the mid-1990's was tackling issues as 
diverse as identity cards, privacy at work, electronic government and 
cryptography'88. The tribunal decision had strengthened the hand of the ODPR 
when advising and negotiating with users in those new fields of interest. 
4.6 UK Data Protection Act 1998 
4.6.1 ImiDlementing a data protection infrastructure 
The 1984 Act left the Data Protection Registrar with a huge administrative burden. 
There was uncertainty about the expected number of data users - in the first six 
months, there were 136 000; by 1994 this had only increased to 202 000. 
Elizabeth France, in her first annual report as Registrar (1995) believed the real 
number should have been around 500 000189. Raab... commented that Whilst 
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during the first ten years of the DPA 1984 the infrastructures for implementation 
of data protection had been formed in the UK, they were fragile and existed along 
adversarial modes of conducting relationships. There was the need to balance 
competing interests of business, a reluctant government and the privacy of the 
individual. 
During the 1990's there was a shift across Europe from computers, privacy and 
bureaucracy towards 'information'. Transactions were recorded and kept longer. 
Information was disseminated to more people in more remote locations at greater 
speeds. As people became less aware about what happened to their data, it 
became more easily accessible and manipulated, correlated and analysed in new 
ways not possible in days of the filing cabinet. Boundaries, particularly between 
public and private sector data, became blurred. It was into this context that the EU 
Data Protection Directive was passed in 1995. In the UK, the Directive was 
implemented as the DPA 1998. 
4.6.2 Key provisions affecting information privacy 
The DPA 1998 represented the first UK Data Protection legislation for fourteen 
years. Despite clear provisions in the 1995 Directive relating to private life, the 
UK legislation failed to make any reference to privacy. The long title of the DPA 
1998 was: 
'An Act to make new provision for the regulation of the processing of 
information relating to individuals, including obtaining, holding, use or 
disclosure of such information. ' 191 
The DPA 1998 included significant changes from its predecessor in six key 
areas192: 
Manual processing - the 1998 Act applied to certain manual files in 
addition to automated data; 
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Legitimacy of processing - new conditions for processing existed as 
minimum threshold requirements before processing could be lawfully 
undertaken; 
(iii) Sensitive data -a new category of personal data was created. Sensitive 
personal data could not be processed unless one of a set of certain pre- 
conditions was satisfied; 
(iv) Data transfer - transfers of personal data to countries outside the 
European Economic Area'93 (EEA) were banned unless certain 
conditions were satisfied; 
(v) Data security - data could not be processed unless processing complied 
with new security requirements; 
(vi) Individual rights - significantly more and stronger rights for 
individuals existed under the new legislation including the right to 
compensation for damage or distress caused by unlawful processing. 
These, in theory, strengthened the individual right to privacy. However, it is the 
final feature - individual rights - that the remainder of this sub-section will focus 
on, as they have most direct effect on the privacy of individuals. 
Individual rights included the right to a description of. 
Personal data of which an individual was the subject; 
Purposes for which the personal data are being processed; 
(iii) Recipients or classes of recipients to whom personal data may be 
disclosed. 
Additionally, the data subject is now entitled to have communicated to him in a 
form capable of being understood: 
Information constituting any personal data of which the individual is 
the data subject; 
Any information available to the data controller as to the source of that 
data. 
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Furthermore, under the secondary legislation 194 a request for any of the above five 
pieces of information must be treated by the data controller as a request for all 
five. Other new rights included that in the cases of automated decisions, the logic 
of the decision be conveyed - for example, in credit scoring by a bank assessing 
the person's suitability for a loan. Additionally, data subjects have a right to stop 
data controllers processing data intended for direct marketing, or that would cause 
distress or damage to the data subject or a third party. An individual who suffered 
damage or distress due to contravention is entitled to compensation. 
4.6.3 Key provisions affecting, employees 
An area of information handling that has received increased attention from 
regulators, lawyers and academics has been the processing of employee data. 
Moreover, the questionnaire survey and expert interviews in Chapter 6 highlighted 
that data controllers required further guidance concerning individual rights in this 
field. Consequently, this issue merits further discussion in order to provide 
context to the fieldwork findings. Personal data about employees includes name, 
address, date of birth, payroll details and CCTV images. Additionally, some 
sensitive data may be involved, for example, criminal convictions, physical and 
mental health data, and trade union membership. As the DPA 1998 covers such a 
significant area of work, commentators have recommended that all large and 
medium sized organisations put in place a data protection officer to ensure 
195 compliance . The compliance officer should be effectively trained and be senior 
enough to have the authority to carry through the reforms. The reforms include: 
training staff; undertaking a thorough review of all personal data held by the 
employer; and setting up procedures and policies for governing relationships 
between employer and employees. For the bulk of organisations the key 
compliance date was 24 October 2001, when the provisions for processing manual 
data entered fully into force. 
One of the many ambiguities with processing employee data has been the thorny 
issue of sensitive data. Schedule three of the DPA 1998 listed the pre-conditions 
under which such data may be processed. One of them was 'explicit consent' -a 
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concept yet to be tested in the courts - but which referred to unambiguous, freely- 
given consent. The most obvious way to obtain this would be in writing, for 
example in an employment contract. Additionally, employees must be informed 
of all purposes of such processing. To guarantee employee data security, the 
Personnel Policy Research Unit suggested employers comply with BS 7799 196 _ 
the British Standards Institute standard concerning information security, and 
viewed by the Data Protection Commissioner as evidence of good records 
management. 
Fundamentally, under the new Act, employees are entitled to gain access to 
personal data held by the employer. Job applicants are entitled to see any record 
of reasons for being refused the job applied for. Moreover, they must be informed 
that a decision has been taken by automated means. Section 56 criminalised 
enforced subject access - the process of employers forcing a data subject to make 
a subject access request in order to obtain records of, say, credit ratings or any 
criminal convictions. Finally, employees are entitled to compensation where 
employer processing caused unwarranted and substantial damage or unwarranted 
and substantial distress. 
Another significant area concerns the transfer of employee data abroad. Under the 
eighth data protection principle, employers cannot generally transfer personnel 
files or names of job applicants outside of the EEA. In both cases, the recipient 
country will need ensure an 'adequate' level of data protection, as defined by 
197 Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC , or have one of the exemptions listed 
in 
schedule four (for example, consent of the employee). Interestingly, transfers to 
third countries can proceed if specifically authorised by the member state's data 
protection commissioner. This has yet to happen in the UK. However, this did 
happen in Germany when an agreement was reached in 1996 allowing Citibank to 
transfer personal data from Germany to the US under German data protection 
law 198 . 
Finally, there has been considerable controversy in the UK over the issue of 
employee surveillance. Legitimate business reasons do exist for some surveillance 
- for example: if an employee is suspected of fraud; to monitor time spent surfing 
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the Internet; or to review emails for discrimination or defamation. In most cases, 
employee surveillance will amount to the processing of personal data. Under the 
first data protection principle, surveillance must be undertaken fairly and lawfully 
- requiring the consent of the employee, ideally in a contract of employment. The 
employee should be able to withdraw consent to any type of processing at any 
time. The fifth data protection principle stated that data be processed no longer 
than necessary, meaning that data obtained through surveillance should be 
destroyed or erased as soon as it is clear such data is not required for disciplinary 
or other action against the employee. Public sector employees also need to have 
regard to Article 8 of the ECHR - although where employees consent to 
surveillance, they can be taken to have waived their right to privacy. 
Codes oýpractice 
A new feature of the DPA 1998 has been the power for the Information 
Commission to establish codes of practice for 'guidance as to good practice' 199 . 
'Good practice' is defined in section 51(9) of the Act as having regard to the 
interests of data subjects and others, and includes compliance with the 
requirements of the Act. According to the Commission's Annual Report 2000200, 
the code of practice must provide 'added value'. To date (January 2003), codes of 
practice have been drafted in two areas: CCTV201 and employment202 . The former 
code was broadly welcomed. The code concerning employment - parts of which 
are still under consultation - was more controversial. 
According to the Commission, two developments necessitated a code of practice 
in employment. Firstly, technology had widened the scope of processing of 
personal data. Decisions increasingly relied on processing personal data through, 
for example: with aptitude, psychometric, and even drug and genetic tests; 
scanning of application forms and CVs; interception of emails; and CCTV 
surveillance. The second development was the new legal environment with the 
DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998. This has generated significant public interest and 
concern. 
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The draft Code, published in October 2000, provided detailed standards on all 
aspects of employment: recruitment; employment records; access and disclosure; 
contract and agency staff, employee monitoring; medical testing; discipline and 
dismissal; and retention of records and former employees. Particular attention was 
given by the press to employee monitoring. Of significant note was the assertion 
that the more automated the processing, the more likely it was to be covered: 
(systems that involve the interception of personal electronic communications such 
as email will almost certainly be covered 1203 . Specific business purposes should 
be established for monitoring, and such monitoring should be targeted. Employers 
should assess the impact on privacy, autonomy and other legitimate rights of staff, 
Staff should be aware it is taking place, and its purpose. The monitoring should be 
for limited purposes only. Employers were advised that information can be 
misleading or false. Detailed provisions were then provided on: covert 
monitoring; monitoring of communications such as telephone, email and Internet; 
on video and audio monitoring; and vehicle monitoring. Failure to comply could 
result in enforcement action by the Commissioner and a claim for compensation 
by the individual who has suffered as a result. 
The Commissioner believed the Code, when finalised, would provide some 
certainty as to the requirements of the law and as to what is good practice. 
Employers were not obliged to adopt the Code. If compliance can be achieved 
through another method, the data controller was free to follow that. However, the 
Code will be of strong evidential value, providing a potent defence against actions 
under the Act by disgruntled employees or the Information Commission. In many 
instances there is probably only one set of practical possibilities. Finally, the code 
could be incorporated into human resource management, professional standards 
and management handbooks. 
Publication of the draft Code generated considerable debate. As a result, the 
release of the final Code has been repeatedly delayed owing to extensive 
consultation and revision lasting over two years. The final Code is to be released 
in four parts. At the time of writing (January 2003), two parts have been finalised: 
Part 1: Recruitment and selection and Part 2: Records management. According to 
Assistant Information Commissioner, David Smith, Part 3: Monitoring at work 
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was due to be finalised "before Christmas" 2002 204 . This timetable 
has slipped 
somewhat, raising questions as to whether the OIC will achieve its stated aim of 
completing Part 4: Medical information "before Eastee'2003 205 . 
The most vocal critic during the extensive consultation process has been the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), representing UK employers. The CBI 
voiced 'significant concerns 206 about the draft, not least its length and complexity 
with over 200 standards set out in 62 pages. In April 2002, following the 
publication of Part 1, the CBI reiterated their position, complaining about the ad- 
hoc nature of the OIC's consultation process and stating that: 
'The main premise of monitoring must be that business should be free to 
decide when and how to monitor employees at work, provided that 
employees are made aware of this. We have commented on the proposals 
but believe that they remain fundamentally flawed. ' 207 
Trade unions, however, broadly welcomed the measure, stating that the OIC was 
correct in providing such detailed guidance. A representative from the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) stated: 
"It is a hugely complicated area of law, and employers do need to put in 
place policy, and they need a clear simple guide which takes you through 
those policies [ ... ]. There's no reason why an employer can't read a 
lot of 
documents if it's actually going to protect them from litigation in the 
, 208 future' 
The OIC has reiterated its position that the Code simply explained, and did not 
create, legal obligations209. 
4.7 North America 
Article 25 (1) of the Data Protection Directive stated that the transfers of personal 
data could only take place to third countrieS210 that had an 'adequate' level of data 
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protection. This posed particular problems for the US and Canada - both major 
trading areas for EU member states. The two countries have responded to the EU 
Directive and the potential threat of trade barriers in contrasting ways. The US, 
over a two year period, negotiated a set of principles for its companies to 
voluntarily sign up to - providing a 'Safe Harbor' for companies to continue to 
trade with the EU. However, the 'Safe Harbor' agreement has proved 
controversial, being opposed by many US businesses and the current US 
administration as presenting a barrier to free trade. Conversely, it has been 
contested by many within the EU - particularly the European Parliament - as not 
going far enough in protection personal data. Canada, with some tradition of data 
protection laws, extended its federal data privacy law to the entire private sector. 
This enhanced data protection regime, with limited exceptions, was formally 
recognised as 'adequate' by the EU in December 200 1211. 
4.7.1 United States 
The Constitution versus common law 
Until the mid-1960's, privacy law in the US had largely developed via the courts. 
This had been achieved at two judicial levels. Firstly, the constitutional level at 
which the federal courts measured statutes against the rights enshrined in the US 
Constitution. Secondly, at common law level, by which judges fashioned 
remedies for particular invasions of privacy. 
The US Constitution did not contain an explicit right to privacy. Indeed, the word 
privacy was not even mentioned. The closest guarantee was the fourth 
amendment, which held that: 
'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
212 
violated' 
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Therefore, the Supreme Court developed a doctrine known as 'substantive due 
process' that extended constitutional protection over some types of personal 
behaviour. This doctrine served as the basis for the constitutional right to privacy. 
The due process clauses in the fifth and fourteenth amendments barred the federal 
government and the states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. From the late nineteenth century, the Court began to 
use due process to protect certain substantive rights. This included a right to 
privacy from government surveillance into an area where a person had a 
'reasonable expectation of privacy 213 and also matters relating to marriage, 
procreation, child-rearing and education. The Court also recognised in NAACP v. 
Alaba=2 14 (1958) that political groups had the right to prevent disclosure of their 
members' names to government agencies. The idea was that people had the right 
to live their lives as they desired. 
A key privacy decision taken by the Supreme Court was Griswold v. 
ConnecticuP15 (1965) which struck down a state law prohibiting married couples 
from using contraceptives. There was no rational reason for such a law, the Court 
ruled, and it too drastically interfered with the basic intimacy of the marriage 
bond. Described by Westin in 1967 as 'a major first step towards enunciating a 
, 216 new constitutional doctrine of privacy , it paved the way 
for a more 
controversial case. In 1973, the Court held in Roe v. Wade 217 that states cannot bar 
a woman from having an abortion because of the constitutional right to privacy. 
As it went against the deep convictions of many people, the case attracted huge 
political controversy. In spite of hearing many abortion cases in the years since 
Roe and changing the rules somewhat, the Court has declined to back away from 
the central point: that a woman has a constitutional right to control her body. 
The development of a general common law right to privacy was first rationalised 
by Warren and Brandeis in a famous article in the Harvard Law Review in 1890218. 
They argued that the existing case law already contained the necessary ingredients 
to make up a general concept of privacy, but that the courts had not seen the wood 
for the trees. Judicial decisions had protected individual privacy under traditional 
headings of trespass, nuisance, slander, libel plus various property rights. Such 
incidental interests of privacy needed to be isolated from the existing remedies and 
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re-classified under a separate and independent liability of privacy. In this way, it 
would be possible to more clearly understand the concept involved and to protect 
privacy in a wider range of situations. This argument eventually became accepted 
in the US, and by 1960 there were over three hundred reported cases on the right 
19 to privacy' . 
In 1960, Prosser attempted to clarify the privacy case law and found not one law, 
but a complex of four tortS220: 
Intrusions upon the plaintiff s 221 seclusion or solitude or into his private 
affairs; 
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; 
Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light; 
(iv) Appropriation for the defendant's 222 advantage of the plaintiff's name 
or likeness. 223 
According to Linowes and Bennett224, it was the Griswold v. Connecticut case 
before the Supreme Court in 1965 that brought case law and constitutional law 
together - with the Supreme Court granting privacy constitutional status, as 
existing within the 'penumbras' of the Constitution 225 Thus, the span and 
application of the concept of privacy widened. 
In terms of public policy, privacy as a problem emerged with the development and 
spread of computer technology in the 1960s, especially with its application to 
government. Particularly important was the abortive attempt to establish a 
'National Data Center' of all basic statistical data originating in federal agencies. 
The proposal floundered when scrutinised by Congress. Simultaneously, this was 
the period when privacy became regarded as more of a policy problem than 
something that can be protected in the face of rapid technological change by case 
laW226 
- From that moment forward, 'informational privacy' or 'data protection' 
was distinguished from other behavioural aspects of privacy (such as physical 
intrusion), and granted its own separate distinction as an issue of public policy. 
The publication of important books by Miller227 and Westin228 during this period 
played a critical role in defining the problem. 
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Freedom ofInformation Act 1966 
The federal legislature from the mid-1960's developed data protection law. The 
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1966 229 was not primarily intended as 
a data protection measure, but did have the effect of improving government 
record-keeping. FOIA was designed to make executive records more accessible to 
the public. Nine categories of sensitive government data were exempt from 
disclosure, with appeals to the ordinary federal courts where the burden of proof 
was on the agency to justify its action in withholding any information. The 
exemption most relevant to data protection was for 'personnel and medical files 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy'230 . In the early days of FOIA, after it went into effect in 1967, 
there were bureaucratic attempts to refuse requests for access on the grounds that 
disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of the applicant's privaCY231. 
However, from the late 1960's increasing use was made of the FOI Act by 
individuals to ask for files compiled on them by federal security agencies. 
Westin stressed that Congress was aware that the Act would provide a basis for 
safeguarding from disclosure private information about citizens that government 
has acquired, and that the citizen's right to privacy was a goal of the FOI Act 
along with the public's right to know232. The Act was a data protection measure in 
two senses: it provided a right of subject access to records - manual and 
automated - held by federal government; and it protected the privacy of third 
parties by exempting records from access if disclosure involved a 'clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy 233 . Finally, there was one other exemption to the 
FOI Act which served to protect personal privacy: the exemption from disclosure 
of any information exempted by another statute. Following clarification by the 
Supreme CoUrt234, the main effect of this provision has been to protect from 
disclosure records such as tax returns and census information. 
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Privaa Act 1974 
Privacy invasions in general had been a subject of Congressional interest since the 
mid-1960s, yet the idea of legislating a set of fair information principles to protect 
the right to information privacy was principally motivated by the long-term efforts 
of Senator Ervin. In the House of Representatives, a broad bipartisan agreement 
on the basic content of the law was fostered by the efforts of Congressmen Koch 
(Democrat, New York) and Goldwater (Republican, California). At the same time 
the privacy law was being debated, the FOIA was amended. That the Privacy 
ACt235 and the amended Freedom of Information Act became law at all was due to 
the significance of the events surrounding Watergate and the ensuing climate of 
distrust of governmen t236. 
The US Privacy Act of 1974 differed from the European data protection laws in 
that the detailed rules were in the statute itself. There was no supervisory 
authority - rather the onus of enforcement mainly fell on the individual, who was 
to take legal action in the courts. The Act protected records held by federal 
government agencies, requiring them to apply basic fair information practices. 
Both manual and computerised files were regulated in this sector. The Act 
provided for a subject access right, but with exemptions to cover any records 
maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency and most records maintained by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, a right was established to request 
amendment of a record if it was not accurate, relevant, timely or complete. 
Finally, there was a right to damages if the data subject suffered harm from 
incorrect records, although this right required proof of some adverse effect of the 
erroneous information. 
An important part of the Privacy Act was the creation of a temporary Privacy 
Protection Study Commission (PPSC). The establishment of this body was a 
compromise, after Senate moves to create a Federal Privacy Board - to have broad 
powers over both public and private sectors - were blocked 
237 
. The Commission 
examined individual privacy rights and record-keeping practices in many 
environments, including the private sector. When it reported in July 1977 238 , the 
PPSC restated the 'eight privacy commandments' of openness, individual access, 
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correction and amendment, collection limitation, internal use limitation, disclosure 
limitation, information management, and accountability. Overall, the Privacy 
Study Commission assessed the Act to be only moderately successfU1231. It also 
found that, owing to the diversity of the subject matter, a single all-encompassing 
federal law would not be practicable. Instead, the PPSC made a series of 
recommendations to cover certain areas of the private sector, some legislative, 
others relying on voluntary compliance. The piecemeal legislation has been 
directed at particular practices and industries, and has included the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act 1970, Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 1976, Right to 
Financial Privacy Act 1978, and the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection 
Act 1988. The Safe Harbor Principles, agreed in July 2000, and discussed later in 
this Chapter may broaden this approach to data privacy legislation. 
The Privacy Act's greatest success was probably in establishing the extent and 
nature of personal record-keeping practice in federal government. In this, a 
supervisory role was assigned to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
which was required to issue guidelines to federal agencies concerning 
implementation of the Act. Privacy Act officers were appointed in each agency. 
Standard operating procedures were instituted for the collection, use and 
dissemination of personal data. Additionally, there was a requirement on each 
agency to publish full details of its records systems in the federal Register and to 
give advance notice to Congress and the OMB of every new system of records and 
every major change in existing systems. This was in order to evaluate their 
privacy implications. Essentially, this constituted a limited form of registration, in 
spite of the generally different approach to privacy taken by the US in most other 
respects. In this capacity, the Act has contributed to the reduction of unnecessary 
information collection, in the elimination of a large amount of information from 
existing systems, and in the consolidation of a number of duplicate record-keeping 
systems. The Act has thus been described as a 'records management statute' 
rather than a mechanism to protect individual rights 240 . Indeed, Rule criticised the 
Act for concentrating on efficiency of record-keeping without critically evaluating 
the need for personal data systems in the first place 241 . 
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A 'Safe Harbor'? 
Historically, the US has taken a sectoral approach towards privacy protection - 
resulting in a patchwork of federal laws, state laws and self-regulatory 
programmes. There was no wish to enact a generally applicable data protection 
law on the lines of the EU Directive for its private sector. The resulting 
differences in approach threatened trade between the two powers. The EU is by 
far the US's largest trading partner and the site of most US foreign investment. In 
2000, the US exported $255 billion of goods and services to the EU and imported 
$302 billion of goods and services from the EU242. Clearly, many US companies 
depend on information flows with suppliers, customers, partners, affiliates and 
other service providers based in the EU. Within the EU, the same is true. Any 
restriction on transatlantic data flows would matter to both partners. 
Provisions 
Therefore, the 'Safe Harbor' framework was developed by the U. S. Department of 
Commerce, in consultation with the European Commission, industry and non- 
governmental organizations. Under 'Safe Harbor', U. S. organisations could 
voluntarily adhere to a set of data protection principles recognised by the 
Commission as providing adequate protection. This arrangement was expressed in 
a set of seven privacy principles, augmented by 15 frequently asked questions and 
answers (FAQS)243 . The FAQs are sector specific measures, detailing 
issues such 
as exceptions for journalists (FAQ 2); human resources data (FAQ 9); and the 
handling of publicly available information (FAQ 15). 
US companies can receive personal data from the EU by means other than 'Safe 
Harbor'. For example, if data subjects have given their consent or the transfer is 
necessary to fulfil a contract involving the data subjece 44 .' Additionally, transfers 
can take place between two companies where the importer can guarantee that 
adequate safeguards are in place - for example, by contraCe45 . These transfers 
required authorisation by the member states' data protection commissioners. 
However, the processed was simplified in December 2001 by the introduction of 
model contracts by the European Commission for exchanging personal data 
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between EU nations and third countries 246 . Under these voluntary contracts, 
EU 
companies exporting data would instruct the subcontractor to treat the data with 
full respect to EU data protection requirements and guarantee that appropriate 
technical and security measures are in place in the destination country. Member 
states' data protection commissioners are obliged to recognise that these transfers 
enjoy adequate protection. 
The documents underpinning 'Safe Harbor' are extensive. They include the 
European Commission's adequacy decision (July 2000)247 and the exchange of 
letters between the US Department of Commerce (DOC) and the European 
Commission 248. These papers revealed the detail and complexity of the 
negotiations. The 'Safe Harbor' framework was finally agreed between the 
European Commission and the DOC in July 2000 after over two years of intense 
negotiations, and criticism from the European Parliamen t249 . The 
framework, and 
its principles, came into force on I November 2000. The principles required the 
following: 
Notice. Organisations must notify individuals about the purposes for 
which they collect and use information about them; 
Choice. Individuals must be given the opportunity to opt out if their 
data will be disclosed to a third party. For sensitive data, an 
opportunity to opt in must be given if the information is to be disclosed 
to a third party; 
Onward Transfer. The notice and choice principles must be followed 
if disclosing information to a third party; 
(iv) Access. Individuals must have access to personal information about 
them held by an organisation and be able to correct, amend or delete 
information where it is inaccurate; 
(v) Security. Reasonable precautions must be taken to protect personal 
information from loss, misuse and unauthorised access, disclosure, 
alteration and destruction; 
(vi) Data Integrity. Personal data should be accurate, complete and current; 
(vii) Enforcement. There must be: 
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a. Readily available and affordable independent recourse 
mechanisms; 
b. Procedures verifying that the commitments companies make to the 
'Safe Harbor' principles are implemented; 
C. Obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply 
with the principles. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to 
ensure compliance by the organisation. 
Companies were not obliged to show that they conform to the 'Safe Harbor' 
principles before they sign up. However, the principles had to be applied to any 
data transferred from the EU after the US organisation had entered the 'Safe 
Harbor'. Yet, there is no obligation to apply the principles to manually processed 
operations. Any organisation that wishes to extend 'Safe Harbor' benefits to 
human resources personal data transferred from the EU, has to indicate this when 
signing up to the principles and confonn to the requirements set forward in FAQ 
9250. 
Enforcement 
Enforcement of the 'Safe Harbor' primarily takes place in the US, in accordance 
with US law. The method is largely through alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, whereby independent private sector bodies will investigate and 
attempt to resolve complaints in the first instance. If the companies fail to c omply 
with the rulings of these bodies, the cases will be notified to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) or the Department of Transportation, depending on the sector, 
which have legal powers to oblige them to comply. Serious cases of non- 
compliance can result in companies being struck off the DOC's list - ensuring 
they will no longer be able to receive data transfers from the EU under the 'Safe 
Harbor' arrangement. Additionally, under the FTC Aces', a company's failure to 
abide by commitments to implement 'Safe Harbor' principles is likely to be 
considered a deceptive act likely to mislead reasonable customers in a material 
way. In such cases, the FTC has powers to impose heavy fines and require the 
payment of compensation to individuals. Such action would additionally produce 
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bad publicity and could trigger a stream of private legal actions. Thus, the FTC 
supports the private sector programmes. 
For the US, the main motive behind the 'Safe Harbor' agreement was clearly 
economic. The DOC, on its dedicated website, has been keen to promote the 
benefits to business from entering 'Safe Harbor 252 : 
All 15 EU member states are bound by the European Commission's 
finding on adequacy; 
Companies participating in 'Safe Harbor' are deemed adequate and 
personal data flows to those companies shall continue; 
Member state requirements for prior approval of data transfers is either 
waived or approval is automatically granted; 
Claims brought by EU citizens against US companies will be heard in the 
US subject to limited exceptions. 
Essentially, the framework offers a simpler and cheaper means of complying with 
the adequacy requirements of the Directive than seeking approval from individual 
member states. An EU organisation can ensure it is sending data to a 'Safe 
Harbor' company by viewing the public list of 'Safe Harbor' organisations - 
posted on the DOC's website253. An organisation's appearance on the list 
constitutes a representation to the DOC and the public that it adheres to a privacy 
policy meeting the 'Safe Harbor' framework. By mid-January 2003,292 US 
organisations - including Hewlett Packard, Dun and Bradstreet, and Microsoft - 
had signed up to the arrangement. 
Following an initial implementation period, the 'Safe Harbor' agreement became 
fully effective from I July 2001. A European Commission working paper 
assessed the effectiveness of the agreement in February 2002 254 . The findings 
were mixed. Whilst acknowledging that all the elements of 'Safe Harbor' were in 
place, a substantial number of the US organisations that had signed up to the 
agreement were not observing the expected degree of transparency. This was 
regarding both their overall commitment and the contents of their privacy policies, 
less than half of which reflected all seven 'Safe Harbor' principles. This lack of 
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transparency risked the credibility of the whole arrangement. The paper also drew 
attention to the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Not all of the six 
private sector bodies elected to fulfil this task have publicly indicated their 
intention to enforce 'Safe Harbor', and not all had put in privacy practices 
applicable to themselves that conformed to the principles. Given this situation, the 
European Commission stated that only those mechanisms fully conforming to 
'Safe Harbor' should be used by the 'Safe Harbor' organisations. A full 
evaluation of 'Safe Harbor' is planned by the European Commission during 2003. 
Ultimately, the EU retains powers to intervene in certain cases, for example, to 
suspend data transfers to a US company disputing violations of the principles with 
the FTC. Additionally, if evidence of non-compliance accumulates and the 
relevant US enforcement body is dilatory or complacent - and if letting transfers 
continue risks causing gave harm to data subjects - EU authorities can again 
suspend transfers. The Commission can reverse its decision to grant the 'Safe 
Harbor' arrangement 'adequate protection' status. 
Reaction 
During the first half of 2001, reaction to the Data Protection Directive and 'Safe 
Harbor' in particular was hostile. Presidential elections held in November 2000 
had replaced the Democrat administration that had agreed to 'Safe Harbor' with a 
more protectionist Republican government under Bush. In May 2001, Ft. com 
reported on a deepening dispute between the EU and the US over the Data 
Protection Directive255. The Bush administration had written to the Commission 
protesting against the model contract that financial institutions would be asked to 
sign to ensure that their exports to non-EU countries complied with the Directive. 
The Independent online had earlier highlighted the potential disruption to EU trade 
with the US if the 'Safe Harbor' agreement was to be dismantled - with 
companies having to seek permission of individual customers before their data can 
be transferred to the US256. 
However, following the terrorist attacks in the US on II September 200 1, 'Safe 
Harbor' has become less of a concern for the Bush administration. The US 
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government did request in November 2001 that the EU revised its draft E- 
Communications Directive to permit the retention of data for a 'reasonable 
period', beyond what was necessary for billing purposes 257 . As discussed 
in sub- 
section 4.3.4 of this Chapter, such a revision was passed during the Directive's 
second reading before the European Parliament in May 2002. Thus, law 
enforcement agencies were granted greater access to electronic communications 
data. Finally, the earlier introduction of model contracts in December 2001 
simplified the transfer of personal data between the EU and third countries, 
providing organisations with an alternative to 'Safe Harbor' when transferring 
personal data to the US258. Nevertheless, US business groups such as the Global 
Privacy Alliance - whose membership include Oracle, IBM and VeriSign - were 
still lobbying the European Commission to relax its data protection regime in 
autumn 2002 259 . 
4.7.2 Canada 
Canada's development of data protection law was more typical of Western 
European countries, especially Germany. Early legislation in this field was at a 
state level, for example British Columbia enacted the Personal Information 
Reporting Act in 1973. During this period the federal government set up a Task 
Force on Privacy and Computers which published a number of independent studies 
and a summary repor t260 . Following the report, the federal government set up an 
Interdepartmental Committee on Privacy in order to prepare a law for the federal 
government261. The outcome was the Human Rights Act of 1977: Part IV of 
which was entitled 'Protection of Personal Information'. The Canadian Human 
Rights Act only effected the public sector, but did regulate manual processing. 
Regulation was by the Privacy Commissioner - essentially an advisory institution, 
as in Germany. However, the main powers were invested elsewhere - in this case, 
in a designated government, minister. The statute ultimately relied on the 
government to regulate its own data handling. For example, sections 53-55 of the 
Human Rights Act enabled each Minister to exempt personal records kept by his 
own department from the data subject's right of access. For this reason, it came in 
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for some criticism at the time 262 . Additionally, although the various criteria 
for 
exemption were set out in the Act (for example, protection of national security, 
criminal intelligence, supervision of convicted persons), each Minister interpreted 
them for himself or herself. 
Concrete proposals for amending Part IV, and creating a separate Privacy Act, 
were first put forward in 1980. In 1982, the Privacy ACt263 was enacted in tandem 
with an Access to Information Act. Both Acts were proclaimed in force on I July 
1983. The federal Privacy Act provided individuals with a right of access to 
personal information held by the federal public sector. Seventeen years later, the 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act264 (known as Bill 
C-6) was passed by federal government - regulating how private sector 
organisations may collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of 
commercial activities. This measure came into effect on I January 200 1, although 
its provisions are being phased in over three years. Both Acts are overseen by the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, who is authorised to receive and investigate 
complaints. 
The Privagy Act 1982 
The Privacy Act was Canada's first dedicated privacy legislation. It imposed 
obligations on federal government departments and agencies to respect privacy 
rights of Canadians by limiting the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information. Data subjects were given a right to access and correct personal 
information held about them by federal government organisation. Moreover, the 
Act established a fair information code to regulate government handling of 
personal records. The code required the federal government to: 
Limit its collection of personal information to the minimum required to 
operate programmes or activities; 
Collect information, whenever possible, directly from the data subject; 
Inform the data subject why the information is being collected and how it 
will be used; 
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Not use information for purposes other than those specified, unless allowed 
by law; 
Keep information for long enough to allow the person a reasonable 
opportunity to obtain access; 
Ensure information is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible; 
Not disclose personal information unless specifically allowed by the 
Privacy Act or another law. 
Clearly, the code was not as specific as the data protection principles found in 
most national data protection laws in Europe at the time. Indeed, the code's 
provisions could be ignored when another federal act allowed for the processing of 
personal information. 'Personal information' was defined as 'any factual or 
, 265 subjective information, recorded or not, about an identifiable individual 
However, personal information did not include a data subject's job title, telephone 
number or address, details appearing on an individual's business card, or that 
could be found through a publicly available source such as a telephone directory. 
The Privacy Act applied to a range of federal government records, including: 
pension and unemployment insurance files; medical records; tax records; and 
student loan applications. As the information may be recorded 'in any form', it 
included video and audio tapes, plus any electronic information medium. 
However, from the late 1980's the federal government was under pressure to 
review and expand the provisions of the ACt266 . Due to growing commercial trade 
in customer information, the issue of data protection in the private sector became 
more prominent. In the mid-1980's self-regulation based on OECD guidelines had 
been encouraged. Industries such as insurance, direct marketing and 
telecommunications all drafted sector-specific codes. These codes were updated 
and harmonised in the mid-1990's by the Canadian Standards Association, 
resulting in the 1996 Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information267. In 
terms of statutes, Quebec became the first North American jurisdiction to adopt 
comprehensive legislation for information held by the private sector. In 1994, the 
province passed an Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the 
priVate SeCtor268. This Act granted individuals a right of access to personal 
information held by private sector businesses operating in Quebec and regulates 
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the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Moreover, by January 
2002, all but two provinces - Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland - had data 
protection legislation governing the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information held by government agencies 269 . 
However, the coming into force of the EU Data Protection Directive with its 
'adequacy' test on the transfer of data to third countries, prompted the federal 
government to enact legislation to control the use of personal data in the private 
sector. 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
built on the existing attempts to encourage self-regulation and will eventually 
regulate the entire private sector, filling some very important gaps in the 
patchwork of federal and provincial statutes passed over the last thirty years. 
The Act is being implemented in three stages. Commencing I January 2001, the 
law applied to: 
Federal works, undertakings or businesses. It applied to personal 
information of clients and employees in the federally regulated private 
sector, such as airlines, banking, broadcasting, inter-provincial 
transportation and telecommunications; 
Personal information disclosed across provincial borders - and outside 
Canada - for consideration. 
On I January 2002, the law was extended to personal health infonnation collected, 
used and disclosed by organisations described under phase one of the law. Finally, 
on I January 2004, the Act will apply to: 
- The collection, use and disclosure of personal information by any 
organisation in the course of commercial activity within a province; 
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- All personal information in all interprovincial and international 
transactions by all organisations subject to the Act in the course of 
commercial activities. 
The federal government may exempt organisations and/or activities in provinces 
that have adopted substantially similar legislation. Provincial governments are 
therefore given the opportunity to pass their own statutes, or to do nothing and 
surrender an important constitutional power to the federal government in three 
years time when the entire private sector will be covered. 
PIPEDA gave individuals a right to know why an organisation would collect, use 
or disclose their personal data; to do so reasonably and appropriately; and not to 
use the information for any purpose other than that to which the individuals have 
consented. Moreover, the data subject can expect to know who in the organisation 
is responsible for protecting their data and expect the organisation to take 
appropriate security measures. Consumers can expect the information held to be 
accurate, complete and up to date; to obtain access to their personal information 
and ask for corrections; and make complaints, in confidence if necessary. 
Furthermore, organisations should destroy, erase or make anonymous personal 
information that it no longer needs in order to fulfil the purpose for which it was 
collected. However, there are exceptions to the above principles. For example, an 
organisation may not need to obtain consent if the information clearly benefits the 
individual and cannot be obtained in a timely way; or if the information is required 
by a law enforcement agency for an investigation. 
In the new Act, sensitive data as such is not identified. Data is regarded as 
sensitive depending on the context in which it is used. There is no prohibition on 
the collection of such data, although it is recommended that an organisation 
'should' generally seek express consent when the information is likely to be 
considered sensitive 
270 
. Finally, the Act stated that more sensitive data should be 
271 guarded by a higher level of protection . 
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Oversight of this legislation has been given centrally to the Canadian Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner. It is a complaints-driven, ombudsman model with powers 
to investigate complaints, call witnesses, compel evidence and inspect business 
premises. Organisations' practices can be audited on 'reasonable grounds' and the 
findings made public. Finally, the Commissioner's mandate includes research, 
education and the promotion of privacy issues in Canada 272 . However, the 
Commissioner has no binding powers and must apply to the federal court for 
enforcement. Nevertheless, it is a criminal offence to obstruct the Commissioner 
during an investigation or audit, or to knowingly dispose of personal information 
that could be subject to a request. Additionally, the legislation makes it a criminal 
offence for employers to take retaliatory actions against employees who blow the 
whistle. 
In December 2001, the European Commission recognised the adequacy of 
273 PIPEDA . In effect, the Commission's 'Decision' permitted the free flow of 
personal data from the EU to Canada subject to PIPEDA 2001 - covering private 
sector organisations that collected, used or disclosed personal information in the 
course of their commercial activities. The Decision did not, therefore concern data 
held by the public sector at federal or state levels, or private sector data held for 
non-commercial purposes, for example, employment data or personal information 
held by charities. Those transfers had to be conducted by other means, for 
example through model contracts. 
However, since the terrorist attacks of II September, Canada has been under 
pressure from the US to amend its domestic legislation to increase security. 
Legislation has been passed restricting rights of access to personal information 
under both the Privacy Act and PIPEDA. The Attorney General has been given 
powers under the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act-2001 (section 104) to prohibit 
disclosure of personal information for the purposes of 'protecting international 
relations or national defence or security'274 . Furthermore, an amendment to the 
Aeronautics Ac t275 overrode section 5 of PIPEDA by allowing foreign 
governments access to passenger lists on flights coming into, or departing from, 
Canada. Bennett276 argued that the prime reason for these changes to Canadian 
data protection legislation were the tsignificant pressures to converge with 
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dominant American practices'. The events of September II 'convinced many 
American policy makers that American security was only as strong as that of the 
9277 largest undefended border in the world 
4.8 Conclusions 
Data protection law is complex - evolving, overlapping with other legislation and 
diversifying into new fields. It is subject to pressures from government, business 
and the consumer. Moreover, with increased dissemination of personal data via 
stand-alone computers rather than centralised government databanks, data 
protection law needed to evolve. As a result, two generations of statutes have 
been passed in many European Union member states in 30 years. Indeed, Sweden 
and Germany have recently enacted third generation statutes. In the midst of this 
rapid progress, this Chapter has identified a few important, and overlapping, 
trends. 
(i) Globalisation and the changing role of data protection laws 
Over a period of three decades, legislation in this field has moved from national 
laws motivated by domestic concerns to international instruments such as the 
Council of Europe's Convention 108, the OECD's guidelines and the EU Data 
Protection Directive. Within Europe, early data protection laws in states such as 
Hesse, Sweden and Germany focused on the role of the computer - especially in 
public administration. This resulted in legislation (in the aforementioned states) or 
detailed recommendations such those in the UK's Lindop Report. In Canada, 
legislation was enacted covering the public sector, combined with the self- 
regulatory Canadian Standards Association's Model Code. 
The enactment of Directive 95/46/EC represented a shifting in gears within the 
EU. Initially intended for information privacy and harmonisation, its focus altered 
during drafting to accommodate free trade - ensuring the transfer of personal data 
between member states, thereby benefiting the single market. Within its 
jurisdiction, the Directive has become a facilitator of free trade. In this respect, the 
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instrument had a global effect with its effective prohibition of the transfer of 
personal data to states lacking 'adequate' protection. Consequently, nations as 
diverse as Switzerland, Hungary and Canada have amended their data protection 
legislation to accommodate the provisions of the Directive. The US entered into 
the 'Safe Harbor' agreement with the EU. However, opposition to this agreement 
by the Bush administration - even prior to the attacks of I Ith September 2001 - 
indicated that there are limits to the globalisation of data protection legislation. 
(ii) The question of hannonisation within the EU - how far-reaching? 
The Directive was enacted only after substantial structural changes within the 
European Communities - in particular the Schengen provisions concerning the 
sharing of information on criminals across borders, and economic moves towards 
the single market. Unlike the Council of Europe's Convention 108, the Directive 
is an all-encompassing piece of legislation that had to be transposed into law of 
member states. This meant that not only the UK, but also states such as Sweden 
with revised legislation, had to overhaul their national data protection laws - 
including manual records for the first time. In France and Ireland, this process is 
ongoing. 
However, the effect will be far-reaching as the Directive absorbed different 
national approaches. Codes of practice were adopted from the Netherlands, the 
appointment of corporate data protection officers borrowed from Germany, and 
registration of data controllers adapted from the UK. Nevertheless exemptions, 
transition periods and flexibility exist. There has been room for individual states 
and organisations, to develop their own best practices in relation to the Directive. 
In conclusion, this attempts to ease the tension between the 'convergence' and 
'divergence' concepts postulated by Bennett in 1992 278 . 
(iii) Move towards a sectoral data protection legal enviromnent. 
In certain respects, Directive 95/46/EC has resulted a more flexible regulatory 
environment. Provision exists within the Directive (Article 27) for individual 
states to develop their own specific codes of practice. This provision has been 
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used by the OIC in the UK to develop codes of practice concerning usage of 
CCTV and processing of personal data in employment practices. Sector-specific 
codes of practice and the development of model contracts between organisations 
trading in different countries have become increasingly prevalent, with 
information privacy being viewed as a quality standard to be 'built-in' to good 
business practice. This observation will be developed finther in the case study 
analysis (Chapter 7). 
Finally, this trend towards specialisation was evidenced in the enactment two 
years later of the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive, superseded in 
2002 by the E-Communications Directive. 
(iv) Difficulties encountered by the UK supervisory authority in promoting new 
data protection practices 
Nationally, the DPA 1998 has prompted UK organisations to revise their data 
handling practices, with new provisions concerning the management of personal 
information in manual records, wider individual rights, the introduction of more 
rigorous standards for handling sensitive data and the outlawing of enforced 
subject access requests. Organisational change will be analysed in more detail in 
the fieldwork Chapters -6 and 7. Whereas the previous DPA 1984 focused on the 
handling of narrowly defined computerised data - being more of a records 
management statute - the DPA 1998 has its roots firmly in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, although the UK Act did not acknowledge this. In 
this respect, individual privacy - at least in the handling of individual's personal 
information - is key. 
However, the UK supervisory authority has encountered difficulties in promoting 
certain new practices. In particular, the new provision concerning codes of 
practice has proved controversial. Whilst the OIC is insistent that such codes are 
merely mechanisms to aid compliance with the law, businesses have been 
concerned that they may be used set new standards of practice over and above the 
provisions of the DPA 1998. This has resulted in extensive delays in finalising the 
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Employment Practices Code of Practice. Moreover, it became clear during 
fieldwork interviews that the OIC was hampered resource and staffing problems - 
resulting in a backlog of work. A positive outcome of this was that local 
authorities at least, were more likely to approach each other with queries than the 
supervisory authority, resulting in greater networking among organisations. This 
debate is considered in further detail in the Chapters 6 and 7 detailing expert and 
case study interviews. 
(V) Anti-terrorism amendments: 'convergence' at the instigation of the US? 
Following the terrorist attacks in the US, most developed countries have been 
amending their domestic legislation. Both the EU and Canada have altered data 
protection legislation in response to US security concerns. The EU revised its 
draft E-Communications Directive to extend the retention of personal data, 
allowing law enforcement agencies greater access, whilst Canada amended 
PIPEDA, restricting data subject access and allowing foreign governments access 
to airline passenger lists. As Bennett 279 recently observed, US pressures are 
causing data protection policy- in a small way - to 'converge'. Whether this 
impact will be lasting, remains to be seen. 
The above trends, overlapping and in some respects contradictory, nevertheless 
give an indication of the current legal situation regarding data protection. Issues 
such as moves towards sectoral codes and the difficulties encountered by the UK 
supervisory authority will be analysed further in the following Chapters. More 
specifically, the impact of other legislation, for example freedom of infori-nation 
concerns, on data protection laws will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5. Safeguarding data protection: the wider legal context 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the enactment of the DPA 1998, a number of statutes have been passed in 
the UK impacting on eight principles that form the backbone of the legislation. 
This Chapter analyses the subsidiary hypothesis 2, assessing how effectively the 
DPA 1998 works with other legislation impacting on data protection. Perhaps the 
most far-reaching statute has been the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, 
incorporating the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) into UK law. A key part of the ECHR is Article 8- right to a private life. 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 will address the context to, and provisions of, the HRA 1998 
- whether it introduces a right to privacy into UK law, and if so, whether it 
represents a clear and workable provision. Section 5.2 examines the ECHR - its 
hierarchy of rights, and the principles of interpretation to be followed by the UK 
courts when examining human rights issues. From the outset, reference has been 
made to Article 8 and how it may interface with Article 10 - freedom of 
expression. Case law from Strasbourg has been assessed to determine any 
precedents that may be followed by UK courts. 
Section 5.3 focuses specifically on the HRA 1998. The key provisions of the Act 
are outlined, and commentary from academics and leading lawyers examined to 
assess how the HRA 1998 will work out in practice. The small amount of case law 
in existence has been analysed for any precedents or patterns, and attention given 
to any difficulties in incorporating legislation from a different legal culture into 
UK law. As the HRA 1998 explicitly applies to 'public authorities', this section 
will examine how aware such organisations are of the legislation, the official 
guidance received and whether current practices need to be radically altered in 
order to safeguard the right to privacy. 
Section 5.4 considers the challenges posed by the new Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) 2000, which will be fully implemented by 2005. Unlike the DPA 
1998, FOIA 2000 was not enacted to implement an EU directive in the field. 
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Rather, it was passed by the UK Labour government following promises made in 
its 1997 election manifesto. The context to, and the provisions of, FOIA 2000 are 
investigated. Issues addressed include: the status of FOIA 2000 in UK law; the 
mechanisms established to regulate the Act; and the interface of FOIA 2000 with 
the DPA 1998. This statute deserves consideration for two key reasons. Firstly, it 
specifically alters and extends the scope of the DPA 1998 to include manually 
personal data that is held in an unstructured format. The implications of this 
change are discussed in subsection 5.4.4. Secondly, FOIA 2000 - in providing for 
access to information generally - complements the DPA 1998, with its emphasis 
on protection of personal information. Indeed, when requesting personal data 
concerning third parties one Act cannot be considered without the other. The 
demands of both laws have prompted organisations to review their policy-making 
in relation to handling of personal data, with both data protection and freedom of 
information being considered in tandem. The consequences for the way 
organisations handle information privacy are introduced in this Chapter, and 
elaborated in the fieldwork analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Section 5.5 considers the final two laws discussed in this Chapter: the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act (ATCSA) 2001. Both Acts were passed in response to international 
concerns. RIPA 2000 enacted part of the EU's Telecommunications Data 
Protection Directive 97/46/EC, whilst the ATCSA 2001 was passed in reaction to 
terrorist attacks in the US. Both have implications for data protection, in particular 
regarding: interception of communications data; retention of personal data by data 
controllers; and access to personal data by law enforcement agencies. Section 5.5 
will assess the extent to which the UK government has built human rights and data 
protection safeguards into these statutes. 
Finally, this Chapter concludes with implications of these measures for public 
organisations attempting compliance with the DPA 1998. This Chapter thus 
provides a foundation for the fieldwork analysis undertaken in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.1.1 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are to: 
Identify the main provisions of the recent key UK legislation affecting the 
provisions of the DPA 1998. The legislation referred to are: HRA 1998; 
FOIA 2000; RIPA 2000; and ATCSA 2001; 
To set the above statutes in context, and assess their impact on public 
organisations attempting compliance with the DPA 1998. 
5.2 European Convention on Human Rights 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, with thirty Articles covering a full range of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights in one document. Article 12 stated: 
'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. ' I 
Member countries were called on to publicise the text of the Declaration 
6principally in schools and other educational institutionS, 2 . The adoption of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950 gave specific legal 
content to the rights contained in the Declaration. 
5.2.1 Key terms and concepts 
The ECHR is fundamental, being at the top of the European legislative tree. Both 
Convention 108 3 and the 1995 Data Protection Directive 4 made explicit reference 
to the ECHR, including respect for the private domain. As the Data Protection Act 
1998 was enacted to implement the Directive, it thus had its roots firmly in the 
ECHR. The Convention guaranteed numerous rights and freedoms5 including: 
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The right to life (Article 2); 
Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment 
(Article 3); 
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4); 
The right to liberty and security (Article 5); 
The right to a fair and public trial (Article 6); 
The right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence 
(Article 8); 
The right to freedom of expression (Article 10). 
This section will be concerned with the latter two Articles. There is a hierarchy of 
Convention rights: some are absolute, some can be limited, and others are 
qualified. Absolute rights cannot be derogated from and include protection from 
torture and prohibition of slavery. Other rights, such as the right to a fair trial can 
be limited under explicit and finite circumstances defined in the ECHR itself. 
Finally, qualified rights include the right to a private life and the right to freedom 
of expression. Interference with these rights is permissible subject to various 
qualifications - for example, that any restriction must have its basis in law, be 
necessary in a democratic society and be related to the permissible aim set out in 
the relevant Article (for example, the prevention of crime). 
Adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950 to prevent totalitarianism and a repeat 
of the atrocities of the Second World War, the ECHR sought to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms against the power of the state. This meant that 
the rights could be relied on by any victim who claimed that his or her civil 
liberties had been or would be interfered with. This could be an individual, non- 
governmental organisation or group of individuals and in some cases also 
companies and other bodies'. However, these rights did not apply to 
governmental organisations such as local authorities. The ECHR contained other 
provisions, largely about the machinery for enforcing rights, which have not been 
incorporated by the HRA. 
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The European Court of Human Rights was established in Strasbourg to decide on 
disputes involving the ECHR. In its judgements, the Court has adopted a number 
of principles of interpretation of the ECHR: 
It is to be given a broad and generous interpretation rather than a strict 
legalistic interpretation. Its purpose is the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and to maintain and promote the ideals and 
values of a democratic society; 
It is a 'living instrument' (Tyrer v UK 1976 2 EHRR If which must be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions. Societies and values 
change, and the Strasbourg court takes account of these changes in 
interpreting the Convention. In doing so, it looks to see whether there 
are common European standards; 
(iii) In relation to some Convention rights - such as those requiring a 
balance to be struck between competing considerations - the 
Strasbourg court allows a 'margin of appreciation' to the state, and is 
reluctant to substitute its own views of the merits of the case for that of 
the domestic authorities; 
(iv) Terms and expressions in the ECHR have the same meaning for all the 
countries bound by it. The meaning is given independently by the 
Strasbourg authorities. The use of an expression in the law of an 
individual state (such as whether the matter is considered to be criminal 
or civil) is not conclusive and may not be the same as the definition of 
that expression in the Convention. 
The ECHR provided a mechanism for individuals to enforce their rights against 
states, allowing a right of 'individual petition', as well as permitting states to bring 
proceedings against one another. In 1966, the right of individual petition was 
granted in the UK. This allowed individual litigants in the UK to seek redress in 
international law where no adequate remedy could be provided by the domestic 
courts. Since November 1998, all cases have been dealt directly by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and its decisions were binding on the 
8 country concerned . The process of application 
is twofold. Firstly, the Court 
decides if a claim is admissible - that is, it falls within its terms of reference 
9. 
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Secondly, the Court considers the merits of the application - attempting in the first 
instance a negotiated agreement between the applicant and the government. 
Failing that, fin-ther written and oral submissions are made by both parties before 
the Court comes to a decision concerning the violation of individual rights. 
5.2.2 Article 8: riaht to privacy 
Article 8 of the ECHR protected the right to respect for a person's private and 
family life, home and correspondence. A qualified right, Article 8 is divided into 
two parts: 
'(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. "O 
The majority of case law has been concerned with defining the terms 'private life', 
'family life', 'home' and 'correspondence" 1. Article 8 has been used in a wide 
range of contexts: from phone tapping to the right to practise one's sexuality. The 
European Court of Human Rights has held that the essential object of Article 8 is 
to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities (Kroon v 
Netherlands, 1994,19 EHRR 263). 
Interference by the state must be justified by one of the exceptions detailed in 
Article 8 (2), and be the minimum necessary. Only these exceptions, along with 
the restrictions in Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights), are permitted. Once 
the state has identified an exception, the Court will then focus on proportionality - 
whether the interference serves a 'pressing social need' 12 . 
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In terms of 'private life' the Court ruled in Niemetz v Germany (1992,16 EHRR 
97) that the concept of private life was to develop one's own personality as well as 
one's right to create relationships with others. It would be too restrictive to limit 
the notion of privacy to an inner circle where the individual may live his life 
entirely as he chooses to the total exclusion of the outside world. Thus respect for 
a private life must comprise, to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings. Additionally, 'private life' can be 
extended to the office context, for example, in Halford v UK, (1997,24 EHRR 
523), it was held that the bugging of private telephone calls made from an office 
telephone could constitute a violation of the right to respect for private life. 
In terms of 'family life', the case law has turned on the evolving definition of what 
is meant by family - now extending beyond formal relationships and legitimate 
arrangements, for example, to children born outside wedlock. The concept of 
'home' has been judged to overlap with private life in certain circumstances. In 
Niemetz v Germany, (1992,16 EHRR 97) the Court extended the notion of privacy 
to include some places of work. The case involved a police search of a lawyer's 
office. The Court held that Article 8 protected the lawyers' office space, as one's 
private life was carried out both at 'home' and, at times, elsewhere, including the 
office. This could have implications for employee privacy. 
Finally, the right to respect for one's 'correspondence' is a right to uninterrupted 
and uncensored communication with others. In the Haffiord case, it was found that 
Article 8 was violated with respect to calls made from the applicant's office 
because there was no legal regulation of it. This has been remedied by RIPA 
2002, in particular, its Lawful Business Practice Regulations. 
Limits on Article 8 
Article 8 (2) stated the limitations on the right to a private life. To prevent any 
interference violating Article 8, it must fulfil two criteria: 
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(i) 
(ii) 
It must be 'in accordance with the law' - in the UK that would relate to 
the common law of confidentiality and the statutory provisions on data 
protection; 
It must be 'necessary in a democratic society', meaning that any 
violation of the right to privacy must be no greater than is necessary to 
achieve the intended objective. For example, if data for research was 
used in a form whereby individuals could be identified when it could 
have remained anonymous. 
However, the above criteria are so vague, that it can be argued they undermine the 
right to privacy. For instance, surveillance could be justified under the Lawful 
Business Practice Regulations, discussed in section 5.5.2 of this Chapter. 
5.2.3 Interface with freedom of expression 
The interplay between Article 8 (privacy and its intentions) and Article 10 
(freedom of expression and its limitations) ask some of the most fundamental 
questions in a democratic society, especially one with a powerful press such as the 
UK. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised the essential role of the 
media as a public watchdog and has declared wide support for freedom of 
expression. However, argued WilliamS13 , the Court has done little to consider the 
relationship between privacy and freedom of expression: both are heavily qualified 
and neither has obvious priority over the other. Nor has Strasbourg arrived at a 
very settled position regarding the nature of 'political' speech, what is of public 
interest, or the extent to which false speech is permissible. However, Williams 
concluded that a hierarchy has been recognised whereby the greatest latitude must 
be accorded to critics of the government, and the narrowest to those who attack the 
reputation of private citizens. 
In the UK, the government has attempted to reassure the media that privacy claims 
will not easily trump freedom of expression. Section 12 of the HRA 1998 requires 
courts to pay 'particular regard' to the importance of the Article 10 when deciding 
whether to grant any relief in respect of 'journalistic, literary or artistic merit' 14. It 
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remains to be seen whether this will significantly alter existing practices in UK 
courts. 
5.2.4 Strasbourg case-law 
15 According to Jay's assessment of Strasbourg case law , the objects and purpose of 
the Convention were: the protection of individual human rights (Foering v UK, 
1989,11 EHRR 439), and the maintenance and promotion of the ideals and values 
of a democratic society. These supposed 'pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness' (Handyside v United Kingdom, 1976,1 EHRR 737), the rule of 
law and the preservation of freedom of expression. 
Recent cases have reinforced the individual's right to protection of personal data 
as part of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
Amman v Switzerland (2000,30 EHRR 843) involved the recording of a telephone 
conversation between a Swiss businessman and a client, coupled with the creation 
and storing of personal data concerning the applicant on a card index. Both 
practices, committed by the Public Prosecutor, were deemed to violate the ECHR 
as they had no legal basis in Swiss law. Moreover, in spite of a provision in the 
national data protection law providing that data which turned out not to be 
'necessary' should be destroyed, this did not occur once it emerged that no 
prosecution was being prepared. A further case, Rotaru v Romania (2000) 16 
concerned the storing and use of personal data about a retired lawyer by the 
Romanian Intelligence Service. The data contained information - some of which 
had been declared false - about the applicant's studies, political opinions and 
criminal record. This data was found to be held and processed not 'in accordance 
with the law. Moreover, the applicant had been refused the opportunity to refute 
its accuracy. Therefore, a violation of Article 8 had occurred. In deciding both 
judgements, Strasbourg not only drew on previous case law such as Halford and 
Niemetz, but also Convention 108 in safeguarding the individual's 'right to privacy 
17 with regard to the automated processing of personal data relating to him' . 
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5.3 UK Human Riahts Act 
5.3.1 Provisions 
The HRA 1998 obtained Royal Assent on 9 November 1998, but its 
commencement was delayed under 2 October 2000 to allow time for an extensive 
programme of judicial education to take place. The Act radically altered the 
interpretation and use of other UK legislation. The overall objective was to 
incorporate the Convention into the existing legal system, so that all courts will 
consider ECHR arguments, and rights previously only obtained in Strasbourg 
could be secured in national courts. Some of the key provisions are outlined 
below. 
Section I and schedule I of the Act defined the Convention rights that had been 
incorporated. Section 2 required that any court or tribunal determining a question 
raised in connection with a Convention right took into account Strasbourg case 
law. Section 3 required primary and subordinate legislation - so far as possible - 
be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the ECHR. Importantly, 
this applied whether the legislation was enacted before or after the HRA 1998. 
Should a declaration of incompatibility is made by the courts, section 10 provided 
a 'fast-track' procedure whereby the government can amend legislation in order to 
remove incompatibility with the Convention. Section 6 generally made it 
unlawful for a public authority to act in a manner incompatible with a Convention 
right. 
Section 7 dealt with proceedings that may be brought by a 'victim'. Section 7 
(1)(a) permitted a victim of an act by a public authority that infringed a 
Convention right to bring proceedings 'in the appropriate court or tribunal'. 
Section 7 (1)(b) permitted a person to rely on the Convention right or rights 
concerned in any legal proceedings against the public authority. Section 8 
concerned judicial remedies, allowing damages to be awarded if necessary to 
afford 'just satisfaction'. In determining whether to award damages and the 
amount to award, the court had to take into account the principles applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Section 11, for avoidance of doubt, provided 
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that reliance on Convention rights should not restrict reliance on other legal rights, 
or procedural methods of enforcing them. Finally, sections 12 and 13 provided 
specific assurances as to the respect which will be afforded to freedom of 
expression and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Accordingly, these 
are 'comfort clauses' for sections of the press and certain religious organisations". 
5.3.2 
-Incorporation of 
ECHR into UK law 
The ECHR and UK law differ substantially - respectively representing civil and 
case law. Put simply, the Convention dealt with rights that are fundamental and 
overarching, not tied to strict and exact language, nor to the doctrine of precedents. 
In UK law, the language is more detailed and precise, and the doctrine of 
precedence is applied. According to Jay, the solution adopted by the HRA 1998 
combines creativity and pragmatism - leaving, on the face of it, the 
aforementioned features of the UK legal system untouched: 'the ECHR is not 
incorporated into UK law so much as infiltrated into it. '19 The ECHR has been 
brought into effect by three main means: 
The doctrine of interpretation by the UK courts and tribunals (section 
2); 
The requirement that statutes and statutory instruments be interpreted 
in accordance to Convention rights (section 3); 
The requirement that Public authorities act in a way compatible with 
Convention rights (section 6). 
As a leading human rights lawyer Lord Lester viewed it, the HRA is a 'code of 
ethics to steer judges or decision makers generally when they have to make 
decisions that impact on the rights of individuals. ' 20 
Strictly speaking the Act did not incorporate Convention rights into domestic law, 
but gave 'further effeCt, 21 to ECHR rights by requiring the courts (section 3 (1)) so 
far as possible to construe primary and secondary legislation in a way compatible 
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with -Convention rights. To quote the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, when the 
Human Rights Bill was being debated in the House of Lords: 
"The Bill gives the European Convention on Human Rights a special 
relationship which will mean that the courts will give effect to 
interpretative provisions [ ... ], but 
it does not make the Convention 
directly justiciable as it would be if it were expressly made part of our 
,, 22 law. I want there to be no ambiguity about that... 
Thus the DPA 1998 will now be interpreted in accordance with Convention rights. 
The Convention rights have been developed over the years by protocols adding 
property rights, education rights and rights to free elections. However, the 
Convention will not be directly 'justiciable' - that is, subject to trial in a court of 
law. 
Incorporation of the ECHR has been presented by commentators such as Singh 23 
and Palmer; 24 as a covert privacy law - potentially filling in the gaps in current UK 
case law provision. Technically, the legislation only applied to 'public 
authorities', but the inclusion of courts under this definition (section 6) has led 
commentators to speculate that a 'horizontal' application of rights (against private 
industries as well as public authorities) is inevitable 25 . 
This may mean far more 
pervasive effect in UK law than might have done had the ECHR been incorporated 
as overriding law, because the method chosen has increased the likelihood of a 
powerful horizontal effect of the Convention rights. Certainly, the application of 
the human rights context reinforces the growing willingness of regulators and 
courts to look at the purposes of the law and its background in the international 
instruments which outline privacy rightS26. 
5.3.3 UK human rights case law 
Although the HRA 1998 was only enacted in October 2000, there has been some 
indication, in the cases judged to date, of the interpretations the UK courts are 
taking regarding the development English privacy law. As discussed in Chapter 4 
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(section 4.5.1), privacy protection in English law had been segmented under 
headings such as trespass, nuisance, defamation and breach of confidence 27 . In 
Strasbourg, the right to privacy had been developed evenly under the aegis of 
Article 8. Given the differences in legal culture, it was difficult to envisage how 
receptive the English judiciary would be to the idea of simple acceptance of the 
Strasbourg case law evolution under Article 8. 
Kearns 28 _ an academic lawyer - suggested in March 2001 that on the basis of 
limited evidence to date, English judges are preferring 'to embrace the European 
law under Article 8 within the already-established most relevant sector of existing 
disparate English law on privacy 29. Thus European law has been divided in an 
alien way into separate English doctrines such as trespass and breach of 
confidence. Kearns backed up this assertion by reference to two major cases. The 
first - Douglas and Others v Hello! Ltd - was discussed in Chapter 3 
30 
. In this 
case, the decision published by the Court of Appeal on 16 January 2001 
recognised that a breach of privacy had taken place within the bounds of the 
English doctrine of breach of confidence. However, one of the judges - Lord 
Justice Sedley - stated that English law could now recognise privacy as a legal 
principle in its own right, drawn from the fundamental value of personal 
autonomy. The second case cited by Kearns - Venables and Another v News 
Group Newspapers and Others - was also published by the Court of Appeal on 16 
January2001. It stated only that the court had jurisdiction to extend the protection 
of confidentiality in exceptional circumstances, such as where not to do so would 
be likely to lead to serious physical injury or death of the person seeking that 
confidentiality. Fundamentally, Kearns believed that there was a danger that 
breach of confidence was being used to accommodate all or the majority of 
privacy issues, 'implausible though that may seem 3 1. This view has been 
endorsed by Singh and Strachan, whose review of the development of English 
privacy law included decisions up to March 2002. Their article was discussed in 
Chapter 3. Both papers argued that this conservative interpretation of privacy 
rights by the English judiciary would fail to do justice to the privacy 
characteristics - private life, family life, home and correspondence - that have 
evolved under Strasbourg case law, and which should take a similar course under 
English law. 
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Recent cases involving data protection include Regina (Robertson) v Wakefield 
Metropolitan District Council and Another and Campbell v Mirror Group 
Newspapers. In the former case, the High Court ruled in November 2001 that 
individuals had the right to prevent their information held on the electoral register 
from being used for commercial purposes. In fact, this right had been stipulated in 
section 9 of the Representation of the People Act 2000 entitled 'Restriction on the 
supply of information contained in the register 32 . This allowed regulations to 
be 
made resulting in two versions of the electoral register -a complete one and an 
edited version omitting the names of those who have asked to be excluded from it. 
Whilst much of the Representation of the People Act came into effect in February 
2000, the section 9 provisions were made subject of a consultation. This 
consultation was completed in June 2001, and a month later the Minister for Local 
Government and the Regions stated that the government intended to consult 
further on the section 9 provisions: 
"... with a view to making regulations in the autumn which will 
provide for a full and edited electoral register with the effect from 
03 the 2002 canvas. 
In the meantime, an elector in Pontefract, Brian Robertson, requested his local 
authority to cease making his data available to third parties such as credit reference 
agencies and direct marketing companies. When Wakefield Metropolitan District 
Council turned down the request, the applicant refused to make his data available 
and consequently lost his right to vote in the 2001 general election. On 16 
November 2001, the High Court stipulated that the transfer of electoral roll 
information to third parties without an opportunity to object breached both the 
DPA 1998 and the claimant's Article 8 right to privacy. Moreover, it amounted to 
an unjustified restriction on his right to vote, thereby violating the HRA 199834. 
For a period, many case study organisations suspended the sale of their electoral 
roll personal data whilst they awaited a response from central government. 
Following this judgement, the section 9 regulations were finalised 35 , taking into 
account the Court judgement in relation to the requirements of the ECHR, HRA 
1998 and the DPA 1998. 
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The new regulations came into effect on 16 October 2002, establishing the dual 
register -a full version, with restricted uses 36 , and an edited version, sold for any 
purpose, from which voters can opt out. However, the original complainant is still 
unhappy. In autumn 2002, Robertson stated that, as the full electoral rolls can still 
be made available to credit-referencing agencies, he will be refusing once again to 
complete his forM37 . At the time of writing, Robertson was waiting for a date to 
argue his case in the High Court. 
The case involving Naomi Campbell has been discussed to some extent in Chapter 
3. Like Douglas, the court ruled that even celebrities were 'entitled to some space 
of privacy' 38 . However, this case was more significant in ten'ns of data protection, 
being the first time a trial court has awarded compensation for breach of the DPA 
1998. On 27 March 2002, Mr Justice Morland found that the personal data 
contained in the material published by the Mirror had been obtained unfairly and 
breached data protection Principle One. Moreover, the judge ruled that 
publication of the text and photographs of Campbell leaving a meeting of 
Narcotics Anonymous amounted to processing of sensitive personal data. 
However, this verdict was overruled by the Court of Appeal on 14 October 2002 
when the judges found that the processing of sensitive personal data in the absence 
of 'explicit consent' was justifiable by journalists as a result of the 'media 
exemption' in section 32 of the DPA 1998 39 . The clarification of the applicability 
of this exemption was particularly welcomed by the media, allaying the concerns 
following the earlier High Court decision. Finally, the Court of Appeal ruled that, 
as Campbell had previously maintained in the press that she did not take drugs, 
celebrities could not use the provisions of the DPA 1998 to prevent the media 
from 'putting the record straight' In November 2002, Campbell announced her 
intention to appeal to the House of Lords. 
The case law discussed in this sub-section demonstrates the difficulties 
experienced by UK judges in attempting to balance various ECHR rights - in 
particular privacy, (Article 8) and freedom of expression (Article 10). Whilst 
Sedley acknowledged the principle of a distinct right to privacy for all individuals, 
the courts have been reluctant to express that right in an explicit way. Indeed, UK 
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courts have tended to rely on extending the tort of breach of confidence, or even 
using the DPA 1998, rather than developing a clear right to privacy in English law. 
5.3.4 Official gEidance 
The UK government has taken some steps to promote compliance with the HRA 
1998. Firstly, the Human Rights Unit was set up by the Home Office to maintain 
and develop the UK's position relating to human rights issues, as well as 
implementing the HRA. The Unit - moved to the Lord Chancellor's Department 
in 2001 - has issued a series of guidance documents to the public sector. The 
document Core guidance for public authorities: a new era of rights and 
responsibilities4o gave a general outline of ECHR rights and key concepts, along 
with a checklist for public authorities to determine potential incompatibilities with 
new legislation. More instructional was The Human Rights Act 1998: Guidance 
for Departments 41 , equipped with an action plan which all government 
departments were instructed to implement. This included a review of current 
practices and procedures to identify incompatibility with Convention rights, and 
identified public authorities whose work was linked to relevant department to draw 
their attention to HRA and ECHR. In October 2002, the above guidance was 
updated with the publication of a new Study Guide 42 and a programme of seminars 
for those working in public authorities43. 
Plemingý 4 examined the measures taken to prepare for the HRA by central 
government, the police and non-government bodies. He found that whilst the 
Home Office Human Rights Unit and the Human Rights Task force have done 
much to ensure compliance with the Act, the absence of a Human Rights 
Commission - to promote compliance and awareness of the HRA 1998 - has 
resulted in a relative lack of coordination. More work was required to ensure that 
public and hybrid authorities are ready for the HRA. Instead of placing the main 
burden on central government departments, Pleming advocated that the Human 
Rights Commission should be set up as soon as possible in order to coordinate the 
review process and become a central specialist advisory body. The desirability of 
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such a Commission is currently being investigated by the Houses of Parliament 
Joint Committee on Human Rightsý5. 
When responsible for human rights, the Home Office set out the main tasks for 
central government as: 
Review of primary and secondary legislation for compliance with 
Convention rights; 
An assessment of new legislative proposals for compliance with 
Convention rights; 
Devising a detailed action plan setting out proposals for 
implementation; 
(iv) Staff training to provide a level of awareness of Convention rights; 
(v) Ensuring public authorities aware of what they need to do to 
prepare for implementation. 
Indeed, police have conducted their own detailed and sophisticated audit - 
reviewing existing practices, policies and procedures to identify breaches and 
potential breaches of Convention rights. This process, which began in November 
1998, (earlier than most government departments) filtered out areas in risk groups 
with those listed as 'critical' undergoing further, in-depth audits. It is intended 
that such human rights auditing will become part of the culture in the police force, 
with no new policy or procedure being implemented until it has gone through the 
screening process. 
However, a bulletin from District Audit (2002) reported that - 20 months after the 
HRA 1998 had come into effect - many local and health authorities were not 
responding appropriately to the ACt46. Summarising the findings of a survey of 88 
local authorities and National Health Service (NHS) trusts, the bulletin outlined 
various criteria for ensuring compliance with the HRA 1998 including: 
Levels of staff awareness; 
Evidence of a corporate approach; 
Monitoring of compliance with the Act; 
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(iv) Arrangements ensuring partners, subsidiaries and contractors all take 
reasonable steps to comply with the Act. 
Overall, the survey found that 45 out of 88 local authorities and health bodies had 
not reviewed their policies and procedures for compliance. Many were adopting a 
'wait and see' approach - looking to siphon good practice from other, more active 
bodies. Health bodies were generally less prepared than local government, leaving 
themselves vulnerable to legal challenges. The bulletin included examples of 
good practice, concluding with a checklist for reviewing organisational 
compliance with the HRA 1998. The provision of half-day seminars across 
England and Wales, explaining how public services can conform with the 
provisions of the HRA 1998, was in part a consequence of this bulletin. 
5.3.5 Issues for organisations 
Wadham and Mountfield have identified several issues for the future 47 . Some of 
the challenges listed are: new police listening devices; telephone taps; electronic 
monitoring of worker's use of keyboards; CCTV surveillance; and privacy of 
employees, particularly in public authorities that will be covered by the HRA 
1998. These issues, some of which have been brought before Strasbourg, will be 
of interest to UK lawyers. To date, the Robertson case has had a significant 
impact on the way public authorities compile electoral rolls. Cases will be brought 
to test some of the recent regulations and codes of practice in UK. They will be 
crucial in deciding whether the HRA 1998 does in fact introduce a right to privacy 
into UK law, and whether it is workable. 
Bumes considered the significance of section 7 (1)(b) of the HRA 1998 for 
employerS48. As stated in subsection 5.3.1 above, this particular part of the Act 
allowed a person to rely on Convention rights in any legal proceeding. This might 
arise where a person wished to use the Act as part of his defence in an action 
brought by another person. An example of this circumstance would be if an 
employer intercepted emails or phone calls of an employee, and as a result the 
employee is dismissed. The employee then appeals against the sacking. In such a 
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situation, the employee could complain that the interception was unlawful and 
contravened his rights under the HRA 1998. With the tribunal being a public 
authority under the HRA 1998, it would not be able to act in a way incompatible 
with the Act. The employee could make reference to section 7 (1)(b) and Article 8 
to argue that a phone call or email had been intercepted unlawfully, therefore the 
tribunal should exclude the evidence. This may have been precluded by the 
Lawful Business Practice Regulations (refer to 5.5.2 below). Yet, if it has not, the 
essential point is that whilst the employee could not sue the employer for breach of 
privacy, they could block the introduction of evidence, and therefore block 
dismissal. A case heard by an industrial tribunal in November 2000 concerning 
the dismissal of employees over 'inappropriate' emails actually rejected this 
argumene9. However, it is uncertain, argued Burnes, how the courts would react. 
5.4 Freedom of Information 
5.4.1 Context: FOI overseas 
Freedom of information legislation is intended to give the public greater access to 
information about the workings of government, thereby improving the democratic 
process. The Swedish Freedom of the Press Act (1776) is the oldest access law in 
the world. This Act - now part of the Swedish constitution - required that official 
documents should 'upon request immediately be made available to anyone making 
a request' at no charge5o. The most recent version of that Act was adopted in 
1949, and amended in 1976. The rest of the world started to consider FOI 
legislation as a priority after the Second World War. Reasons for legislating for 
greater openness of official information included the rise of more pluralistic 
societies, increasing individualism and a series of political crisis5l. The US was 
the first common law state to pass freedom of information legislation, in 1966. 
This law has been discussed to some extent in Chapter 4 (section 4.7.1). Other 
freedom of information laws include those of France (1978), Australia (1982), 
Canada (1983) and Ireland (1997). Most national laws have been updated in 
recent years to generally increase levels of access, and to take into account 
electronic records and information. 
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Within the EU, progress has been slow. During the drafting of the Data Protection 
Directive 1995, freedom of information issues were in the background. According 
to an official at Internal Market Directorate General of the European Commission 
this important question was only discussed at the very end of negotiations 52. That 
was encouraged by the accession to the European Community of Sweden in 
particular, with its tradition of freedom of information53. The outcome was Recital 
72 of the Data Protection Directive: 'this Directive allows the principle of public 
access to official documents to be taken into account when implementing the 
principles set out in this Directive'54. 
During the last decade, the EU has taken steps to provide a greater degree of 
public access to documents held by Union bodies. Declaration 17 of the 
Maastricht Treaty 1992 highlighted the need for greater transparency of decision- 
making". In the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, the EU included a provision in Article 
255 allowing 'a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents'56 . This provision was implemented by the European Commission 
through Regulation 1049/2001, which came into force in December 2001 57 . The 
Regulation permitted access to paper and electronic documents relating to policies, 
activities and decisions falling within the remit of the EU institutions. A number 
of exemptions existed, for example, concerning the protection of the public 
interest and commercial interests, although there were no blanket exclusions from 
the right to access. A 15 working day time limit for replies was set, and a register 
of documents held was drawn up during the first half of 2002 to aid public 
identification of documents. 
5.4.2 Context: FOI in the UK 
In the UK, there was limited activity in the twenty years prior to the enactment of 
FOIA 2000. In 1979, the Labour government suggest an open government code of 
practice5g. In the same year a general election returned the Conservative Party to 
power. The new government chose not to proceed with the code of practice, and 
the following decade was marked by the passing of piecemeal FOI legislation such 
210 
as the 1985 Local Government (Access to Information) Act 198559 and Access to 
60 
Medical Reports Act 1988 . In 1993, the Conservative government moved a step 
closer to FOI by introducing an Open Government White Paper6l. It 
recommended a voluntary Code of Practice to be supervised by the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. The Code came into effect in 1994. As a non-legal instrument, it 
did not provide a statutory right of public access to official information through 
the courts. 
The Code was revised in 1997, and again in 1998. Its key features were 
62 : 
Official information was released where in the public interest, and in 
response to 'reasonable' requests; 
Code overseen by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Whilst the Ombudsman 
could recommend the release of information, government departments 
could refuse such requests 63 ; 
Exemptions from disclosure applied to fifteen categories of information, 
including: 
" Defence, security and international relations; 
" Communications with the royal household; 
" Law enforcement and legal proceedings; 
" Voluminous or vexatious requests; 
" Privacy of an individual; 
0- Statutory and other restrictions. 
Nevertheless, the Code did have some positive effects in reducing secrecy. The 
amount of information routinely disclosed did increase - generally in the form of 
providing facts and analysis with explanatory material on departments dealings 
with the public. However, this so-called 'pro-active publishing' was only a small 
part of the commitment to FOL Right of access was the key principle, and the 
exemptions to the Code meant that the balance was with government departments 
to withhold information. When the Select Committee on the Parliamentary 
Commissioner held an inquiry into open government in 1996, the Code was 
considered inadequate. The Committee advocated a FOI Act for the UK64. 
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5.4.3 FOIA 2000: access to information? 
In 1997, a new Labour government came to office, having promised a Freedom of 
Information Act. A White Paper 65 was published later that year, proposing a 
liberal enactment - offering an enforceable right to a wide range of public 
information and restricting access in only a limited number of cases. However, the 
draft Bill that emerged 18 months later disappointed those campaigning for greater 
66 
access to government records . It contained an expanded list of exemptions to the 
right of access and weaker enforcement powers for the independent Information 
Commissioner - also the supervisory authority for the DPA 1998. 
Nevertheless, during its turbulent passage through Parliament, the Bill underwent 
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several amendments improving it as a measure for accessing official information 
These included: limiting the use of veto to government departments and certain 
other bodies; ensuring that exemptions do not apply to statistical information about 
a decision once it has been taken; and dropping the power to create new 
exemptions by Parliamentary order. The passage of the Bill through the House of 
Lords was finally secured in November 2000 when the government came to an 
agreement with Liberal Democrat peers, pennitting four further amendments to the 
proposed legislation. The main change was to the Bill's public interest test, to 
ensure the government is more even-handed when deciding whether to disclose 
information6s. 
Provisions 
The FOIA 2000 received royal assent on 30 November 2000, and is to come into 
force in phases. The Act provides a right of access to information held by public 
authorities including Parliament, central government departments, local 
authorities, health trusts and schools. Under the Act, access to information held by 
these bodies is to be granted 'without significant formality, without inquiry into 
the motives of the applicants and at subsidised CoSt'69. There are, however, 23 
exemptions. Some are absolute or class exemptions, which include all information 
falling within a particular class. Such exemptions are70: 
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Information accessible to the applicant by other means; 
Information supplied to, or relating to, bodies dealing with security 
matters; 
Court records; 
Parliamentary privilege; 
Prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs (only applies to 
information held by the House of Commons or House of Lords); 
Personal information (where the applicant is the subject of the information, 
as this is dealt with under the DPA 1998); 
Information provided in confidence; 
Prohibitions on disclosure: where a disclosure is prohibited by an 
enactment or would constitute contempt of court. 
Nevertheless, the majority of exemptions are qualified exemptions: they are only 
effective where the public interest in maintaining the exemption can 
be 
demonstrated to outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Qualified exemptions 
include": 
Information intended for future publication; 
Defence; 
International relations; 
Relations within the UK; 
The economy; 
Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities; 
Law enforcement; 
Formulation of government policy; 
Health and safety; 
Environmental information. 
Such exemptions are also known as 'prejudice-based' exemptions: they are only 
effective in preventing disclosure of information if such disclosure was likely to 
(prejudice' certain specified interests. For example, section 36 (1 and 2) of FOIA 
2000 states that information held by government departments is exempt from 
disclosure if disclosure 'would, or would be likely to, prejudice ... the effective 
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conduct of public affairs'. The use of the word 'prejudice' (as opposed to 
'substantial prejudice') was subject to some criticism during the drafting of this 
legislation 72 . For further discussion of this point, refer to the subsection on FOIA 
Scotland - under which partial exemptions are indeed subject to the stricter 
'substantial prejudice' test. 
On 30 January 2001, a new Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) was 
established to enforce rights of access under FOIA. The OIC, formerly the Office 
of the Data Protection Commissioner, now supervises both the FOI regime 
established under the Act and the data protection regime under the DPA 1998. In 
most cases, the Commissioner is entitled to overrule the decisions of public 
authorities not to disclose information where he believes that those decisions 
contravene the requirements of the Act. However, this may be subject to an 
'Executive override', where the public authorities can obtain a signed certificate 
from a Cabinet Minister overruling the OIC's decision. There is no right of appeal 
against the Ministerial certificate, effectively a government veto on the disclosure 
of information. 
The OIC's role in balancing the public interests in disclosure and non-disclosure 
will be crucial in ensuring that the Act becomes an effective tool for public 
openness. Concerns were expressed during the Bill's passage through Parliament 
about the same body being responsible for supervising the enforcement of two 
Acts with potentially conflicting functions 73 . However, this combined approach 
has the advantage that there will not be, as in Canada, a conflict between two 
groups of enforcement authorities. Moreover, there will be a more consistent 
interpretation of the interface between the laws. Appeals from a decision of the 
Commissioner can be brought to the Information Tribunal. 
Each public authority must adopt a scheme for publication of information. The 
schemes must be approved by the OIC, and specify the following: 
The classes of information the public authority intends to publish; 
The manner of publication; 
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- Whether the information will be made available to the public free of 
charge. 
Public authorities have 20 working days in which to respond to access requests. 
74 
They may charge a fee, which will be calculated according to Fees Regulations 
If a fee is required, the 20 working days will be extended by up to three months 
until the fee is paid. 
An offence of tampering with personal data has also been created. Section 77 of 
FOIA states that an offence is committed if, following an access request, any 
person 'alters, defaces, blocks, erases, destroys or conceals' any record which the 
recipient may have been entitled to. 
The Act is far from flawless. In particular, the extensive number and scope of the 
exemptions to the right of access to information have been widely criticised by 
organisations such as the Campaign for Freedom of Information Nevertheless, 
FOIA 2000 is like to prove an extremely useful tool for various applicants - 
individual citizens, investigative journalists, members of interest and pressure 
groups, commercial organisations and lawyers. The effectiveness of the Act 
largely depends on the willingness of such applicants to use the mechanisms 
established under FOIA 2000 to their fullest extent. 
Delffs in implementation 
Since enactment of the Act in November 2000, the government's enthusiasm for 
freedom of information has waned. Under section 87 of the Act, FOIA has to be 
in force no later than five years after royal assent - that is, by 30 November 2005. 
The government had originally stated that it planned to phase it in much earlier, 
starting with bodies that were already subject to the open government Code. 
Initially, the intention had been to implement rights of access for central 
government 18 months after royal assent (by summer 2002), with other authorities 
phased in at intervals thereafter 75 . Each class of public authority would first 
comply with the Act's duty to produce a publication scheme, and then with right 
of access. However, this approach was apparently blocked by the Prime Minister, 
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Tony Blair, who was said to have been alarmed at prominent figures using the 
DPA 1998 to obtain their own files 76 . 
The delay in implementation was confinned by the Lord Chancellor, responsible 
for FOI since June 2001, in an announcement to the House of Lords in November 
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into force for all public 
authorities at once, in January 2005 - over four years after the Act's passage in 
November 2000. This is a longer delay than any other country in the world 78 , and 
sends out a poor signal concerning the government's commitment to FOIA which 
may be reflected in the approach taken by officials to the legislation. The public 
authority publication schemes are currently being phased in79. 
FOIA Scotland 
The Scottish Parliament passed a Freedom of Information Act8o in April 2002. 
This separate legislation will apply to public authorities dealing within the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament (for example, Scottish educational 
establishments). Generally, the freedom of information provisions in Scotland are 
more far-reaching. Where exemptions are partial, there will be a higher test of 
'substantial prejudice' rather than just 'prejudice' as in the UK law. Moreover, 
unlike the UK, factual information used in policy formation can be released. A 
separate, independent, Information Commissioner will be appointed by the 
Scottish Parliament with the power to order public bodies to release documents on 
request. This has been necessary as the Information Commissioner in Scotland 
will be enforcing a different piece of legislation, with different standards, to that 
applied in the UK. 
However, campaigners perceive that the UK Commissioner may take a more 
liberal interpretation to the exemption test given in FOIA 2000 as a result of the 
legislation in Scotland: "It can't be in the public interest to keep it secret in the 
,, 81 UK if it's disclosed without damage in Scotland. No timetable for 
implementing the Act has been announced, however it must be fully in force by 
31 December 2005 82 
. 
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5.4.4 FOI and data protection 
Unlike the DPA 1998, the FOIA 2000 is not part of European legislation. Thus, 
in theory protection of personal data is given legal precedence over rights of 
access. The relationship between the two Acts is complex. FOIA 2000 does not 
deal with individual requests to access their own personal information. Rather, 
FOIA 2000 sets in place mechanisms to ensure that any such requests continue to 
be handled in accordance with the DPA 1998. However, where an application for 
personal information is made by someone other than the data subject (the person 
to whom the information relates), it is governed by FOIA 2000. Nevertheless, the 
disclosure of personal information to someone other than the data subject is very 
likely to infringe the data protection principles. Public authorities receiving such 
requests will, accordingly, usually be exempt from their duties as a result of an 
exemption provided in section 40 (2) of FOIA 2000. 
FOIA 2000 expands the range of personal data held by a public authority to which 
an individual can have access to under the DPA 1998. Prior to the Act, the DPA 
1998 generally only covered manually processed data in a 'structured' form - that 
is, in a 'relevant filing system'. For example, a hand-written card index system, 
ordered by reference to individuals' surnames, would fall within this definition. 
However, a random file of correspondence received by an organisation within a 
particular month would not. Following the new Act, this provision has been 
extended to cover all 'unstructured personal data', including the random file of 
correspondence. This amendment was necessary to bring the DPA 1998's 
provisions regarding access to personal information in line with FOIA provisions 
allowing access to non-personal information, regardless of the way in which it 
was stored. Moreover, it is symbolic - in principle, extending privacy protection 
to all forms of personal information, no matter how poorly organised. 
The implications of this legislation for public authorities, in addition to those 
brought about by the DPA 1998, are considerable. In the words of one case study 
interviewee at a university: 
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"If you look at FOI and DP, everything that isn't covered by one is 
covered by the other - they've got the whole public authority records 
wrapped up between them. " 
As analysed in Chapter 7, in particular, this has resulted in a more coordinated approach 
to policy-making concerning infon-nation, and often to the creation of a new post - 
combining responsibility for data protection and freedom of information. 
Public authorities are now responsible for adopting and maintaining publication 
schemes, and releasing information, not covered by an exemption, within 20 
working days of the request. Where an authority decides not to release 
information, because it considers an exemption applies, it must give reasons for 
its decision and must inform the applicant of their right to complain to the OIC. 
The full implications of the new Act will be discussed in the analysis of case 
studies in Chapter 7. Official guidance concerning FOI has been drafted by the 
Lord Chancellor's Department 83 and the OIC84. 
5.5 Interception and retention of communications data 
Since the enactment of the DPA 1998, a key test of its effectiveness has been with 
regard to the interception and retention of communications data. This section 
considers the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 and the Anti- 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001. Both have implications for 
data privacy - concerning interception of communications, retention of personal 
data by data controllers and access to personal data by law enforcement agencies. 
5.5.1 RIPA 2000: context 
Article 5 (1) of the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 97/66/EC (refer 
to Chapter 4, section 4.3.4) aimed to protect the confidentiality of communications 
made by means of a public telecommunications network. Under the terms of this 
Directive - recently revised by the EU - this requirement extended to all types of 
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electronic communication sent by such a network, including fax and email. The 
obligation also extended to communications on private networks (for example, 
office telephone networks or email systems), which will also travel - or have also 
travelled - on a public network. However, the Directive left scope for member 
states to authorise the interception of communications by businesses when this is 
necessary for the purpose of providing evidence of business communications. 
Although the majority of provisions in the Directive had to implemented by 
October 1998, an exemption was made for Article 5 for which a deadline of 24 
October 2000 was set. 
Within the UK, the provisions were implemented as RIPA 2000. RIPA repealed 
the Interception of Communications Act 1985, providing for a new regime to 
govern the use of intrusive investigative techniques, including interception. 
Reflecting changes in the communications industry over the previous 15 years, 
RIPA 2000: 
Created offences of unlawful interception on public telecommunication 
systems, and a tort of unlawful interception on a private telecommunication 
system by the operator of that system; 
Authorised the interception of communications in cases where the 
interceptor has reasonable grounds to believe that both the sender and 
intended recipient have consented to the interception; 
Provided for the Secretary of State to authorise interception in certain 
limited circumstances, by means of warrants issued to organisations; such 
as the security and intelligence agencies and the police. 
Section 4 of RIPA 2000 provided for the Secretary of State to make regulations 
authorising businesses to intercept for certain evidential purposes. The 
government achieved this through the Lawful Business Practice Regulations, 
which came into effect on 24 October 2000. 
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5.5.2 Lawful Business Practice Regulations: undermining data protection? 
The Lawful Business Practice Regulations permitted businesses to intercept 
communications without consent for the following purposes: 
To establish the existence of facts; 
To ascertain compliance with regulatory or self-regulatory practices or 
procedures (quality control); 
To ascertain or demonstrate standards which are or ought to be achieved 
(training); 
To prevent or detect crime; 
To investigate or detect unauthorised use of telecommunication systems; 
To ensure effective system operation (for example, by monitoring for 
viruses). 
Additionally, communications could be monitored to determine whether or not 
they were business communications. The wide scope of the Regulations led many 
in the media and campaign groups to question whether they undermined the 
provisions of the DPA 1998. To quote Akdeniz from the Internet civil liberties 
group, Cyber Rights-Cyber Liberties, the vagueness of the Regulations meant that 
"anything is justified under them,, 85 . 
At the same time that the Regulations were 
being finalised, the OIC released its draft Employment Code ofPractice (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4, section 4.6.3) resulting in what many perceived to be a 
confused legal environmen t86. 
The OIC, defending its Draft Code of Practice, strongly emphasised that the 
Regulations only addressed the act of interception87., They did not address the 
monitoring of traffic data, nor did they deal with the storage and use of personal 
information obtained as a result of interception. Monitoring needed to be 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the DPA 1998. By its very 
nature, monitoring will involve personal data that must be obtained and processed 
in such a way that it is both lawful and fair to employees. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, an employer who acquires information by surveillance under the 
Regulations could still be prosecuted under the DPA 1998. This has sparked 
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criticism from the Confederation of British Industry that the draft Code did not 
adequately meet the needs of employerS88. Additionally, any monitoring must: 
Be necessary; 
Be proportionate to achieving the business purpose (doing no more than 
needs to be done); 
Respect the privacy of individuals. 
If audit logs, or similar, were being applied to track websites or email addresses 
used by employees, the resulting records - if they identified individuals - would 
contain personal data for the purposes of the DPA 1998. An employee would be 
entitled to seek, and could expect to be given, access under section 7 of that Act, 
unless one of the exceptions could be invoked. It is unlikely that third parties 
would be entitled to see the log. 
Employers were advised to limit monitoring to traffic data - rather than the 
contents of communications - should that achieve their business requirements. If 
the traffic record alone was insufficient, organisations were to use it to ensure any 
further monitoring should be, as far as possible, strictly limited and targeted. If 
employers were monitoring the content of incoming emails to detect computer 
viruses, usage of an automated monitoring and detection process was advised. A 
need for virus detection did not warrant reading the content of incoming emails. 
Ultimately, RIPA 2000 has to be interpreted by judges within the context of the 
HRA 1998 - with its own in-built conflict between Article 8 right to privacy, and 
Article 10 freedom of expression. 
5.5.3 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 
Since the terrorist attacks on the US on II September 2001, a number of Western 
governments have passed anti-terrorism measures. In December 2001, the UK 
government enacted the ATCSA 2001. In Chapter 3 (section 3.3), the views of 
lawyers and journalists concerning the data protection implications - and the costs 
to industry - of this Act were considered. This subsection will look in a little more 
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detail at some of the provisions of ATCSA 2001, in particular, how the Act 
interfaces with the DPA 1998 and HRA 1998 - and any problems public 
organisations may face. 
Provisions affecting data protection 
According to the Home Office, the purpose of ATCSA 2001 is 'to enhance our 
anti-terrorism and security capability'. The Act is wide-ranging, structured in 14 
parts and eight schedules. It includes: measures tackling terrorist finance; the 
streamlining of immigration procedures; provisions against inciting religious 
hatred or violence; improving civil nuclear security; extension of police powers; 
and, under Part 11, retention of communications data. It is the provisions under 
Pýrt II that impact is greatest on data protection. 
In this context - as in RIPA 2000 (section 21) - communications data means 
traffic data and any other data which are not part of the actual communications 
themselves. This is essentially billing data, subscriber data, details of numbers 
dialled or Internet sites accessed by a given subscriber, email headers and so on. It 
does not include, for example, the contents of email messages or voice calls. The 
data is to be retained by communications providers - such as internet service 
providers (ISPs) - for national security purposes, so that they can be accessed by 
the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies by means of a voluntary 
code of practice. This code is to be drawn up in consultation with industry, law 
enforcement agencies and the OIC. This process is currently underway and a final 
version of the voluntary code is expected during 2003. 
However, should the Secretary of State not be satisfied with the operation of the 
voluntary code, he is permitted under section 104 of the Act to issue compulsory 
directions on communications service providers. There is no need to consult with 
the OIC over such an order, over the content of which the Secretary of State 
enjoys a substantial amount of discretion. However, if this power is not renewed 
within two years of the enactment of the Act, it will lapse. 
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Concerns have been expressed that this Act undermines the DPA 1998 and the 
HRA 1998. In a press release promoting the publication of her second annual 
report in July 2002, the Information Commissioner stated the retention of 
communications data by service providers is 'of continuing conceM, 89 . The 
Commissioner continued that, whilst the purpose for which data could be retained 
was limited to matters of national security, the basis on which law enforcement 
bodies could have access to those communications had not been similarly 
restricted. This meant that the data could be accessed for any of the wider law 
enforcement activities provided for in RIPA 2000. Such activities include not just 
the prevention and detection of crime, but also matters relating to public health 
and tax collection. Essentially, the data may not be used for the purposes for 
which it was collected -a clear breach of Principle Two of the DPA 1998. 
Secondly, if there is a need to retain the data for longer than the communications 
provider would for their own purposes in order to prevent and detect crime then a 
statutory duty to retain would have to be established. This would ensure that the 
DPA 1998 (Principle Five) is not contravened. This approach should have been 
adopted at the enactment of the Act, rather than being left as an alternative to be 
considered at a later date, as it would have provided a proper legal basis for 
processing by the communications provider. 
Additionally, concerns have been raised by the OIC and lawyers about the 
interface of the proposed legislation with the ECHR rights. The absence of clarity 
concerning the Secretary of State's powers to issue a code of practice concerning 
data retention has been questioned. Although Article 8 (2) of the ECHR permits 
interference with individual privacy 'in accordance with the law', the Convention 
further requires that the law concerned must be accessible and precise - that is, 
foreseeable in its consequences9o. According to Strasbourg case law9l, Article 8 
requires a positive framework of legal rules circumscribing the exercise of any 
such power, and incorporating legally binding safeguards against abuse. The law 
must indicate the circumstances in which such interference can occur, its duration 
and the limits of the authorities' powers. Without any sight of the proposed code 
of practice or any secondary legislation proposed under the Act, it is not possible 
to assess the legal framework in this area. Therefore, the legislation appears to be 
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incompatible with Convention rights as it fails the requirement for precision and 
foreseeability in the delineation of the Secretary of State's powers. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter has given insight into the complexity of the wider legal environment 
surrounding and impacting on privacy of personal information. Considerable legal 
changes have been enacted in both Europe and UK since the enactment of the 
DPA 1998. Some observations are outlined below: 
(i) The competing legal demands on public organisations. 
This has been clear, particularly over the last five or six years. On the one hand, 
the UK government is acting to incorporate effective privacy standards into data 
handling through the implementation of the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998. On the 
other hand, more recent legislation such as RIPA 2000 and ATSCA 2001 have 
shifted the emphasis towards sharing of personal information with other public 
organisations. Concerns about the privacy implications of recent laws regarding 
interception and retention of communications data have been expressed by lawyers 
and the OIC. Finally, the complex legislative environment places competing 
pressures on those attempting to achieve data protection compliance. 
(ii) The need for more explicit case law. 
Although the laws analysed in this Chapter have some explicit provisions, many of 
the finer details of the statutes - particularly the extent to which a culture of 
protecting personal data can be established in public organisations - will need be 
determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the impact of the 
HRA 1998 - incorporating a set of principles into UK law - will take years to 
assess. Although the Robertson case was significant, the majority of case study 
interviewees perceived the HRA 1998 as having little direct impact on the 
information handling processes of public authorities. To quote one Data 
Protection Officer, public organisations were maintaining a "watching brief 92 . 
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(iii) The impact of FOIA 2000. 
Of the laws analysed in this Chapter, FOIA 2000 will have the most tangible effect 
on the daily work of organisational Data Protection Officers (DPOs). As quoted in 
subsection 5.4.4, some interviewees viewed the FOIA 2000 as a tidying-up 
exercise, ensuring that public sector records management practices were better 
coordinated. Certainly, the Act expanded the scope of the DPA 1998 to cover 
(unstructured' manual data. More practically, it increased the workload of public 
authorities with many organisations currently drafting publication schemes, 
auditing records and preparing job descriptions for new personnel. The impact of 
FOIA 2000 on the role of DPOs will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
(iv) The need for a strong lead from the OIC. 
This finding has been implicit throughout both Chapters 4 and 5. Whilst the 
conclusions to the previous Chapter made it clear that the OIC faced many 
difficulties in promoting data protection compliance, there is little doubt that the 
supervisory authority has an important role to play. With the Information 
Commissioner now responsible for overseeing and enforcing both data protection 
and freedom of information, a strong lead is essential. To date, the OIC has been 
very positive in this regard - maintaining a high profile and commenting on the 
legal issues discussed in this Chapter. Moreover, public organisations 
implementing the legislation must be able to refer to the OIC for immediate and 
consistent advice. Fieldwork in Chapters 6 and 7 will show that this was not 
always the case. Finally, the public must be informed of their access rights under 
both the DPA 1998 and the FOIA 2000. A process of education, already 
underway with some success", needs to be continued and expanded so that 
individuals are fully aware of their rights under the new Acts. 
225 
References and Notes 
1 United Nations. Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights 1948. Micle 12. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Council of Europe. Conventionfor the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing ofPersonal Data, ETS no. 108. Strasbourg, 198 1. Explanatory report, para. 19. 
4 European Communities. Commission. Directive 95146 EC ofthe European Parliament and ofthe 
Council of24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and thefree movement ofsuch data. Off icial Journal of the European Communities. 
No. L281/31 (23/11/95). See recitals I and 2. 
For full list of rights and freedoms refer: 
- Council of Europe. Conventionfor the protection qfHuman Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Article 8. ETS no. 005. Rome, 1950. 
6 only a person considered a victim can bring proceedings against a public authority under the 
HRA 1998. A victim is someone who is directly affected by the act in question. This can include 
companies as well as individuals. Additionally, a victim may also be a person who is at risk of 
being directly affected by a measure. Organisations, interest groups and trade unions cannot bring 
a case unless they themselves are victims. However, they can provide legal or other assistance to a 
victim. Governmental organisations, such as local authorities, cannot be victims. 
' The referencing of most of the cases quoted in this chapter takes after: 
- Wadham, J. and H. Mountfield, Human Rights Act 1998,1999. 
'EHRR' refers to European Human Rights Reports, the best UK source for decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights - publishing full judgements of significant cases. For example, 
in 11976,2 EHRR V: '1976' refers to the year of the decision; '2' to the volume of EHRR; and T 
to the page number where the decision can be found. 
Those not included in EHRR are referenced by their application number. This comprises a five 
digit number followed by the year of application, and then the date of decision. For an example, 
see Rotaru v Romania, ref. 16. 
226 
8 Prior to this, complaints could have been heard by the European Commission on Human Rights. 
This body was abolished with the introduction of Protocol II to the ECHR on I November 1998. 
9 Approximately 95 per cent of applications are found to be inadmissible. Source: 
- Wadham, J. and H. Mountfield, ref. 7, pp. 142-143. 
10 Conventionfor the protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. ref. 5, Article 8. 
11 Wadham, J. and H. Mountfield, ref. 7, pp. 91-96. 
12 Ibid., p. 92. 
13 Williams, K. Re-regulating ftee speech: privilege, public interest and privacy. Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues, 1999,1. URL: hLtp: Hwebicli. ncl. ac. uk/1999/issuel/ýýilliamsl. html 
[Accessed 16/01/03]. 
14 For full discussion of the background to the addition of section 12 to the HRA, refer to: 
Singh, R. Privacy and the media after the Human Rights Act. European Human Rights 
Law Review, 1998,6, pp. 712-729. 
" Jay, Data Protection Act 1998 - the Human Rights context. International Review ofLaw 
Computers and Technoloýy, 2000,14 (3), 388. 
16 Rotaru v Romania (2000). Application No. 28341/95,4 May 2000. 
11 Council of Europe. Conventionfor the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing ofPersonal Data, ref. 3, Article 1. 
18 Wadham, J. and H. Mountfield, ref. 7, p. 24. 
19 Jay, R., ref. 15,390. 
20 BBC News Online. Forum: Human Rights Act - Quiz Lord Lester. BBC News Online. 06/10/00. 
URL: bttp: //newsvote-bbc. co. uk/low/en lisb/talking ppint/fnm tm 
[Accessed 16/01/03]. 
227 
1 This is made explicit in the long title of the HRA: 
'An Act to givefurther effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain 
judicial offices who become judges in the European Court of Human Rights; and for 
connected purposes. ' (My italics). 
22 Lord Irvine of Lairg. House of Lords, Report Stage. HansardHL, 585 (column 421) 29 January 
1998. 
23 See Singh, FL, ref. 14. 
"' See Palmer, S. Human rights: implications for labour law. Cambridge Law Journal, 2000,59 
(1), 168-200. 
25 Gearty, C. Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights; some guesses about the 
future in Butler, F. (ed. ) Human rightsfor the new millennium. Kluwer Law International, 2000, 
pp. 3347. 
" Jay, R., ref. 15, p. 395. 
27 The legal system in Scotland differs slightly from England and Wales, taking more of a civil law 
- rather than case law - approach. 
'8 Kearns, P. Privacy and the Human Rights Act 1998. New Law Journal, 16/03/01,377-8. 
" Ibid, P. 377. 
10 Owing to the celebrity status of those involved, the case received substantial publicity at the 
time. For a full analysis of this case refer: 
Thomas, S. Privacy: media. Privacy and Data Protection, 2001,1 (3), 8-9. 
31 Kearns, ref 28., p. 378. 
32 Great Britain. Representation ofthe People Act 2000. London: TSO, s. 9. 
33 For analysis of the chronology of Robertson in relation to the Representation of the People Act 
2000, refer to the following policy paper: 
228 
Great Britain. Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions. Electoral 
Registers -Access, Supply and Sale. May 2002. URL: 
http: //www. lcd. gov. uk/consultlelections/t)dfý`/olicypapeL. pdf [Accessed 07/05/03]. 
34 Protocol 1, Article 3 of the ECHR guarantees the right to free elections. This provision was 
incorporated into the HRA 1998. 
35 Refer: 
Great Britain. Representation ofthe People (England and Wales) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2002. Statutory Instrument 2002, No. 187 1. TSO, 2002. URL: 
hqp: //www. hmso. Rov. uk/si/si2002/20021871. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" These uses are electoral purposes, investigation of crime and credit checks. 
37 Privacy and Data Protection. Robertson commences new action against local authority. Privacy 
and Data Protection, 2002,3 (1), 16. 
" Privacy and Data Protection. Naomi Campbell wins damages in landmark privacy ruling. 
Privacy and Data Protection, 2002,2 (5), 1,13. 
" Broadly, section 32 of the DPA 1998 permits the publication of personal data forjournalistic 
purposes which are considered to be in the public interest. In the first instance decision, Morland 
interpreted the provisions of section 32 as relating to processing of personal data prior to 
publication only. In the Court of Appeal, the judges went against this -stating that section 32 of 
the DPA 1998 applied both before and after publication, as it would be illogical for the data 
controller to be obliged to comply with the provisions of the Act until the moment of publication 
but not thereafter. For finther analysis, refer: 
Harper, L. Model behaviour. Privacy and Data Protection, 2002,3 (2), 8-9. 
' Great Britain. Home Office: Human Rights Unit. Human Rights Act: Core guidancefor public 
authorities: a new era offights and responsibilities, 2000. URL: 
bgpL//www-Icd- ov. uk/hractv/core(gyd. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
41 Great Britain. Home Office: Human Rights Unit. Human Rights Act 1998: Guidancefor 
Departments. 2 nd edition, 2000. URL: 
htta: //www E. -ic-d-goav. u-k/hTraa5it-/LuiiLadance. 
hLtm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
229 
42 GreatBritain. Lord Chancellor's Department. Study Guide- Human Rights Act. 2"d edition, 
2002. URL: h=: //www. lcd. gov. uk/hract/studyp-uide/index. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
43 For flulher details, refer URL: http: //,, vw,, v. lcd. gov. uk/hracVstudyguide/index. htm [Accessed 
16/01/03]. 
44 Plerning, N. Assessing the Act: a firm foundation or a false start? European Human Rights Law 
Review, 2000,6,560-579. 
45 Refer URL: h! M: //Nvww. partiament. uk/commons/selcom/hrhorne. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" Great Britain. District Audit. The Human Rights Act., a bulletinfor public bodies. 2002. URL: 
hIM: //www. district-audit. gov-tik/PDF/district-audit-humanrijzhts-02.12df [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
47 Wadham, J. and H. Mountfield, reE 7, pp. 97-98. 
48 Burnes, C. Human rights in employment. Privacy and Data Protection, 2000 1 (2), 4-5. 
49 Rawstornej. Bosses can sack staff over emails. TheDailyMail, 2000pp. 1-2. 
" Banisar, D. Freedom of Information and access to government records around the world. Privacy 
International, 2002. URL: http: //www. freedominfo. orgJsurvey/ [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
51 Wood, S. and J. Dearnley. Open government? Freedom of information legislation and 
information provision in the UK. Proceedings of8th International BOBCA TSSS Symposium on 
Library and Information Science, Krakow, Poland 24-26 January 2000, p. 3 09. 
Interview with Alain Brun, DG Internal Market, European Commission, Brussels. 6 July 1999. 
Sweden, along with Finland and Austria, acceded to the EU on 0 1/0 1/95. 
Directive 951461EC, ref. 4, recital 72. 
55 Refer URL: European Communities. Treaty on European Union. Maastricht, 1992. For full 
text, refer: hgp: //eurol2a. eu. int/en/record/mt/top. htmi [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" For details, refer to The Amsterdam Treaty a comprehensive guide. URL: 
gp: Heuropa. eu. int/scadplus/]eWenývb/a2lOOO. htm [Accessed 16/01/031. 
230 
5' European Communities. Commission. Regulation (EQ No 104912001 ofthe European 
Parliament and ofthe Council of30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents. Official Journal of the European Communities. No. L 145/43. 
(31/05/2001). URL: hn: //europa. eu. int! comm/secretariat izeneral/sac/acc doc/index en. htm 
[Accessed 16/01/03]. I 
58 Great Britain. Cabinet Office. Open Government. HMSO, 1979. (Cmnd 7520). 
59 Great Britain. Local Government ( Access to Information) A ct 1985. London: HMSO. 
'0 Great Britain. Access to Medical ReportsAct 1988. London: HMSO. 
61 Great Britain. Cabinet Office. Open Government. London: HMSO, 1993. (Crand 2290). 
62 Wood, S. and J. Dearnley, ref. 51,310-3 11. 
63 For example, the Department of Trade and Industry's reftisal to release a summary of 
information on encryption, criticised in: 
Great Britain. House of Commons. The Parliamentary Ombudsman Annual Report 1999- 
2000, HMSO, 2000. (HC 593). pp. 44-46. 
64 Great Britain. House of Commons. Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration. Second special report on open government. HMSO, 1996. (HC 1995-1996 556). 
" Great Britain. Cabinet Office. Your right to know: the government's proposalsfor a Freedom of 
Information A cf. HMSO, 1997. (Crnnd 3 818). 
66 Campaign for Freedom of Information. Press release. Deeply disappointing Information Bill 
'weaker than Conservatives'openness code'. 24/05/99. URL: 
hgp: //Nvww. cfoi. orp,. uk/draftbi11240599pr. htmi [Accessed 16/01/031. 
67Amendments prior to the Lords Committee stage appeared on the Parliament website on 
31/07/00. Refer: 
Great Britain. Houses of Parliament. Session 1999-2000. Freedom ofInformation Bill - 
amendments to be debated in the House ofLords. 31/07/00. URL: 
231 
http: //www. publications. parliament. ukipalldl99900, lldbillslO551amendlamO55-p. htm 
(Accessed 14/05/03). 
68 The amendment became section 2 (2) of the Act: 
'In respect of any information which is exempt information [the duty to disclose] 
does not apply if or to the extent that - 
(b) in all circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption 
outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. ' 
The significance of this amendment was the subject of some controversy, with campaigners and 
even the Liberal Democrat spokesman, Lord Goodhart, claiming it would not make much of a 
difference. For opinion and Rifther analysis, refer: 
Campaign for Freedom of Information. Press release. Anger at Liberal Democrat 
decision to backflawed Information Bill. 13/11/00. URL: 
hi! 12: //ww%v. cfoi. oriz. uk/libdemsl3l 100pr. hnni [Accessed 14/05/03]. 
Comford, T. The Freedom of Information Act 2000: genuine or sham? Web Journal of 
Current Legallssues. 2001 (3). URL: http: //-, vebi cl i. ncl. ac. uk/200 I /issue3/com ford-' ). html 
[Accessed 14/05/03]. 
69 Wadham, J., J. Griffiths and B. Rigby. Freedom ofInformation Act 2000,2001. p. ix. 
70 Refer: 
Great Britain. Office of the Information Commissioner. Freedom ofInformation Act 
2000: An overview, January 2002, pp. 6-7. URL: 
hjM: //wNvw. dataprotection. g , ov. uk/dpr/foi. ns 
(Under 'General Information') [Accessed 
16/01/03]. 
71 For full list: Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
72 For example, refer: 
- Campaign for Freedom of Information. FOI Bill: Lords Third Reading Briefing. 
21/11/00. URL: hitp: //www. cfoi. orv,. uk/newinOO. html [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" The Earl of Northesk. House of Lords. Committee Stage. Hansard HL, 618 (column 431) 25 
October 2000. 
232 
74 The Fees Regulations are still at draft stage. Refer: 
Great Britain. Lord Chancellor's Department. Annual report on bringingfully intoforce 
those provisions ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act 2000 which are not yetfully inforce. 
2002. (HC6). 
" Campaign for Freedom of Information. Government to abandonfreedom of information 
timetable? 02/11/01. URL: httl2: //www. cfoi. ora. uk/newin0l. html [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
76 Hencke, D. and R. Evans. Blair wins battle to put open goverment on ice. The Guardian, 
30/10/01. URL: h! W: //ýw,. v. auardian. co. uk/Archiveý/Article/0.4273.4287729.00. htmI [Accessed 
16/01/03]. 
77 Great Britain. Lord Chancellor's Department. Annual report on proposalsfor bringingfully into 
force those provisions ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act 2000 which are notYetfully inforce. 
Lord Chancellor's Department, November 200 1. (HC 3 67). URL: 
b=: Hw%vw. led. gov. uk/foi/imprel2/annrepOl. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" Campaign for Freedom of Information. Double blowfor FOI, 13/11/01. URL: 
ttn: //www. cfoi. oriz. uk/newin0l. html [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" The timetable for publication schemes include: most of central government (November 2002); 
local authorities (February 2003); police (June 2003); NHS (October 2003); schools and 
universities (February 2004). Source: Office of the Information Commissioner, URL: 
hgp: //www. dataprotection. gov. uk/dpr/foi. ns [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" Great Britain. Freedom ofInformation (Scotland) Act 2002. London: TSO. 
" Interview with Maurice Frankel, Campaign for Freedom of Information, London. 7 November 
2001. 
92 Freedom ofInformation (Scotland) Act 2002. ref. 80, s. 75. 
83 For details of guidance issued by Lord Chancellor's Department, refer URL: 
http-//w_wwff. l-cd. Zoav. uk/foii/fgiLdiLimit. htm [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
84 For details of OIC guidance, refer URL: h! V: //www. dataprotection. pov. ukldpr/foi. nsf [Accessed 
16101103]. 
233 
85 Thompson, B. Every click you make. Online. ne Guardian, 2 November 2000 pp. 2-3. 
86 ibid 
97 Refer to: 
Great Britain. Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. Draft Code ofPractice: The 
use ofpersonal data in employerlemployee relationships, 2000, pp. 25-34. 
URL: http: //www. dataprotection. 2ov. uk/dpr/dpdoc. nsf [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
'a Thompson, B. reE 85, p. 3. 
" Great Britain. Office of the Information Commissioner. News release. Monitoring must be 
justified. Ogice ofthe Information Commissioner, 10/07/02. 
URL: hi! p: //www. dataprotection. Rov. uk/dpr/dpdoci. nsf [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
" For ftirther discussion of this point, refer to Wadham and Mountfield, ref. 7, pp. 12-13. The 
authors cite the following case law to support their views: 
a 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245; 
Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14; - 
Hatford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
9' Ibid. 
92 Refer case study analysis, Chapter 7. 
93 Refer: 
Great Britain. Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. Annual Report andAccounts 
for the year ending 31 March 2002,2002, p. 74. 
234 
6. Findings: questionnaire survey and expert interviews 
Following discussion of the literature, coupled with scrutiny of the laws impacting 
on data protection compliance in public organisations, this Chapter marks the 
point of departure for analysis of fieldwork. The methodology behind the 
techniques chosen was discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This Chapter is divided 
into two discrete sections. Section 6.1 considers 14 of the 15 interviews conducted 
with experts in the fields of policy-making, law and campaigning. Concerns 
raised by interviewees include: 
The "convoluted" text of the UK DPA 1998; 
Data protection in the employment context; 
The development of data protection policy within organisations; 
The impact of related legislation on information privacy - in particular, 
UK statutes relating to freedom of information, human rights and anti- 
terrorism. 
The findings triangulate the conclusions drawn in previous, desk research, 
0 Chapters. The outstanding interview, with Sir Norman Lindop, chairman of the 
Data Protection Committee 1976-1978, is unique in providing historical context to 
data protection in the UK. Consequently, it is analysed separately in Appendix A. 
Section 6.2 of this Chapter examines findings from the questionnaire survey 
comprising almost 400 public organisations. For the reasons stated in Chapter 2, 
the questionnaire focused on employee personal data. Data analysed include: 
Measures to ensure compliance with the DPA 1998; 
Subject access procedures for employees; 
Security procedures for safeguarding employee records; 
Monitoring of workplace email and internet use; 
Awareness and opinion concerning various legislation and the Employment 
Practices Data Protection Code. 
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Some of the survey produced findings - particularly in the fields of staff training 
and formation of policies - that were pursued during case study interviews. These 
are analysed in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Expert interviews 
This section presents detailed findings from the expert interviews. The interviews 
were conducted to establish an overview of policy and expert opinion concerning 
data protection and related issues. The interviews triangulated desk research and 
questionnaire findings, and raised issues that were later explored during the case 
study interviews. 
In total, 15 people from a variety of organisations involved in law, policy-making 
and campaigning were interviewed. Only individuals who gave permission are 
named in this thesis. In all other instances the organisation they represented has 
been referred to. The participants are listed below: 
Sir Norman Lindop, cl; airman of the Data Protection Committee 1976- 
1978; 
Data Protection Unit, DG Internal Market, European Commission; 
Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC); 
Lord Chancellor's Department; 
Office of the e-Envoy (Oe-E), Cabinet Office; 
Professor David Feldman, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Houses of 
Parliament; 
European Union Committee, House of Lords, Houses of Parliament; 
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE); 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI); 
Hannah Reed, Trades Union Congress (TUC); 
236 
Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union - Information Technology 
Professionals Association (MSF-ITPA, abbreviated in this text to 'MSF'); 
JUSTICE; 
Consumers' International (CI); 
Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFOI); 
Hazel Grant, Bird and Bird, international law firm. 
The questions were tailored to the expertise of individual interviewees. The 
interview with Lindop was unique in that it focused almost exclusively on the 
history behind UK data protection legislation. As stated earlier, analysis of this 
interview has consequently been placed in Appendix A. However, the discussions 
with Lindop were referred to in Chapter 4 (section 4.5), detailing context to the 
UK Data Protection Acts 1984 and 1998. The remaining 14 interviews included 
the following common issues: 
Interviewee's role in their particular organisation; 
Aims of the organisation; 
When and how that organisation developed an interest in data 
protection and/or human rights; 
Level of data protection and/or human rights expertise in the 
organisation; 
Other bodies consulted/extent of peer group cooperation within this 
field; 
Official and personal opinion on legislation and official guidance, 
especially: 
o Text of the various Acts (DPA 1998; HRA 1998; FOIA 2000; 
RIPA 2000); 
0 Workability of official guidance in this field (for example, 
Employment Practices Data Protection Code); 
0 Recommendations for improvement. 
Research and policy work conducted in this field; 
Future challenges facing organisations concerning data protection and 
human rights. 
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It should be noted that 13 of the interviews were conducted in the two months 
following the terrorist attacks in the US on II September 2001. Hence, anti- 
terrorism measures - particularly relating to the retention of personal data - 
suddenly became prominent for those working with data protection issues. Many 
of the topics relating to data protection in this section have been discussed to some 
extent in Chapter 4. However, the interviewees added fresh insights based on 
their personal experiences. This section analyses textual difficulties presented by 
the DPA 1998, employment practices, the transfer of personal data to third 
countries, and the need for organisations to have clear data protection policies. 
Additionally, the interface between data protection and other concerns such as 
HRA 1998, FOIA 2000 and the various anti-terrorist measures proposed during 
autumn 2001 are considered. Finally, conclusions are drawn, summarising the 
key findings from the expert interviews. 
6.1.1 Data Protection Act 1998 
The complexity of the UK DPA 1998 was raised in a number of interviews. 
According to the majority of interviewees, this strengthened the need for clear and 
practical guidance, from the European Commission as the institution responsible 
for the underlying Directive 95/46/EC as well as from UK government and the 
OIC. The need for fin-ther clarity has been recognised and gradually addressed 
through the documents of the EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party' and 
the OIC's publication of two Codes ofPractice2. 
The text of the DPA 1998 was subjected to heavy criticism, being described as 
66appallingly drafted" and "ambiguous". The Lord Chancellor's Department - the 
government department responsible for data protection and freedom of 
information since June 2001 - is in the process of appraising the DPA 1998. 
Completion of the appraisal has been deferred until the European Commission 
publishes its report on the implementation of Directive 95/46/EC. Nevertheless, 
responses to the Department's consultation exercise were published in December 
200 13 . Key issues identified by respondents included: 
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Definition problems - in particular, the lack of definition for 'consent'; 
Confusion over international data transfers to third countries; 
Unclear relationship between 'data controller' and 'data processor', 
causing particular difficulties for large organisations such as the NHS and 
multi-nationals; 
Problems of interpretation over the 'sensitive data' distinction, with the 
OIC suggesting it should be abandoned. 
Grant, a lawyer at Bird and Bird aiding organisations in IT procurement and data 
protection, stated that clients experienced difficulties with terms used in the Act. 
Speaking in a personal capacity, Grant criticised the text of the Act as 
"convoluted", with too much guidance around a few words such as "structured 
filing system"4. Its ambiguity was also censured, supporting the observations 
identified during the Lord Chancellor's consultation exercise. In addition to the 
issues surrounding consent and relationships between data controllers and data 
processors, the meaning of terms such as 'personal data', 'adequate protection' 
and 'disproportionate effort' were also far from clear. Finally, the conditions for 
fair and lawful processing of personal data set out in Schedules 2 and 3 of the Act 
were indistinct - in particular Schedule 2 (6) which permitted processing that was 
in the 'legitimate interests pursued by the data controller'. Grant's comment 
relating to that condition summed up the attitude of many case study organisations 
to the whole Act: 
"We don't really know how far that will extend until we've had several years 
worth of guidance on it.,, 5 
Guidance relating to employment practices is discussed in the next subsection. 
6.1.2 Employment practices 
This subsection focuses on protection of employee personal data, adding to the 
perspectives given in Chapter 4 (section 4.6). This issue is analysed at three 
levels: 
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Possible EU moves towards legislation; 
Opinion concerning the OIC's Employment Practices Data Protection 
Code; 
Collective agreements being drafted at a local level between employers 
and trade unions. 
EU working paper and possible moves toward legislation 
In September 2001, an interview was conducted at the Data Protection Unit, based 
in DG Internal Market, part of the European Commission. During the meeting, a 
recently drafted working paper concerning data protection in the employment 
environment was discussed6. This paper, which the interviewee had contributed 
to, was published by the Article 29 committee. The aim of this paper was to 
provide guidance for organisations, to clarify certain aspects of the application of 
Directive 95/46/EC in the employment context. Its key points were: 
Most employment activities were within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC; 
Employers needed to consider fundamental data protection principles 
when processing personal data belonging to employees; 
As the relationship between employer and employee is not an equal one, 
reliance on employee consent should be limited. 
it bore many similarities to the OIC's Draft Code ofPractice: The use ofpersonal 
i7 data in employerlemployee relationsh PS , and it was no surprise to learn that 
David Smith, Assistant Information Commissioner at the OIC, had a leading role 
in its drafting. Such EU working papers were described by the interviewee at the 
EU Data Protection Unit as "soft law' 8, as only the national supervisory 
authorities were bound by its provisions. However, given that the supervisory 
authorities applied Directive 95/46/EC via national data protection laws, the effect 
was clear. If those authorities stated that employee consent was weak, "it will 
impact on national policies"9. Speaking in a personal capacity, the interviewee 
believed action by the European Commission in this field was likely in the course 
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of 2002, although some delays were expected following the terrorist attacks in the 
US on II September 200 1: 
"As you know, Article 30 states one of the tasks of the Working Party is to 
promote the harmonisation of national law'O. So we should start by this. If 
this is not sufficient maybe we should consider supplementary action. This 
opinion is the foundation ... that is my personal view. "' 
1 
The European Employers' Confederation (UNICE) had argued against centralised 
EU legislation concerning workers' personal data following an initial EU 
consultation in autumn 2001 12 . The employers' organisation stated that existing 
regulations - particularly Directive 95/46/EC - applied to workers' personal data 
and that specific solutions could be found at a more decentralised level, for 
example, through codes of practice, self-regulation, and voluntary agreements: 
6social partners at national level would be in a better position to address 
problems as and when identified. ' 13 
In a written answer to interview questions for this thesis given in December 2001, 
UNICE stated that employees did have a right to some privacy in the workplace, 
, but privacy can have some limitations in the employment context'14. For 
example, some controls may be necessary to ensure that the company's IT system 
is not used to send offensive or illegal material. Such systems were perfectly 
acceptable, 'provided the employee is informed that control systems are in 
15 place' 
Notwithstanding such reservations, the European Commission launched a second 
stage consultation on the protection of workers' personal data 16 . Given the more 
general nature of Directive 95/46/EC, the Commission believed there was a need 
for "clearer, simpler rules on the protection of workers' personal data which take 
better account of the employer/worker relationship"17 . The substance of the 
second consultation covered: 
- Consent; 
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Access to, and processing of, medical data; 
Drug testing and genetic testing; 
Monitoring and surveillance. 
Although acknowledging that some of these measures had been tackled by 
member states through national legislation and various codes of practice, the 
Commission argued that different treatment of workers' personal data within the 
EU may create barriers to the free movement of information within the internal 
marketig. 
UNICE, and other 'social partners' - including trade union and consumer 
representatives - had six weeks from 31 October 2002 to comment on the 
Commission's proposals, or decide to take up the matter themselves, 
independently of the Commission, with a view to establishing their own EU-wide 
initiative in this area19. UNICE replied in January 2003, stating their opposition to 
the Commission's proposal, and to opening negotiations with other social 
partners 20 - The employer's organisation repeated their arguments given 
in 
response to the first stage consultation. Firstly, directives such as 95/46/EC 
afforded a high degree of protection to European workers. Secondly, the 
Commission's own assessment own report on the implementation of Directive 
95/46/EC has yet to be published. Finally, that the Article 29 committee is the 
appropriate forum for such discussions. 
UK code o)fpractice 
During interviews with organisations based in the UK, the Draft Code ofPractice: 
The use of personal data in employerlemployee relationships was frequently 
discussed. A strategic policy officer interviewed at the OIC stated that the UK 
was one of the first EU member states to produce a code of practice in this field. 
The OIC guidance was "not an increased obligation, [but] reaffirmed existing 
obligatione 921 . The interviewee agreed there had been confusion over what 
constituted 'consent' under the DPA 1998 and both employers and employees had 
requested further clarification. Acknowledging that the first draft of the Code had 
been "badly presented", the interviewee stated "the main thrust of the final version 
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is going to remain the same - especially the issue of monitoring in the 
workplace"22 . 
Indeed, the draft Code had been criticised by many organisations. Grant described 
the draft as "totally unworkable"23. It was too lengthy at 60-plus pages. The new 
Code - which will be published in four separate parts - is "now going to be a quite 
incredible length, it's going to be over 200 pageS,, 24 . This may be useful, Grant 
concurred, for large organisations such as Marks and Spencer and the NHS, the 
chances of anyone in small organisations reading it at all are "very slim". 
Additionally, Grant contested the position the OIC has adopted in the Code 
limiting the reliance on consent: 
"There are few other means available. In recording sensitive personal data, 
how else are they going to do it?,, 25 
Finally, concern was raised that in the Code, the OIC has incorporated their 
interpretation of the law with their suggestions for good practice. Thus, there is a 
risk of "scope-creep": 
"The law will increase, because what will happen is if big employers follow 
the Code to the letter, then that will become normal practice in personnel 
,, 26 departments. 
Therefore, Grant contested, the Code will "push out the boundaries of the Act' -)27 . 
The CBI adopted a broadly similar view. On the issue of timing, the draft Code - 
when published in October 2000 - attempted to anticipate the provisions of the 
Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR) finalised in the same month. In the 
end, the draft Code "completely contradicted the Regulations, which didn't help 
the consultation proceSS,, 28 . Delaying the release of the dmft Code for a few 
weeks "could have saved a lot of confusion7% and improved coordination between 
the Department of Trade and Industry and the OIC. 
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However, both employee representatives - the TUC and the Manufacturing, 
Science and Finance Union (MSF) - broadly welcomed the draft Code. To quote 
the interviewee at the latter organisation: 
"'We've been supportive of the principle of a data protection code as 
envisaged by the Information Commissioner, and have been pushing for such 
a Code,, 29. 
The interviewee viewed some of the arguments by employers in favour of 
monitoring as ill thought through. Most legitimate interests of employers could be 
achieved through "means other than monitoring and surveillance', 30. For example, 
one of the organisations the MSF works with attempts to safeguard against 
downloading pornography by limiting the size of file that can be attached to an 
email to half a megabyte, "about 30 pages of A4 -)-)31 . Should the employee require 
a larger attachment, they need to get express permission. 
Reed, from the TUC, also welcomed the approach taken in the draft Code: 
"Our viewpoint is that the code of practice should be detailed and should also 
,, 32 have wide-ranging guidance. 
The interviewee pointed out that TUC had wide experience of working with 
ACAS33 and equal opportunities codes of practice, and employers, too, had 
worked with codes of practice. As quoted in Chapter 4 (section 4.6.3), Reed 
emphasised that the draft Code was there to aid employers in creating policies - 
and avoiding litigation - in what is a complicated and sometimes controversial 
field of law. Reed was concerned that the final version was going to be "watered 
down", which, for the reasons give above, would "not necessarily be much help to 
employers". Finally, Reed noted that the draft Code referred to 'employees' in the 
employment relationship whilst Directive 95/46/EC actually relates to 'workers'. 
Under this distinction, most agency and casual staff would be excluded from the 
interpretations outlined in the draft Code. 
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Towards collective aareements? 
In general, the TUC and MSF welcomed the extended protection afforded by the 
DPA 1998, but acknowledged that the provisions of the Act could lead to very 
rigid systems of filing and monitoring and "everyone could get themselves tied up 
in bureaucracy', 34 . The problem with the DPA 1998, according to Reed, was a 
lack of awareness among organisations concerning the scope of data protection - 
which extended beyond correction, deletion and access to interview notes. Indeed, 
the Act also "covers things such as drug-testing and alcohol testing"35 . 
In terms of policy-making - and promoting understanding of the DPA 1998 in the 
workplace - both employee organisations interviewed stated a preference for 
collective agreements with employers. The TUC stated that UNISON 36 and the 
MSF were "advanced" on this issue 37 . Even where there was no trade union 
recognition, organisations should still be under an obligation to consult their 
workforces. This obligation will become compulsory for organisations employing 
50 or more staff under the Information and Consultation Directive 02/14/EC, 
enacted in March 2002 38 . For the MSF, workplace agreements built on the legal 
provisions, adapting the legislation to specific circumstances of individual 
organisations. In this, the union had made progress. Generic model guidelines 
had been developed focusing on access to and monitoring of emails and internet 
use. The two key documents were a Model Electronic Facilities Agreement and a 
Draft Code of Practice on Protection of Privacy at Work39. Drafted in 1999, the 
interviewee believed: "the principles and the wording have stood up remarkably 
well to negotiations, challenges and so forth". When drafting the guidelines, 
reference was made to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) code of 
practice on the protection of privacy, some of the original research behind the 
OIC's Draft Code of Practice: The use of personal data in employerlemployee 
relationships, and the ideas of a Union Network International IT working group 
which the interviewee chaired. 
The core principles of both had been adopted in workplace situations, with 
allowances made for the particular circumstances of specific environments. For 
example, members based in customer-facing areas may favour the use of CCTV 
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for safety and security purpose, whilst those working in, for example, a postal 
sorting office may oppose the use of such cameras. Agreements have been signed 
with various government agencies and "some smaller businesses as well, although 
A0 they are not yet at the stage of developing these things by and large' 
However, employers were more reluctant. Although UNICE recognised that some 
consultation with employees "is guaranteed by legislation7', interviewees at the 
CBI believed it was up to individual organisations, to draw up policies concerning 
employee data protection: 
"I think they would, as a general rule, be drawing up their policy themselves 
and not with the trade unions: it being the translation of legal obligations, not 
, 41 amendments to terms and conditions. 
The issue of policies for protection of employee personal data is considered in 
further detail in Chapter 7. 
6.1.3 Transfer of personal data to third countries 
Other general data protection issues that concerned interviewees included the 
transfer of personal data outside the European Economic Area (EEA), in particular 
to the US. This built on the context to this issue outlined in Chapter 4 (section 
4.7). The 'Safe Harbor' agreement was described by the European Commission 
official as a "political succeSS,, 42 in that it allowed the EU and US to talk about 
data protection, something they had not done before. However, from a practical 
point of view, the results had been "scarce". At the time of interviewing 
(September 2001) only 100 companies had signed up to the agreement, and their 
compliance "appeared not to be good enough', 43 . 
This view was later supported in 
a European Commission working paper published in February 2002 44 , also 
discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.7.1). 
Although the Commission was sceptical, UNICE supported the 'Safe Harbor' 
principles as a means of allowing businesses continuity in transborder flows of 
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personal data. Model contract clauses were viewed by the EU and business as a 
viable alternative, with applicability going beyond the US to all third countries. 
Approved by the European Commission in July 2001, the reception by business 
representatives was mixed. The CBI argued that it was impractical for 
organisations to draw up separate contracts for each of its global subsidiaries. The 
CBI interviewees preferred a single policy complying with basic international data 
protection rules, although they acknowledged: 
"... a fundamental difference in vision between Europe and the US over what 
,. AS is actually data protection. 
UNICE expressed concern that certain clauses concerning joint and several 
liability went beyond the protection outlined in Directive 95/46/EC. Their main 
fear was that the Commission's contracts would act as a benchmark, and 
disqualify other contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third 
countries. When the European Commission clarified this was not the case, a 
number of business organisations - including the CBI and American Chambers of 
Commerce - drafted alternative model clauses. To quote UNICE, the alternative 
models are: "intended to provide just as high a level of data protection as the 
Commission's clause, but using more flexible mechanisms that reflect business 
realitieS,, 46 . Key differences between the EU and alternative model contracts 
included: 
Obligations on the exporter and importer of personal data revised to 
exclude obligations which go beyond the Directive. For example, 
clauses stating that exporter must explicitly inform data subjects that 
their data will be transferred to a country without an 'adequate level 
of protection' (Commission clause 4. b), and that a copy of the 
clauses must always be given to the data sub ect upon request 
(Commission clause 4. c), have been removed; 
Liability reflects existing data protection law (i. e., each party is liable 
for damages it caused), no joint and several liability; 
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Selection of law governing processing by data importer is more 
flexible, and would allow a company to select a single set of 
principles (such as Safe Harbor) to cover its worldwide processing; 
Explicitly allows further transfers and multiple transfers to be 
covered. 
The current position at January 2003 is that the European Commission introduced 
its model contracts, which member states' data protection authorities are obliged 
to recognise - in December 2001 (refer to Chapter 4). No decision has been made 
regarding businesses' alternative model. 
6.1.4 Policy: data protection in organisations 
During the case study interviews, the interviewees were asked about the key data 
protection issues impacting on their workplace. At expert interview level, Grant 
lucidly summed up the issues involving public organisations in her experience as a 
legal consultant to such bodies: 
Subject access requests (SARs). Organisations often did not have the 
technology to gather information from a large number of areas. This is 
especially true regarding personal data in emails; 
Transfer of data outside the EEA, a problem cited by employers 
organisations; 
Information systems. Not all data protection issues were considered prior 
to procurement of such systems: "It's after the contract's been awarded 
and the systems are actually been slowly developed, that those sort of 
issues would come up and have to be dealt with. 947 
In terms of overall written policy, Bird and Bird tended not to advise public 
organisations. In Grant's experience, they appeared to be more pro-active than the 
private sector, and have an appointed DPO. However, it was noted that the 
postholder tended to be at a low level in the authority, and usually did not ask for 
legal advice: 
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"So, when I see data protection issues it's usually not because someone's 
come to me from a local authority to answer the questions, but I've raised an 
issue initially in procurement: "What are you doing about this? Have you 
taken some advice on thisT' So, I think there is a level of compliance within 
authorities but it's not really a very high level. "48 
In summary, data protection generally - personal data belonging to both 
employees and clients - required a higher profile in public organisations. It lacked 
visibility and was perceived as an obstacle to progress rather than a service to an 
organisation in terms of systems development and records management. The 
status and role of the DPO in an authority was a topic which repeatedly came to 
the fore during case study interviews. Organisations were at a variety of stages. 
The key challenge perceived by Grant included the issue of data sharing and 
'joined-up' government19: how and whether it is going to work. This partly 
overlapped with the work conducted by the Office of the e-Envoy (Oe-E), whose 
efforts in promoting electronic government are considered in the next subsection. 
E-jzovernment 
Policy concerning general data protection in public organisations forms a key part 
of the work of the Oe-E. Part of the Cabinet Office, the Oe-E was established in 
September 1999 with the aim of promoting access to, and use of, online facilities 
in the UK 'to ensure that the country, its citizens and its businesses derive 
maximum benefit from the knowledge economy'50. The key issues referred to at 
interview were data sharing and 'joined-up' government. In order to achieve these 
aims, part of the focus has been on increasing public trust in electronic service 
transactions, and specifically the question of the extent to which privacy could be 
protected. The end product of this was the draft e-Trust Charter, published in 
September 200 15 1. This represented government policy in this area, recognising 
the importance of data protection legislation in safeguarding privacy of personal 
data, whilst attempting to integrate public services. The Charter was perceived by 
the Oe-E interviewee as its key future challenge in "ensuring the design and 
delivery of electronic services"52 . 
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The Charter was to be displayed on all sites where the government delivered 
electronic services, seeking to reassure users of electronic public services about 
how their personal data will be handled. It envisaged that providers of electronic 
services would then offer context-specific privacy statements whenever personal 
information is requested from the public, covering each of the points in the 
Charter 53 : 
Who will see the personal data; 
Why they need it; 
What they will do with it; 
When they will deleted. 
Additionally, public organisations are expected to inform individuals: 
How they will safeguard their personal data; 
How individuals can check and correct their personal data; 
How to pursue a query or complaint; 
Where to get more information. 
The Oe-E perceived the Charter to be relevant for both government departments 
and the wider public sector, proving a useful policy tool for achieving data 
protection compliance in the electronic environment. In April 2002, the draft 
Charter was subsumed within the 'Public Services Trust Charter' as detailed in the 
Performance and Innovation Unifs report on Privacy and data-sharing published 
that Month54 - The significance of this report 
is referred to throughout this thesis. 
Safeguarding personal data online 
In January 2001, Consumers' International (CI) produced similar 
recommendations for all organisations in its report Privacy@nds discussed in the 
Literature Review (Chapter 3,3.1.5). C1 had worked with the US civil liberties 
group and research centre, EPIC, to write the report and recommendations. CI's 
research showed that the majority of websites surveyed ignored basic principles of 
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information use that had underpinned data protection legislation for the last three 
decades. These included: giving consumers control over the collection and use of 
their information; giving them a right to access and collect that information; and 
ensuring security of their data. A practical tip sheet was enclosed for consumers 
who wanted to protect their privacy online 56 - 
Released nine months prior to the draft e-Trust Charter, the report recommended 
that all sites that collect information from users should provide a privacy policy 
that clearly stated their policy towards individual's personal data. The policy 
should be signposted clearly from the home page, and at every point within the 
site where personal information is collected. The privacy policy should include: 
The identity of the company that owns and operates the site; 
The kind of information collected; 
Why the data is stored and what it is used for; 
Who the data is shared with (including a list of affiliates), and what 
choices the user has about this; 
How long the data is stored for; 
How the security of that data is ensured; 
How consumers can access, alter and delete their data; 
How the site"s policy might change in the future; 
Contact details for the person responsible for the privacy of data; 
Contact information for the pertinent oversight body. 
The privacy policy was similar to the draft Charter. In some respects it went 
finiher, with the provisions concerning who the data is shared with and how the 
site's policy may change - attempting to counter commercial realities of mergers, 
takeovers and the sale of personal data to third parties. The report called for 
establishment of an independent oversight body to 'ensure compliance and 
provide for adequate sanctions for violations 57 . At interview, it was stated that 
this body should be either European or global, comprising lawyers and IT experts. 
As the interviewee stated: "You can't ask us to accept that US businesses set the 
standards"58 . 
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6.1.5 Human Rights Act 1998 
The HRA 1998 was referred to in many interviews. Interviewees saw its 
advantage in bolstering the provisions of the DPA 1998. The most detailed 
observations on the HRA 1998 were gained through interviews with JUSTICE, the 
JCHR, and Grant. JUSTICE appraised the Act as a "very politically astute 
document" that was balanced - incorporating the concerns of the media 
concerning freedom of expression - and clear and workable". However, 
JUSTICE were keen to stress that the HRA 1998 lacked the weight of a 
constitutional Bill of Rights, and there was no guarantee that the individual's 
constitutional rights would always be protected. Finally, there was a lack of 
training in public authorities, other than central government. JUSTICE had 
worked with the Local Government Association in an attempt to remedy this. 
Feldman, the legal policy advisor to the JCHR, was "very impressed" with 
cooperation from goverranent departments - particularly the Home Office over the 
anti-tefforism measures that were being discussed at the time of interview 
(November 2001). More broadly, Feldman believed a common law had been 
developed in the wake of the 2000 Douglas case, involving the taking and planned 
publication of illicit photographs at the wedding of actors Michael Douglas and 
Catherine Zeta Jones: 
I don't think that there's very much doubt that there's a right of common 
law privacy. Who's to say how far it's been influenced by the Article 8 point. 
I think that having certain obligations under Article 8 does no harm at all. " 60 
Overall, the transition to HRA 1998 had been smooth. Certainly, in Feldman's 
view, the judiciary had been well-trained and central government departments 
been very effective prepared. In the interviewee's experience, there had been no 
lack of awareness, although, unsurprisingly, some lack of understanding on the 
more technical legal issues. 
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At Bird and Bird, the perspective of Grant was that the HRA 1998 was "bedding 
itself down7' and the higher courts had been conservative in their interpretations 
regarding privacy 61 . Horizontal effect - that is, the HRA 1998 being applied 
outside of public authorities - was certainly evident with courts and tribunals 
interpreting certain cases. This was a view supported by Feldman and JUSTICE. 
An example given by Grant was that of Leonard Cheshire Homes 62 , stating that 
local authorities, even when contracting out work, still had to ensure the 
organisations that were working for them complied with the HRA 1998. The 
HRA 1998 appeared to be clear and workable. Awareness of the Act was high in 
public organisations, although there was uncertainty as to what it meant in 
practice. These observations were borne out during the case study interviews. 
6.1.6 Freedom of Infonnation Act 2000 
More practical awareness was to be found concerning the implications of FOIA 
2000 - something strongly supported during the case study interviews. 
Interviewees at the Lord Chancellor's Department perceived this legislation as its 
"key challenge"63. The supervisory model enacted by the UK government of one 
Information Commissioner balancing both FOI and data protection was perceived 
as more consensual than having two Commissioners each championing their own 
causes64- It was observed that the OIC already had a strong role in promoting and 
enforcing openness of information. The key tests were perceived by the Lord 
Chancellor's Department to be: 
Implementation of FOIA 2000 - and how it would impact on the extended 
scope of the DPA 1998; 
The reaction of the courts to FOIA 2000. Whilst the DPA 1998 was 
underpinned by international law, the case for FOIA 2000 was less 
certain"; 
The need for sound information handling practices. Can public 
organisations find information requested under FOIA 2000? 
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The leading campaigner for freedom of information, the CFOI, had developed 
good contacts with the Lord Chancellor's Department, with a member of staff 
seconded to the Department at the time of interview (November 2001). Like the 
Lord Chancellor's Department, the CFOI perceived difficulties with data 
protection being given precedence over FOI due to its European roots. The effect 
of the HRA 1998 on FOIA 2000 was viewed by the CFOI as "indirect": 
"I think the FOI Act is explicit enough in most cases, it doesn't leave too 
many opportunities or areas where it would have an impaCt.,, 66 
However, the greatest difficulty the CFOl experienced with FOIA 2000 was that 
"the government doesn't want to implement if', having just announced at the time 
of interview that the implementation of the provisions were to be delayed until 
January 2005. Additional problems cited included rights of access were very 
weak, with many depending solely on the balance of public interest test, where 
ministers have the right of veto. Moreover, other exemptions were "much too 
broad"'67 . These exemptions, including 'information provided in confidence', and 
6prohibitions on disclosure by enactment' were discussed in Chapter 5 (section 
5.4.3). 
Like JUSTICE, CFOI had provided a training service in its field of expertise. A 
general guide to the individual's right to information had been produced and 
training had been organisated for public authorities - either directly, or through 
speaking at conferences. At the time of interview, the workload was decreasing 
with the non-implementation of the Act. However, demand was expected to rise 
when implementation becomes imminent. 
6.1.7 Anti-terrorism 
Anti-terrorism concerns were thrust into prominence following the attacks of I Ph 
September 2001. As one legal advisor to the government stated: "Terrorism is 
now a priority. Within this, data protection is of key importance. 9M During the 
period of the interviews, the UK government considered various initiatives 
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including issuing of national identification cards, derogating from Article 5- right 
to liberty and security of person - of the ECHR, and retaining communications 
data. These initiatives will be considered in turn. Many of the government's 
proposals came together in the ATCSA 2001, enacted in December 2001 and 
discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.5). All but one of the expert interviews took 
place prior to the passing of this Act. Yet, various concerns were voiced by 
interviewees. 
The interviewee at the OIC stated that any national ID system would be "flawed 
from the starf', as the government would have to compile a database covering the 
identities of the national population69. The issue of which system to base this 
database on would cause major difficulties. One of the largest databases in the UK 
- concerning National Insurance (NI) numbers - contains more NI numbers than 
there are residents in the UK70: "If you use that system which is inaccurate as a 
basis for any new system, it is automatically flawed Additionally, identity 
72 cards have existed in Spain for almost 60 years , and yet 
internal terrorist 
movements are still successful. In July 2002, the UK government confirmed that 
it favoured the introduction of national 'entitlement cards', and launched a six- 
month consultation period into the issue 73 . The consultation 
document stated that 
the government 'would ensure the scheme fully complied with the Data Protection 
974 Act 1998 
Concerning the derogation from Article 5, Feldman explained it related only to 
immigrants who posed a threat to national security and could not be deported 
because there was nowhere safe to deport them to, as deportation would violate 
their Article 2 (right to life) or 3 (prohibition of torture) rights. In those cases 
only, the UK government are "going to take a power to detain those people in this 
country rather than throw them out in violation with their other more important 
righte'75 - Feldman did not believe the UK govermnent disregarded human rights 
-j76 at all, and thought it was "unfortunate that that impression is created' 
Regarding data retention, the CBI raised fears at interview in November 2001 -a 
month prior to the enactment of the ATCSA 2001. The Act's voluntary code 
allowing for data retention had yet to be drafted 77 , but there was unease as to 
how 
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it would interface with RIPA 2000, which allows access through the issue of 
warrant or authorisation. The assumption is that there is going to be an increase in 
the amount of data that companies - such as (internet service providers) ISPs - are 
expected to retain and then disclose to law enforcement agencies. Naturally, this 
will result in issues of trust in how the retention will be presented to business 
clients, in addition to cost implications in terms of storing and accessing the data: 
"I think businesses are probably aligned very much against it because they're 
aware of the cost implications. " 78 
6.1.8 Conclusions 
The expert interviews have provided an overview, a useful snapshot of opinion on 
a number of issues ranging from the text of the DPA 1998 to broader human rights 
concerns and the establishment of a privacy common law. Moreover, the events of 
II September 2001 - and heightened interest in acquiring personal data as a result 
- demonstrated how relevant data protection concerns are now. Although the UK 
government has stated its anti-terrorism measures comply with the requirements of 
both the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998, many of the interviewees were uneasy. 
The interviews raised the following key issues, some of which complement 
findings from previous Chapters: 
(i) Needfor legal clarity. 
The interviewees heavily criticised the wording of the DPA 1998, describing it as 
"appallingly drafted" and "ambiguous". A practising lawyer stated that clients 
found the text "convoluted" and were overwhelmed by guidance surrounding 
terms such as 'structured filing system'. Moreover, there were clear problems 
concerning important terms such as 'consent', which lacked any definition in the 
AO. The task of OIC in providing the necessary detailed guidance appeared 
particularly onerous. The text of the DPA 1998 is undoubtedly complex, 
comprising 75 sections and 16 schedules. Moreover, 19 separate sets of secondary 
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legislation8o have been produced by central goverment - adding greater depth to, 
and frequently clarifying - the provisions of the 1998 Act. 
Reconciling data protection with e-government. 
The interview with the Oe-E highlighted the tension between the government's 
obligations under the DPA 1998 and HRA 1998, and their drive to coordinate and 
integrate public services. At the time of interview (October 2001), the Oe-E was 
promoting the e-Trust Charter - later the 'Public Services Trust Charter' - to 
reassure the public about their personal data when using online public services. 
Case study interviews in public authorities in Chapter 7 expound on this issue, 
with many local authorities being assessed on their "e-government agendas", 
rather than compliance with the DPA 1998. 
(iii) Specific difficulties presented by employee personal data 
The EU and the OIC appeared to have difficulty getting to grips with the specific 
issue of employee personal data. The sensitivity of the information involved, the 
fact that it could be accessed - and abused - by colleagues of the employees, and 
the unequal relationship between employee and employer were among the factors 
convincing interviewees within the EU, OIC and trade unions that further action 
was necessary. 
To this end, the interviewee at the European Commission had drafted a working 
paper on the issues with a view to legislating in the near future. However, UNICE 
did not see the need for further regulation, preferring instruments such as codes of 
practice, voluntary instruments and guidelines". The OIC - who had worked 
closely with the EU interviewee on the working paper - were experiencing 
difficulty in pitching their Employment Practices Data Protection Code to the 
appropriate audience. The CBI viewed the OIC's Code - half of which is still in 
draft form - as interfering with business working practices, and failing to take into 
account the daily administrative needs of small businesses in particular. However, 
at a local, bottom-up level, real progress appeared to be being made, with the MSF 
entering into collective agreements with various organisations. The reason for the 
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union's success perhaps hinged on the codes being flexible enough of meet the 
individual needs of organisations, rather than being blanket regulations imposed 
from above. 
(iv) Interface between the provisions ofthe DPA 1998, and other legislation. 
Supporting the findings of Chapter 5, the key legislation referred to by 
interviewees were FOIA 2000, HRA 1998 and the proposed anti-terrorism 
measures. FOIA 2000 was recognised as having a huge impact on the data- 
handling practices of public organisations, being perceived by the Lord 
Chancellor's Department as its "key challenge". Implementation of the Act, its 
impact on the extended scope of the DPA 1998, and the reaction of the courts to 
the new Act were all perceived by the government to be important tests. 
Understanding of the practicalities involved in the HRA 1998 and anti-terrorism 
legislation for organisations was less clear. For the HRA 1998, this was due to the 
general nature of its provisions and small, but growing, amount of case law 
concerning the legislation. The anti-terrorism measures were under discussion at 
time of interviewing, thus the interviewees were unable to comment on their 
possible impact. 
The above issues have significant consequences for public organisations seeking 
compliance with the provisions of the DPA 1998. The questionnaire survey 
analyses views from practitioners. 
6.2 Ouestionnaire survey 
This survey measured practitioner awareness and informed opinion concerning the 
DPA 1998. In particular, the survey sought to assess the challenges facing 
organisations regarding the handling the employee personal data. Additionally, 
data protection issues surrounding relevant legislation such as FOIA 2000, HRA 
1998 and RIPA 2000 were considered. The aim of the survey was not to achieve 
statistical significance, which would have been difficult to justify in a PhD study 
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concerned with measuring organisational policy and best practice. Instead, the 
aim was to yield indicative data that could be triangulated with findings from 
expert interviews. Indeed, an important justification for conducting this survey 
was to develop contacts for case study interviews. In this respect, the survey was 
very successful, with 18 respondents ultimately participating in the case studies. 
The questionnaire survey was initially piloted on eleven organisations in February 
2001. The questions were devised following desk research into the legal context 
behind UK data protection legislation. Following feedback, amendments were 
made to the questionnaire format. In September 2001,382 questionnaires were 
distributed to a variety of public organisations including local authorities, health 
authorities, universities and police authorities. The final number of replies was 
107, representing a response rate of 28.0%. Table 5 below breaks down the 
respondents by organisational type. 
Type of organisation Number of questionnaires 
received 
Local authorities 89 
Universities 9 
Health authorities 3 
Police authorities I 
Quangos 2 
Privatised utilities 3 
Total 107 
Table 6: Questionnaires received by category 
This section examines findings from a selection of questions posed during the 
survey. Questions were chosen for analysis based on the relevance and usefulness 
of the data in relation to the overall aim, hypotheses and objectives of this thesis. 
A copy of the full questionnaire survey is included in Appendix D. The data 
contained in the bar charts and pie charts in this section have been described using 
actual numbers, as an over-reliance on percentages would have been misleading. 
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Where data concerning the responses has been given in the text, two numbers are 
displayed in brackets - for example (33,30.8%). The first number relates to the 
actual number of responses; the second to the percentage of the total that this 
represents. Percentages are given to one decimal place. The data displayed is 
illustrative only - providing a 'snapshot' of public authority opinion and 
awareness concerning the DPA 1998 and related issues. 
In this section, each question posed is presented in bold, followed by a brief 
analysis of the responses. For ease of reference, the numbering of the questions 
corresponds with their numbering in the full survey. The following abbreviations 
are used: 'DK' for 'don't know' and 'DNA' for 'did not answer'. 
6.2.1 Data analysis 
1. Does your organisation have a nominated member of staff with 
responsibility for data protection? 
Percentage 
Yes 103 96.2 
No 2 1.9 
D/k 2 1.9 
Total 107 100.0 
Table 7: Respondents with nominated staff responsible for data protection. 
Almost all respondents stated that they had a nominated member of staff 
responsible for data protection in their organisation. Only two (1.9%) explicitly 
stated that they did not, and both were in the process of creating a position. This 
demonstrated, at the very least, that the respondents had acknowledged the 
existence of UK data protection legislation. 
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2. What steps has your organisation taken to comply with the DPA 1998? 
The results from this question are displayed in Figure 2 overleaf. The most 
popular steps taken to achieve compliance with the DPA 1998 were internal audit 
(85,79.41/o) and in-house staff training (85,79.4%). The latter was confirmed 
during the case study interviews, where almost all interviewees stated that data 
protection training was conducted by the organisational Data Protection Officer 
(DPO). Less than one third (33,30.8%) of organisations had used external trainers 
-a finding that again was bome out at interview, and ascribed to the expense 
involved in hiring outside organisations. One case study organisation had received 
quotes of E5 000 -H 000 to receive a day's training for up to 25 people. So, 
where possible, training was conducted in-house. 
Measures taken to comply with DPA 1998 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
.0 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
to Oo 
as 
0, E7; 4) > 
wi 
*0 
E 
00 
Compliance measures 
U 
Figure 2: Measures taken to comply with the Data Protection Act 1998 
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In terms of policy-making, the questionnaire aimed to assess the presence of 
policies in organisations, rather than their actual contents. However, a small 
number of respondents did mail copies of actual documents. These documents 
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tended to be general statements informing the public of their rights to information 
under the DPA 1998, with advice on exercising this right. Organisational policies 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (section 7.6). Over half the survey respondents 
(63,58.9%) had devised policies for handling subject access requests -a key 
element of the DPA 1998. A little over a third (38,35.5%) had a policy 
concerning employee personal privacy and 12 respondents (11.2%) had a policy 
concerning automated decision-making. Case study interviews established that 
most organisations were still in a state of flux regarding this issue. 
Other compliance measures were cited by 28 (26.2%) of respondents. They 
included: 
Amending application forms to inform, applicants of the purposes their 
personal data will be put to; 
ICT security policies; 
Establishment of data protection working groups; 
Informing staff of developments through newsletters, email circulars and 
information printed on their payslips. 
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7. What are the subject access procedures for employees asking to view their 
records? 
Provisions for employees requesting their own personal data 
66 
Figure 3: Provisions for employees requesting their own personal data. 
* Specific policy 
* Request employer 
13DK/DNA 
The right of subject access request is a fundamental right under the DPA 1998, 
allowing the data subject to exercise other rights such as the rectification, 
blocking, erasure and destruction of inaccurate or incomplete personal data. 
Subject access procedures are discussed in further detail during the case study 
analysis (Chapter 7, section 7.5). 
From the analysis of the questionnaire data, only 32 respondents (29.9%) had 
specific policies in place regarding employee access to their personal data. 66 
respondents (61.7%) did not have a formal policy, but made personal data 
available on request. Finally, nine (8.4%) either did not answer the question, or 
did not know the situation regarding employee subject access requests. These 
findings contrasted with those of the case study interviews, where 15 out of the 18 
organisations interviewed had developed well-defined subject access procedures. 
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8. What are the security procedures in place for safeguarding employee 
records? 
Procedures for safeguarding the security of employee records 
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Figure 4: Procedures for safeguarding security of employee records. 
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Principle 7 of the DPA 1998 states that 'appropriate technical and organisational 
measures 9 must be taken to safeguard personal data. Nearly all respondents (94, 
87.9%) had controls regarding access to employee personal data. A popular 
control was use of passwords to restrict access to certain types of record (79, 
73.8%). Moreover, the majority of organisations (72,67.3%) had formal 
disciplinary procedures in place to combat any breaches of data security. 
Technical measures safeguarding security were less common. Less than one third 
(31,29.0%) of respondents claimed compliance with formal security standards 
2 
such as BS 7799 - the British Standard for Information security managemen? . 
One reason for this, supported during the case study interviews, was the time and 
expense involved in achieving compliance. Eight respondents (7.5%) encrypted 
emails containing employee personal data. 
264 
9. Does your organisation have a formal policy concerning staff use of-. 
i. Email 
ii. Internet? 
Yes No Total 
Email 100 7 107 
Internet 100 7 107 
Table 8: Policy conceming staff email and intemet usage. 
The need for a detailed policy governing employee usage of email and the internet 
has been the subject of much media debate since the OIC released its Draft Code 
of Practice in October 200083. It is telling that at the time of writing (January 
2003), over two years following the publication on the draft Code, the section 
concerning Monitoring at work has yet to be finalised. The latest version of the 
section recommends employers draft a policy concerning monitoring of 
communications and communicate this to employees. This issue was discussed in 
interviews with both employer and employee representatives (section 6.1.2). 
The overwhelming majority of respondents (100,93.5%) claimed to have such 
policies - all combined policies - concerning staff usage of email and the internet. 
However, this was not borne out during the case study interviews, where only half 
had actually devised such policies. The complexities of policy-making in this field 
are discussed in Chapter 7 (section 6). 
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10. Does your organisation monitor staff use of. - 
i. Email; 
ii. Internet? 
Yes No Total 
Email 79 28 107 
Internet 88 19 107 
Table 9: Respondents monitoring staff email and internet usage. 
Perhaps in response to media reports of employee abuse of email and internet 
usage - and the resulting fear of legal action - levels of monitoring were very high. 
79 respondents (73.8%) monitored staff email use. A higher number (88,82.2%) 
kept track of internet usage, perhaps due to the ease at which pornography could 
be accessed online. 
Questions 11 and 12 were aimed at respondents who answered 'yes' to either or 
both 10 (i) and 10 (Y). 
11. How frequently does your organisation monitor use of email and/or the 
internet? 
The data for this question is presented in Figure 5 overleaf. In all, 90 respondents 
answered this question. Almost half of those who monitored employee use of 
email and internet did so 'only with good reason' (41,45.6%). The next most 
popular answer was daily (25,27.8%). However, a total of only 27 respondents 
(30.0%) monitored more than once a month. 
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Frequency of monitoring of staff email and internet use 
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Figure 5: Frequency of monitoring of staff email and internet usage. 
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This is in line with guidance on this issue in the OIC's latest version of part three 
of Employment Practices Data Protection Code - Monitoring at Work. Under the 
section of the draft Code entitled 'Monitoring communications', the OIC advises 
organisations to: 
'Make an impact assessment to determine what, if any, monitoring of 
electronic communications is justified by the benefits. Limit the scope of 
monitoring to what is strictly required to deliver those benefits. 84 
The Code proceeds to state that established methods of supervision should be 
considered prior to any monitoring. 
267 
12. Is email/internet use monitored automatically? 
Over half the 90 respondents (49,54.4%) stated that they monitored email and/or 
intemet usage automatically. Software products mentioned included: ]-gear; 
Mailsweeper; Surfcontrol; and Webtrends. Less than a third of respondents (28, 
3 1.1%) did not automatically monitor email and/or internet usage. 
Automatic monitoring of email and internet usage 
13 Yes 
MNo 
13 DK 
28 
13 
Figure 6: Respondents monitoring staff email and internet usage automatically. 
13. Is your organisation aware of: 
- Draft Code of Practice on the use of personal data in employerlemployee 
relationships; 
- Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR) -part of RIPA 2000; 
- HRA 1998? 
Figure 7 demonstrates that overall awareness was high - attributed to levels of 
training and the media coverage the above legislation and guidance have received. 
Nearly all respondents (104,97.2%) were conscious of the HRA 1998, and the 
overwhelming majority mindful of the draft code of practice (98,91.6%). 
Awareness concerning the LBPR was lower at 73 organisations (68.2%), but still 
impressive for a piece of secondary legislation. 
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Figure 7: Respondent awareness of legislation and official guidance. 
14. Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following 
statements: 
(i) The LBPR represent a positive measure for ensuring compliance 
and good practice; 
(ii) The DPA 1998 represents a positive measure for ensuring 
compliance and good practice; 
(iii) The HRA 1998 will have a considerable impact on our 
organisation's handling of personal data; 
Ov) Official guidance concerning the DPA 1998 has been clear and 
practical; 
(V) Official guidance concerning the HRA 1998 has been clear and 
practical. 
- Figure 8 overleaf shows results for 14 (i) and (fi): 
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The LBPR and DPA 1998 represent positive measures for ensuring 
compliance and good practice 
Disagee 
Level of agreement 
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Figure 8: Respondent views on the Lawful Business Practice Regulations and the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
Opinion on the LBPR was unclear, perhaps reflecting the lower level of awareness 
(refer question 13). The most popular response was 'don't know/no opinion' (50, 
46.7%), with a finiher 21 respondents (19.6%) neither agreeing nor disagreeing 
with the statement. Thus two thirds of respondents has no clear opinion 
concerning the LBPR. However, only 7 respondents (6.5%) disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement that the LBPR are a positive measure. This is in spite 
of some negative press coverage concerning this legislation, stating that the LBPR 
contributed to a confusing legal environment concerning monitoring of employee 
data85. 
Opinion concerning the impact of the DPA 1998, however, is more clear-cut. 
Most respondents strongly agreed or agreed (75,70.1%) that the DPA 1998 is a 
positive measure for ensuring compliance and good practice. Only 14 respondents 
(13.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this viewpoint. These findings were 
confirmed in the case study interviews. However, many case study organisations 
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- and expert interviewees - found the text of the Act 'convoluted' and generally 
poorly drafted. Thus, although practitioners generally agreed with the aim and 
intentions of the DPA 1998, there were problems with the drafting of the 
legislation and some of the official guidance - considered below. 
Figure 9 shows the results for question 14 (iii): 
The HRA 1998 will have a considerable impact on our organisation's 
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Figure 9: Respondent views concerning the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Opinion concerning the impact of the HRA 1998 on organisational personal data 
handling was not particularly strong. The most popular response was 'neither 
agree nor disagree' (36,33.6%), with an additional twelve (11.2%) stating 'don't 
know/no opinion'. Thus, more respondents (48,44.9%) had no clear opinion 
concerning the impact of the Act, than any stated view. This could reflect a lack 
of guidance on the HRA 1998, or perhaps the feeling - gained during case study 
interviews - that the HRA 1998 only applies to organisations in a rather distant, 
indistinct, way. 38 (35.5%) respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the HRA 
WHRA 
1998 
271 
1998 would have a considerable impact, whilst 21 (19.6%) disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement. 
Figure 10 below shows the results for both questions 14 (iv) and (v). Opinion 
concerning official guidance on the DPA 1998 was generally positive. 46 
respondents (43.0%) either agreed or strongly agreed that the official guidance has 
been clear and practical. However, a significant minority (28,26.2%) disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement. Case study interviewees revealed 
frustration in some quarters at varying interpretations given to issues surrounding 
this complex piece of legislation by official bodies such as the OIC. 
Official guidance on the DPA 1998 and the HRA 1998 has been clear and 
practical 
ODPA 1998 
0 HRA 1998 
V) 
z . 
11 
Level of agreement 
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Figure 10: Respondent views concerning official guidance on the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
Concerning the HRA 1998, the above chart demonstrates that responses were 
similar to those given in answer to question 14 (iii), reflecting the general 
vagueness - and perhaps lack of understanding - surrounding the statute. Again, 
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the most popular answer was 'neither agree nor disagree' (33,30.8%). Where 
opinion was given concerning official guidance on the HRA 1998, it was more 
negative than positive. 32 respondents (29.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed 
that the guidance had been clear and practical, whilst 24 respondents (22.4%) 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. 
15. Any further comments? 
Useful feedback was received concerning a wide range of issues brought up by the 
questionnaire. Most comments related to the DPA 1998, and official guidance by 
the OIC. However, there was input concerning records management, the likely 
impact of the HRA 1998 and whether employees were entitled to privacy in the 
workplace. For ease of reference, the following comments have been categorised 
by issues they relate to: 
Records manaizemen 
'As part of a wider organisation, we receive information from the relevant 
departments. We have been asked about records kept re public. Having 
received this questionnaire, I will certainly follow up the relevant legislation 
and familiarise myself. Thank you'; 
DPA 1998 and offlicialguidance 
'The move from implementation phase one to two of the DPA did not receive 
good advance publicity last month [October 2001] - much more should have 
been to alert/remind data controllers'; 
'The Act is very weak in that it does leave so much undefined, and therefore 
guidance needs to be stronger to fill the gap until case law becomes effective. 
To this end, there has been little or no government support and the 
Commissioner's information is very poor - the amateur website is an 
example. 
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'No-one has bothered to think it [the DPA 1998] through for its user, or the 
person who is data controller - and frankly the video is bigoted, sexist, 
portrays stereotypes and has little of use in the way of help'; 
'Areas of ambiguity exist in the draft Code relating to the DPA 1998. This is 
not helpful to employees responding to the legislation, or where deadlines are 
imposed'; 
'Official guidance [concerning the DPA 1998] not yet fully 
implemented/agreed. Would be nice to get firm decisions'; 
'The advice given by the Information Commission is good and practical. The 
problem is that the DPA itself is unclear and woolly'. 
Employee i2rivaa in the workplace 
'We do not believe that staff have the right of free use of communications 
equipment that they do not own or pay for. All staff are made aware of the 
situation. For the same sort of reason we do not allow staff to use office 
addresses as personal 'mail' addresses. Many staff use mobile (personal) 
phones for 'private' matters'; 
'I have strong views on privacy and human rights in the workplace, and I am 
opposed to bosses snooping on their workers'. 
HRA 1998 
'Impact [of HRA 1998] on organisation likely to be considerable. However, 
not our area of responsibility'; 
'Not involved to any high degree with the Human Rights Act'. 
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6.2.2 Conclusions 
The questionnaire survey provided a useful template, helping clarify issues and 
frame questions for the case study interviews. Additionally, it gave a useful 
indication of compliance with the DPA 1998. Almost all respondents to the 
survey had nominated members of staff with responsibility for data protection. 
Most had trained their employees in data protection issues, and had audited their 
holdings of personal information. Knowledge that these measures were in 
progress enabled further details to be elicited at case study level. Additionally, the 
reasons for slow development of policy-making in areas such as subject access 
requests - where only 32 organisations had formal policies regarding employee 
access to their own personal data - could be explored in further detail. In some 
respects, however, the questionnaire data belied the difficulties organisations were 
facing - for example, in the development of formal policies concerning staff use of 
email and the internet. Although 100 respondents (93.5%) claimed to have 
policies in this field, the reality at case study interview was different. Only half 
those interviewed had developed policies. The majority had encountered 
problems, with many interviewees highlighting frustration over delays in finalising 
relevant sections of the Employment Practices Data Protection Code - intended as 
the official guidance in this field - and confusion at its interface with the LBPR as 
reasons for lack of policy development. Many practitioners were waiting for 
strong case law in this field before acting, fearful of being caught in a legal 
quagmire. 
Awareness of the legislation and official guidance was generally high. Most 
respondents supported the intentions of the DPA 1998 as a positive measure for 
ensuring compliance and good practice. Nevertheless, comments in answer to 
question 15 revealed problems existed with the Act itself, which 'does leave so 
much undefined'. This led to a reliance on strong guidance from the OIC in 
particular, at least until case law had filled in many of the gaps. Opinion 
concerning official guidance was mixed. Many practitioners were clearly 
frustrated - some expressed this dissatisfaction in answer to question 15, others at 
case study interview. The case studies are analysed in the next Chapter. 
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7. Findin2s: case studies 
This Chapter presents a detailed analysis of findings from the case study 
interviews. The methodology behind the techniques chosen was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. 
7.1 Introduction 
The case study interviews were devised to assess compliance with the DPA 1998 
among public organisations. The intention of the interviews was to test ýypothesis 
1: 
At an organisational. level, the DPA 98 represents a positive measure 
for ensuring compliance and good practice. 
A common approach was taken to all organisations involved. The substantive 
background to the case studies analysed the nature of the organisations: in 
particular, their corporate structure and need to process personal data. 
Additionally, consideration was given to the population each public organisation 
served. The interviews explored questions raised by those affected by the 
legislation on a day-to-day basis. The emphasis was placed on detail, with clear 
examples given of any particular measures enacted to ensure protection of 
personal data. Attention was given to policy-making within the organisations, in 
particular how organisational processes were adapted in order to ensure 
compliance with obligations under the DPA 1998. For ease of reference, the 
phrase 'Data Protection Officer' ('DPO') is used to refer to the individual in the 
organisation responsible for data protection, irrespective of their actual job title. 
Unless otherwise stated, it was the DPOs who were interviewed in the case study 
organisations. 
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7.1.1 Nature of organisations studied 
A total of 18 public organisations, participated in the case studies, with one 
organisation withdrawing shortly before interview. They comprised: 12 local 
authorities; three universities; one health authority; one police authority; and one 
'other' -a central government educational organisation. Prior to interview, all 
participants - individuals and the organisations they worked for - were promised 
anonymity. This facilitated some frank discussions not only concerning the 
workability of the DPA 1998, but also the shortcomings in certain organisations. 
The functions and roles of the organisations varied considerably. The greatest 
number of interviewees came from local authorities. Local government in the UK 
is structured in two contrasting ways. In Scotland, Wales and parts of England, a 
single tier 'all purpose' council is responsible for all local authority functions. 
The 'all purpose' councils comprise unitary authorities', metropolitan authorities' 
and London boroughs. The remainder of England has a two-tier system, in which 
two separate councils divide responsibilities between county and district councils. 
The 12 local authorities interviewed, included: 
Eight single-tier councils: one unitary authority, five metropolitan councils 
and two London boroughs. They performed a wide range of local government 
functions including environmental health, housing, leisure, education and 
social services. The size of the single-tier councils varied widely - from a 
unitary authority serving a town and its surrounding area, to councils 
responsible for large cities. Within the eight councils, the number of 
employees ranged from 3 200 at the lowest end up to 15 000 at the largest 
Council. The population served in the eight councils varied between I 10 000 
and 320 000; 
Four two-tier councils: two county councils and two district councils. The 
county councils were responsible for providing services for the whole county, 
such as education, transport and social services. Both county councils visited 
employed a large number of staff (24 000 and 30 000) and served a 
populations of 650 000 and 750 000 respectively. The district councils were 
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smaller, exercising some autonomy in providing some local services such as 
housing and environmental health for a specific area within a county. The 
organisations visited employed 220 and 400 staff, and served populations of 
38 000 and 160 000 respectively. 
The data protection issues in such diverse organisations, offering a wide range of 
services, were immense. As one DPO stated: 
"Almost everything one does - in a local authority certainly - has got 
something to do with people. If you like, the Data Protection Act applies to 
everything you're doing. " 
One of the greatest barriers facing the DPOs interviewed was that information 
tended to be highly departmentalised, with each local authority department having 
their own subject access procedures, security standards and retention periods for 
records. Frequently, no comprehensive record existed of personal data held by the 
organisation. Thus, duplication of personal data was inevitable. This was of 
concern considering the highly sensitive nature of some of the personal data held 
by many authorities, especially records relating to social services and education. 
There was a need for centralised corporate standards. Development of corporate 
data protection policies and procedures was occurring in the case study 
organisations, but the rate of progress varied enormously. 
Other issues mentioned included: the time and resources involved in training large 
numbers of staff, sharing personal data with other agencies such as the Inland 
Revenue and the NHS; and the relationship between data protection and e- 
Government, with the latter promoting transparency and availability of 
information. 
The three participating universities comprised: 
An established research-orientated university, attracting students from around 
the world. This institution had 7 500 students - over half from overseas, and 
employed 2 000 academic and non-academic staff-, 
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A former college, and a founding member of a large university. This 
organisation had an intake of 7 000 students and employed 2 500 academic 
and non-academic staff-, 
A former polytechnic, now a vocational university. It attracted 18 500 
students and employed 1500 staff. 
A key issue cited by interviewees working in the universities was low level of 
interest shown in data protection by academics, with many absent from training 
sessions. The sensitive role of many academics as personal tutors made this an 
important concern. As in the local authorities, there was a fundamental need to 
embed data protection awareness into the corporate structure of the university. 
One DPO described his role as: "Getting everybody to understand: "Think data 
protection if data on individuals is involved. "" Additionally, concerns were 
expressed about the security of staff information with the publishing of staff email 
directories on the internet. Resources - an issue with almost all interviewees - 
appeared to be particularly lacking in the universities, with two of the three 
organisations interviewed not having a separate budget for data protection. 
The health authority interviewed employed 80 staff serving a population of 250 
000. Its role was to look after the public health of the community by providing 
and monitoring services such as general practitioners, ophthalmologists, dentists 
and pharmacists. In addition, the health authority held the patient information to 
which the GPs were linked, and was responsible for ensuring that all GPs had 
Information Management and Technology (IM&T 3) systems. In this particular 
health authority, the DPO's main difficulties concerned attitudes of colleagues - 
especially at board level: 
"Nobody sees [data protection] as a priority. The issue is that I cannot get 
knowledge improved because nobody sees it as important. " 
This indifference towards data protection hindered the work of the DPO, and 
distracted from pressing issues surrounding access to, and release of, sensitive 
personal data relating to data subjects' health. Although efforts have been made 
by the DPO to provide staff training, this had not been supported by staff, and 
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turnout had been poor. In addition, the DPO had received no support in creating 
policies, staff had abused the computerised patient information system, and no 
additional finance had been provided for data protection issues. At interview, the 
DPO was pressing for an internal audit on data protection: "until there's an audit, 
nobody's going to take us seriously". 
The police authority employed 3 500 staff, and was responsible for overseeing 
policing for a population of a little over one million. The key issues for the DPO 
concerned fair obtaining of information, ensuring personal data is used solely for 
its intended purpose, and security of what is often highly sensitive information. 
Difficulties encountered by the force DPO included the temptation for the police 
authority keep "forever" any data acquired, for example car registration plates 
captured by roadside cameras "... because that's intelligence, and that's good 
intelligence. " This was compounded by the motivation of officers wanting to 
generally "get around" the Act: 
"To me, it's not how you "get around" the Act, it's "how do we deal with the 
issue in order to comply with it? " That's an entirely different mindset in that 
context. " 
Additional difficulties experienced by the DPO included establishing retention 
periods for personal data that had previously been kept on manual records in order 
to avoid the provisions of the DPA 1984. Finally, the delays in the establishment 
of the Criminal Records Bureau had resulted in the police authority struggling 
with a large number of subject access requests (SARs). 
The final case study organisation interviewed differed in that it was global. The 
organisation employed 7 000 staff in 210 offices across 109 countries. 
Established by central government, its main purpose was twofold: to promote 
learning overseas; and to develop relations between overseas countries and the 
UK. The key issues mentioned by the DPO were data collection notices - 
informing data subjects of the purpose of data collection - and contracts with 
external suppliers or even governments: 
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"... who themselves wouldn't necessarily rccognisc data protection and 
humans rights as the main issues that they want to think about. " 
This ensured that one of the greatest difficulties faced by this organisation was 
overcoming overseas resistance as: "they don't see why UK legislation should 
have anything to do with them. " However, because this institution was 
constituted in the UK, the hierarchy had to ensure the offices abroad were totally 
compliant with the law. Coupled with this was gaining acknowledgement that 
data protection was a serious issue -a problem faced by most of the other, 
exclusively UK, case study organisations. Finally, there were the "ongoing" 
issues of resources and staffing - again, a typical concern for the case study 
bodies. 
7.1.2 Criteria for compliance 
The case study interviews were conducted from late February to May 2002. 
Based on desk research, and findings from the questionnaire survey and expert 
interviews, criteria for compliance were devised - divided into the following five 
categories: 
(i) Status of the data protection function in the organisation: are the DPOs in a 
position of influence? 
The position of the DPO in the organisational hierarchy was mentioned in much of 
the guidance issued by the OIC relating to data protection4. Moreover, the 
inclusion of this category is justified by recommendation 7 of the Performance and 
Innovation Unit's Privacy and data-sharing report, published in April 2002, 
halfway though the author's case study interviews: 
'All public sector organisations should have a named senior manager with 
clear responsibility for the handling of personal information5. [Author's 
italics]. 
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The word 'senior' reflected the importance central government is now attaching to 
the issue of data protection. The intention is to discover how far this had filtered 
down to organisational level. In addition to hierarchy, attention is given to: 
Available training for the postholder; 
Staffing and resources; 
Access to the executive; 
Influence on policy-making. 
Public awareness: informing those outside the organisation of their rights 
under the DPA 1998 at point of collection. 
As the authorities interviewed collected personal data directly from their clients 
and employees, it is important that the data subjects are made aware of their rights 
at the point of collection. Thus, the need to inform individuals about the way their 
personal data is handled and their rights under the DPA 1998. Specific criteria 
include: 
The drafting of a Fair Processing Code outlining individual rights and 
organisational responsibilities; 
Standard statements on forms requesting personal data; 
Training of frontline staff-, 
Production of leaflets and posters to inform data subjects. 
Finally, the attitude of the interviewees to this task is noted - in particular whether 
it is perceived as part of their public duty, or as an additional burden. 
(iii) Staffawareness and training. 
This category is clearly significant because without employees handling personal 
data being trained, organisations are unable to conduct their obligations under the 
DPA 1998. Criteria include: 
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Training methods adopted; 
The extent to which training matched the job descriptions of the employees; 
The establishment of a training culture, sustaining interest in data protection 
issues throughout the staff member's term of employment. 
Finally, some sector-specific difficulties are highlighted. 
Handling subject access requests (SARs). 
This is the key aspect of the DPA 1998 in allowing individuals to exercise their 
rights - verifying what is recorded about them and the basis of decisions taken. 
Specifically, this category sought to answer the question: how do organisations 
handle requests from both employees and clients for personal information? The 
relationship between employee and client - outlined in Chapter I- is particularly 
important in this context, as both are data subjects for the purposes of the DPA 
1998. Moreover, as employees will be handling data belonging to colleagues, it is 
vital that adequate security arrangements are in place. As security forms part of 
the organisation's policy-making, it is considered in greater detail in final category 
for compliance. 
In terms of handling of SARs, one key criterion is the existence and content of 
SAR procedures - in particular the extent to which SARs were documented. A 
further indicator is the volume of requests received - testing the procedures in 
place. Finally, consideration is given to whether organisations charged for SARs - 
employee or client - and the perceived effects of charging data subjects for access 
to their personal information. 
(V) Data protection policy. 
This category sought to answer the following four questions: 
Do organisations have an overarching policy? 
How effective is it? 
What guidance underpins the policy? 
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- How is policy evaluated? 
Policy is perceived as important for two reasons. Firstly, in stating the 
organisation's intention to comply with the DPA 1998. Secondly, in order to 
outline exactly how the organisation intends to comply with the Act. Particular 
attention is given to the security of personal data, with a number of interviewees in 
the process of integrating data protection into a more wide-ranging information 
security policy. Finally, this category considered use of employee personal data - 
particularly that gathered through monitoring of email and internet usage, as 
practitioners had expressed concerns in that regard during the questionnaire 
survey. In assessing this category of compliance, emphasis will be placed on the 
extent data protection had been 'built-in' to other organisational. policies - crucial 
in considering how far organisations were determined to develop a culture of 
compliance. 
The remainder of the Chapter will analyse how close organisations are to meeting 
the above criteria for compliance. Conclusions will then be drawn about the 
development of data protection policy in public organisations. 
7.2 Status of data protection function 
This section assesses the key changes to the post of DPO since 1998, the resources 
and staffing available, any specialist training provided for the DPO, and the 
location of the post within the organisational hierarchy. 
In almost all the case study organisations, the data protection function had been 
upgraded to some extent. Prior to 1998, data protection was generally a low status 
clerical post. It was an add-on to a job, usually located in information technology 
(IT) services, and with little or no budget. Often, the postholder merely processed 
registrations, "a post-box type situation". A degree of training was generally 
provided following the enactment of 1984 Act, yet it was allowed to lapse. Since 
1998, however, the data protection function has evolved into more of a managerial 
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post, sometimes with a specific budget. This process was ongoing at the time of 
interview. To quote a DPO in a large metropolitan council: 
"... it's more structured, more disciplined and more built-in to the way of 
working. At least it should be when we've finished. Whereas the old Act 
was tokenism! " 
Nevertheless, some DPOs were more pragmatic about their roles. One 
interviewee, based in a district council, described data protection as "important, 
but low priority": 
"... we don't want it [the DPA] to be seen as an obstacle that stops us doing 
the things we're being measured on. We are not being measured on 
compliance with the DPA. We are being measured on our e-Government 
agendas. " 
In this particular organisation, there had been a lack of support from higher up in 
the organisation. A previous manager had dismissed the DPA 1998 as "legislation 
which should have been put down at birtW', and the interviewee had been working 
with his current manager for approximately six weeks and data protection had yet 
to be discussed: "I suspect that speaks volumes really". Another DPO at a 
metropolitan council had experienced difficulties because she had only been in the 
post for three weeks and, as the post was graded below managerial, certain 
managers had not been listening or taking data protection seriously. However, this 
DPO did benefit from the support of her immediate line manager. Other 
interviewees had experienced similar difficulties in the immediate time following 
the enactment of 1998 Act. As status - and knowledge of data protection - had 
been so low under the 1984 Act, senior mangers would still not turn up for 
training. However, that attitude was beginning to change, and most DPOs stated 
that they were listened to by their senior managers. Finally, DPOs found that their 
role was being boosted by the impending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
2000. Indeed, many interviewees perceived FOIA 2000 as the key issue in their 
role requiring ftirther development. The majority had been given responsibility for 
ensuring their organisations were compliant with the new legislation, broadening 
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their task to a records management function - considering all aspects of 
information handling. To quote an interviewee in a county council: 
I think there's a need to pull everything together, particularly with the FOIA 
requirements, so that we have a central policy on retention allowing 
everybody that needs to, to know a particular type of record. " 
Within the case study organisations, the role of DPO was generally perceived as 
middle or senior management, often reporting directly to the Chief Executive or 
equivalent. Although the posts were not usually full-time data protection, they 
were permanent and combined with other related duties such as information 
security and freedom of information. One DPO from a county council saw 
ongoing training of all employees as more important than whether the post was 
categorised as 'data protection': 
"My fear with organisations that do have somebody who's labelled 'DPO' is 
that tends to be a cop-out. What then happens is that the whole organisation 
says: "Oh well, we don't need to worry about data protection because we've 
got a DPO", and that can actually be counter-productive. " 
The important tasks were raising awareness, training staff and establishing 
contacts throughout the organisation. However, the reverse of this was the 
experience of another county council that lacked an appointed DPO. That 
organisation was unusual in that they had an appointed DPO - albeit at a low level 
- prior to 1998, who had been allocated a small training budget. However, 
following the DPO's departure in 1997 the post was allowed to lapse, leaving the 
county council in the position of not having anyone dealing with data protection. 
At the time of interview, a personnel manager in Corporate Resources was 
spending less than 10% of his time on the issue. Nevertheless, the case for a new 
postholder was being discussed, and the interviewees felt it had to be managerial 
post, answerable to someone of some influence, for example Deputy Chief 
Executive. A job description and budget made available for new DPO - which 
had the support of Chief Executive - but it needed to be "brought up priority list". 
In some respects, this organisation had the advantage of starting with a clean slate. 
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The training, available staffing and resources, and location of the data protection 
function could be moulded to suit the particular data protection requirements of 
that organisation. The remainder of this section considers these three factors are 
considered in turn. 
7.2.1 Trainina 
Specialist training was generally provided for the DPOs, frequently resulting in a 
recognised qualification. Approximately one third of the interviewees had trained, 
or were in the process of training, for the Information Systems Examination Board 
(ISEB) certificate in data protection6. Part of the British Computer Society, the 
ISEB provides industry-recognised qualifications in various information systems 
related disciplines. The training is conducted by accredited training providers 
such as Masons solicitors. The syllabus comprises 40 hours of course work, 
including: 
The broad context of the DPA 1998, its origins and reasons for data protection 
legislation; 
The concepts and elements of the DPA 1998, for example, definitions, the 
principles, and exemptions; 
Case studies into how the Act works in practice; 
An overview of related legislation. 
As an interviewee in a metropolitan council, who was about to study for the 
qualification, reported: 
"It's becoming a profession now. It's not just a tag onto someone else's job". 
In local authorities, the majority of DPOs had been on external training courses, 
received funding to attend conferences and seminars, and many were members of 
the professional body, the National Association of Data Protection Officers 
(NADPO). In smaller organisations, external training was not so extensive, but 
funds were still available on request. Frequently, the DPOs would supplement 
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external training with membership of mailing lists such as JISCmail data 
protection discussion list, and their own reading. Generally, there was a very high 
level of awareness among DPOs of their training needs, and knowledge of how to 
pursue them. All had access to legal advice, although it was frequently a case of 
in-house lawyers approaching the DPOs for advice, rather than vice versa. 
Experience in case study organisations other than local authorities, was mixed. In 
the police authority, external training was available, with the DPO's assistant 
training for the ISEB certificate. However, the DPO himself had been denied 
training since 1998. This was in part due to his intention to retire, but mainly a 
consequence of "the issues and the strategy I've taken as an individual", which 
involved whistleblowing "within the correct channels ... but it doesn't make you at 
all popular". In the health authority, external training was available, but the 
expense of some of the courses available sometimes made it difficult for the DPO 
to justify. In the three universities, external courses were available and funded, 
although none of the interviewees had studied for qualifications such as the ISEB 
certificate. Finally, in the central government education organisation there were 
one-day courses available on data protection and freedom of information. 
Additionally, the DPO has access to outside law firms such as Bird and Bird and 
Masons. 
7.2.2 Staffing and resources 
The majority of DPOs had staffing support to some degree. This varied: from the 
creation of full-time posts of assistant DPOs in two metropolitan councils and the 
police authority; to temporary staff in other local authorities; to reliance on Data 
Protection Representatives (or Reps) in the majority of case study organisations. 
The data protection reps existed in almost all organisations. An add-on to their 
normal jobs, the Data Protection Reps were responsible for data protection within 
their particular departments. Their role was usually twofold: 
(i) Promote staff awareness of the DPA 1998 in their department; 
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Be the first point of contact regarding SARs, responsible for gathering 
information at ground level. 
The role in the SAR process is an important one, and will be discussed later in 
section 7.5 of this Chapter. 
However, data protection reps were not universal, nor were they judged to be 
completely successful. The Data Protection Rep situation had "lapsed" in the 
county council without a DPO. In the Police Authority, the DPO had let the reps 
"die" due to the difficulty in maintaining interest, coupled with the fact that 
responsibility data protection was being placed on people lower down in the 
organisation, who had less influence. Finally, one university interviewed did not 
have a system of reps established. 
In terms of resources, six of the 18 organisations allocated a specific budget for 
data protection, including four local authorities. This fund was used for training, 
publications and printing. Where the amount was disclosed, it ranged from ElO 
000 a year to a more paltry L75 a year. However, these figures are misleading as 
the latter amount related solely to the notification fee. At the time of interview 
(April 2002), the DPO in the latter organisation had, in the current financial year, 
"overspent by LIO 000, but that's yielded results". Just one university had a 
budget, of 0 000, to spend on training and printing, although legal advice was 
funded by the Registrar. The police and health authorities did not have allocated 
data protection budgets. However, the education body did have a fund to promote 
data protection. To quote the DPO: 
"It's quite high at the moment, because we're rolling out. But I don't know 
what it will be next year, and that will have to be negotiated. " 
In cases where there was not a dedicated data protection budget, further finance 
was often available if a strong enough case could be demonstrated. Indeed, a 
DPO in a county council declared himself "quite happy with the resourcing I gef ', 
whilst another interviewee based in a London borough stated: "I've never had any 
difficulty if I can prove that I need some money for my job. " 
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However, other organisations were less happy with their state of funding. An 
interviewee at another London borough stated that data protection "isn't as well 
resourced as it ought to be", and a DPO in a small district council complained 
about the lack of separate provision for data protection: 
"... any training we have comes out of our own Department budget, which I 
don't think is very fair. But there we are. " 
Nevertheless, these organisations were in a minority. 
7.2.3 Location of data protection function 
The diverse nature of the DPO role ensured that its placement in the organisational 
structure was highly problematic, and often the subject of much debate. This was 
particularly the case in the local authorities conducting wide-ranging functions. 
Under the DPA 1984, applicable to computerised records, the vast majority of 
organisations had placed the data protection function under IT. Following the 
enactment of the DPA 1998, with its implications for all information - manual and 
computerised - and ensuing concerns regarding the interface with FOIA 2000, 
many interviewees felt that location in IT was no longer appropriate. 
Within the II local authorities that had a nominated member of staff with 
responsibility for data protection, eight placed the DPO function within major 
policy-making department in the local authority. The name of such a department 
differed from council to council, variously referred to as 'Corporate Services', 
'Chief Executive's Department', 'Central Services' and 'Strategic Services'. 
Most interviewees believed the data protection function was best suited to this 
location, as it enabled the postholder to gain the necessary corporate overview 
required to strive for data protection compliance. Additionally, legal services and 
central IT services were often located within central corporate department, 
providing resources for the DPO to draw on. Furthermore, such a centralised 
location enabled DPOs to be kept "in the loop" regarding projects and systems. 
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Finally, there was a view that this location helPed give the DPO more authority. 
As a DPO in a unitary authority stated: 
"With DP placed in Corporate Services I don't get ignored like I did when I 
worked in IT in other authorities. If Corporate Services says it needs to be 
done it gets done! " 
IT and Finance - often the traditional location of DPOs - were perceived by most 
interviewees to be unsuitable as they were specialist areas. Only three of the II 
councils had the DPO function located within those departments. However, a few 
DPOs differed in opinion. A practitioner based in a metropolitan council elected - 
in spite of selling data protection as a corporate responsibility - to be located in 
ICT Services (part of the Finance Department) for "ease of implementation" as the 
infrastructure was already in place. The DPO found it easier to get his message 
across in the form of briefing papers, ICT newsletters and messages of the day, as 
well as establishing an Intranet website and having immediate technical support. 
For the interviewee, the Chief Executive's Department would have been "very 
lonely", whilst access to the Chief Executive was still guaranteed in ICT Services 
via the Chief Finance Officer. 
Data protection in two of the universities interviewed was located in Information 
or ICT Services. One DPO post was funded by the Registry, thus having links 
across the entire University network. The DPO postholder in the other university, 
however, was unhappy with his location in ICT as "data protection is about more 
than just computerised information". The third university had data protection 
located in Central Administration - with responsibility shared between the Deputy 
Registrar and the Records Manager. In the education organisation, data protection 
was located in Corporate IT. 
In the police authority, the location of the data protection post was unsettled. 
over a number of years, the function had moved from IT to Quality Services to, at 
the time of interview, the Professional Standards Unit. The DPO recognised that 
data protection "doesn't sit comfortably in any role within the organisation 
because its breadth and all the issues that arise from it". However, he stated there 
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were conflicts in locating the post in a Unit designed to assure the "professional 
integrity of the organisation - not to assure the professional standards of the 
organisation" [interviewee's emphasis]. The subtle difference between 
maintaining standards and merely integrity came "if you find something messy": 
"If you're maintaining merely the professional integrity, some of maintaining 
that can involve danger. " 
Whereas, if the police authority was upholding the professional standards of the 
organisation internally, the implication was that if "something messy" was found, 
it would be easier to blow the whistle. 
Another public authority experiencing difficulties with the location of the data 
protection function was the health authority. The DPO's official job title at that 
organisation was Caldicott Project Manager 7, with additional responsibility for 
data protection and BS 7799 - the British Standard for Information security 
management. The post was located in Information, "quite a poor relation" and a 
subsection of Finance: 
"I answer to a director, but I don't consider that my status is what it should 
be... I think I've done enough - when I look at other people earning the 
same as me, and what they turn out... Therefore the influence I have, 
because of the status I have, is dreadful. " 
As the interviewee's organisation lacked legal knowledge on data protection, the 
DPO turned to DPO's in other organisations, particularly the local council, for 
advice. The essential problem was lack of support from senior management or 
Directors. Each department in the organisation did have a Data Protection Rep, 
and a Working Group had been established. However, the people appointed in 
those positions, in spite of their best efforts, "aren't of status to influence". 
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7.3 Public awareness 
Most organisations interviewed were positive about their duty in raising 
awareness of those data subjects outside the organisation of their rights under the 
DPA 1998. This issue particularly affected local authorities collecting various 
personal data concerning council tax forms, applications for bus passes, 
membership of public libraries, housing tenancy details and so on. At the most 
basic level, nearly all local authorities included a standard statement on all forms 
requesting personal data, stating that under the DPA 1998, individuals had rights 
to access, correction and deletion. A few forms referred to data-sharing that may 
take place between departments and included contact details of the DPO. Most 
job application forms stated uses that personal data collected would be put to. 
A few organisations went fixther in raising public awareness. One metropolitan 
council had drafted a Fair Processing Code setting out how the council should 
obtain information from data subjects. Although use of intranet was popular to 
raise staff awareness of the DPA 1998, at the time of interview only four of the 
case study organisations had information concerning the Act on their internet 
websites. The organisations comprised two metropolitan councils and a 
university. The information published on the internet included details about 
subject access rights, contact details for the organisational DPO and a link to the 
OIC website. The university website additionally included downloads of SAR 
forms and the university's Data Protection Handbook, in addition to a statement 
concerning sensitive data. However, three further local authorities, at interview, 
stated their intention to transfer their data protection websites from internal 
intranets to the internet so most information could be accessed by the public. 
More traditional methods of raising public awareness at local authorities included 
training all front-line staff, and producing leaflets based on the OIC's Your right 
to information to be displayed at all council buildings. Universities incorporated 
data protection statements on student registration forms and distributed leaflets 
once a year during registration. One university went a little further, training 
student union officers in data protection. 
300 
However, two public organisations did not perceive their role as raising pU ic 
awareness. The view of a DPO in one metropolitan council was typical of this 
minority: 
"It's our job to comply with the DPA, not to make people aware of it - that's 
the Information Commissioner's responsibility. " 
A county council went further, justifying their attempts to avoid publicising rights 
of access stating: "if you try to generate questions, you generate work for 
yourselves". The county council was a "complex" organisation, and according to 
the interviewee, the question the council should be asking themselves when it 
came to publicising data subject rights was: "Is that what we actually want to do? " 
Those two organisations were the minority. Most believed that they had a public 
service duty to raise data protection awareness within the population, although a 
few stated that the OIC had the greater role in this respect, and that the dry nature 
of the subject of data protection made the task difficult. As one DPO in another 
county council confided about his topic: 
"There a lot of very interesting things of course but they're interesting to the 
likes of you and me. They're not terribly interesting to everyone else... " 
7.4 Staff awareness and traininp, 
Training and the consequent raised levels of awareness among staff are vital if 
public service organisations are going to be able to demonstrate compliance with 
the DPA 1998. Indications from case study organisations suggest that staff 
training was taken very seriously. Development of such training, however, was at 
various stages. At one end organisations were employing external consultants to 
research the data protection training requirements, whilst a few organisations had 
in place a highly organised Corporate training structure: centrally planned, tailored 
to the needs of employees at various levels in the organisation, and comprehensive 
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enough to demonstrate considerable efforts had been made in attempting 
compliance with the DPA 1998. 
7.4.1 Metbods 
As discovered in the questionnaire survey analysed in Chapter 6, most training in 
the case study organisations, was conducted in-house, on the initiative of the 
DPO8. The most popular format for introducing staff to the DPA 1998 was 
presentations by the DPO, enhanced by publication of more detailed information 
on the corporate intranet. Data protection training was gradually being built into 
the general induction process for new employees. A few organisations were 
considering software packages to enhance established training methods. Finally, 
the nature of training was evolving: from a diverse, department-driven approach, 
to a more centralised corporate approach - although the often convoluted 
processes of policy approval hindered progress in this respect. 
StaEpresentations 
Almost all DPOs had given presentations to the staff concerning the 1998 Act. 
This in-house training was viewed as the most effective means of reaching a large 
number of staff quickly and cheaply. The methods varied. In one metropolitan 
council, the individual departments identified their particular training needs, then 
reported back to the DPO. The DPO then conducted formal training sessions, 
which ranged from one hour's awareness to full-day's workshops. The workshops 
were aimed at departments such as Social Services and Education where there 
were sensitive data protection issues that required a specific type of awareness. In 
this authority, the minimum requirement was issuing leaflets for all staff outlining 
their responsibilities under the DPA 1998 and mounting posters on the council 
buildings. The DPO measured awareness through the number of hits on the data 
protection intranet website, "about fifty a week" and any queries received: 
"I'm getting about 30 emails a day. That includes JISCmail - but also quite a 
few data protection queries, advice and guidance there, plus all the telephone 
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calls. So awareness ... has proved to be highly escalated as the training 
initiatives are getting out. " 
In another metropolitan council, the DPO had trained 2 500 out of 14 500 staff, 
with some departments conducting their own training. The DPO's own training 
involved a two-hour presentation with slide shows and various "tall stories" 
designed to alleviate the dry subject matter. Additionally, newsletters were 
published to keep staff informed with latest developments as well as look in detail 
at one or two key data protection issues. The DPO in the health authority had 
enjoyed less success. Over a two-year period, the interviewee had conducted two 
sets of one-hour sessions, and expressed disillusionment that "hardly anybody 
turned up". The essential difficulty was lack of support from directors and senior 
management. However, the DPO felt that her brief had been fulfilled: 
"I've got enough evidence now to say: "These were provided, you failed to 
ensure that staff attended. "" 
This was an exception. Generally, DPOs in the case study organisations had the 
full support of those at executive level. 
Essentially, the trend was for short one or two hour presentations supplemented 
with more specialist training on demand. In local authorities, more specific 
service training was provided for departments such as Housing, Education and 
Social Services as they dealt with intimate details of people's lives and held the 
most personal data. A DPO in a unitary authority explained how data protection 
issues were handled in such circumstances. Joint training with staff from the 
affected departments addressed issues of confidentiality and pertinent policies. In 
Social Services departments, access to information can go back 40 years, with 
people often wishing to know their family background when they were fostered or 
adopted in order to find their biological parents. Such issues needed to be handled 
with extreme care. Often, a social worker was on hand to explain and sometimes 
counselling needed to be offered to the data subject. In such circumstances, a 
DPO could not just release the personal data to them as it could, in certain 
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scenarios, cause untold damage. In relevant departments, presentations by a social 
worker often formed part of the staff training. 
Intranet and video 
The use of the intranet was pervasive, supporting training in almost all 
organisations interviewed. Typically, a data protection intranet site would include 
contact details of the DPO, the main provisions of the Act, copies of any policies 
or guidance drafted by the DPO, a question and answer session for staff to test 
their data protection knowledge, and contact details for the OIC. 
Other methods of raising awareness included use of educational videos. This was 
less widespread, although three local authorities of varying sizes employed the 
OIC's public service video, Barry's Bad Data DayP, as a training tool. One 
metropolitan council posted a streamed version onto its intranet. A London 
Borough believed the video provided "a bit of levity", working well as staff could 
relate the office situation outlined to their own workplaces. However, one district 
council disagreed, believing that if staff did not know anything about the DPA 
1998 prior to viewing the video, it would "just pass them by". 
Induction 
At interview, case study organisations were beginning to include data protection 
training as part of the induction for new starters. Approximately two thirds of 
institutions interviewed either included data protection as part of the induction 
process, or were planning to do so in the near future. Typically, at induction, fresh 
employees would view a short presentation concerning the basic principles of data 
protection, receive leaflets and various guidance on how to avoid breaching the 
DPA 1998, and a few would view Barry's Bad Data Day. Generally, training at 
induction was perceived to be the ideal introduction to data protection. However, 
one DPO in a district council expressed concern about the timing of the induction 
training: 
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"I'm inclined to think that it's maybe too soon for them to absorb everything 
- data protection along with health and safety and everything else. We need 
to consider some refreshers because it seems to be something that soon 
becomes a dim and distant memory ... It's an almighty job trying to keep 
people interested. " 
Training packages 
In addition to providing data protection training on corporate intranet, some 
organisations were researching computerised training packages. The DPO at the 
police authority had previously considered a software package prior to 1998, but 
"wasn't impressed". However, he acknowledged the package had been improved 
since, and suspected "the force will buy one before too long". The DPO in a 
London Borough was considering computerised training "because I can't get in 
front of 8 500 people". Additionally data protection was built-in to computer 
training course modules at the police authority and certain local authorities. For 
example, a few organisations were incorporating training in software packages 
such as Microsoft Word and Excel with data protection training, in order to 
maintain levels of awareness and reinforce the "relevance of data protection to all 
aspects of information handling". This "integration" could be viewed as part of an 
overarching policy to filter data protection into organisations' standard corporate 
procedures. This is discussed fiu-ther in section 7.6.3 of this Chapter. 
7.4.2 Targeted-training 
Maintaining interest was a difficulty cited by many interviewees. Some 
organisations tried to sustain employee awareness by having more targeted data 
protection training. One of the best organised is this respect was a metropolitan 
authority, where training needs were divided into three groups: 
(i) Lower risk- 
This applied to employees not generally in contact with personal data (for 
example, parks and ground staff). They received a leaflet about the DPA 
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1998 once a year, and were visited by managers to ensure they were 
f 6reasonably confidenf 'about data protection; 
(ii) Average risk: 
This applied to general office staff, who came in routine contact with personal 
data. They received the guidance above plus intranet training. The intranet 
training involved an assessment resulting in a score out of one hundred. The 
test was repeated on an annual basis, thus continually enforcing the training; 
(iii) Management training: 
This was the most targeted training, aimed at managers and those working in 
fields involving processing of particularly sensitive data (for example, Social 
Services, Education, Housing, CCTV). This group receive all the instruction 
outlined above, plus training by an external firm of solicitors. 
Another metropolitan authority was considering a similar technique, researching 
computerised training packages also graded at three levels: executive; middle 
management; and front-line staff. However, a further metropolitan authority was 
looking at its training needs according to staff function. In this organisation, the 
DPO had conducted detailed briefings with the Data Protection Representatives on 
their role, identifying the key groups that needed training. Customised training 
was then produced that was "relevant to each group". At the same time, certain 
sections in the organisation could approach the DPO when they thought there was 
a significant data protection issue (for example processing CCTV footage). 
Some organisations, in particular those in the early stages of data protection 
compliance, used external consultants. One county council was devising a training 
plan as part of a consultancy making Best Value recommendations' 0 for the 
organisation. A district council used external consultants for two days' 
introductory training into data protection, and on the relationship between the 
DPA 1998, and HRA 1998 and FOIA 2000. Another district council employed the 
same consultants four times to take "morning and afternoon sessions with 40 to 50 
people at one time", and covering most staff. 
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Regarding the HRA 1998, practitioners appreciated the significance of the Act and 
most organisations had provided staff briefings. The views of one DPO, based in 
a metropolitan council, summed up the position of most interviewees: 
"We are aware that the HRA is there, and that it needs promoting. But it is 
not specific to my job. Data protection and freedom of information are more 
of a priority. " 
The key exception to this approach came from the police authority, who, due to 
the nature of their work, have prepared vigorously for the Act. Nationally, the 
police had audited existing practices, policies and procedures to identify breaches 
and potential breaches of Convention rights: 
"There's a great deal on nervousness in the police service on human rights 
because the HRA is now inclusive, rather than exclusive as in 'if it's not 
covered by the law, then you are free to please yourself'. It's a significant 
change for the police service - very significant. " 
The HRA 1998 was being implemented across the police authority, with a 
considerable amount of training underway. The interviewee thus found the HRA 
1998 "very useful" in bolstering his own work. 
7.4.3 Difficulties facing local authorities 
With their wide-ranging functions, local authorities in particular faced some 
difficult challenges when training in data protection. Social Services were 
mentioned in the previous section. Schools and councillors also posed difficulties, 
due to their legally ambiguous relationships with local authorities. Under the 
DPA 1998, schools are separate data controllers, responsible for their own 
notification procedures and legally liable for the data they process. However, 
many schools were not well versed in data protection issues, with DPOs observing 
that certain headmasters believed they had complete ownership of information 
held on record. Notwithstanding this, most local authority DPOs perceived it as 
307 
their duty - as the institution responsible for education provision - to provide basic 
training. One metropolitan authority found that writing to schools about the 
hazards of non-compliance most effective: 
"I wrote to them last February [2001] - the letter arrived on a Friday 
morning, and I had 80 phone calls by the Monday night. The phrase 'the 
headteacher's liable for a L5 000 fine' might have had something to do with 
it! " 
Most DPOs judged their role in relation to schools as one of advising and helping 
with their notifications and subject access requests. As there was sometimes a 
need for Social Services to liaise with schools, training on basic records 
management and access rights acquired huge importance. 
The legal position regarding the role of councillors is complex. Councillors can 
play three roles: 
A member of the council, for instance as a member of a committee. In this 
case, the councillor is not required to have his or her own data protection 
notification and is effectively in the same position as an employee; 
A representative of the residents of his or her ward, for instance, in pursuing 
complaints. In this case, they need to notify in their own right. Most local 
authorities, whilst accepting this, also accept the only reason they may be 
involved is because of their Council duties and therefore pay the annual fee 
and provide help and assistance in becoming notified; 
A representative a political party, particularly at election time. In this role, 
notification should be the party they represent. 
In spite of the legal complexity of data protection in this context, and of most 
councils' willingness to help, many councillors did not attend training courses. 
Particularly problematic were issues involving a conflict of interest, especially any 
use of personal data - for example, relating to individuals eligible for bus passes - 
for political purposes, as two DPOs in metropolitan councils have experienced: 
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"Basically having to tell elected members that they shouldn't be doing 
certain things, one has to treat it very diplomatically! " 
"It's been very difficult in the past to get elected members to take any 
notice. Under the new Act, it's much stronger. We're taking advantage 
now the elections are here, and the Members are going to have to have 
training. I've already written the guidelines. I didn't want them to have a 
huge raft of stuff -just the minimum they needed to know, and then where 
to come if they've got a problem. " 
One metropolitan authority at interview was taking legal advice concerning a 
councillor who asked in writing for personal data from a council survey, which he 
proposed to use for purposes other than those originally intended. When the 
interviewee refused, the councillor threatened court action. At the time of 
interview, the DPO had referred the case to the council's barristers. 
7.4.4 Towards compliance? 
Overall, most case study organisations interviewed were well-advanced with staff 
training. There were variations between the types of authorities, with local 
authorities and the police authority tending to be better resourced than universities 
or the health authority. However, a lot of progress regarding training depended on 
the status and personality of the DPOs. Most local authorities were well 
organised, although one county council was at the stage of awaiting 
recommendations from its consultants. The police authority was in full progress 
with induction training. Furthermore, data protection manuals had been published 
for all computer courses, and the DPO had promoted his role by issuing policies 
and encouraging staff feedback. However, training was not regularly reviewed 
and data protection considerations were not generally built-in to the IT 
procurement process -a situation noted by Grant when commenting on public 
authorities in general in Chapter 6. As the police authority DPO stated, legislative 
requirements: "need to be addressed from the beginning, not when the risk comes 
home to roost. " 
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At the health authority, the nature of the problems was similar, but the level was 
more severe. The DPO's attempt to generate staff interest through presentations 
had suffered due to poor turnout. However, a CD had been developed to guide 
staff through the requirements of Caldicott and data protection, and help the DPO 
cope with lack of time and resources. This initiative had largely been successful. 
In total, 2 000 CDs had been developed, and: "most have gone out. The issue now 
is - are people using them? "' 
Training in universities was on the initiative of the DPOs, who appeared more 
hampered by lack of resources than DPOs in local authorities. Those interviewed 
had trained the clerical staff through a combination of presentations and provision 
of handbooks. However, the lack of interest was shown among academics was a 
concern for DPOs at the three universities interviewed. Finally, training in the 
education organisation was at a similar stage of development to most of the local 
authorities. In their UK offices employing 1200, all but 90 employees have been 
instructed in data protection. The training has been conducted in-house by the 
DPO, an induction pack was "being worked on" and contact details for the DPO 
had been put on the intranet. In many ways this organisation is typical of 
development in most case study organisations. Basic training has been conducted, 
and a more structured approach was under development in order to achieve full 
compliance. 
7.5 Handling subiect access requests (SARs) 
Section 7 of the DPA 1998 provides that a data subject is entitled, upon written 
request, to be informed whether the data controller (the organisation) is processing 
personal data to which the individual is the data subject. A fee - in most cases 
subject to the statutory maximum of E1011 - can be charged by the data controller 
for this service, and the data controller has 40 days from receipt of the request to 
comply with it. The 40-day time limit does not start until the data controller has 
received the fee and/or has been supplied with sufficient information to enable 
compliance with the request. The right of access is the key right in the data 
310 
protection legislation, enabling individuals to request, and verify, information held 
by organisations concerning them. 
7.5.1 Procedures 
As this was such an important aspect of the DPA 1998, it was not surprising to 
discover that all but three case study organisations had developed well-defined 
procedures. Essentially, the process was: 
1. Individual would submit the subject access request (SAR) together with 
proof of identity and a fee if appropriate; 
2. This would be checked by the DPO. If the SAR contained sufficient 
information, the DPO write back to the individual informing them of the 40 
day time limit; 
3. DPO would send out standard letter to relevant departments asking for 
personal data. A deadline would be set; 
4. Data Protection Reps would gather the personal data, and report back to the 
DPO; 
5. DPO would perform the final checks: to verify, for example, that there was 
not any data relating to other people without their permission; 
6. Despatch personal data to data subject. 
The three organisations without working SAR procedures were a county council, a 
London borough and the health authority. In the two local authorities, procedures 
were "under developmenf" and expected to be in use within six to 12 months. In 
the health authority, the DPO admitted the procedures were "something I've got to 
start working on. " At the time of interview (April 2002), no action had been taken 
- due to lack of time and support. This was mitigated slightly by the fact that 
health authority did not generally receive SARs from the public. However, the 
DPO doubted that most staff in the organisation knew they could view their 
records: 
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"It's like data protection is not about them, it's about Joe Public, and when 
they're at the health authority, they're not Joe Public, so therefore data 
protection does not apply to them. But it does. " 
The lack of procedures enabling staff access to their personal data concerned the 
interviewee, especially in view of certain abuses of personal information that had 
occurred in the authority. The most serious breaches involved misuse of the 
computerised Patient Management System, with individuals looking up of details 
colleagues in hospital and, in one case, discovering that a colleague was pregnant. 
Such conduct left the DPO "waiting for the day that someone takes out a case -a 
member of staff against a member of staff'. 
A complication regarding SARs was establishing procedures for requests for 
CCTV images. With increased usage of such technology in town and city centres, 
this was of particular concern for local authorities. It was being addressed, but as 
a DPO in a metropolitan council stated, progress was slow: 
"It's been dealt with through the whole lengthy process of Committees, and 
agreements, and ratifying and rubber-stamping. " 
At the time of interview, requests for CCTV images had not been completely built 
into most authorities' standard SAR procedures. However, there were exceptions. 
For example, a small district council had drafted a specific form regarding CCTV 
requests, had liaised with the Crime Prevention Officer, and established a simple 
procedure whereby: 
1. Initial requests sent to the DPO, who logs them; 
2. The SARs then go to the police, who administer entire process; 
3. Police inform the DPO once the process was complete. 
At the time of interview, the council had not received a SAR relating to CCTV, 
but the DPO had ensured "all the documentation [was] in place. " 
312 
7.5.2 Volume of SARs 
The volume of SARs received was difficult to ascertain as the process was not 
always documented. At the time of interview, only a few case study organisations 
had introduced centralised documenting procedures. Most metropolitan councils 
centrally logged all SARs received on a database. This was partly to keep on top 
of procedures to ensure deadlines were not missed, in addition to demonstrating 
compliance with internal performance indicators. Moreover, it ensured that the 
organisation had evidence of action in case any SARs resulted in litigation. 
However, in other organisations the procedures were less rigorously monitored. 
One metropolitan council chose not to document SARs centrally. The DPO 
stated: 
"They are actually mostly received at Departmental level, and I haven't 
actually got figures for that. It works quite well, so I've not tried to change 
it. 119 
Processing the majority of SARs at departmental level ensured flexibility and 
speed in dealing with requests in targeted areas such as Social Services and 
Housing. A DPO at a London borough council took a less official approach to 
processing complex SARs centrally. Although formal and legally compliant 
procedures were posted on the corporate intranet, when receiving SARs the DPO 
preferred to have an "informal chaf 'with the data subject than follow through the 
official process with the accompanying red tape: 
"It's better than ending up being cut to pieces by sorting out the bits of 
paperwork. It's worked effectively for me like that, and I don't want to get 
forced down the route of a formal process. " 
All the interviewee required was for the departments to inform ffi his o ice when 
they had formal applications. This combination of "informal chat" and formal 
legal guidelines to refer to if necessary appeared to work very well, although its 
success was largely to due to the experience and personality of the DPO. The 
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total number of formal, centrally administered SARs - four received in the 
previous five months - was small enough for the DPO not to be overwhelmed with 
"informal chats" to the data subjects. 
Indeed, the number of formal SARs processed, where figures were available, was 
generally very few. In local authorities as a whole, the volume of SARs ranged 
from six since the DPA 1998 was implemented in March 2000 12 to another 
organisation receiving 18 in the previous calendar year 13 . The universities 
received fewer formal requests, with one institution having processed just the one 
formal SAR since the DPA 1998 came into being. Another university had 
received three SARs in the same time period - all staff grievances. In the final 
institution the DPO "heard a year ago we'd have 10 since 1984". Although 
uncertain whether or not that figure was accurate, it demonstrated that the volume 
of SARs had been very few indeed, even in institutions employing a large number 
of staff and serving a sizeable population. 
The education organisation had received 10 SARs in 2001. Those requests, like 
the universities, comprised "grievances, disciplinary issues" and a few who have 
requested information from the corporate database "out of curiosity". In the 
health authority, the number of SARs received was unknown, but was "likely to 
be very small". Indeed, the only organisation to receive a large number of SARs 
was the police authority. The overwhelming majority received by the police were 
for convictions history, which in 2001 totalled 2122. They were processed by the 
authority's Criminal Records Office, Subject Access Bureau. At the time of 
interview (April 2002), this task was due to be taken over by the Criminal Records 
Bureau (CRB), the establishment of which had been somewhat delayed". Once 
the CRB was fully active, the police authority's DPO will only be processing 
internal SARs from within the police authority's catchment area. However: 
"... the internal [SARs] are growing. I dealt with three or four yesterday, so 
we're probably now getting to the stage of receiving maybe 10 a week. " 
The internal requests can relate to sensitive criminal cases occurring within the 
police authority catchment area or to staff requesting information relating to police 
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exams after feeling they "were being unfairly passed over". Such internal SARs 
are processed by the DPO. 
7.5.3 CharRiniz for subject access 
Interviewees were divided on charging for subject access. 12 of the 18 public 
organisations interviewed did charge for SARs to some extent. Five chose not to, 
and one organisation -a county council - was "undecided". Those that did charge 
mainly believed it would be a useful deterrent against frivolous and/or malicious 
requests. As a DPO in a metropolitan council stated: 
"I use it very much as adding to a negotiating position: "If there is a specific 
piece of information you want, you can have it free of charge. Or, if you 
want the whole lot, we can do it for E 10. "" 
Others charged for administrative reasons. Another interviewee, based in a 
metropolitan council, stated that the fl. 0 charge was used as a "reference point' ', to 
avoid entering into debate with data subjects about when the 40-day period began: 
"It's not the money we're interested in, it's getting the procedures right - the 
point in time when we received it. " 
only one case study organisation, a university, stated that charging was used to 
"cover costs". Frequently, the local authorities that did charge made exceptions, 
for example, for Social Services records, due to their sensitive nature. Housing 
records were sometimes exempted from any fee because the data subjects were 
generally in dispute with the council and, to quote a DPO in a metropolitan 
council: "charging those on low incomes could be seen as putting a barrier in their 
way". 
The five organisations; that chose not to charge at all made their decision as 
charging would be: 
315 
Against the public service ethos of their organisation; 
Poor public relations; 
An administrative burden. One DPO in a small district council stated: "it'll 
cost us more to invoice, or whatever, to collect that E 10 ... it's pointless. " 
Regarding staff access to records, the approach of case study organisations was 
generally twofold. If an employee requested access to their personnel file, this 
would be granted free of charge. If employees request more detailed information 
- such as access to all emails making reference to them - which would involve 
more time and effort on the part of the organisation, then a formal SAR would 
have to be submitted, following the same procedures as all other data subjects. 
Most DPOs were keen to avoid the latter situation. To quote interviewee from a 
large metropolitan council: 
"We take the view that when [employees] get to the stage of submitting the 
SAR, it tends to suggest that something's failed somewhere... If our 
procedures are right, then it should never happen. " 
Where staff had submitted formal SARs, it was because they were in dispute with 
their employer, often concerning disciplinary matters or being overlooked for 
promotion. Such disputes were, in the words of a university DPO: 
64 ... ongoing issues where they thought by doing the SAR they would gain 
more information for their cause, if you like. " 
Staff SAR procedures did differ in the police authority. If a member of staff did 
not want to explain why they were submitting a request, they submitted a form 
and paid the police authority's standard flO fee. If they did not want to pay the 
fee, the individual would submit a report to the Force requesting the material and 
explaining the reasons for the request. 
The handling of SARs was taken seriously by the DPOs. The majority of case 
study organisations had written procedures in action, and those that did not were 
aware of their obligations to data subjects in this respect. Organisations' 
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willingness to follow their own SAR procedures varied, with some DPOs going by 
the letter of the law, whilst other practitioners were willing to be more flexible - 
ringing data subjects up at home in their own time to establish "what they really 
wanted". Both approaches had merit, and appeared to be successful. Most 
organisations charged for SARs, although many organisations made exemptions in 
sensitive cases, or with requests affecting people in lower income brackets. 
Whether charging acted as a deterrent to subject access is difficult to state, and 
was not part of the remit of the interviews. However, the low number of SARs 
received was surprising, with most case study organisations averaging one formal 
SAR a month. This did not include SARs dealt with internally by departments 
such as Social Services and Housing. The exception to this was the police 
authority, averaging almost 10 'internal' SARs a month. These comprised 
requests made by employees of the organisation regarding material the 
organisation processed about them. Out of the criteria measured so far in this 
Chapter, handling of SARs is perhaps where organisations demonstrated greatest 
compliance with the DPA 1998. The next section analyses how the criteria 
measured to date form part a coherent data protection policy for the organisation. 
7.6 Data Protection Policy 
Dictionary definitions refer to policy as the decisions that an organisation makes 
on the actions it should take. A written policy should describe the basic plan to 
achieve an agreed course of action. In the case study organisations, policy- 
making on data protection was frequently represented by two types of document: 
A short clear general statement of the organisation's intention to comply with 
the DPA 1998; 
Detailed procedures outlining how the organisation would achieve data 
protection compliance, in fields as diverse as housing policy and email 
monitoring. Often outlined with targets, and sometimes differing versions 
aimed at various levels of staff in the organisation. 
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Some organisations concentrated on the procedures, and did not have the 
statement of intention. A few were still at the drafting stage, and did not have any 
concrete data protection policies. Nevertheless, many had both the statement of 
intention and the detailed procedures. The former was generally a tool to 
demonstrate compliance, being aimed at the wider audience, including the public 
and OIC. The detailed procedures frequently took the form of a corporate manual, 
devised for internal use. This section investigates the influences behind - and then 
the contents of - data protection policy and procedures. It concludes with an 
assessment of the extent to which data protection has been built into the general 
policy-making processes of public organisations, and how the case study 
organisations evaluate the success of their policies in achieving compliance with 
the DPA 1998. 
7.6.1 Influences 
In the process of policy development, interviewees took advice from the OIC and 
their peers, with a considerable degree of cooperation occurring between 
organisations. In addition, professional bodies in IT, business and law were all 
consulted. This subsection reviews the key influences cited by interviewees when 
devising policy. 
Many organisations referred to the data protection supervisory authority, the OIC, 
for initial advice. Although little was provided in terms of model policies, many 
DPOs found the OIC's written guidance helpful. However, in the words of a DPO 
working in a large metropolitan council, some practitioners felt the OIC's policy 
advice tended "to be a bit over-detailed and over-prescriptive at times. " In an echo 
of concerns voiced by the CBI in Chapter 6, the draft Employment Practices Data 
Protection Code was highlighted as potentially "causing serious problems for 
employers". 
The main complaints from DPOs across all sectors interviewed were that the draft 
Code was "daunting", "over-complex" and "a personnel issue". Indeed, many 
practitioners had delegated interpretation of the Code to their personnel offices, 
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affording the document barely a "cursory glance". Additionally, there was a 
feeling that draft Code was something of a legal minefield, clashing on the issue of 
monitoring with RIPA 2000 and its Lawful Business Practice Regulations. The 
parts of the Code that had been finalised at the time of interview were generally 
perceived to be "better, but still far too long". Generally, practitioners were 
underwhelmed. In the view of the DPO in the education organisation: 
"At the moment, sometimes it's not terribly helpful, sometimes it's not 
terribly clear, and sometimes you think: "Well, we are already doing that 
anyway. 
Vrv) 
A minority of organisations were more positive. A DPO working in county 
council found the draft Code to be "excellent": 
"I actually use it as though it was not a draft, and I've based guidance on it 
because I think it's reasonable, it's sensible and it strikes a nice middle of the 
road balance. " 
Another DPO in a metropolitan council concurred and was in the process of 
"championing" the document - building it into his organisation's data protection 
code of practice and into general human resource strategies. Although a minority 
of DPOs used it as a foundation for policy-making, most did not - being deterred 
by its length, wide scope and complexity. In many cases, it appeared to be unread, 
certainly by those working in data protection. This defeated the OIC's stated 
objective in drafting the Code "as a reference documenf'. In this respect, the OIC 
had trouble in determining its audience. 
Nevertheless, other OIC publications were praised. One of the most frequently 
mentioned by DPOs was the OIC's Legal Guidance15. Intended by the 
supervisory authority as a reference document for data controllers and advisors, 
the Guidance provided a broad guide to the DPA 1998 as a whole. It outlined the 
OIC's view as to how many of the provisions in the Act should be interpreted, and 
included definitions of terms such as 'personal data', 'processing' and 'data 
controller'. One DPO, working in a metropolitan council, referred to the 
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Guidance as his "bible" - using it as a basis to answer any queries. That way, if 
the wrong advice happened to be given: 
,6 you've made your best efforts and you've used the most official guidance 
you can - you can claim extremely mitigating circumstances! " 
In the main, the OIC was consulted more to answer specific questions, rather than 
to assist in devising policy documents. Moreover, the OIC faced the practical 
difficulties encountered by a publicly funded watchdog, being expected to police a 
complex piece of legislation on limited resources. Particularly problematic was 
the exodus of highly trained but poorly paid staff at all levels to financially more 
rewarding posts in other sectors. During the author's visit to the OIC office in 
Wilmslow, the interviewee stated that it was not uncommon for skilled 
Compliance Officers to more than double their existing wage by taking up 
positions in industry16. Whilst it is unlikely that OIC salaries will ever compete 
with the private sector, it was surprising to find many experienced data protection 
professionals in Wilmslow earning sometimes significantly less than their 
counterparts in local government17. 
When actually drafting documentation, the vast majority of interviewees liaised 
with their peers. In this respect, a few interviewees believed the OIC could make 
a contribution - acting, in the words of a metropolitan authority DPO, as a 
"facilitatoe' between public organisations from different sectors. The sharing of 
knowledge was particularly strong among DPOs in local authorities, most of 
whom were members of the National Association of Data Protection Officers 
(NADPO), a non-profit organisation aimed at promoting the role of public sector 
DPOs. NADPO is structured into a number of regional groups. During 
interviews, the West Midlands 18 and London groups appeared particularly active. 
In the West Midlands, five metropolitan councils created and adopted a joint Data 
Protection Code of Practice 19 , discussed in section 7.6.2 below. Two of the case 
study organisations interviewed were part of the West Midlands group, and 
interviewees outside of the region had approached the group members for advice. 
The London group - which included one interviewee as a member - had consulted 
with Masons' solicitors with a view to providing an online 'information law 
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service'. This service would be subscription-based and, according to a London 
borough DPO, provide information concerning "policies, protocols, standards, 
layouts, documents", plus general computer-based training. 
Some of the interviewees from an IT background were members of the Society of 
Information Technology Management (SOCITM). A professional association for 
ICT managers working in and for the public sector, SOCITM had a membership 
that included 90% of all UK local authorities2o. SOCITM formed a data 
protection group to provide a forum for members with an interest in the 
implications of data protection legislation on ICT, with the aim of producing 
guidance for all members. Three of the DPOs interviewed were members of 
SOCITM. 
Finally, some local authority DPOs drew on the Improvement and Development 
Agency (IDeA) for policy advice. Established by local government to 'deliver 
practical solutions to improve local government performance', IDeA enables 
councils and their employees to create, pool and exchange learning resources on 
various topics including data protection and freedom of information. 
Additionally, the Agency's website has downloads of various draft guides and 
forms, for example, concerning the implications of the DPA 1998 for 
councillors 21 . 
In the further and higher education sector, the Joint Information Systems 
Committee (JISC) is a major forum for exchanging ideas. JISC's role is promote 
application and use of information systems and information technology in further 
education and higher education across the UK. Two of the three university DPOs 
interviewed had referred to JISC Data Protection Code of Practice, which JISC 
2 had produced with Hull University' . JISC hosts the JISCmail data protection 
discussion list, enabling practitioners and researchers in the field to share 
information. As a DPO in a university remarked: 
"I certainly view [JISCmail] as the next level down from the OIC, because 
you can go there and a lot of people have had the same problems and you can 
see what they did. " 
321 
In the police authority, the DPO used the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO), the professional body for the UK's most senior police officers 23 . ACPO 
had also produced a draft code of practice on data protection, referred to the OIC 
for consultation in November 200 124. 
Additionally, interviewees drew on organisations removed from the sectors they 
were employed in for data protection advice. The British Standard Institute (BSI) 
was mentioned by the majority of DPOs. In conjunction with experts and the 
OIC, the BSI has produced the Guides to the Data Protection Act 1998 
)25, to (PDO012 which a number of case study organisations had subscribed. The 
Guides advise organisations, on how to ensure compliance with the DPA 1998 
when managing their information processing operations. The first Guide 
concerned the practical implementation of the DPA 1998 26 , and others 
have 
covered specific fields such as sub ect access, email policies and manual data. To 
date (January 2003), nine Guides have been produced, with a tenth Data 
Protection and Information Securitýý7 due later in 2003. Five of DPOs 
interviewed made reference to the generic Guide on practical implementation of 
the Act, when devising policy. In the words of a DPO in a small district council: 
I thought it was good actually. It helped to get me going, to be honest, to 
develop the policy. " 
In addition to the BSI, case study organisations referred to the National 
Computing Centre (NCC)28 , an independent membership and research 
organisation aiming to promote more effective use of information technology. 
Membership included both public and private sectors. One large metropolitan 
authority based their data protection policy on the NCC's recommended 
guidelines 29 . Another reference source was the Encyclopedia ofData Protection3o 
-a loose-leaf publication bringing together relevant legislation, decisions and 
codes of practice. The Encyclopedia is updated twice a year to keep subscribers 
informed of latest developments. The DPO based in the police force found it 
particularly authoritative. Finally, many organisations had consulted law firms for 
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policy advice, as well as training. The most frequently mentioned were Masons 31 
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and Bird and Bird 
7.6.2 Policy development 
This subsection analyses policy development in the case study organisations. For 
ease of reference, each 'type' of authority is considered in turn: local authorities; 
universities; the health authority; the police authority; and the education body. 
Local authorities 
All but two local authorities interviewed had defined policies and procedures in 
place. The majority of the councils had short policies of one or two sides of A4, 
supported by detailed guidelines. A metropolitan council had a general statement 
of intention as an overview. The interviewee stated its aim as simply: 
66safeguarding personal data. We are custodians of personal data. That is the 
angle we are coming from. We're expected to treat it in an appropriate 
manner. " 
This was supplemented - as in another case study organisation - by the West 
Midlands group's Data Protection Code of Practice as a framework. This 160 
page document concerned shared best practice between the five large West 
Midlands councils, and stated its purpose as helping 'the Council 03 Comply with 
the Data Protection Act 1998.934 A collection of 'guidelines and procedures for 
employees of the Council', it guides employees through the terminology of the 
Act, the eight data protection principles and their relationship to data handling 
procedures in the Council and exemptions. Particularly useful for employees is 
section 9: 'other relevant legislation and links'. This section details issues 
surrounding the internet, direct marketing, HRA 1998, RIPA 2000 and e- 
government. This was particularly relevant in ensuring privacy was respected 
when employee email and internet usage was being monitored. Section 10 - 
(commonly asked questions' - is also extremely useful for the novice, and is 
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probably the first section many employees would refer to. Finally, detailed 
procedures are outlined in the appendices. The appendices include procedures on: 
Contracts with data processors; 
SARs; 
Information from third parties; 
SARs, via third parties; 
Requests to stop processing information; 
Requests to stop automated decision making. 
Additionally, the appendices outline specific Council contracts and a number of 
case studies taken directly from the OIC's website. All in all, this was the most 
impressive and up to date policy document that had been drafted by the case study 
organisations. Indeed, the West Midlands group's Data Protection Code of 
Practice included something for all local authorities. 
Other councils had variations on this approach. Another metropolitan authority 
had developed a handbook Data Protection: guidelines and procedures, which 
had been used as evidence to the OIC following a complaint against the Council 
by a data subject. The document's purpose was to provide 'guidelines to assist in 
the implementation of [the Council's] data protection policy'. The guidelines 
were not exhaustive, but provided a framework under which the Council would 
conduct its normal activities, so that the DPA 1998 was complied with fully. The 
policy was returned by OIC with only a few minor corrections, leading the DPO to 
conclude: "if you like, it has got the approval of Commission. " 
A county council chose a different approach, developing a well-structured, four- 
tiered policy that integrated data protection into a policy concerning 'information 
security': 
I- Information Security Policy 
o This involved short guidance aimed at top level - mainly directors and 
senior management. It set out the minimum acceptable level of 
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information security management and the primary responsibilities for 
information security in the Council. 
2. Information Security Manual 
Based on the standard BS 7799, the Manual provided a guide for IT 
practitioners, and could be used as a basis for internal policy or 
guidance; 
A substantial document, the Manual was constantly revised and 
updated to reflect changing technology, legislation and official 
guidance. 
3(a) Supplementary Guidance 
- Specialist papers, for example on Internet use monitoring and Private 
email, published where specific issues required additional guidance. 
This also included guidance to personnel for handling employee 
personal data, and ensuring access to such information was strictly 
limited; 
- Mainly aimed at IT practitioners and managers, but could be of use to 
other employees seeking information on specific issues concerning 
information security. 
3(b) Departmental Information Security Guidelines 
- Expanded for Departmental needs, for example Social Care and 
Education; 
- Apply to all Departmental employees. 
4. The Use ofComputers and the Law 
-A booklet aimed at new starters, forming part of their basic induction 
training. 
This was an impressive example of how policy-making had been tailored to the 
needs of the all employees and Departments in the organisation. Data protection 
was included as one of the 10 'Key controls' in the overarching Information 
Security Policy, under the heading 'Data protection legislation must be obeyed'. 
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Additionally, it demonstrated how data protection considerations were one of 
many concerning IT security, included in the Manual under a section concerning 
compliance with legal requirements. However, data protection considerations 
permeated other sections in the Manual such as 'Physical and Environmental 
Security', 'Access Control', and 'Monitoring System Access and Use'. Finally, 
this organisation had a dedicated Data Protection Group producing various 
Supplementary Guidance and Departmental Information Security Guidelines for 
departments such as Social Care, which "is workable because they have a different 
set of problems and circumstances than anybody else. " 
A final example of detailed policy came from a large metropolitan council. This 
organisation was slightly unusual in that prior to September 2001, the council did 
not have a corporate policy concerning data protection. Nevertheless, in the six 
months prior to interview (March 2002), the Council had drafted a Statement of 
data protection policy -a general statement of intention about two sides of A4 in 
length. The Statement specifies the Council's commitment to upholding the data 
protection principles plus its intention to ensure the following: 
There is a nominated person with specific responsibility for data 
protection; 
All those processing personal data are trained to do so; 
Information is provided so that people can make enquiries about 
handling personal data; 
The management of personal data is regularly audited. 
This list is not exhaustive, but gives an insight into the main features of a typical 
data protection statement. Supporting this Statement were procedures concerning 
aspects of the DPA 1998 such as subject access requests, accessing third party 
information and deleting personal data. The procedures, set out in a manual, were 
similar to those outlined in West Midlands Data Protection Forum Data 
Protection Code ofPractice. 
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However, a few DPOs were keen to state that detailed policies do not determine 
data protection compliance. To quote a DPO from a unitary authority that did 
have a corporate data protection policy: 
"My view is that policies are not the drivers. You can have as many policies 
as you like but people don't read them as they don't have time... It's the day 
to day practical issues in dealing with access to information which keeps data 
protection in the limelight. " 
This is a reminder that it is not what is on paper, but what is happening on the 
ground that is important. In the words of the aforementioned interviewee, DPOs 
in local authorities ensured compliance by: "constant reminders and getting [ ... ]a 
high profile". Personal contacts were developed, procedures questioned and the 
support of senior management - preferably at a Corporate level - was sought. 
Networking was the key, and many colleagues in local authorities did not mind 
interference from the DPO - as prior knowledge of data protection was low, and 
any assistance drafting policies and procedures was largely welcomed. 
Only two local authorities had not, at the time of interview, established policies 
and procedures for data protection. One, a county council, lacked a central policy 
concerning the DPA 1998, but acknowledged there was a need to show "where 
we're standing as an organisation7. The interviewees perceived the aim of their 
data protection policy to: "set the standards of the organisation ... and its 
intentions in terms of compliance with the Act. " Overall, it would be a short "one 
or two page documenf'. At the time of interview, the DPO was "actually working 
on thaf'. 
The second local authority, a London borough - lacking an explicit policy - 
intended "to comply with the Data Protection Act as [ ... I with any other 
legislation". At the time of interview (April 2002), "policy was a bit on the hoof', 
but recommendations were expected from a strategic review into 
"communications, information and marketing", due to report in June 2002. This 
strategic review was looking to: "consolidate the information management role - 
looking at both DP and FOI - and make recommendations... ". At interview, a 
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Data Protection Working Group had been established to "consider' issues as they 
are raised", for example monitoring in the wake of RIPA 2000. Yet, an 
overarching policy - setting out intentions and procedures for dealing with data 
protection issues on a daily basis - was clearly absent. 
Universities 
Policy-making at the universities interviewed was impressive, especially given the 
resource constraints discussed in section 7.2. This was largely due to the 
persistence of the DPOs interviewed. Two universities had published detailed 
Data Protection Handbooks, both of which included the institution's data 
protection policy. The policies differed slightly. The basic aim of the policy of 
one university, in the words of the DPO, "to inform7% 
"It's informing the staff and the students, and any other data subject, of what 
we're doing with the data; and how they can gain access to it; and giving 
some guidance as well to academic staff, especially, with things like 
examination marks etc. " 
Essentially, the policy is an introduction to the scope and provisions of the DPA 
1998, and how they impact on the university. It concludes with the contact details 
of the DPO. It extends beyond a short statement of intention regarding 
compliance with the DPA 1998, without being over-long. This statement was 
devised by the University's Data Protection Working Group, although the onus 
was on the DPO to update it yearly as she saw fit. 
The aim of the second university's policy was to state its intention to comply with 
the DPA 1998. Further, the policy stated that the university: 
"will seek to ensure that the rights of all data subjects for which it has 
responsibility are observed and that these rights are made explicit. " 
[Author's emphasis] 
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This was in contrast to a few of the Councils interviewed, whose DPOs expressed 
reluctance at publicising data subject access rights was discussed in section 7.3. 
The third and final paragraph of the policy statement outlined the responsibilities 
within the university hierarchy for ensuring compliance with the legislation. The 
scope and provisions of the DPA 1998 are dealt with in a separate section of the 
Handbook. Tbus, two institutions in the same sector had differing but equally 
effective policy statements. As with the previous university, this institution's 
statement and Handbook were devised by the DPO. Other departments in that 
university were consulted when the policy was drafted, and a Data Protection 
Working Group had been established but "meetings were difficult" as data 
protection had not been viewed as a priority. 
The Handbooks of both universities were comprehensive, covering both generic 
issues - such as SARs and archiving - and education-orientated concerns, for 
example, examination marks, references and research data. In the Handbook of 
the second institution, additional consideration was given to student debt, CCTV 
and storage media, and careers and counselling services. Both publications had 
appendices attached, concerning model application forms for SARs, and in the 
case of the latter university, notice of student debts held and notice of staff data 
held. In contrasting ways, both Handbooks represent model guidance for higher 
education institutions. 
The policy of the final university was a little more basic. The institution had 
recently drafted a new policy, although an older version was displayed on its 
website. The new policy was: 
"... just a brief thing - minimal compliance: "We will do what we need to do; 
we have a DPO", and that's about it really. " 
Staff attention had been drawn to it via circulars, and it was intended to be posted 
on the university website for wider coverage. It, too, was developed by the DPO 
in consultation with a Data Protection Working Group. However, at the time of 
interview, interest in data protection had "fizzled out", and the Working Group 
had not met for over 18 months. 
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Other case stuA or-ganisations 
In the remaining case study organisations, progress had been mixed. The health 
authority did not have a policy but were "hoping to develop one". The DPO was 
fully aware of the need for a general policy for data protection, and another policy 
concerning information security - hugely important in an organisation processing 
sensitive patient data. At the time of interview (April 2002), the DPO was seeking 
advice on how to draft such a policy, which would be written by the DPO and 
commented on by the authority's Data Protection Working Group and 
departments. 
The police authority did have a data protection policy in the Force's Data 
Protection Manual contained the Manual's two generic chapters. However, the 
DPO was moving towards a code of practice approach, with codes for each 
system. For example, in relation to the CCTV systems this would be a code 
which: 
"incorporates the Police and Criminal Evidence Act requirements, data 
protection requirements, police covert surveillance requirements, and so on". 
In some ways this integrated approach, putting the systems first mirrored the 
'information security' approach of the county council highlighted in earlier in this 
section. In the police authority, the onus in producing the codes of practice was 
placed on those working at the front-line. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, 
those people would have the most intimate knowledge of the system. This would 
allow the DPO to deliberately relegate himself to a consultancy role. Secondly, it 
would ensure a more pro-active approach to data protection by those who actually 
used the systems: 
"That's been successful, because the codes of practice when they've 
eventually been completed - and it's a matter of hand-holding, and giving 
them some models - they've been quite good. " 
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Previously, when the DPO had produced guidance and passed it down to the 
nominated officers: "They had returned it saying: 'Yes, it's OK', whether it was or 
not". By having actual input into the codes, such officers were forced to be more 
critical. The police authority did not have a data protection policy group as such, 
but there was a group of practitioners: 
"... who meet and assist in determining the codes of practice: the operating 
rules; the issues relating to that system etc. That should feed through to a 
nominated officer with overall responsibility for the system. " 
However, the effectiveness of those groups and that structure really depended "on 
the interest of that nominated officer. " Policies are generally reviewed "between 
two and five years, except for those that are moving quite rapidly at the time". 
For example, the policy concerning emails had been reviewed three times in the 
previous six months. Fundamentally, the police authority had an impressive, 
structured system for policy-making which involved considerable, critical 
participation by those with the greatest involvement in the systems affected. 
Finally, the education organisation had a straightforward policy agreed by its 
Director-General. The policy - like most in this Chapter - was a statement of 
intention underpinned by standards, subject to a peer review process every three 
years. There was not a specific data protection group, but a senior management 
group - the Electronic Services Committee - that considers data protection as part 
of its general interest "in the whole of IM 
7.6.3 Data protection 'built-in? 
As the analysis in the previous section demonstrates, data protection is 
increasingly being 'built-in' as part of an organisation's general information 
strategy. An interviewee at a unitary authority stated that data protection "gets a 
mention in departmental information strategies", whilst a metropolitan council 
DPO stated: 
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"All Council policies I've been able to get my fingers on have been updated 
to include standards relating to DP, so staff are aware there are issues. " 
Such policies included loans, recruitment and selection, housing and social 
services. Development of data protection as standard procedure was notable in the 
universities where, in words of one DPO, there had been "considerable progress" 
with graduation and alumni data. Typical measures included opt-outs from 
publishing names during graduation and using ID numbers instead of names when 
displaying graduation data on notice boards. Progress had also been made in 
publishing email addresses of staff on Internet directories, with an opt-out from 
the directory being proposed. Areas for ftirther development in one university 
included the use of sensitive data for research, with progress to be made before all 
data is anonymised whilst being processed. In the words of a university DPO: 
"Considerable improvements have been made in building-in data protection, 
but it remains a slow, painful process". 
The police authority's code of practice approach was successfully integrating data 
protection into the Force's many systems, whilst the health authority 
acknowledged the need for a "proper records management strategy" incorporating 
the requirements of the DPA 1998, Caldicott and information security. Progress 
had been made in the health authority towards BS 7799 - the standard for 
information security that several case study organisations, were working towards. 
Other difficulties mentioned were inserting data protection clauses in contracts 
with data processors, often conducting specific duties for the organisations. 
Further problems concerned schools displaying photographs on the internet 
without permission of the data subject. This could be sensitive if, for example, the 
child is in hiding from a violent parent. One metropolitan authority interviewed 
amended its procedures to inform parents when promotional photographs were 
being taken. This was in order to give them the chance of opting out. Finally, in a 
London borough a DPO blamed internal politics - "power and control of your own 
ends in Departmente' - for hindering development of an integrated data protection 
policy. However, change was underway, with the DPO gaining centralised 
332 
control of the all Council's forms over the intranet. This will enable the 
interviewee to "find out all the ones that haven't got the data protection stuffl. " As 
a whole, analysis of the case study interviews suggested that data protection was 
becoming a standard part of forms, reports and contracts along with financial and 
environmental concerns. Data protection was thus becoming part of standard 
procedure. 
7.6.4 Evaluation 
To ensure that data protection policies extend ftirther than statements of intention, 
rigorous evaluation procedures are vital. In almost two-thirds of the organisations 
interviewed, some form of monitoring and review process was underway. 
Auditing - internal and external - proved the common method of measuring 
compliance. A DPO in a metropolitan council conducted occasional audits of 
Departments, usually by invitation and just to check, for example, that contact lists 
are locked away at night. A small district council had been audited for data 
protection by a private company of accountants - highlighting issues such as 
having a clear desk policy, established retention periods for data and telephone 
email and internet usage policies. Another metropolitan council was unique 
among the case study organisations interviewed, in that they subjected their 
procedures to a voluntary 'health check' by the District Auditor. This was 
perceived as an objective way of measuring data protection performance according 
to specific and detailed criteria, such as the handling of SARs. A score was given 
to each criterion, resulting in an overall percentage which could be compared wiýh 
other local authorities. At the time of interview, two such 'health checks' had 
been conducted - the first in September 2001; the second in February 2002. The 
interviewee concluded: 
"In nearly, if not all, areas we've above average. We've made significant 
improvements on where we were in most areas. As a percentage, we went 
from something like 54% to 73%. We've got all the procedures, the policies 
and everything else in place. " 
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This appeared to be an objective method of measuring procedures on the ground, 
which determine the success of compliance. It was perhaps surprising that this 
form of evaluation was only being applied by one of the 12 local authorities 
interviewed. 
The most advanced organisations, reviewed data protection policies at set intervals. 
In one metropolitan authority, policy was reviewed on an annual basis, "to ensure 
it meets requiremente': 
"It comes down to data protection compliance across the Council. Staff 
training is a way of ensuring compliance. Monitoring incidents and 
complaints in relation to data protection, and identifying the issues that come 
out of those. " 
In a county council, policy was reviewed by the DPO "continuously, when the 
need arises", but in any event annually "just to make sure". Furthermore, for any 
guidance and policies published on the internet, the Council were in the process of 
constructing their own metadata for all webpages 35 . Included in the metadata was 
the ownership and the review data, which cannot be set more than one year in 
advance: 
"All of these things will be published in that way, so that they've got to 
physically enforce the review date... Those papers will be checked 
through. They can just be left: "We've reviewed them, we're happy with 
them, we don't want to make any changes", and put the review date back 
for another year. Which is OK. " 
other organisations, were less sophisticated. A few admitted that not enough work 
had been done to warrant full-scale audits. At the time of interview, one DPO 
based in a district council stated: 
"I go around with my ears and eyes open, and when I hear or see something 
I'm not comfortable with, I try to act on it. " 
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At a unitary authority the DPO sent out constant reminders and ensured the post 
was given a high profile. An interviewee in a university was more damning. 
Although an audit was in progress, it had been delayed by a year and there was 
still "a need for a database of the records they possessed and where they were 
being held". 
In most case study organisations, evaluation of data protection compliance at 
some level was becoming routine. The majority of organisations interviewed had 
a Data Protection Working Party or Steering Group comprised of the DPO and 
Departmental DPRs to monitor compliance. In the words of a DPO at a 
metropolitan council, compliance included "identifying staff training needs, 
drafting policies and allocating responsibilities for audits". In this respect, 
compliance was being ensured in the majority of the organisations participating in 
the case studies. 
7.7 Conclusions 
The complexities of the issues surrounding the DPA 1998, and its wide 
application to almost all information processed by public authorities, ensures that 
compliance is not going to be an easy task. Nevertheless, when measured against 
the criteria outlined in this Chapter, some organisations, were close to achieving 
full compliance. The key to observance lay in a full-scale review of organisational 
records management practices. In order for such a review to be successful, the 
nominated individual responsible for data protection - the DPO - required the full 
support of the organisation's executive. Status and influence were crucial to the 
task of implementing the change to data handling practices, essential to ensure full 
compliance. In the health authority, and the small district councils, this had not 
been forthcoming. Thus, in spite of the best intentions of the DPOs in those 
organisations, progress was slow. Moreover, the DPO needed to be situated in 
'Corporate Services' or the equivalent. Although a DPO did argue convincingly 
for a position in Finance department, data protection needed to be a central post 
with access to the executive and the key policy-makers in the organisation. 
- 
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Moreover, the nature of the post was changing. In many organisations, it was 
becoming more a general records management post of the type recommended in 
the Performance and Innovation Unit's Privacy and data-sharing report published 
in April 2002: 
'Public service bodies should consider [ ... ] the appointment of a board level 
Chief Knowledge Officer as a means to ensure integration of information 
issues into decision-making processes. 36 
This role combines a range of functions including: data protection and freedom of 
information; electronic records and document management; and ICT systems and 
services. It has the advantage of lending a more integrated approach to 
information management, with data protection and freedom of information 
concerns being incorporated 'into mainstream decision-making processes' such as 
business design 37 . Although not a suitable model for all the organisations studied 
in this Chapter, there were signs that this approach is developing in the county 
council and police authority in particular. 
A crucial part of the role of the DPO was to train staff and promote awareness of 
the Act. It was disappointing to note that a minority of interviewees did not 
perceive their role as raising awareness of individual rights outside of their 
organisation. This attitude appeared at odds with the professed public service 
ethos of their organisations. Moreover, it appeared myopic, as it denied 
authorities through the processing of SARs, the most practical test of how their 
systems complied with the Act. Staff training, however, was well planned and 
documented. At a basic level, all but one of the case study organisations had 
delivered presentations concerning the DPA 1998. Most used the intranet as a 
tool for providing further information on the Act, and saw the need for data 
protection training to form part of the induction - although, in practice, many 
organisations failed to train new starters in data protection. This situation needed 
to be addressed. Additionally, training needed to be more targeted to the 
requirements of the individual employees. In a large metropolitan council, the 
data protection training requirements of a caterer differed greatly from those of an 
IT analyst. 
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The procedures in place for handling SARs - perhaps the greatest test of data 
protection compliance - were impressive. Clearly, the majority of DPOs had 
researched the issue thoroughly, and most had published policies and model forms 
for handling data subject requests for personal data. However, the small number 
of corporate - as opposed to departmental requests - received by organisations, 
was surprising. The low volume perhaps indicated a lack of awareness among 
data subjects of their rights -a factor that case study organisations, as well as the 
OIC, could contribute to improving. Finally, only a few case study organisations 
had introduced centralised documenting procedures. This is recommended by the 
author for all organisations, and has the following advantages: 
It will test the workability of SAR procedures ensuring deadlines are 
met and the data subject receives a professional service; 
It will enable the DPO to demonstrate compliance with any internal 
performance indicators; 
It will provide evidence of action on part of the organisation, should 
any SARs result in litigation. 
Finally, written policies and procedures were in place in most case study 
organisations. In order to satisfy any potential audit by the OIC, the author 
believes it is advisable that organisations; have both: 
1. A short statement of intention to comply with the DPA 1998. 
This would emphasise the organisation's intention to ensure the rights of all data 
subjects for which it had responsibility were observed and made explicit. It would 
state the allocation of responsibilities for ensuring data protection compliance and 
conclude with contact details of the organisational DPO. The full statement need 
not exceed one side of A4. The statement frequently made the following 
assurances: 
That there is a nominated person with specific responsibility for data 
protection; 
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That contact details are provided so data subjects can make enquiries 
about handling personal data; 
(iii) That opinions are carefully and professionally expressed; 
(iv) [If relevant] That the organisation reserves the right to charge for 
access to personal data; 
(v) That data sharing with external agencies will be the subject of a written 
agreement setting out the powers that permit the exercise, together with 
its scope and controls; 
(vi) That all those processing personal data on behalf of the organisation 
will be trained to do so; 
(vii) That the management of personal data is regularly audited. 
The above list is not exhaustive. However, it has been drawn from the policy 
statements of various case study organisations interviewed, representing a solid 
outline of what should be included in a basic policy document. The majority of 
organisations had published such documents, which tended to be revised annually. 
Such reviews highlighted incidents and complaints in relation to data protection, 
identifying any issues that arose and needed to be fed back into the policy. 
2. Detailedprocedures on how to achieve data protection compliance. 
The procedures can take various forms. Some organisations had a single, bound 
Handbook or Code of practice. These were aimed at all employees in the 
Organisation, and could be supplemented by more detailed guidance for managers 
and practitioners in certain departments. Other had separate Codes ofpractice or 
Supplementary guidance, taking the form of specialist papers published where 
specific issues required additional guidance. These were intended for IT 
practitioners and management, with a generic introduction to the DPA 1998 - 
perhaps in booklet form - for the remainder of employees. 
The experience of the five West Midlands metropolitan councils in drafting and 
implementing their Data Protection Code of Practice prove that good practice 
procedures can be shared across similar organisations. It was significant that 
DPOS in other authorities outside of the region had referred to members of the 
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West Midlands group for data protection policy advice. This author recommends 
that networking is further encouraged across all local authorities, and in other 
sectors such as higher education - where two universities had produced 
remarkably similar Data Protection Handbooks - health, and the police. 
Generally, policy-making involving data protection had taken two approaches: 
(i) Data protection-centric 
In the majority of case study organisations, policy had - first and foremost - been 
orientated around data protection. Specific policies had been drafted with data 
protection at their heart. These policies only applied to information covered by 
the DPA 1998 and relevant legislation that impacts upon it. Data protection was 
being built into departmental strategies, but this was often by insertion of a 
specific clause, rather than full integration from the outset. 
(H) Integrated information strategy 
This had been the general approach of a minority of case study organisations, for 
example a county council and the police authority. In both organisations, data 
protection was given considerable importance. However, from the outset, it was 
viewed as just one pillar of a more general information strategy. In the county 
council, data protection formed part of the Information security policy, with data 
protection concerns permeating all considerations in this policy, including 
, Physical and environmental security' and 'Access control'. In the police 
authority, this was reflected by the DPO's code of practice approach, tailoring 
codes that included data protection around the needs of the various police force 
systems. 
A few case study organisations fell halfivay between the two approaches. The 
recommendations in Chapter 8 outline how data protection policy can be 
developed in public organisations, building on the findings of this thesis. For 
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successful compliance, data protection considerations must become part of 
standard procedure, built-in to organisational strategies in the same way financial, 
environmental and personnel considerations have been. If this is achieved, then 
data protection should not be an issue that requires continual promotion and high 
profile. 
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8. Conclusions and recommendations 
This final Chapter will consider the original aim of this thesis. By testing the 
hypotheses and objectives set out in Chapter 1, this Chapter will evaluate the 
extent to which the aim has been achieved - and indicate where further research 
can be conducted. Firstly, an outline of the thesis is provided. Following this, 
hypotheses I and 2 are considered, with an assessment being made of the extent to 
which the objectives of each have been fulfilled. Additionally, findings from both 
desk research and fieldwork are considered. Finally, recommendations are made: 
firstly, to stakeholders concerning the further policy development; and secondly, 
for further academic research. 
8.1 Outline of thesis: aim and hypotheses 
The overall aim of this thesis was: 
To investigate and analyse the extent to which public organisations 
have achieved compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
1998. 
In order to achieve this aim, two hypotheses were tested. The primary hypothesis, 
directly addressing the aim, stated: 
1. At an organisational level, the DPA 1998 represents a positive 
measure for ensuring compliance and good practice. 
The secondary, broader, hypothesis set the DPA 1998 in context with previous 
UK data protection legislation, and similar legislation abroad. Additionally, it 
sought to understand the regulatory framework, and the extent to which it enabled 
compliance with the DPA 1998. It stated: 
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2. The DPA 1998 has built on previous legislation in the UK, and 
abroad, in order to strengthen the individual right to 
informational privacy. Within the UK, a regulatory framework 
has been established, enabling this right to be exercised effectively. 
Finally, a subsidiary hypothesis sought to critically compare provisions of the 
DPA 1998 and other key UK legislation, drawing out any ambiguities and 
potential for confusion. 
The DPA 1998 works effectively with other legislation impacting 
on data protection. Overlap is minimal and meaning is clear. 
This subsidiary hypothesis acknowledged the evolving legislative environment, 
which in the space of eighteen months witnessed the coming into effect of 
significant legislation including: Human Rights Act (HRA) -1998; Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
2000; and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001. 
The hypotheses were tested using a rigorous methodology based on triangulation 
of research. Lines of enquiry opened up through desk research were backed up by 
fieldwork. The desk research - supported by expert interviews - afforded a wide 
appreciation of the key data protection issues facing organisations. A 
questionnaire survey provided a gateway for the case studies - permitting an 
insight into the data protection issues facing organisations, on a daily basis. The 
case studies expanded the survey's findings, focusing on the detailed policy- 
making processes affecting the protection of personal data. In short, the 
methodology established an evaluative framework - assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of internal data protection policies in order to assist public 
organisations; in their policy-making and legislative compliance. 
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8.2 Hypothesis 1: compliance and aood practice 
At an organisational level, the DPA 1998 represents a positive 
measure for ensuring compliance and good data handling practice. 
This hypothesis was addressed completely. It can be stated with certainty that the 
DPA 1998 was perceived as - and in practice represented -a positive measure for 
compliance and good data handling practice. The effect of FOIA 2000 in 
particular, due to be enacted in 2005, was seen as a boon to the DPA 1998. 
Furthermore, the objectives, setting out how each Hypothesis was to be 
investigated, were fulfilled. 
A nalvsis of obiectives 
The questionnaire survey polled attitudes of practitioners concerning the 
workability of the DPA 1998. Most respondents (75,70.1%) strongly agreed or 
agreed that the DPA 1998 is a positive measure for ensuring compliance and good 
practice. Only 14 respondents (13.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this 
viewpoint. 
The case study interviews, with Data Protection Officers (DPOs) from 18 
organisations, helped identify the processes in working towards compliance with 
the DPA 1998. Whilst no organisation claimed to be fully compliant, the vast 
majority had made major changes to organisational practices in response to the 
enactment of the Act. Key modifications included: the increased status of the 
DPO; development of detailed training plans aimed at staff throughout the 
organisation; implementation of procedures for the enactment of subject access 
requests - and the publicising of that right; and the drafting of data protection 
policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance throughout the 
organisation. The changes were considered in detail in Chapter 7. Fundamentally, 
it can be stated that Hypothesis I has been proved to be correct. 
Recommendations for further best practice - over and above those initiated by 
most case study organisations - have been given in section 9.4 of this Chapter. In 
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November 2002, they were presented at the conference of the National 
Association of Data Protection Officers in Warwick, in order to gain practitioner 
feedback. The feedback has been taken seriously by this author, and incorporated 
into Chapters 8 and 9 of this ihesis. 
8.3 Hvpothesis 2: privaev and the interface with other kev lemislation 
The DPA 1998 has built on previous legislation in the UK, and 
abroad, in order to strengthen the individual right to 
informational privacy. Within the UK, a regulatory framework 
has been established, enabling this right to be exercised effectively. 
The DPA 1998 works effectively with other legislation 
impacting on data protection. Overlap is minimal and meaning 
is clear. 
The secondary hypotheses considered the context to - and the scope of - the DPA 
1998. Additional consideration was given to the role of the OIC, especially in 
promoting codes of practice, and to practitioner views on compliance advice 
received from the supervisory authority. These hypotheses were more wide- 
ranging and, consequently, more difficult to quantify. The objectives, largely 
addressed through desk research and expert interviews, were thus not entirely 
fulfilled. 
A nalLysis of obiectives 
Firstly, Chapter 4 set the DPA 1998 in context with previous data protection in the 
UK and abroad. In its 30 year history, data protection law had clearly evolved: 
from the early national laws in Sweden and Germany reacting largely to domestic 
concerns about the role of government computers; to international instruments 
such as the EU Data Protection Directive. The latter specifically mentioned the 
individual right to privacy, and the need to ensure the free transfer of personal data 
between EU member states to facilitate the Single Market. In comparison to 
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national data protection laws within the EU and further afield, the UK DPA 1998 
was demonstrated to be pragmatic and flexible. It shunned its human rights 
origins by not referring to 'privacy' at all. Instead, the complex text set out eight 
'principles' that data controllers should follow in order to achieve compliance. A 
number of practitioners complained that the lack of explicit guidance made the 
text of the Act "woolly". This increased the pressure on the supervisory authority, 
the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC), to develop clear guidance. 
Additionally, the OIC was granted powers in the new Act to develop codes of 
practice in order to develop best practice in specific fields. 
Secondly, desk research established that academic studies in the field of data 
protection, commencing in the US in the mid-1960's, had been many and varied. 
Much research, such as Bennett and Grant (1999), emphasised the significance of 
explicit policy choice, with organisations needing to build data protection 
principles into their practices. However, none had considered in detail the 
implications of the 1998 Act for public organisations in the UK. Clearly, there 
was a need for such a study, given the large shadow the DPA 1998 cast over all 
forms of data processing - computerised and manual. Rule's Private Lives and 
Public Surveillance (1973)1 represented a earlier generation's detailed research 
into the field, with case studies including three large UK public institutions: the 
Driver Licencing system; the Criminal Record system; and National Insurance. 
The methodology of this PhD thesis owed a little to Rule's approach, which this 
project sought to develop at a micro-level. 
Thirdly, in an attempt to quantify Hypothesis 2, the main provisions of the DPA 
1998 impacting on individual privacy were'considered in Chapter 4 (section 
4.6.2). They included: extension of the scope of the Act to include manual 
processing; the creation of a new category of sensitive personal data; the 
prohibiting of the transfer of personal data outside the European Economic Area2 
(EEA) unless certain conditions were satisfied; and the creation of significantly 
more and stronger individual rights. It is the final provision that has the most 
direct effect on the privacy of individuals. Such rights included not only rights of 
access to personal data, but also the right to stop such data being processed for 
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direct marketing, or that would cause damage or distress to the data subject or a 
third party. 
The role of the supervisory authority in promoting compliance was given 
consideration throughout the thesis. Desk research outlined the general regulatory 
framework, the codes of practice, and documents giving opinion for and against 
the instruments. The expert interviews included a visit to the OIC in Wilinslow, 
in addition to gaining views of others in the field. Finally, questionnaires and case 
studies elicited comments from practitioners. Naturally, views on the 
performance of the OIC varied enormously - with business being against any 
interference in their working practices, trade union representatives in favour of the 
principles behind the Employment Practices Data Protection Code, and 
practitioners tending to turn to their peers when addressing compliance issues, 
often finding the OIC's advice slow and contradictory. A number of factors 
accounting for the views of the practitioners were cited, including the high staff 
turnover at the OIC, and the excellent levels of cooperation between peer groups - 
particularly local authority forums such as NADPO and SOCITM. 
The final objective in investigating Hypothesis 2 involved critically comparing the 
provisions of the DPA 1998 and other key legislation already mentioned in this 
Chapter. Fulfilling this objective proved particularly difficult, given the scope and 
some of the unknown challenges presented by some of the legislation involved. 
Certainly, the objective presented manifold options for further detailed research. 
In summary, considerable legal changes have occurred, nationally and 
internationally, since the enactment of the DPA 1998. In the UK, the HRA 1998 
has resulted in the creation of a common law of privacy for the first time. 
However, the scope and impact of this statute will take years to assess, as the 
HRA 1998 has to infiltrate UK case law through the courts. More pertinent to 
organisations' actual handling of personal and official data are the provisions of 
FOIA 2000, with its creation of a general right of access to information held by 
public authorities. At interview, many public authorities were in the process of 
drafting publication schemes, auditing records and preparing job descriptions for 
new personnel. The effect of this legislation, due into force in January 2005, will 
be considerable. Interviewees in case study organisations were fully aware of the 
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records management significance of such legislation, working as it does in tandem 
with the DPA 1998. 
The impact of other key legislation - such as RIPA 2000 and ATCSA 2001 - on 
data protection in public organisations was particularly difficult to assess. A 
satisfactory conclusion has not been reached. RIPA 2000 - aimed at protecting 
the confidentiality of communications made over a public telecommunications 
network - created some confusion among employers as to which information 
organisations could intercept for evidential purposes. The government sought to 
clarify this issue through the Lawful Business Practice Regulations. However, the 
OIC's release of its Draft code ofpractice on employerlemployee relationships in 
the same month as the government's Regulations created confusion about exactly 
how far employers could go in acquiring employee personal data through 
monitoring and interception. More than two years later, with the repeated delay of 
the release of Part 3 of the finalised Employment Practices Data Protection Code: 
monitoring and surveillance, this issue has yet to resolved. When conducting case 
study interviews (February-May 2002), it was discovered that - for this reason - 
half the organisations visited had not finalised policies concerning monitoring of 
employee email and internet usage. Finally, the events of 110, September 2001 
compelled many western governments to pass anti-terrorism measures. Of 
particular relevance to this thesis was Part II of the ATCSA 2001, relating to the 
retention of communications data. Although this is mainly of interest to 
communications providers such as ISPs, the OIC expressed concern about the 
basis on which law enforcement bodies could have access to such 
communications, and the delays in drafting a voluntary code under which such 
data could be accessed. At the time of writing, the code had yet to be finalised. 
in conclusion, to answer the main statement of Hypothesis 2, the DPA 1998 has 
strengthened the individual right to privacy. This was clear from consulting the 
text of the legislation - with its increased scope to cover manual records, its 
creation of sensitive personal data that was afforded greater protection, and in its 
extended individual rights. Moreover, the role of the supervisory authority has 
been strengthened - with the OIC able to establish codes of practice and 
overseeing compliance with the incoming FOIA 2000. The HRA 1998 potentially 
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strengthens these provisions by enabling courts and tribunals to assess the privacy 
considerations on a case by case basis, thereby acknowledging the DPA 1998s 
links to the European Convention of Human Rights, via the EU Data Protection 
Directive. FOIA 2000 certainly bore out the second statement of this Hypothesis, 
and has been drafted to 'work effectively' with DPA 1998. In fact, when it comes 
into force, FOIA 2000 will amend and increase the scope of the Act - allowing 
data subject access to manually processed data that is 'unstructured'. However, it 
is clear from desk research - supported by expert and practitioner interviews - that 
RIPA 2000 and ATCSA 2001 do not 'work effectively' with the DPA 1998, and 
appear to some extent, to undermine the legislation3. Indeed, the provisions of 
RIPA 2000 and ATCSA 2001 have contributed to a confused regulatory 
environment that does little to strength the right to privacy. 
Suggestions for further academic research addressing the issues raised by 
Hypothesis 2 have been outlined in the final section of this Chapter. 
8.4 Recommendations 
This thesis has achieved its aim in investigating and analysing the extent to which 
public organisations achieved compliance with the DPA 1998. Recommendations 
are now outlined for stakeholders - experts and practitioners - and for further 
academic research, where safe conclusions have not been reached. The 
recommendations below build on the findings from the various Chapters of this 
thesis. Where necessary, they are cross-referenced (quoting the relevant page 
numbers) for further clarity. 
8.4.1 Stakeholders 
The first two recommendations are aimed at government and the regulatory 
authority respectively. The remainder are pitched at the DPOs interviewed at case 
study level. The intention is to build on the findings of the interviews outlined in 
Chapter 7, and provide hard and fast guidelines of where data protection can 
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develop. Most of the points below were acknowledged by practitioners 
themselves as areas requiring further development. In the general course of 
research the author identified the remainder, with reference being made to the 
views of the OIC, lawyers, and professional bodies as to what facilitates adequate 
data protection compliance. Consequently, it is believed that the 
recommendations for the case study organisations are realistic in terms of 
financial and human resources involved in their implementation. 
(i) The text ofthe DPA 1998 to be made more explicit 
This was a clear problem, identified by most interviewees - at expert and case 
study level. Undoubtedly, the format of DPA 1998 leaves a lot to be desired. On 
a personal level, research for this thesis would have been more problematic 
without reference to various newsletters and the JISCmail discussion group to 
shed light on many topical data protection issues and aid in the interpretation of 
the case law. It appears strange that the UK DPA 1998 should be so "appallingly 
drafted" - in the words of one expert interviewee - given that the Directive it 
enacts is a relatively straightforward and readable piece of legislation. Reference 
to other contemporary national data protection laws - such as those of Sweden4 
and Canada5 - demonstrate that concise, clearly drafted statutes in this field are 
possible. The Data Protection Directive is currently being reviewed by the 
European Commission, and the UK government has recommended changes to the 
text of the Ace. 
(i i) Greater education concerning the DPA 1998 
This recommendation is aimed at the UK's supervisory body, the OIC. Whilst the 
burden of their work was appreciated, it was widely believed at interview level 
that more could be done to promote the Act - in particular, data subject access 
rights. Additionally, the presentation of their material was criticised - especially 
with respect to Draft Code of Practice: The use of personal data in 
employerlemployee relationships, and the confused design of the OIC website. 
Suggestions for further development include: 
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A better-designed and regularly updated website, outlining the latest 
publications and activities of the OIC. This concern was outlined in response 
to the questionnaire survey (Chapter 6, section 6.2.1, pp. 272-3); 
Greater consultation on codes of practice from the outset: the CB1 in particular 
complained about not being involved in the production of the Draft Code of 
Practice: The use ofpersonal data in employerlemployee relationships. This 
point was made forcibly by a CBI speaker at a conference on data protection in 
the employment contexe; 
Greater availability and faster response times of OIC Compliance Officers to 
reduce delays of up to three months experienced when replying to questions 
from DPOs. It is appreciated that this recommendation has some resource 
implications. Complaints about the speed, quality and consistency of advice 
received from the OIC were made during the questionnaire survey (Chapter 6, 
section 6.2.1, pp. 272-3), and case study interviews (for example, Chapter 7, 
section 7.6.1, pp. 3 17-8); 
Facilitating greater cooperation between public bodies from different sectors 
(whilst networking among local authorities was excellent, it was singularly 
lacking among health trusts and between police authorities). The issue of 
networking, and the role the OIC could play in this, was raised by interviewees 
in Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.1, pp. 319-321). 
With the exception of the issue relating to Compliance Officers, the above 
recommendations do not pose any great strain on resources, instead involving 
changes in procedures. Moreover, successful implementation of the above would 
ensure that DPOs used the OIC more often than perhaps they did at the time of 
interview, thus enhancing the OIC's status and influence. 
In order to achieve compliance, organisations need tofirstlyfollow certain 
basic steps. 
The steps outlined below represent the conclusions to Chapter 7, following 
interviews with DPOs. Additionally, they build on the compliance criteria 
established in Chapter 7 (section 7.1.2, pp. 287-90). The list is not exhaustive, nor 
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will following it guarantee absolute data protection compliance. However, they 
represent the first moves towards achieving that goal. 
Appoint a nominated individual responsible for data protection of sufficient 
status and influence to fully review organisational records management 
practices. 
Most organisations had a nominated individual, although the status accorded to 
the post was sometimes low (section 7.2, pp. 291,297-8). Admittedly, a fresh 
appointment would cost additional money, but with the sensitive nature of the 
records involved and the increased profile that FOIA 2000 gave to records 
management generally, organisations were beginning to realise that they could 
not afford to under-fund this area. To quote a DPO in a district council: "You 
would not want to be the subject of case law". 
Promote awareness of the DPA 1998 among data subjects who regularly 
contact the organisation, for example, local authority council tax payers, 
university students, and National Health Service (NHS) patients. 
This need not be expensive or time-consuming - it could involve just placing 
leaflets in public offices. However, the posting of a Fair Processing Code 
(modelled on the OIC's legal advice 8) on the corporate internet site would 
highlight how the organisation should obtain information from the data 
subject, how it will be used and the rights of the data subject to access, correct 
and delete their personal data. This would help develop trust between case 
study organisations and the population they serve. This point is made in 
Chapter 7 (section 7.3, pp. 299-300). 
Devise a structured training programme tailored to the needs of particular 
staff. 
Data protection training needs to be embedded into the organisational structure 
from the bottom up. Additionally, it should 'relevant to each group' - the 
requirements of someone working in a local authority Social Services 
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department differ from a colleague based in Housing. Training strategy has to 
take account of this. Finally, data protection training needs to become part of 
the induction process - ensuring that new starters are confident of the issues 
surrounding the handling of personal data from their first day of employment. 
A comprehensive strategy should be devised by the practitioner, and approved 
at board level. There may be some initial expense involved in drafting the 
programme and in terms of staff time, but savings would be made through 
better records management and compliance with the DPA 1998, reducing the 
likelihood of legal action. Examples of training strategies include the targeted 
training employed by the metropolitan authority outlined in section 7.4.2, pp. 
304-5. 
- Devise procedures goveming the handling ofsubject access requests (SARs). 
Such procedures need to be carefully documented, enabling organisations to 
monitor the progress of SARs - ensuring deadlines are met and that the data 
subject receives a professional service (refer to section 7.7, p. 336). Further, 
the new procedures will enable the postholder to demonstrate compliance with 
internal performance indicators, and provide evidence of action on part of the 
organisation should any SARs result in litigation. This recommendation is 
merely procedural, and should not significantly add to costs. 
Formulate a written data protection policy, stating intention to comply, and 
detailed procedures, outlining how data protection compliance is to be 
achieved. 
These documents would enable procedures to be implemented uniformly 
throughout the organisation, in addition to providing evidence of compliance 
in the event of any audit or legal dispute. Well-drafted policies would provide 
a roadmap for achieving data protection compliance, being flexible enough to 
incorporate changes in legislation and guidance from government and the 
supervisory authority respectively. Ideally, data protection concerns should 
not be considered in isolation, but form part of general "information strategies" 
(Chapter 7, section 7.6.3, pp. 330-2). 
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- Regularly audit data protection compliance. 
Vital if organisations are going to test the effectiveness of their procedures. 
This can be achieved either internally or externally. Internal audits by the 
DPO are a good way of quickly checking that procedures are being adhered to 
- for example, that desks are cleared at night, passwords are not shared, and 
that lists of contact numbers are not left on general display. An external audit 
would be an objective measure of these procedures, gaining an additional 
perspective from the outside. An example would be the voluntary 'health 
check' by the District Auditor in which one county council participated 
(section 7.6.4, pp. 332-3). This was more structured, with each compliance 
criteria being given a score by the District Auditor, resulting in an overall 
percentage, which could be compared with other local authorities. This may 
be suited to the larger public authorities. Another external audit option would 
be to recruit a consultancy group to verify procedures, although this can be 
prohibitively expensive for many public organisations. 
Whatever methods are chosen, it is important that policies and procedures are 
evaluated on a regular basis. This would be at least once a year, and more 
frequently where there have been changes to official guidance (for example, 
monitoring of email and internet usage) or to the law (for example, concerning 
selling personal data on the electoral roll). 
Case study analysis demonstrated that most organisations at least some of the 
basic recommendations listed above. The areas where compliance was found to be 
most wanting - documentation of SARs and regularly auditing - could be 
implemented incurring little additional financial cost. SARs could be recorded 
using a straightforward database, whilst templates for auditing compliance 
internally could be acquired from peers, through forums such as the JISCmail data 
protection discussion list or from contacting professional organisations such as 
NADPO and SOCITM. 
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(Iv) Further recommended steps towards compliance. 
The recommendations below build on the basic steps outline in part (iii) above. 
They have been devised following the author's interviews with case study 
organisations and study of their procedures. 
- Creation of an integrated records management post, incorporating the 
additional workload generated by FOIA 2000. 
Based on recommendation 7 in the Privacy and data-sharing report (quoted in 
Chapter 7, section 7.1.2, pp. 287-8)9. This would be at senior management 
level, but - in addition to data protection - this role would comprise freedom of 
information and human rights. The postholder would therefore be responsible 
for handling all information, resulting in a more integrated information policy. 
The post needs to be central with access to the executive and the key policy- 
makers in the organisation. In the larger organisations interviewed - the police 
authority, health authority and some metropolitan councils - this new position 
should be supported by a board level Chief Knowledge Officer, lending the 
new postholder further authority. Whilst the establishment of the post would 
cost money, it should generate savings in greater efficiency with which records 
are managed throughout their life cycle. 
- Training the DPO in Information Systems Examination Board (ISEB) 
certificate. 
A basic and practical introduction to data protection. As an industry- 
recognised qualification, would enhance the DPO's status in their organisation. 
Approximately one third of the interviewees had trained, or were in the process 
of training, for the certificate (Chapter 7, section 7.2.1, pp. 293-4). However, 
the costs of upwards of L2 20010 involved in training with an accredited 
provider may put this out of reach of the smaller organisations interviewed. 
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- Developing policies concerning employee use ofemail and internet. 
With well-publicised cases of organisations being sued for damages or 
employees being dismissed, there is an essential need for clear policies in this 
field. This is something that organisations, can achieve at minimal expense 
through greater networking - finding policy that best suits their circumstances. 
- Improving information security: aim to be BS 7799 compliant. 
A requirement of the Seventh Data Protection Principle, BS 7799 is a 
comprehensive standard that could be used as the basis for data protection 
policy development. The aim is to be complaint with BS 7799, rather than 
invest in the actual certificate which one metropolitan authority DPO 
complained was "very expensive! "" 
- Greater nenvorking among organisations. 
Where good practice exists, it should be shared among similar organisations. 
Evidence suggested this was occurring between many of the local authorities 
interviewed (Chapter 7, section 7.6.1, pp. 319-320). However, there was little 
indication of health authorities sharing practices, accounting for the feelings of 
isolation experienced by the DPO interviewed. Such networking needs to be 
encouraged by all professional bodies, whether or not they specialise in data 
protection. The work of JISC for higher and fin-ther education, SOCITM for 
ICT, and Association of Chief Police Officers all demonstrate that this can 
happen. The benefits for organisations include: reduction of costs in terms of 
finance and time, especially in terms of policy-making; exchange of ideas and 
pooling of resources (for example, establishing which training methods were 
the most beneficial); and promotion of a sense of community among 
practitioners, reducing feelings of isolation. The experience of the West 
Midlands local authorities testifies to the success of such networking. 
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The stakeholder recommendations listed in this subsection demonstrate how 
organisations, can take data protection forward. They are of relevance to all 
organisations, interviewed, although the size and nature of each body must be taken 
into account when following the above advice. However, the author believes that 
consultation with the case study organisations added value to the 
recommendations outlined in this thesis, lending them a de facto practitioner 
approval 12 . Adherence to the above recommendations should ensure that 
stakeholders are well equipped to achieve compliance with the DPA 1998. 
8.4.2 Further research 
Data protection is a broad field, opening up many opportunities for further 
research. The full extent of the research possibilities became apparent when 
testing Hypothesis 2. The following comprise a few suggestions: 
(i) Data protection in the EU and the US. ý a comparison 
Two different regimes: historically, legally and culturally. Chapter 4 (section 
4.7.1, pp. 152-7) demonstrated the different, self-regulatory, approach taken by the 
US. Research can involve case studies of organisations on both sides of the 
Atlantic - comparing data handling techniques, and data subject rights, between 
the regulatory EU and the self-regulatory US. The impact of the 'Safe Harbor' 
principles on the practices of US companies can be investigated, assessing whether 
the commitment of US organisations to the agreement had improved since the 
, nixed findings of the European Commission working paper of 2002 13 . 
(ij) Data protection and the HRA 1998 
Although the Data Protection Directive refers to the European Convention on 
14uman Rights, from which the HRA 1998 derived, the link between data 
protection and human rights remains under-explored. One of the reasons for this, 
is that the amount of relevant case law at the moment is too small to make a 
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meaningful assessment (Chapter 5, section 5.6, p. 224). However as court cases 
accumulate over the coming years, such a study could demonstrate why data 
protection, as opposed to other forms of privacy 14 , is a human right. Case studies 
may involve individuals or organisations that have been significantly affected by 
such human rights and data protection case law. 
(Iii) Data protection andfreedom ofinformation in public organisations 
FOIA 2000 was identified by many experts (Chapter 6, section 6.1.8, p. 258) and 
practitioners (Chapter 7, section 7.2, pp. 291-2) as the most important future issue 
regarding their work. Certainly, FOIA 2000 will have a significant impact on the 
handling of public records when it enters into force in January 2005. This would 
make a fascinating PhD project, developing the findings of this thesis by studying 
the interface between the two Acts in similar organisations. Particular attention 
could be drawn to changes in job descriptions of practitioners, development of 
publication schemes, staff training, policy development and so on. The categories 
for data protection compliance outlined in Chapter 7 (section 7.1.2, pp. 287-90) 
could make a useful starting point. 
(jV) Data protection and e-government 
1-low does data protection affect the government's e-government agenda? In April 
2002, the Performance and Innovation Unit published the significant report 
privacy and data-sharing15 concerning data protection and the efficient delivery of 
public services. Are the two concerns compatible? The interview with the Office 
of the e-Envoy in Chapter 6 (section 6.1.4, pp. 249-50) highlighted the tension 
between the government's obligations under the DPA 1998 and HRA 1998, and 
their drive to coordinate and integrate public services. Interviews with public 
authorities in Chapter 7 (section 7.2) developed this issue, with many interviewees 
being assessed on their e-government targets rather than actual data protection 
compliance. This is an issue of considerable public policy interest, with the 
government drafting a 'Public Services Trust Charter' in order to allay public 
concern about their handling of personal data. Case studies may include the 
office of the e-Envoy, charged with delivering the government's e-agenda until 
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2005, and public organisations from different sectors, as they attempt to deliver 
more services electronically. 
(V) Data protection and the private sector 
Assess the challenges the DPA 1998 presents to the commercial world. Due to the 
necessary need to set limits, private sector concerns were omitted from the remit 
of this thesis. However, a study of data protection compliance in this field would 
be useful, particularly as an increasing amount of individual data is transferred 
globally between multi-national companies. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
assess how the DPA 1998 is perceived by those working in such organisations. 
"Ist the Act's provisions concerning security of information - in particular 
principle 7- may be welcomed by business as enhancing client trust, improved 
individual rights to access, correction, deletion and compensation for damage 
and/or distress could be perceived as increasing costs, and impacting on often tight 
profit margins. Case studies involving various sectors (for example, retail, 
financial services, direct marketing) could assess whether the DPA 1998 is viewed 
as a measure improving good practice or as an additional burden on business. 
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A telephone conversation with BSI Management Systems revealed that application for the 
standard would cost L512 and an on-site assessment would cost L780 per day. The period of 
assessment would vary depending on the size of the organisation. For further details of the 
processes involved in registration, refer URL: hqp: I/emea. bsi- 
jzlobal. comlin format ionSccurijy/l SM Srega istrat ionIBSI RoutetoReg. xalter [Accessed 23/05/03]. 
12 The recommendations were presented by the author to NADPO members at their annual 
conference in November 2002. Refer 
Warren. A. Data protection in public organisations. NADPO annual conference, 
University of Warwick, 18-19 November 2002. 
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Refer. Privacy Intcmational and EPIC. Privacy and Human Rights 2002,2002. URL: 
hlM: //%ývN, v-privacy. orgýpi,! surveylphr2002I [Accessed 16/01/03]. 
1-5 Perfonnance and Innovation Unit. Privacy and data-sharing, reE 9. 
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Appendix A 
Interview: Sir Norman Lindop -6 September 2001 
I 
Interview: Sir Norman Lindop -6 September 2001 
Appropriately, the first expert interview was with Sir Norman Lindop, chairman of 
the Data Protection Committee, whose report in 1978 commenced serious moves 
in the UK towards legislating for data protection. The interview thus provided a 
fascinating insight into the history behind the current UK data protection regime. 
The Lindop Report, as discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.3), was a 
comprehensive study into the practices of organisations in both the public and 
private sectors when using personal data. Lindop, was approached to chair the 
Committee in June 1976, whilst director of Hatfield Polytechnic, following the 
sudden death of the original candidate, Sir Kenneth Younger. After receiving the 
request "out of the blue" from the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, Lindop 
acquired copies of the Younger Report' and the 1975 White Paper Computers and 
Privacyý from the Polytechnic library, and took them home to read over the 
weekend. On the Monday, he rang the Home Secretary's office, saying: I don't 
know anything about this". To which, Lindop, related, the reply was: 
.... That's neither a disqualification, nor a reason for not doing it, "' and 
basically, get on with itlII 
At interview, Lindop stated he was unsure why he was approached in the first 
place, although he commented: "the fact that Hatfield was very prominent in 
computer education at that time may have had something to do with W'. 
The Committee of twelve comprised six specialists in areas relevant to privacy and 
information technology, and six so-called "lay people", including the chairman 
himself. This arrangement was deemed by the intervicwce to have been 
successful. The two key experts on the Committee were Paul Sicghart and Charles 
Read - both now deceased. The former was a barrister, a human rights advocate, 
and had been involved in bringing together the members of tile Committee other 
than the chairman. A hugely talented individual, Sicghart had "somehow got tile 
ear of Roy Jenkins", and had been employed by the Home Officc to %%Titc the 
White Paper Computers and Privacy -a "very good starting documcnf' for the 
11 
Committee. Read, director of the Inter-Bank Research Organisation, was "first 
rate" and "an excellent Committee man". 
The Committee was established to formulate principles on which future data 
protection legislation should be based. Following on from the work of the 
Younger Committee on Privacy, the Data Protection Committee was "welcomed 
by a large number of people". Initially, Lindop had hoped that the Committee's 
work would take a year, but it took twice that period: 
"That was partly because the gathering of infonnation took longer than we 
expected. We also had to do one or two investigations on the spot. " 
The latter included a trip to Sweden, a home of the first national data protection 
law; and attendance of a Council of Europe meeting in Vienna. The Swedish visit, 
conducted in December 1976, demonstrated to the Committee that "the data 
protection regime could work!. On a lighter note, Lindop observed that although 
the Stockholm health system had data subject access: 
11 ... the only thing people ever tried to change was their address! 
There was 
never any upset over the medical diagnosis or anything like that. " 
This impressed on the interviewee, as issues that appear to be matters of principle 
can turn out to be rather inconsequential. 
However, at the same time, the work of the Committee was "rcsistcd" in ccrtain 
quarters: 
"It was not resistance in the physical forni, or political sense, although I 
suppose it was political. It was more as to be cautious in what we 
recommended because of the implications. " 
Organisations that were more defensive included the secret service and the Policc. 
The former did not reply to the Committee's enquiries, whilst the police "canic 
and put up a witness who refused to answer any qucstionsl" As a rcsult, the 
III 
Committee had to rely on press revelations in The Times by investigative journal ist 
Stewart Tendler concerning the Police National Cornpute?. 
In a general discussion concerning data protection issues that had emerged since 
publication of the Lindop Report in 1978, the interviewee made two observations. 
Firstly, that the private sector - due to the growth of multi-national corporations - 
has emerged as a much greater threat than was anticipated during the mid-1970's. 
With hindsight, the interviewee believed the Committee were "naYve" about that: 
"We were very prc-occupicd with the threat which we saw being presented 
by government departments, and we didn't see the private sector as being a 
threat. " 
Secondly, the issue of who has 'control' over electronic information was raiscd. 
In this respect, Lindop admitted to feeling "a bit despondent", and had difficulty in 
perceiving how "any degree of data protection can be offered to anyone at this 
particular time": 
"It used to be technically feasible at least to say that you could destroy 
information if it was printable, but you can't control electronic information 
once you have released it. " 
This interview provided excellent context and insight to the issues explored in 
later expert interviews. The perspective of one of the key forces behind tile first 
UK Data Protection Act was particularly illuminating, enabling desk research to 
be triangulated with human observation. As stated in Chapter 2, the author 
attempted to acquire papers relating to the work of the Data Protection Committee 
for Loughborough University's Department of Information Science, only to be 
prevented by the law relating to disposal and preservation of public records (rcfcr 
to Home Office letter, Appendix B). 
IV 
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Appendix B 
Copy of Home Office letter dated 15 November 2001 
re Lindop papers 
vi 
Home Office 
Record Management Services 
Corporate Support Services Unit 
50 Queen Anne's Gate, London SWIH 9AT 
Switchboard 020 7273 4000 Fax 020 7273 3592 Direct Line 020 7273 2150 
E-mail Tim. Sargent@homeoffice. gsi. gov. uk www. homeoffice. gov. uk 
Mr Adam Warren Our Ref Your Ref 
Department of Infonnation Science Date 15 Noveinber 2001 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire 
LE11 3TU 
Dear Nir Warren 
HOME OFFICE COMMITTEE ON DATA PROTECTION 
Thank you for your letter of 27 October. 
The official records relating to die Home Office Committee on Data Protection are held 
at the Public Record Office in the Home Office class H0261. Some papers are open to 
public inspection but others remain close&for 30 years and therefore those from the final 
stages of die committee in 1978 are not due to be released until January 2009. 
1 have consulted the Public Record Office about your Department's intention to acquire 
Sir Norman Lindop's papers for the purposes of placing them in an open archivc which 
would be accessible to all students. We are advised that this would be unwise as it is not 
good practice to have duplicate sets of papers and the Public Record Office is the correct 
place of deposit for such records. If Sir Norman wishes to dispose of his papers, the best 
course of action would be to offer diem to the Home Office and we would ensure that 
any which were not already held at the Public Record Office were transferred for 
permanent preservation. 
Yours sincerely 
Tim Sargent 
Head of Record Management Services 
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Appendix C 
Pilot Questionnaire 
Privacy and human rights in the workplace 
Vill 
Privacy and Human Rights in the Workplace 
Respondent's identities will be kept confidential. The ID number at the top will be used onlY to 
tmck response rates. 
Please return your completed questionnaire by Friday 2 March 2001. 
A pre-paid envelope is enclosed. 
Data Protection 
Al. Does your organisation have a nominated member of staff with responsibility 
for data protection? 
Please tick (, /) Yes 
No 1: 1 
A2. What steps has your organisation taken to comply with the Data Protection Act 
1998? 
Please lick those that apply: 
- Internal audit 
- Staff training (in-house) 
- Staff training (external) 
- Policy on employee personal privacy 
- Policy on automated decision-making 
- Policy on subject access requests 
- Other, please specify 13 
--- .......... -- ------------- I 
---------------- -- -------------------- 
............... ..................... 
------------------ ----------- 
W) 
0 
El 
A3. What are the procedures for dealing with subject access requests? 
(These are requests made by users of your services for data concerning themselves. ) 
ix 
Privacy policies 
B1. Does your organisation's website require users to disclose 
personal data to you? 
Yno, proceed to section C. 
B2. Ifj-es, does your organisation's website, have a privacy 
statement? 
, Vno, proceed to section C 
If), es: 
Does that statement include: 
Right of access to personal data 
Right to have inaccurate data corrected or deleted 
Transfer of data to third (non-EU) countries 
OV) Opt-out from receiving marketing material 
D3. Is the privacy statement on the main page, or does 
the user have to hyperlink to it? 
Main page 
Hyperlink 
C. Monitorine of emplovees 
C1. Does your organisation have a formal policy concerning 
staff use of. - 
Email 
Intemet 
C2. Does your organisation monitor staff use of: 
(i) Email 
(ii) Intemet 
Ifno to both C2 (i) and (H), proceed to C5. 
Yes No 
El 
r-l 0 
o0 
o0 
00 
00 
0 
0 
Yes No 
V) 
o0 
00 
o0 
00 
x 
C3. How frequently does your organisation. monitor use of email and/or the 
Internet? V) V) 
Daily Less than El 
Weekly once/month 
Fortnightly Only when good 
Monthly reason to do so E3 
C4. Is Email/Internet use monitored automatically? 
Please lick V) Yes 
No 
0 
0 
, ý. ýrs,. please give details of software used: 
. ...... ------------------------------ ---------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- -- --------------- - 
I.. I ----- ------ ---- -------------------------- ---------- ---------------------------- 
C5. Has your organisation obtained the Data Protection 
Commissioner's Draft code ofpractice on the use of 
personal data in employerlemployee relationships? 
Yno, proceed to DI. 
Ifyes: 
(i) Was the scope of the Code clear? 
(ii) Are the standards clear? 
(iii) In your opinion, does it impose 
disproportionate burdens on your organisation? 
Ifyes to (iii), please give reasons: 
.......... I ...... --- ----------------------------------------- 
Yes No 
V) 
00 
o0 00 
0 0 
----------- ----------- - ----------- 
............ -I. - . -- ---------------- 
--------------------------------------- ---------------- 
------------- ------------------------------ ---------------------- 
D. Other legislation 
D1. Is your organisation aware of the Department of Trade 
and Industry's Lawful business practice regulations? 
Ifno, proceed directly to D2(1i). 
-------------- --- - 
Yes No 
V) V) 
1: 1 1: 1 
xi 
D2. Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements 
I indicates you strongly agree 3 indicates you neither agree nor disagree 
5 indicates strong disagreement 
Please circle most appropriate number. 
The Lmvful Business Practice Regulations complement the Draft code of 
practice on the use ofpersonal data in employerlemployee relationships 
Don't knowNo opinion 
1 0 
The Data Protection Act 1998 represents a positive measure for ensuring 
compliance and good practice. 
1 
Don't know/No opinion 
0 
The Human Rights Act 1998 will have a considerable impact on our 
organisation's handling of personal data. 
1 
Don't know/No opinion 
0 
(iv) The Human Rights Act will work effectively in tandem with the Data 
Protection Act 1998. Overlap is minimal and meaning is clear. 
Don't knowNo opinion 
1 5 0 
ID3. Any further comments: 
x1i 
Appendix D 
Full Questionnaire 
Privacy and human rights in the workplace 
xill 
Privacy and Human Rights in the Workplace 
Respondent's identities will be kept confidential. The ID number at the top will be used only to 
tmck response rates. 
Please return your completed questionnaire by Friday 12 October 2001. 
A pre-paid envelope is enclosed. 
Data Protection 
Does your organisation have a nominated member of staff with responsibility 
for data protection? Yes No 
Please lick (, /) ID M 
2 What steps has your organisation taken to comply with the Data Protection Act 
1998? 
Please tick those that apply., 
- Internal audit 
- Staff training (in-house) 
- Staff training (external) 
- Policy on employee personal privacy 
- Policy on automated decision-making 
- Policy on subject access requests 
- Other, please specify 0 
(I) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
------------------------------------------- ------------- ------------ 
---------------------- ---------- ---------------------- 
---------- I- ----------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------- 
Employee Records 
3 For what purposes is personal information collected from employees by your 
organisation? 
---- ------------------ 
---------- ---------------------------- 
-------------- 
----------- 
---------- 
--------------------- - --------------------- ---------- 
---------------------------- -------------- I- ----------------- ............. 
---------------------- I ------------------------------------------------------- 
4 Are staff informed of these purposes? 
Please tick (, 0 
Yes No 
0 r7l 
5 How is the accuracy of employees' personal data checked and maintained? 
6 For how long are the following employee re'cords kept: 
Application fonns 
References received -------------------------------------------- 
--------------------- -------------------------- Payroll and tax 
gickýes's -- ----------- * ----------------------------------------- 
. 1-1 -I................ -- ------- ------ - ------ Annual appraisal/assessment 
------------------------------------------- Accident/injury at work 
........ -. 1 --------------------------------------- ----------- Promotion, transfer, training and discipline 
----------------- I ------ --- ------------------- References given 
---------------------------------------------- Summary of record of service e. g. name, position held, 
dates of employment 
----------------- 
---------------- 
----------- 
-- -------------------- 
7 What are the subject access procedures for employees asking to view their 
records? Please append ifnecessary. 
------------- 1- -------------- - ---------------------- 
---------------- -------------------- - ----------- -, -------------- 
-. - ------------------------------------------ ---- ---------------- 
------------------- ----------- -- ---------- - ---------- -. - 
---------------------------------- ------------------- 
------- ----- 
xv 
8 What are the security procedures in place for safeguarding employee records? 
Please tick those that apply: 
- Adherence to security standards e. g. BS 7799 
- Access controls to employee records 
- Password controls to employee records 
- Disciplinary procedures for unauthorised access to 
employee records 
- Encryption of emails transferring employee data 
- Othcr, please specify 
El 
Employee Monitoring 
(l() 
0 
0 
Does your organisation have a formal policy concerning Yes No 
staff use of: 
(i) Email 
(ii) Intemet, 
10 Does your organisation monitor staff use of., 
(i) Email 
(ii) Intemet 
Ifno to both 9 and 10, please proceed to 13. 
(I) 
0 
0 
(I) 
0 
0 
00 
11 Ilow frequently does your organisation monitor use of email and/or the 
Internet? 
Daily 
Wcekly 
Fortnightly 
Monthly 
Lessthan 
once/month 
Only when good 
reason to do so 
xvi 
12 Is Email/Internet use monitored automatically? 
Please tick (, /) 
Legislation and official guidance 
13 Is your organisation aware of: 
- the Information Commissioner's Draft code of 
practice on the use ofpersonal data in employerl 
emplo)-ee relationships 
- the Department of Trade and Industry's Lawful 
business practice regulations 
- the Human Rights Act 1998 
Yes 
0 
No 
0 
Yes No 
V) V) 
0 r-l 
U0 
00 
14 Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements 
I indicates you strongly agree 3 indicates you neither agree nor disagree 
5 indicates strong disagreement 
Please circle most appropriate number. 
7he Lmtful Business Practice Regulations represent a positive measure for ensuring 
compliance and good practice. 
Don't knowNo opinion 
1 0 
The Data Protection Act 1998 represents a positive measure for ensuring compliance 
and good practice. 
Don't know/No opinion 
1 
(Continued overleaj) 
0 
xvil 
(iii) Ile Human Rights Act 1998 will have a considerable impact on our organisation's 
handling of personal data. 
Don't knowNo, opinion 
1 0 
(iv) Official guidance concerning the Data Protection Act 1998 has been clear and practical. 
Don't knowNo opinion 
1 0 
(v) Official guidance concerning the Human Rights Act 1998 has been clear and practical. 
Don't know/No opinion 
1 
15 Any further comments: 
El 
It is intended that follow-up interviews will be conducted with some organisations later 
in the year. If interested, please supply contact details in the box below: 
----------------------- ---------------------- -- 
Ilank- you for your time. 
You cooperation in this study is appreciated. 
